JUDGMENT Hon’ble Het Singh Yadav, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned A.G.A and perused the record. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the revisionists that the Court below has framed charges against the revisionists under Section 498-A, 307 and 323 I.P.C and 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act without taking into consideration the material on record. In fact, on the basis of material on record prima facie no offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C appears to have been made out. Therefore, the revisionists preferred application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code) in this Court being Application No. 37754 of 2012, Hari Ram Singh and others v. State of U.P. This Court vide order dated 9.11.2012 allowed the application and the impugned order of framing of charge under Section 307 I.P.C was set aside and further directed the Court below to consider the matter afresh after examining all the relevant record. 2. In pursuance of the order of this Court the trial Court vide order dated 6.2.2014 again framed charge against the revisionists under Section 307 I.P.C, it is argued, without considering material on record which is under challenge in this revision. 3. The grievance of the revisionists is that as per medical opinion the injured had allegedly sustained 7 injuries. All are simple in nature caused by hard and blunt object and by friction. Except injury No. 1 which is abraded swelling on the right side of the face, all the remaining injuries are on non-vital parts of the body of the injured. Besides, the Doctor who examined the injured has not disclosed anything in the injury report about pouring kerosene upon the injured. Even there is no strong suspicion against the revisionists that they had any intention or knowledge to commit murder of the injured. Thus, from the material on record prima facie no offence under Section 307 I.P.C appears to have been committed. The trial Court, it is argued, despite the fact that its earlier order of framing charge under Section 307 I.P.C against the revisionists has been set aside by this Court, again framed charge under Section 307 I.P.C even without any prima facie evidence against the revisionists. The impugned order is, accordingly, illegal and deserves to be set aside. 4.
The trial Court, it is argued, despite the fact that its earlier order of framing charge under Section 307 I.P.C against the revisionists has been set aside by this Court, again framed charge under Section 307 I.P.C even without any prima facie evidence against the revisionists. The impugned order is, accordingly, illegal and deserves to be set aside. 4. It is almost settled law that at the stage of framing of charge it is not obligatory for the Court to consider in detail and insensitive willing whether the fact is proved would be in conviction of the innocent or the accused. The Court is not to see whether there is a sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is to sure in conviction. The strong suspicion at the stage of framing of charge is sufficient to frame the charge. At the stage of framing of charge the Court is required to evaluate the material and document on record with a view to finding out if the fact emerging therefrom taking at their face value disclosing existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. 5. In the instant case, the only grievance of the revisionists, is that as per medical opinion, the injuries sustained by the injured are simple in nature and have been caused by hard blunt objects and by friction. This shows that the accused persons who alleged to have committed those injuries to the injured, had no intention to commit her murder. It is settled law that to constitute an offence under Section 307 I.P.C, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually inflicted may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused. Such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances and may even be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds.
Although the nature of injury actually inflicted may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused. Such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances and may even be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. Section 307 I.P.C reads thus: “Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to (imprisonment for life) of to such punishment as is herein before mentioned.” On bare reading of the section, it emerges out that to constitute offence under this section firstly there must be such intention/knowledge as is required to constitute an offence of murder and; (2) in furtherance of such intention/knowledge any act has been done. Thus, the section contemplates a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault, should be sufficient under ordinary course to cause death of the person assaulted. It is to be seen as to whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention/knowledge and under the circumstances as enumerated under Section 300 I.P.C to commit the murder. To constitute an offence under Section 307 I.P.C as discussed above it is sufficient that intention of a degree as envisaged under Section 307 I.P.C is present coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. 6. The revisionists who are the husband and the relatives of the husband of the daughter of the complainant/first informant, alleged to have mercilessly beaten her for being unable to meet the gratuitous dowry demand.They allegedly poured kerosene upon her with intention to set her ablaze. As stated above at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not required to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is concluded without any conviction. Strong suspicion at the stage of framing of charge is sufficient to frame the charge.
As stated above at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not required to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is concluded without any conviction. Strong suspicion at the stage of framing of charge is sufficient to frame the charge. Thus, from the material available on record there is strong suspension against the revisionists that they had such intention/knowledge as is postulated in Section 307 I.P.C and an overt act in execution thereof was done for being unable to meet the gratuitous dowry demand. The learned trial Court has thus committed no error or illegally while passing the impugned order to frame the charge against the revisionists under Section 307 I.P.C also. The revision has no merit and, accordingly, dismissed. ————