Judgment : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondent no.1. Nobody present on behalf of respondent no. 2 though duly served. 2. Heard finally by consent. Rule returnable forthwith. 3. Mr. Diniz, learned counsel waives notice on behalf of respondent no.1 on merits. 4. The only question that arises in this Writ petition is:- Whether the order dated 14.3.2013, impugned herein is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of Writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. By the order dated 14.3.2013, learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mapusa has allowed production of Photostat copies of the documents by way of secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order does not reflect any application of mind and also does not show that the learned Civil Judge has satisfied himself whether the application filed for grant of permission to produce copies of the documents by way of secondary evidence fulfills the conditions of Section 65 read with Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act. He submits that it was necessary for respondent no.1 to explain as to how and in what manner the photostat copies of the documents sought to be produced as secondary evidence were obtained and only because there has been no specific denial to the documents referred to in the plaint of respondent no.1, by the present petitioner, learned Civil Judge could not have allowed the application. In support of his submissions, he refers to me the case of J. Yashoda Vs. K. Shobha Rani, 2007(5) SCC 730 . 6. In the above case, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in paragraph 9 of the judgment observed that conditions laid down in Section 65 must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be admitted and that it is necessary that party seeking production of secondary evidence first accounts for the nonproduction of the original. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also referred to the law laid down in Ashok Dulichand Vs. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also referred to the law laid down in Ashok Dulichand Vs. Madahavlal Dube, (1975) 4 SCC 664 , in which case the issue was as to whether the High Court could have rejected the production of photostat copies of a documents and the Hon'ble Apex Court, found that since the photostat copies sought to be produced as secondary evidence were not above suspicion and as there was no explanation as to what were the circumstances under which the photostat copies were prepared and who was in possession of the original documents at the time when photostat copies were taken, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the order of High Court was not illegal and suffered from no infirmity. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has submitted that the ratio in the case of J. Yeshoda (supra) is in the context of clause(a) of Section 65 of the Evidence Act and therefore, it cannot be applied to the case which is founded upon clause (b) and Section 65 of the Evidence Act. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, disagrees and submits that the observation in paragraph 9 of the said judgment sufficiently indicates principle of law stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it essentially lays down that conditions of Section 65 must be fulfilled before secondary evidence is allowed by the Court. 9. There can be no dispute about the principle that conditions as mentioned in Section 65 of the Evidence Act must be fulfilled. There can also be no quarrel about the principle that whenever photostat copy is to be produced as a secondary evidence, document should be above suspicion and there should be no dispute about accuracy of the Photostat copy. The dispute of accuracy of the photostat copy can be resolved when a party opposing production of secondary evidence does not specifically deny the existence or execution and contents of the documents. 10. In the instant case, as can be seen from the copy of the written statement of the petitioner available in the paper book (page 46), the petitioner does not specifically deny the existence and contents of the documents sought to be produced as secondary evidence and what he submits is that the receipts could not have been issued by his wife, respondent no. 2, as she was not authorised to do so with the petitioner having community of interest along with her in the property. Such averment made in the written statement would only show that there is no dispute about the existence or execution or contents of the documents. Of course, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner could not have specifically denied these documents as he was not aware as to what was done by his wife. This explanation cannot be considered at the stage of deciding an application for production of secondary evidence. It can be considered only when respondent no.1 is confronted adequately in respect of these documents by the petitioner on merits. Even otherwise, the law of pleadings -denial for want of knowledge is no denial, does not assist the petitioner in this regard. 11. Perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Civil Judge has considered the fact that there is no dispute about the existence or execution of the documents and therefore, I am of the view that since these documents fulfill the conditions of clause (d) of section 65, the order passed by learned Civil Judge cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. Besides, the learned Civil Judge has also observed that petitioner would be getting an adequate opportunity to cross examine the respondent no.1 which would also rule out the possibility of miscarriage of justice in the matter. 12. There is also a question involved in this petition, which is whether or not in supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227, any interference with the impugned order is warranted. This question can be answered by following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003)6 SCC 675 , referred to me by learned counsel for respondent no.1. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down that so long as error is capable of being corrected in appeal or in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it would be a sound exercise of the jurisdiction on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down that so long as error is capable of being corrected in appeal or in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it would be a sound exercise of the jurisdiction on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. In the case in hand, no prejudice is going to be caused to the petitioner as he would be having sufficient opportunity to cross examine the concerned witness of the plaintiff and even then if same error occurs, it can always be corrected by an appellate Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, for this reason also, no interference with the impugned order is called for. 13. In the circumstances, the impugned order cannot be said to be as so perverse or unreasonable as to warrant interference by this Court. Point is answered accordingly. 14. Writ Petition stands dismissed. 15. Rule is discharged.