ORDER 1. Petitioner has challenged order dated 18/9/1980 (Annexure-K). 2. The relevant facts of the case are that respondent Nos.3 to 6 on the enforcement of Karnataka Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1974 filed Form No.7 against the petitioner-Temple. The Land Tribunal by impugned order dated 18/9/1980, granted occupancy rights to respondent Nos.3 to 6, which is impugned in these writ petitions. Though there is a delay of thirty two years in preferring these writ petitions, nevertheless, this court issued notice to respondents on 12/9/2012. In response to which, only respondent No.6 has engaged services of an advocate to represent him. Respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 are served, but not represented and respondent Nos.1 and 2 are represented by the learned Government Pleader, who has also made available original record. 3. Learned counsel for petitioner sought to raise several contentions regarding the infirmities in the impugned order, but the first and foremost question that had to be considered in this matter is with regard to delay of thirty two years in filing these writ petitions. 4. At the outset, learned counsel for petitioner contended that the petitioner was not served with the notice of proceedings and therefore, the impugned order is a nullity, being in violation of principles of natural justice. As stated above, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that the impugned order is flawed and that an opportunity has to be given to the petitioner to appear before the Land Tribunal. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.6 and learned Government Pleader for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 would support the impugned order. 6. I have considered the submission of the learned counsel for petitioner in light of the material as well as on perusal of the original records. 7. The subject matter of controversy of this writ petition is land bearing Sy.No.273/1B1, measuring 5 acres 70 cents and Sy.No.273/3P1 measuring 3 acres 64 cents in respect of Form No.7, which was filed by respondent Nos.3 to 6. The Land Tribunal had initiated proceedings in LRT-3-397-TRI-10795-80-81, LRT-3-528-TRI-10794-80-81, LRT-3-418-TRI-10797-80-81, LRT-3-422-TRI-10798-80-81, LRT-3-492-TRI-10799-80-81 and LRT-3-594-TRI-10800-80-81. 8. On perusal of the impugned order, it becomes clear that the petitioner herein was arrayed as respondent before the Tribunal and it is stated that the petitioner-Temple was represented by the administrator. The Land Tribunal had initiated proceedings in LRT-3-397-TRI-10795-80-81, LRT-3-528-TRI-10794-80-81, LRT-3-418-TRI-10797-80-81, LRT-3-422-TRI-10798-80-81, LRT-3-492-TRI-10799-80-81 and LRT-3-594-TRI-10800-80-81. 8. On perusal of the impugned order, it becomes clear that the petitioner herein was arrayed as respondent before the Tribunal and it is stated that the petitioner-Temple was represented by the administrator. The Tribunal has also noted in the course of its order that pursuant to the issuance of notices, the respondent before the Tribunal i.e., the petitioner herein had appeared and that survey numbers were identified by measurement as per Exs.C-1 and C-2. The Tribunal has also noted that the statements made by the applicants who filed Form No.7 were not contested, in that applicants were not cross-examined. Based on the material on record and also the statement made by the applicants, the Tribunal granted occupancy rights to the applicant-respondent Nos.5 and 6 herein. The subject matter of this writ petition as already stated are only two items of land referred to above, the occupancy rights of which were given to respondent No.3 herein. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that the grant of occupancy rights was given to respondent Nos.4 to 6 is not assailed in these writ petitions. 9. Therefore, what becomes apparent is the fact that impugned order has recorded the presence of representatives of the petitioner in the proceedings. The lands have been identified by way of measurement and that there has been no contest by the petitioner herein in the proceeding before the land Tribunal. After a lapse of thirty two years, the present writ petitions are filed. There is no explanation offered for the delay in filing at this length of time. Learned counsel for petitioner, during his submission candidly, stated that the management was not interested then and now the temple management has become active and therefore, they have chosen to file these writ petitions. But that explanation is not sufficient in law to condone the delay of thirty two years in preferring this writ petition. Reliance placed on a decision of the Division Bench of this court in Sri. But that explanation is not sufficient in law to condone the delay of thirty two years in preferring this writ petition. Reliance placed on a decision of the Division Bench of this court in Sri. Vinayaka Deva of Idagunji Public Trust V/s. Manjunath Bhat and others [2001(2) KCCR 1001 (DB)], which is also of no assistance to the petitioner as in that case although there was delay of twenty years delay in assailing the impugned order therein, this Court was of the opinion that the proceedings conducted therein were without public notice and without notice to the trustees of the temple and the entire order was regarded as null and void on account of violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure i.e., principles of natural justice. But that is not the case in this matter. The petitioner herein though represented before the tribunal did not choose to contest the matter, as the applicants therein were not cross-examined and the Tribunal proceeded to pass orders based on the materials and evidence on record. 10. At this stage, we are not concerned with the merits of the matter, but only the question of delay and latches. I am of the view that having regard to the fact that the petitioner was represented before the Tribunal and the delay not being explained so as to be sufficient in law to be acceptable and condoned by this court, the writ petitions have to be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches by placing reliance on decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows:- a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 [State of Orissa & Anr. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows:- a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 [State of Orissa & Anr. v. Mamata Mohanty], the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. b) In the case of Shankar Coop Housing Society Ltd. v. M.Prabhakar & Ors [2011 AIR SCW 3033], the Apex Court at Para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows; “53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” c) Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of SAWARAN LATHA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS [ 2010(4) SCC 532 ], has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged. d) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS v. D.R.LAKSHMI & OTHERS [ (1996) 6 SCC 445 ], wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. e) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. [( 2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus:- “The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” f) In fact in S.S.Balu and others v. State of Karnataka [ (2009) 2 SCC 479 ], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time. g) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & others [ (2012) 12 SCC 797 ]. The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 11. In the result, writ petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.