JUDGMENT Mr. Hemant Gupta, J.: - Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short ‘the Act’) is subject matter of interpretation before this Court. The said Section reads as under: “24. Land Acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases – (1) xx xx (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act, but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act; Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 2. The Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5478 of 2014 titled ‘Union of India & others Vs. Shiv Raj & others’ [2014(2) Law Herald (SC) 1765 : 2014(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2398 (SC)] : decided on 07.05.2014 has interpreted Section 24(2) of the Act, including in the context of the cases where State could not take possession of the acquired land due to interim stay orders passed by Courts. It has been held that the benefits under the new law would be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where award has not been made or possession of land has not been taken. Relying upon the said judgment, a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.7027 of 2005 titled ‘S.D. Adarsh Bal Vidyalaya Vs. State of Haryana & another’ decided on 13.05.2014 has allowed a bunch of writ petitions filed by the land owners and the notifications as well as the award were set aside. 3. Relying upon the said judgment, a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No.7027 of 2005 titled ‘S.D. Adarsh Bal Vidyalaya Vs. State of Haryana & another’ decided on 13.05.2014 has allowed a bunch of writ petitions filed by the land owners and the notifications as well as the award were set aside. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the matter stands concluded by the order of the Supreme Court in Shiv Raj’s case (supra), which was followed by this Court in S.D. Adarsh Bal Vidyalaya’s case (supra), therefore, the acquisition proceedings stand lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act. 4. However, on the other hand, it is argued that no argument was raised before the Supreme Court in Shiv Raj’s case (supra) that an act of the Court shall not prejudice any person. Relying upon the term ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’, it is argued that the period of stay granted by the Court(s) is required to be excluded while determining the period of five years, which leads to lapse of acquisition proceedings. Reference is made to a judgment reported as Atma Ram Mittal Vs. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 , wherein it was held to the following effect: “8. It is well settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ – an act of court shall prejudice no man….” 5. A three Judges’ Bench in Auto & Metal Engineers Vs. Union of India (1997) 7 SCC 734 was examining the consequences of an order staying the passing of the final order of assessment to determine the period of limitation for issuance of a notice under Section 142 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court held that since the passing of the final order of assessment had been stayed, it must be held that there was a stay of assessment proceedings for the purpose of Explanation I in Section 153. Therefore, the period during which the said stay order passed by the High Court was in operation has to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for making the order of assessment and the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It was observed as under: “7. ……. Therefore, the period during which the said stay order passed by the High Court was in operation has to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for making the order of assessment and the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It was observed as under: “7. ……. An order staying the passing of the final order of assessment is nothing but an order staying the assessment proceeding. Since the passing of the final order of assessment had been stayed by the Delhi High Court by its order dated 23.11.1971 in the writ petitions, it must be held that there was a stay of assessment proceedings for the purpose of Explanation I in Section 153. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in holding that the period during which the said stay order passed by the Delhi High Court was in operation has to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for making the order of assessment and the appeals are liable to be dismissed.” 6. In State of Gujarat Vs. Essar Oil Limited (2012) 3 SCC 522 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court delineated the following principles in respect of the proceedings before the court. The Court inter-alia held to the following effect: “197. The other aspect which has been dealt with in great detail is to neutralise any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by the litigants. While adjudicating, the courts must keep the following principles in view: (1) xx xx (2) When a party applies and gets a stay or injunction from the court, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. An order of stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of additional right upon the litigating party. (3) xx xx (8) The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts.” 7. Recently, a five Judges’ Bench in Sarah Mathew Vs. An order of stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of additional right upon the litigating party. (3) xx xx (8) The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts.” 7. Recently, a five Judges’ Bench in Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, [2014(1) Law Herald (SC) 225 : 2014(1) Law Herald (P&H) 449 (SC)] : (2014) 2 SCC 62 while examining the question; whether for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in respect of a criminal complaint, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance. The Court held that Court’s inaction in taking cognizance should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent complainant. The Court held that the use of legal maxims as guiding principles is perfectly justified. It was also held as under: “39. As we have already noted in reaching this conclusion, light can be drawn from legal maxims. Legal maxims are referred to in Bharat Damodar kale Vs. State of A.P. (2003) 8 SCC 559 , Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty [2007(5) Law Herald (SC) 3960] : (2007) 7 SCC 394 and Vanka Radhamanohari Vs. Vanka Venkata Reddy (1993) 3 SCC 4 . The object of the criminal law is to punish perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well-known legal maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi, which means that a crime never dies. At the same time, it is also the policy of law to assist the vigilant and not the sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Chapter XXXVI Cr.P.C. which provides limitation period for certain types of offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws support from this maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384 or 465 IPC, which have lesser punishment may have serious social consequences. The provision is, therefore, made for condonation of delay. Chapter XXXVI Cr.P.C. which provides limitation period for certain types of offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws support from this maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384 or 465 IPC, which have lesser punishment may have serious social consequences. The provision is, therefore, made for condonation of delay. Treating date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit which means that the act of court shall prejudice no man. It bears repetition to state that the court’s inaction in taking cognizance i.e. court’s inaction in applying mind to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the interplay of these three legal maxims. The provisions of this Chapter, however, are not interpreted solely on the basis of these maxims. They only serve as guiding principles.” 8. In view of the fact that principle of law ‘actus curiae neminem gravabit’ has not been brought to the notice of the Court, as no argument based upon such principle has been raised or considered, we think that the issue as to whether the period of stay granted by this Court is liable to be excluded for determining the period of five years requires to be examined by a Larger Bench. 9. Consequently, the matter be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench. 10. Since the issue is legal and likely to affect large number of land owners, liberty is given to the affected persons to appear and argue before the Larger Bench. ---------0.B.S.0------------