Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 1050 (HP)

Prem Lal v. Bhagdei

2014-08-05

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2014
JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The plaintiff/respondent had instituted a suit before the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Dalhousie, District Chamba, H.P. claiming the relief of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the defendant/appellant. The learned trial Court, in its judgment and decree, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent. Besides the counter claim, instituted by the defendant/appellant before the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Dalhousie, District Chamba, for a decree of specific performance of agreement, comprised in Ext.DW1/A, being awarded in his favour, was, too, declined by the learned trial Court. In an appeal, instituted, at the instance of the plaintiff/respondent, before the learned First Appellate Court, the first Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal of the plaintiff/respondent, in as much, as, it granted the relief of possession in favour of the plaintiff/respondent qua the suit property, comprised in Khasra Nos.888/431 and 892/431. Though the defendant/appellant too had filed cross-objections, before the First Appellate Court against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court refusing to accord the decree of specific performance of Ext.DW1/A qua the suit land in his favour, the same, too, came to be dismissed by the First Appellate Court. The defendant is aggrieved by the judgment and decree, rendered by the First Appellate Court, in dismissing his cross-objections, preferred before it. Hence, has instituted the instant appeal before this Court. 2. The brief facts of the case are that plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant/appellant from interfering in two rooms constructed by the plaintiff/respondent over her land comprised in Khasra No.888/431 and 892/431, Khata Khatauni No.202/230 min, situated at Mauza Banikhet Jarei, Pargana Chuhan, Tehsil Bhattiyat, District Chamba, H.P. and also for mandatory injunction directing the defendant/appellant to remove his lock from both the rooms. The plaintiff/respondent had averred that she is owner in possession of Khasra No.888/431 and 892/431, measuring 0- 13-0 bighas bearing Khata Khatauni No. 202/230 and has constructed two houses, one each on Khasra No.888/431 and 892/431 and has let out the house to various persons. The plaintiff/respondent had averred that she is owner in possession of Khasra No.888/431 and 892/431, measuring 0- 13-0 bighas bearing Khata Khatauni No. 202/230 and has constructed two houses, one each on Khasra No.888/431 and 892/431 and has let out the house to various persons. It is further averred that the defendant/appellant purchased 0-2-0 bighas of land out of Khasra No.889/431, Khata Khatauni No.203/231 from one Kesar, son of Haria vide sale deed No.77 dated 15th June, 1998 and after the registration of the sale deed, the defendant/appellant put his lock, on two rooms of the plaintiff/respondent, situated in Khasra No.888/431 and 892/431, which were already locked by the plaintiff/respondent. The plaintiff/respondent requested the defendant that he has not purchased these rooms from her. The plaintiff/respondent further averred that the defendant/appellant took forcible possession of the two rooms constructed by her without any right and title on 15th June, 1998, therefore, the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to get back the possession of the rooms, hence, the cause of action accrued to her and the suit before the trial Court was filed. 3. The defendant/appellant contested the suit and filed written statement, thereby denying the claim of the plaintiff/respondent. The defendant took the preliminary objections inter alia valuation of the suit, maintainability and estoppel. On merits, it is submitted that the plaintiff is not in possession of khasra No.888/431 since the plaintiff has handed over the possession of the same to the defendant vide agreement to sell dated 27.11.1991 entered into interse the parties at contest and the entire consideration amount stands paid to the plaintiff by the defendant. It is denied that the suit land was let out to the tenants. It is pleaded that the plaintiff and her brother Kesar Singh had agreed to sell their respective land to the defendant in the year 1991 and the possession of the suit land was handed over to the defendant. Kesar Singh has executed the sale deed in favour of the defendant but the plaintiff has refused to perform her part of contract. It is denied by the defendant that he forcibly put his lock on the rooms. The plaintiff has been averred to have been requested many times to perform her part of contract, yet was evasive in her commitment which goaded the defendant to inquire about it from the Halqa Patwari. It is denied by the defendant that he forcibly put his lock on the rooms. The plaintiff has been averred to have been requested many times to perform her part of contract, yet was evasive in her commitment which goaded the defendant to inquire about it from the Halqa Patwari. The certified copy of jamabandi for the year 1996-97 has been averred to have been obtained on 16.7.19098 wherein, the sale of property comprised in Khasra No.888/431, 876/245, 892/431 was forbidden till 31.8.1994 and 14.12.1997. Consequently, a legal notice dated 23.7.1998 was issued to the plaintiff and thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present suit against the defendant. The defendant has also claimed specific performance of agreement dated 27.11.1991 by way of counter claim. It is pleaded in the counter claim that the plaintiff was requested time and again to execute the sale deed and in the months of June and July, 1998, the plaintiff instead of performing her part of contract filed the present suit against the defendant. It is also pleaded that the defendant purchase the suit land comprised in Khasra No.888/431, in, pursuance to agreement dated 27.11.19091 and came in possession of the suit land accordingly. 4. The plaintiff/respondent filed replication as also written statement to the counter claim, wherein, she denied the contents of the written statement and re-affirmed and re-asserted the averments, made in the plaint. In the written statement to the counter claim, it is alleged that the counter claim is not valid and cannot be looked into since the same is beyond limitation. The execution of the agreement to sell inter se the parties has been denied by the plaintiff. It is also submitted that the defendant took possession of the house on 15.6.1998 and not in the year 1991. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court struck following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, as prayed? OPP. 2. Whether the defendant has forcibly put locks on the property of the plaintiff, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected on account of improper verification? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 5. Whether the suit is not properly valued? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct? OPD 7. Whether true facts have been suppressed from the Court? OPD 8. OPP 3. Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected on account of improper verification? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 5. Whether the suit is not properly valued? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct? OPD 7. Whether true facts have been suppressed from the Court? OPD 8. Whether the land comprising Khasra No.888/431 was allegedly purchased by the defendant vide agreement of sell dated 17.11.1991 and is in their possession? OPD 9. Whether the defendant has already paid full consideration amount to the plaintiff, if so, its effect? OPD 2(A) Whether the counter claim of the defendant is time barred? OPP 2(B) Whether the defendant is ready and willing to perform the part of contract, as alleged? OPD Relief. 6. On appraisal of the evidence, adduced before the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent, as also, the counter claim filed by the defendant/appellant. In appeal, preferred before the learned first Appellate Court, against the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, by the plaintiff/respondent, the learned first Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-objections, filed by the appellant/defendant. 7. Now the defendant/appellant has instituted the instant Regular Second Appeal before this Court, assailing the findings, recorded by the learned first Appellate Court, in, its impugned judgment and decree. When the appeal came up for admission on 24.12.2004, this Court, admitted the appeal instituted by the defendant/appellant, against the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned first Appellate Court, on, the hereinafter extracted substantial question of law:- 1. Whether the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case? Substantial question of Law No.1: 8. The factum of an agreement to sell qua the suit land having been entered into between the parties at contest and as comprised in Ex.DW1/A, has remained uncontroverted. Hence, in the face of forceful, adequate and vigorous proof having been lent by the witnesses, to, DW1/A, of it having been thumb marked by the plaintiff/respondent after its contents having readover and explained to her, as such, renders credible proof qua its execution. Hence, in the face of forceful, adequate and vigorous proof having been lent by the witnesses, to, DW1/A, of it having been thumb marked by the plaintiff/respondent after its contents having readover and explained to her, as such, renders credible proof qua its execution. Moreover, when there is proof lent by the witnesses, to, Ex.DW1/A, of part of the sale consideration having been handed over by the vendee to the vendor at the time of the execution of Ex.DW1/A, besides when Ex.DW1/A voices the factum of possession of the suit property having come to be delivered at the time of execution of Ex.DW1/A inter se the vendor and the vendee. Consequently, it is urged, that, when there, is, proof of tendering of part of the sale consideration by the vendor to the vendee and also there, is, proof comprised in the recital in Ex.DW1/A of possession of the suit property at the time of execution of Ex.DW1/A having been handed over by the vendor to the vendee, as such, in the light of principle of the part performance envisaged in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, whose provisions are extracted hereinafter, investing a right in a transferee, who, has acquired possession of the property under an agreement to sell entered into interse the vendor and vendee or transferor and transferee and has fulfilled his part of the obligation, to, oust and bar the transferor/vendor from enforcing any right, title or interest qua the property, of which the transferee or vendee has taken the possession. "S.53-A:- Part performance.- Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty: and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof." Consequently, it is urged that, hence, when the recital in Ex.DW1/A conveys the factum of possession of suit property having come to be delivered by the vendor to the vendee and the part of the sale consideration having been defrayed to the vendor by the vendee at the time of execution of Ex.DW1/A intere se the vendor and the vendee. As a sequel, then, on the anvil of the contemplation voiced in Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, of, such transferee, in, possession on his having fulfilled part of his obligation under Ex.DW1/A, as, the defendant/appellant, has, comprised in his having defrayed part of the sale consideration to the vendor at the time of execution of DW1/A, as such, he has a right to oust or bar or estop the vendor/plaintiff/respondent, from enforcing any rights in the suit property, against the defendant/appellant. However, the above contention for the reasons to be afforded hereinafter necessitate its being dispelled:- (a) given the fact that the dispute interse the parties, is, qua house, yet when the recital in Ex.PW1/A conveys, it having been entered into qua the suit land. Besides, when there is omission in the pleadings of the defendant/appellant, of, his having purchased the house from the plaintiff/respondent or that after his having purchased the suit land from the plaintiff/respondent, his having raised construction thereon. Moreover, with there being no corroborative evidence adduced on record by the defendant/appellant, to, demonstrate that he had raised house upon the suit land, in, pursuance to Ex.DW1/A, sequels, a firm conclusion that the disputed house raised on the suit property was, hence, raised at the instance of the plaintiff/respondent. In the defendant/appellant having not concerted to restrain the plaintiff/respondent by appropriate proceedings from raising a house on the suit land, conveys acquiescence, to, the title, of, the plaintiff/respondent, to, raise construction on the suit land and it also constitutes waiver and abandonment on the part of the defendant/appellant of any right or interest acquired over/upon the suit land, in, pursuance to Ex.DW1/A. In sequel, when, hence, the defendant/appellant never entered into possession of the suit property, he, cannot be held to be in possession thereof. The mere recital, in, Ex.DW1/A of possession of the suit property having been delivered at the time of, its, execution by the vendor to the vendee, is, of no significance, rather is an illusory recital, having no force and is belittled and rendered unworthwhile by the factum of the conclusion arrived at herein above of the plaintiff/respondent having raised construction over/upon the suit property and of the defendant having acquiesced to such construction raised over/upon the suit property by the plaintiff/respondent, comprised in his omission to restrain her from doing so, by way of launching appropriate proceedings; (b) even the defendant's witnesses DW2, DW3 and DW-4 have omitted to, in their respective depositions, divulge that the defendant/appellant had purchased a house as is standing on the suit property from the plaintiff/respondent. Nor they have then deposed in their respective depositions, of possession of the house having been delivered by the plaintiff/respondent, to the defendant/appellant, at the time of execution of Ex.DW1/A. Besides there is an omission, in their respective depositions, of the defendant/appellant having constructed a house upon the suit land. Nor they have then deposed in their respective depositions, of possession of the house having been delivered by the plaintiff/respondent, to the defendant/appellant, at the time of execution of Ex.DW1/A. Besides there is an omission, in their respective depositions, of the defendant/appellant having constructed a house upon the suit land. In sequel, it has to be concluded that at the time of execution of the Ex.DW1/A, the recital in Ex.DW1/A of possession of the suit property having been delivered to the defendant/appellant, has no significance, nor has any probative force and value, rather, is, rendered nugatory in the face of the fact that the shape/classification/kism of the suit property is enunciated in the jamabandi for the year 1996-97, Ex.DW1/C as gair mumkin makan, which classification/kism as borne by the suit land is to be concluded to have been begotten at the instance of the plaintiff/respondent Consequently, when the raising of the house on the suit property is at the instance and at the behest of the plaintiff/respondent and not at the instance of the defendant/appellant, she, as such by said act marking or connoting her physical possession, even it, hence, is to be held to be entitled to retain its possession. 9. Even otherwise, the jamabandi qua the suit property comprised in Ex.PA, enunciates the fact of the plaintiff/respondent being the recorded owner in possession of the suit property. Presumption of truth, is, attached to the revenue entries and the said presumption has remained unrebutted by the defendant/appellant, inasmuch, as he has omitted to place on record any deed of conveyance executed qua the suit property inter-se him and the plaintiff/respondent. For lack of adduction thereof, it has to be concluded that the revelation in Ex.PA of the suit property being owned and possessed by the plaintiff/respondent has remained undislodged and unrebutted. In aftermath, the act of the defendant/appellant in forcibly putting lock on the house existing on the suit property is unvindicable and necessitates, its, being denounced by a decree for possession qua the gair mumkin makan comprised, in, khasra No.888/431, being renderable in favour of the plaintiff/respondent, as, tenably done by the learned first Appellate court. 10. In aftermath, the act of the defendant/appellant in forcibly putting lock on the house existing on the suit property is unvindicable and necessitates, its, being denounced by a decree for possession qua the gair mumkin makan comprised, in, khasra No.888/431, being renderable in favour of the plaintiff/respondent, as, tenably done by the learned first Appellate court. 10. The learned counsel for the defendant/appellant has with force and vigor contended, that, the counter claim of the defendant/appellant for a decree of specific performance entered into inter-se the parties, at, contest has been untenably rejected on the ground, that, the counter claim, is, barred by limitation. The reason, as projected by the learned first Appellate Court, for rejecting the counter claim of the defendant/appellant, is on the score of Ext.DW1/A, executed in November, 1991 and with the parties at contest/ vendor and vendee, having not executed the registered deed of conveyance before December, 1994, hence, when it remained unexecuted before December, 1994 and when the limitation prescribed under the apposite Article 54 of the Limitation Act, for instituting a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell is, a, period of three years from the date of refusal of execution of the commitment comprised in Ex.DW1/A, i.e. before December, 1994. Resultantly, when the period of limitation of three years commencing from the aforesaid date of refusal of execution of the commitments comprised in Ex.DW1/A expired in December, 1997, in aftermath, given the commencement of the period of three years of limitation for a suit for specific performance of contract, from December, 1994, it, hence, stood expired in December, 1997. Obviously then, when the defendant/counter claimant/appellant omitted to institute a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell Ext.DW1/A before December, 1997, rather, instituted it on 15.7.1998, as such, it was concluded that the suit/counter claim filed by the defendant/appellant is barred by limitation.. The aforesaid reasons have been contended by the learned counsel for the defendant/counter claimant/appellant to be overcome and repulsed by the factum of decisions reported in S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, 1994 (1) RRR 253 SC, holding:- "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first court or by the highest court has to be treated as a nullity or every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in the collateral proceedings." 11. In Indian Bank v. Satyan Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 , the Court holds:- "Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practiced upon that Court. Similarly, where the court is misled by a party or the court itself commits mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to call (recall?) its order." 12. In, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, 2000 (2) RCR (Civil) 483(SC), it has been held that:- "No one can possibly fault the Insurance Company for persistently pursuing the matter up to this Court because they are dealing with public money. If they have discovered that such public fund, in a whopping measure, would be knocked off fraudulently through a fake claim, there is full justification for the Insurance Company in approaching the Tribunal itself first. At any rate the High Court ought not to have refused to consider their grievances. What is the legal remedy when a party to a judgment or order of court later discovered that it was obtained by fraud?" Moreover, when the principle, voiced in the aforesaid decision, stands statutorily engrafted in Section 17 of the Limitation Act, whose provisions are extracted herein-after:- "17. Effect of fraud or mistake.- (1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act. Effect of fraud or mistake.- (1) Where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act. (a) the suit or application is based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his agent; or (b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the suit or application is for relief from the consequences or a mistake; or (d) where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been frequently concealed upon him. The period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it, or in the case of concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production." Consequently, it is argued by the learned counsel appearing for the defendant/appellant/counter claimant, that, with the plaintiff/respondent having practiced duplicity, as also, having indulged in suggestio falsi and suppressio veri, comprised, in, her having misrepresented to the defendant/counter claimant/appellant of hers, being barred, to, execute a sale deed qua the suit land in favour of the defendant/appellant till 1997, whereas, the bar against her selling the suit property to the counter claimant/appellant, as divulged by the Jamabandi for the year 1996-97, Ext.DW1/C, obtained on 16.7.1998, was in force, till 31.8.1994 with respect to Khasra No.888/431 and with respect to Khasra Nos.876/245 and 892/431 till 31.4.1998 respectively. In sequel when, hence, the plaintiff/respondent is canvassed to have practiced deception, in aftermath, it is contended that when the revelation of the deception, practiced by the plaintiff/respondent, inasmuch, as, her having misrepresented to the defendant/appellant the fact of there being a bar, against the selling of the suit property by her in favour of the defendant/counter claimant surviving till 1997, whereas, it was in force, as divulged by the copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1996-97, obtained by the defendant/appellant/counter claimant, with respect to khasra No. 888/431 till 1994 and with respect to other land till, 16.7.1998, hence, the period of limitation has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant/counter claimant to be commencing from 16.7.1998, when he discovered the deception/fraud and misrepresentation of the plaintiff/respondent qua there being a bar against the sale of the suit property. The said contention would have formidability and would have stood countenanced by this Court only in the event it having been proved by cogent evidence, existing on record displaying that at the time of execution of the agreement to sell, comprised in Ext.DW1/A, there was suppression of the fact of there being bar of the sale of the suit property by the plaintiff/respondent in favour the appellant/counter claimant till 1997. 13. The defendant/appellant/counter claimant, has, through a bald averment concerted to project before this Court, that, the plaintiff/respondent had mis-informed him qua the prohibition against the sale of the suit property in favour of the defendant/appellant being alive or in force till 1997, whereas, the lack of authenticity of the representation, made by the plaintiff/respondent to the counter claimant/defendant, was discovered on 16.7.1998, as such, when, hence, the misrepresentation constitutes fraud, as well, as, deceit practiced by the plaintiff/respondent, upon the defendant/appellant and when such deceit was discovered on 16.7.1998 by the defendant/counter claimant, the period of limitation for institution of suit for specific performance, is, to commence there-from, yet no corroborative and cogent evidence in proof thereto has been adduced by the defendant/counter claimant. He has omitted to either depose, that, at the time of execution of Ext.DW1/A, the Jamabandi qua the suit land did not contain any recital qua ban with respect to the alienation of the suit property by the plaintiff/respondent to the defendant/appellant being alive or in force till 1997, as purportedly misrepresented by the plaintiff/respondent, rather, was alive till the year 1994, as discovered subsequently by the defendant/counter claimant. Omission on the part of the defendant/counter claimant to place on record the jamabandi qua the suit land pertaining to the year of execution of Ext.DW1/A and its forthrightly displaying and magnifying the factum of bar of sale qua the suit property to the defendant/appellant by the plaintiff/respondent being alive only till 1994, sequels a conclusion that the plaintiff/respondent did not misrepresent or mis-inform the defendant/counter claimant about the longevity of the bar/prohibition of the sale of the suit property by her in favour of the counter claimant/defendant/appellant being alive till 1997, as contrarily averred by the defendant/counter claimant. A further sequel or as a natural concomitant, the further ensuing deduction is that the ground, as urged by the learned counsel for the defendant/counter claimant, of the period of limitation for the institution of suit for specific performance qua Ext.DW1/A, being reckonable from the discovery of the purported deceit practiced by the plaintiff/respondent upon the defendant/appellant, qua, the longevity of the ban/prohibition qua the sale of the suit property in favour of the appellant/defendant by the plaintiff/respondent, is wholly an invention, concoction as well as succumbable. It gets further eroded in the face of a further disclosure made in the statement of DW-2, who, in his, cross examination has deposed that at the time of scribing of Ext.DW1/A he had perused and scanned the revenue record. With the disclosure, emanating in the deposition of DW-2, of his having at the time of scribing/execution of Ext.DW1/A perused and scanned the revenue record, manifestly surges forth a conclusion that there was then an endorsement in the jamabandi, qua the suit land, of the longevity of the ban/prohibition qua the sale of the suit land by the plaintiff/respondent in favour of the defendant/appellant, being alive or, in, force till 1994. Therefore, when the appellant/defendant/counter claimant was aware of the longevity of the ban/prohibition against the alienation of the suit land in his favour by the plaintiff/respondent by way of an execution of a registered deed of conveyance in his favour, at, the time contemporaneous to the execution of Ext.DW1/A, it appears that, hence, any purported misrepresentation or purported deceit practiced upon him by the plaintiff/respondent or hers purportedly mis-communicating and mis-conveying, to, him qua the longevity of the ban/prohibition against the execution of a registered deed of conveyance qua the suit land in his favour, cannot, be construed to be having any force nor can the defendant/appellant be, hence, construed to have been cajoled by the purported misrepresentation of the plaintiff/respondent, especially when as portrayed by the deposition of DW2 his having full knowledge about the longevity of the ban. Consequently it has to be held that, rather, the defendant/counter claimant is inventing a false ground, of, his having discovered the factum of the longevity of the ban/prohibition qua the alienation of the suit land and execution of the registered conveyance deed only, in, the year 1998, where from he untenably canvasses that the commencement of the period of limitation for institution of the suit for specific performance, is to be reckoned, merely for bringing his suit within the limitation, also he has indulged in levelling spurious allegations of misrepresentation of the longevity of ban/prohibition against the plaintiff/respondent, whereas, for reasons aforesaid, he, was throughout aware of the longevity of the ban/prohibition qua the alienation of the suit land by execution of a registered deed of conveyance by the plaintiff/respondent in his favour. Resultantly, it is to be concluded that throughout the period prescribed in Ex.DW1/A for execution of the registered conveyance deed, he was not ready and willing to perform his part of performance, as a sequel, then also no decree for specific performance of contract can be passed in his favour. Hence, substantial question of law is answered in favour of the plaintiff/respondent and against the defendant/appellant. 14. The result of the above discussion is that the appeal, preferred by the defendant/appellant, is dismissed and the judgment and decree, rendered by the learned First Appellate Court, is affirmed.