JUDGMENT Sudhir Agarwal,J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. 2. The respondent-landlord instituted Suit No. 302 of 1971 (subsequently registered as SCC Suit No. 135 of 1995) seeking ejectment of petitioners from premises in dispute on the ground of default in payment of rent. The suit was dismissed by Trial Court observing in respect of Issues No. 1 and 2 that during pendency of suit rent deposited by petitioners-tenants having been accepted by landlord, it means that he has waived his quit notice and, therefore, decree of eviction cannot be passed. The suit having been dismissed by Trial Court, respondent-landlord preferred SCC Revision No. 24 of 2000 which has been allowed by Revisional Court vide judgment dated 15.10.2004 observing that mere fact that during pendency of suit rent has been accepted or received by landlord, it cannot be inferred or concluded that landlord has gives up his suit and waived his right to seek eviction of tenants. The Revisional Court placed reliance on decisions of this Court in Mohd. Ahmed Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Dehradun and others, 1995(2) ARC 12 and Roshan Islam Vs. District Judge, Bulandshahar and others, 1982(2) ARC 294. 3. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners, however placed reliance on this Court's decisions in Laxmi Kishore and another Vs. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 and Kailash Chandra and another Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Jalaun at Orai and others, 1998(2) ARC 451 and contended that the findings of Trial Court cannot be reversed by Revisional Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1887") and, therefore, the judgment of Revisional Court is liable to be set aside. 4. However, I find no force in the submission and in my view, the power exercised by Revisional Court is well within its jurisdiction and authority. 5. The scope of interference of a Revisional Court under Section 25 Act, 1887 is whether the decree or order made by Small Cause Court was according to law or not. Undoubtedly it is a supervisory power and not appellate power. The Revisional Court can call for record to see whether decree is according to law and, if not, it can pass such order with respect thereto as it may thinks fit. 6. Undoubtedly it is a supervisory power and not appellate power. The Revisional Court can call for record to see whether decree is according to law and, if not, it can pass such order with respect thereto as it may thinks fit. 6. The next question is, the ambit of the words "according to law" occurring in Section 25 of Act, 1887. 7. The Apex Court considered the same in Hari Shanker Vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhary, AIR 1963 SC 696 and held that it refers to the decision as a whole and not to be equated to error of law of or of fact simpliciter. It contemplates that entire decision, i.e., the overall decision must be according to law. There should be no miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. 8. Some of the instances where the Court can interfere under Section 25 are, (1) where the Court has no jurisdiction in the matter; (2) where a party had not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or that the burden of proof had been misplaced on wrong shoulders; (3) where the Court had based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted; (4) where there has not been a proper trial according to law; and (5) if on certain facts two views are possible, then a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 was not interfered. 9. The observations of Beaument, C.J. in Bell and Co. Ltd. Vs. Waman Ramraj, AIR 1938 Bombay 223 were referred and approved by Apex Court in Hari Shanker (supra). It further said: "the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at." 10. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker Vs. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas Firm, AIR 1969 SC 1344 it was held that a wrong decision on facts by a competent court is also a decision according to law. The Court has no power to de novo examine the findings of facts reached by Trial Court. 11. In Ram Narain Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Vishwakarma, 1965 ALJ 989 a Division Bench said that Revisional Court is not empowered under Section 25 to look into evidence of case and decide whether the finding of fact arrived at by court below is justified by evident on record or not. 12. 11. In Ram Narain Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Vishwakarma, 1965 ALJ 989 a Division Bench said that Revisional Court is not empowered under Section 25 to look into evidence of case and decide whether the finding of fact arrived at by court below is justified by evident on record or not. 12. The language of Section 25 is different than the Revisional Court powers conferred on civil court under Section 115 C.P.C. 13. Act, 1887 constitute Small Cause Courts of exclusive on preferential and limited jurisdiction. The class of suits not cognizable by small causes is listed in the schedule appended to Act, 1887. The provisions of Civil Procedure Code inapplicable to Small Cause Court are provided in Section 7 of C.P.C. By Section 40 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 certain provisions thereof, i.e., Sections 15, 32, 37, 38 and 39 have been applied to Small Cause Courts. Vide Section 7 the applicability of Sections 96, 112 and 115 C.P.C. is made inapplicable to Small Causes Court, meaning thereby its judgment is made non-appealable. The Trial in Small Cause Court is summary and its decision is final subject to revision under Section 25 only. It is in these circumstances, one has to make a distinction between power of Revisional Court under Section 25 and other appellate and revisional powers under C.P.C. or other provisions of procedural statutes. 14. The circumstances where Revisional Court to find out whether decision of Small Cause Court is in accordance with law may look into the facts without assessment have been explained in para 19 and 20 of judgment of Division Bench in Laxmi Kishore and another Vs. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 and it says: "19. If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on admissible evidence. In such case, the court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law, viz. validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. 20. In such case, the court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law, viz. validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. 20. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order, as the justice of the case requires; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine as issue of fact for itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, asses it and determine an issue of fact." 15. The bar is in effect with respect to reassessment of evidence and substitute its conclusion of fact but not where relevant evidence has not been considered or finding is based on inadmissible evidence or finding is without any evidence etc. In Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan Vs. Punjab National Bank, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675 the Apex Court reiterate that reassessment of evidence is not permissible to substitute its own inference but not where the decision is not in accordance with law. If the Revisional Court does not agree with finding, that by itself cannot be a ground since it is within the realm of assessment of evidence. This is what has been observed by Apex Court in Rafat Ali Vs. Sugni Bai and others, JT 1998(8) SC 157; Sri Raj Laxmi Dyeing Works Vs. Rangaswami, JT 1998(4) SC 46; Sarla Ahuja Vs. United Insurance Company Ltd., JT 1998(7) SC 297; and, Ramdoss Vs. K. Thangavelu, JT 1999(10) SC 51. 16. In Roshan Islam (supra) the Court said that there has to be an evidence adduced to show that landlord intended to give up his case by doing something so as to record a finding that he has waived his claim. Therein, after issuing a notice terminating tenancy under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 the landlord filed an application under Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Therein, after issuing a notice terminating tenancy under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 the landlord filed an application under Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. it was argued that mere filing of application under Section 21 leads to the conclusion that landlord has waived his claim pursuant to quit notice but that was not accepted and the Court said that it would depend on the intention of landlord, which has to be shown by adequate evidence. 17. The decision in Mohd. Ahmad (supra) is more elaborate on this aspect and the Court referred to a decision of Apex Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 SC 933 to observe that waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 18. In the present case the Revisional Court has found that there is no presumption that during pendency of suit if rent has been accepted or received by landlord, it shall justify an inference that landlord has given up/waived his right to seek eviction of tenant and has surrendered his cause of action for filing suit. The view taken by Trial Court otherwise was not in accordance with law and, therefore, has rightly been reversed by Revisional Court. Since basis assumption on the part of Trial Court in non-suiting plaintiff-landlord was not apparently in accordance with law it has rightly been reversed by Revisional Court and the view of Revisional Court, in my view, being in accordance with law, hence warrants no interference in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution. 19. The scope of judicial review in these matter under Article 226 /227 is very limited and narrow as discussed in detail by this Court in Jalil Ahmad Vs. 16th Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 2013(2) AWC 2168. There is nothing which may justify judicial review of orders impugned in this writ petition in the light of exposition of law, as discussed in the above judgment. 20. In view of above, I do not find any legal or otherwise fault or error in the impugned Revisional Court's judgment warranting interference. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. 21. No costs.