Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 1053 (GUJ)

C. H. Upadhyay v. State of Gujarat

2014-09-26

ABDULLAH GULAMAHMED URAIZEE, V.M.SAHAI

body2014
JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. We have heard Mr. M.B. Gandhi with Mr. Chinmay Gandhi, learned Counsel for the petitioner N.J. Shah, learned Asst. Govt. Pleader for respondent No. 1 and A.S. Supehia, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2. The petitioner, a Judicial Officer of the cadre of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) has challenged the order of communication of initiation of departmental inquiry, tentative decision dated 12th September, 2008 as well as final order of dismissal, communicated on 23rd July, 2009 as being illegal and void and for other incidental reliefs under Art. 226 of Constitution of India. 2. The brief facts of the petition are that the petitioner was working as Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Upleta, District Rajkot. By a confidential communication dated 7th April, 2004 he was informed that the High Court had decided to hold departmental inquiry against him on the following charges: "STATEMENT OF IMPUTATIONS That Mr. C.H. Upadhyay was working as Civil Judge (J.D.) and J.M.F.C., Upleta, Dist. Rajkot from 14-6-1999 to 10-6-2002. It was found as under: Mr. C.H. Upadhyay acted rudely and with insulting manner with the Members of the Bar at Upleta and he was passing orders for cancellation of warrant etc. illegally and with mala fide intention and for the reasons otherwise than judicial, and therefore, detailed representations nere made to Hon'ble the High Court and the District Judge, Rajkot and he created disharmony in the function of the Court working in his Court while passing discriminative orders or while not passing any order for inordinate delay and long time. It was also found that Mr. Upadhyay had tendency of keeping ready matters for orders and on approach by the Advocates for order/judgment, he expressed demand of money for favourable orders, asking such Lawyers to follow such practice and such attitude was exhibited to Advocate Mr. P.B. Acharya in presence of other two Advocates Mr. Gaji and Mr. Sojitra, while demanding Rs. 5,000/- to get the order of status quo, in a case concerning Khichadia Ashram, and mere were number of cases pending for orders/judgments for which on the date fixed, no orders were passed; without any proceedings for a long time. Thus, Mr. P.B. Acharya in presence of other two Advocates Mr. Gaji and Mr. Sojitra, while demanding Rs. 5,000/- to get the order of status quo, in a case concerning Khichadia Ashram, and mere were number of cases pending for orders/judgments for which on the date fixed, no orders were passed; without any proceedings for a long time. Thus, Mr. Upadhyay damaged the impression of judicial department by adopting corrupt practice, while pressurizing the Advocates to get favourable orders by paying the money as demanded by him and his such corrupt practice was a talk of the town, amongst the litigants of N.C. cases etc. to the effect that he was illegally getting Rs. 100/- to Rs. 200/- for cancellation of warrants, while exercising corrupt practice in Court cases. It was also found from the records that behavior of Mr. Upadhyay with the Advocates was also very rude and insulting in respect of which resolutions were passed on 21-6-2000 and 13-11-2000 by the members of the Bar. Mr. Upadhyay has not passed orders for long time after hearing arguments and he used to pass indiscriminating orders or would not pass any orders if he was not paid the money as per his demand. It was also found from the records that Mr. Upadhyay has told in the chamber to Mr. P.P. Acharya and Mr. Gazi, the learned Advocate that if they would have became practical then order would have been passed in their favour. It was also found that there were number of cases pending for orders and number of other cases were pending without any further proceedings for long time. He had also directly demanded money for passing orders in favour of the Advocates of Upleta Bar Association and by that way he used to directly collect money from the litigant for passing the orders. Therefore, Mr. Upadhyay had failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. A Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, First Class has to conduct the cases and impart justice with the settled principles of law to uphold the dignity and independence of the judicial department, but by indulging in corrupt practice, Mr. Upadhyay ruined the same while acting as such purporting to unbecoming of a Judge. Therefore, Mr. Upadhyay had failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. (a) Mr. C.H. Upadhyay is guilty of indulging in corrupt practices. (b) Mr. Upadhyay ruined the same while acting as such purporting to unbecoming of a Judge. Therefore, Mr. Upadhyay had failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. (a) Mr. C.H. Upadhyay is guilty of indulging in corrupt practices. (b) Mr. C.H. Upadhyay is guilty of dereliction in his judicial functions. (c) Mr. C.H. Upadhyay acted in a manner unbecoming of Judicial Officer. These above acts of Mr. C.H. Upadhyay, if held proved would tantamount to act unbecoming of a Judicial Officer, and a act of grave misconduct, which is violative of the provisions contained in Rule 3 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971." 3. The learned Principal District Judge, Rajkot was appointed as an Enquiry Officer to conduct the departmental enquiry being Enquiry Case No. 20 of 2002. The Enquiry Officer, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, submitted his report dated 30th August, 2005 and found charges levelled against the petitioner as proved. On the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer, took a tentative decision that the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be proved and looking to the charges, the High Court was of the opinion that this was a fit case for dismissal from service, and therefore, a show-cause notice dated 17th September, 2008 for penalty of dismissal from service was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner replied to the notice vide reply dated 25th October, 2008. 4. The High Court, on its administrative side, took a final decision dated 26th June, 2009 and came to the decision that the petitioner is required to be awarded with most severe punishment, and therefore, punishment under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 and recommended dismissal of the petitioner from the service. The recommendation of the High Court was accepted by the Government of Gujarat in Legal Department and vide Notification dated 23rd July, 2009 and the petitioner came to be dismissed from the service has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the dismissal from the service. 5. Mr. M.B. Gandhi, learned Counsel with Mr. 5. Mr. M.B. Gandhi, learned Counsel with Mr. Chinmay Gandhi, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no direct evidence as regards amount being accepted by the petitioner by way of illegal gratification and merely because the files are kept pending with the petitioner, the Enquiry Officer could not have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was in the habit of demanding money and was indulging into corrupt practice. He further submitted that mere suspicion cannot be allowed to take place of proof even in domestic enquiry. He has further submitted that in absence of any evidence, a charge-sheet cannot sustain merely on the basis of conjectures and in support of his contention he has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of State of Assam v. Mohan Chandra Kalita, AIR 1972 SC 2535 and in the case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 . 6. Mr. Gandhi next contended that as regards second charge of behavior of the present petitioner, no evidence is found except the Resolution passed by the Bar Association and the complaints and lack of personal quality could not constitute a misconduct for proceeding against the petitioner in disciplinary proceedings. In support of his submission, Mr. Gandhi has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022 . 7. Mr. Gandhi has next contended that the charges levelled against the petitioner by the department are vague and no allegations regarding it have been made by him before the Enquiry Officer or before the High Court, the fact that he has participated in the enquiry would not exonerate the department to bring home the charges. The enquiry based on such charges would stand vitiated being not fair. In support of the said contention, Mr. Gandhi has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 995 . 8. Mr. Gandhi has next contended that incidents which were alleged against the petitioner took place in the year 1999-2000. The charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 7th April, 2004 and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 30th August, 2005. 8. Mr. Gandhi has next contended that incidents which were alleged against the petitioner took place in the year 1999-2000. The charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 7th April, 2004 and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 30th August, 2005. Thereafter, tentative decision came to be communicated to the petitioner on 12th September, 2008 and final notification of dismissal was issued on 26th June, 2009 and Notification was issued on 23rd July, 2009. Mr. Gandhi, therefore, submitted that there is a long delay, and therefore, the inquiry is bad on the ground of delay and laches and in support of his contention, he has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kamleshbhai B. Mehta v. Registrar, High Court of Gujarat, 2004 (3) GLR 2290 . 9. Mr. Gandhi has lastly contended that a Judge doing justice is likely to err. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1034 a Judge who has not committed an error is yet to born'. 10. Mr. A.S. Supehia, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 on the other hand submitted that rules of evidence in Evidence Act do not apply and high degree of proof is not required and there is sufficient evidence on record to justify the dismissal of the petitioner. Mr. Supehia has further submitted that a perusal of the depositions of the witnesses in Departmental Enquiry can make it clear that Inquiry Officer has rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct. He has next contended that in the present case, from the statements of witnesses it is clearly established that the petitioner had demanded money from the witness Shri Makadia, which has been corroborated by the evidence of Shri Anwar Ibrahim, Peon. The petitioner has failed to satisfactorily explain the same and could not rebut the aforesaid statements made by the witnesses. 11. Mr. A.S. Supehia, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 has next contended that the departmental proceedings against the delinquent officer can be quashed on the ground of delay in case of two contingencies viz. The petitioner has failed to satisfactorily explain the same and could not rebut the aforesaid statements made by the witnesses. 11. Mr. A.S. Supehia, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 has next contended that the departmental proceedings against the delinquent officer can be quashed on the ground of delay in case of two contingencies viz. (1) by reason of delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of employee, and (2) where the delay has caused prejudice to the employee and such a case of prejudice has to be made out by the employee before the Enquiry Officer. He submitted that in the instant case the petitioner has not taken the ground of delay either before the Inquiry Officer or in this appeal and further that how the delay has prejudiced his case. In support of his contention, Mr. Supehia has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Appala Swamy, 2007 (14) SCC 49 . 12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the entire record. 13. It is borne out from the record that along with the statement of imputation, the petitioner was supplied with the list of witnesses and documents. The said list is as under: "(A) Witnesses: (1) Mr. Gulam Kadar Taiyubbhai Gazi, Advocate, Upleta (2) Mr. S.T. Unadkat, Advocate, Upleta (3) Mr. K.R. Raninga, Advocate, Upleta (4) Mr. P.B. Acharya, Advocate, Upleta (5) Mr. K.H. Joshi, Advocate, Upleta (6) Mr. D.U. Mankadia, Advocate, Upleta (7) Mr. R.V. Sojitra, Advocate, Upleta (8) Mr. M.M. Vala, Superintendent, Court of Upleta (9) Mr. Anwar I. Belim, Peon, Civil Court, Upleta (B) Documents: (1) Complaint of Mr. G.T. Gazi, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 7-9-2000. (2) Copy of Resolution of Upleta Bar Association, dated 21-6-2000. (3) Statement of Mr. Gulam Kadar Taiyubbhai Gazi, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (4) Statement of Mr. S.T. Unadkat, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (5) Statement of Mr. K.R. Raninga, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (6) Statement of Mr. P.B. Acharya, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (7) Statement of Mr. P.B. Acharya, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 25-10-2000. Gulam Kadar Taiyubbhai Gazi, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (4) Statement of Mr. S.T. Unadkat, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (5) Statement of Mr. K.R. Raninga, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (6) Statement of Mr. P.B. Acharya, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 4-3-2001. (7) Statement of Mr. P.B. Acharya, Advocate, Upleta, District Rajkot, dated 25-10-2000. (8) Copy of letter addressed to the President, Upleta Bar Association, dated 17-10-2000 (9) Copy of Resolution passed by Bar Association, Upleta, dated 13-11-2000." Thus, it is manifestly clear that the enquiry against the petitioner was not initiated merely on the basis of suspicion or conjecture and surmises. The petitioner, in his reply to the statement of imputation has nowhere raised the contention that the enquiry against him is initiated on the basis of suspicion, conjecture and surmises. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Assam v. Mohan Chandra Kalita, AIR 1972 SC 2535 and in the case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 have no application in the facts of the present case. In the case of State of Assam v. Mohan Chandra Kalita, AIR 1972 SC 2535 the enquiry was initiated on the basis of an allegation that money was illegally collected from the villagers while distributing compensation amount due to them, but during enquiry some evidence was adduced, which was in respect of matters extraneous to the charge prejudicing the Enquiry Officer against the delinquent, and therefore, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer has based his conclusions on conjectures and there was no evidence against the delinquent to have collected the money at his instance or by his connivance. In the case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 the Supreme Court has held in Paragraph 20 as under: "20. This conclusion does not finally dispose of the appeal. It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is conclusion which is perverse, and therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. It is conclusion which is perverse, and therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Art. 311(2), the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of Certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence. In fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney-General, we ought to add that he did not seriously dispute this position in law." However, in the present case, the inquiry against the petitioner cannot be said to have been initiated on the basis of mere conjectures and surmises and the Enquiry Officer has not recorded his findings though there was no evidence as in the preceding part, we have extracted the list of documents and the documents which were supplied to the petitioner along with statement of imputation. Not only that, during the course of enquiry, five witnesses have been examined besides many documents are marked as exhibits, and therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the enquiry against the petitioner was initiated on the basis of some suspicion and Enquiry Officer has recorded his finding though there was no evidence. Strong reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022 to contend that there is no evidence against the petitioner except the resolution passed by the Bar Association. This contention is also meritless. Strong reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022 to contend that there is no evidence against the petitioner except the resolution passed by the Bar Association. This contention is also meritless. We have gone through the enquiry report and the evidence of the witness. Perusal of the material by no stretch of imagination can lead us to come to the conclusion that there was no evidence against the petitioner. The enquiry against the petitioner was not initiated solely on the basis of the resolution of the Bar Association, but the complaints about corrupt practices adopted by the petitioner were also received. The witnesses examined on behalf of the Department have graphically stated the modus operandi of the petitioner in discharge of his judicial duty. The department, in our opinion, has satisfactorily proved that the conduct of the petitioner was not befitting a Judicial Officer. It is not that there were some shortcomings in the petitioner, and therefore, the departmental enquiry was initiated against him. The statements of witnesses and the findings of the Enquiry Officer makes it manifestly clear that the petitioner had indulged into rampant corruption in passing the judicial orders. The witnesses have graphically stated the modus operandi adopted by the petitioner and how the petitioner used to collect the bribe money for passing favourable orders. The ratio expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of J. Ahmed, [ AIR 1979 SC 1022 ], would have no application in the facts of the present case as the petitioner has indulged into corrupt practices. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 995 , has observed in Paragraph 17 as under: "17. The application of those principles of natural justice must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and the subject-matter of the case. It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules as to which principle of natural justice is to be applied. There is no such thing as technical natural justice. The requirements of natural justice depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with and so on. There is no such thing as technical natural justice. The requirements of natural justice depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with and so on. Concept of fair play in action which is the basis of natural justice must depend upon the particular lis between the parties. See K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, 1984 (1) SCC 43 : AIR 1984 SC 273 . Rules and practices are constantly developing to ensure fairness, in the making of decisions which affect people in their daily lives and livelihood. Without such fairness, democratic Governments cannot exist. Beyond all rules and procedures that is the sine qua non." 15. In Surath Chandra Chakravarthy v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752 , it has been held by the Apex Court that the charges involving consequences of termination of service must be specific, though a departmental enquiry is not like a criminal trial: "4. ........Now, in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. The appellant repeatedly and at every stage brought it to the notice of the authorities concerned that he had not been supplied the statement of allegations and that the charges were extremely vague and indefinite. In spite of all this, no one cared to inform him of the facts, circumstances and particulars relevant to the charges. Even if the Enquiry Officer had made a report against him the appellant could have been given a further opportunity at the stage of the second show-cause notice to adduce any further evidence if he so desired after he had been given the necessary particulars and material in the form of a statement of allegations which had never been supplied to him before. This could undoubtedly be done in view of the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution as they existed at the material time. The entire proceedings show a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit." The principles of these judgments are based on the peculiar facts of those cases. Here, in the present case, the Department has supplied the list of documents and witnesses. Not only that, the statement of imputation is also very clear, and therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that it was not possible for him to make out the exact nature of the charges and the evidence - documentary and oral, which the department was going to rely during the course of enquiry. Therefore, the contention of the learned Advocate that the charges levelled against the petitioner are vague cannot be accepted because the petitioner has participated in the departmental enquiry without raising any demur about the vagueness of the charge. 16. As regards the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan v. Y.B. Zala, (supra) that the enquiry conducted against the petitioner was bad on account of delay and laches, the same cannot be countenanced. The perusal of the reply of the petitioner to the show-cause notice and the reply to the tentative decision of the High Court shows that the petitioner has not raised this contention during and after the departmental enquiry. Moreover, it is rightly submitted by Mr. Supehia, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 that the petitioner has not demonstrated as to how any prejudice is caused to the petitioner because of the so called delay in conducting the departmental enquiry. In Mohanbhai Dungarbhai Parmar v. Y.B. Zala, 1979 GLR 497 , this Court was dealing with an issue viz. Moreover, it is rightly submitted by Mr. Supehia, learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 that the petitioner has not demonstrated as to how any prejudice is caused to the petitioner because of the so called delay in conducting the departmental enquiry. In Mohanbhai Dungarbhai Parmar v. Y.B. Zala, 1979 GLR 497 , this Court was dealing with an issue viz. "Can an employee satisfactorily explain whether he had a good and sufficient cause for reporting late on a particular day one and a half years ago and show-cause for the lapse "would or would not the delay of one and half years to initiate disciplinary proceedings by itself constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to defend, and thus violate principles of natural justice". The Court in Paragraph 3, in the backdrop of the issue posed before it, has held as under: "3. It is an admitted position that the alleged absence from parade occurred on November 15, 1971 and the alleged absence at the time of taking roll-call occurred on some occasions between November 15, 1971. It is also not in dispute that charge-sheet in this behalf was served for the first time on May 18, 1973 that is to say about 11/2 years after the aforesaid lapses are paid to have occurred. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has argue that this inordinate delay by itself constitutes denial of reasonable opportunity to defend inasmuch as after 11/2 years, it would be humanly impossible for any one with average memory and recollection to explain under what circumstances he was unable to attend the parade or to remain present at the time when roll-call was taken. The allegation appears to be that at the point of time of roll-call the petitioner was not found present. It does not mean that he had not turned up at all. It means that he had turned up late. It is not possible for any one after a lapse of 11/2 years to explain under what circumstances he was late or unable to attend the parade or had remained present at the time of the taking of the roll-call. No doubt in the police force, the authorities would be justified in expecting strict discipline from the police constables. Even so, it cannot be overlooked that they are human-beings. No doubt in the police force, the authorities would be justified in expecting strict discipline from the police constables. Even so, it cannot be overlooked that they are human-beings. Nor can it be overlooked that they may have good grounds for not being able to report for the parade or roll-call at the stroke of the hour. One can conceive of several reasons. May be he was indisposed. May be there was some unexpected occurrence in the family. May be something occurred on his way to the parade ground which held him up. A mere lapse in regard to such a small matter by itself regardless of the underlying cause for the lapse cannot constitute negligence or dereliction from duty. A police constable must be given an opportunity to effectively explain the circumstances in which the lapse occurred in order to satisfy the disciplinary authority that the lapse was neither intentional nor deliberate nor on account of indifference or negligence but was occasioned by circumstances beyond his control. If he can satisfy the disciplinary authority on this point the charge cannot be established. Can he however, at all offer a satisfactory explanation on the basis of his memory when the charge is levelled one and half years after the occurrence? "Having regard to the very nature and content of the charge, a delay of about 11/2 years must be considered fatal from the point of view of affording reasonable opportunity to the constable concerned to show-cause against the charge levelled against him. It would be asking for the impossible to expect the constable concerned to explain satisfactorily the reason which occasioned the delay in reporting for duty. If the charge or accusation had been levelled very soon after the lapse, the constable concerned could have rendered an appropriate explanation regardless of whether it was or was not considered satisfactory by the competent authority. Not having done so for more than 11/2 years after the occurrence, the constable cannot be penalized for not being able to show-cause to satisfaction of the disciplinary authority. Not having done so for more than 11/2 years after the occurrence, the constable cannot be penalized for not being able to show-cause to satisfaction of the disciplinary authority. Under the circumstances, the very delay in initiating proceedings must be held to constitute a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself for one cannot reasonably expect an employee to have a computer like memory or to maintain a day-to-day diary in which every small matter is meticulously recorded in anticipation of future eventualities of which he cannot have a prevision. Nor can he be expected to adduce evidence to establish his innocence for after inordinate delay he would not recall the identity of the witness who could support him. Delay by itself therefore, will constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to show-cause. This would amount to violation of principles of natural justice and the impugned order must be struck down on this ground alone." The Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 (2) SCC 570 , has observed as under: "11. The principles to be borne in mind in this behalf have been set out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225 . Though, the said case pertained to criminal prosecution, the principles enunciated therein are broadly applicable to a plea of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. In Paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that "ultimately the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors - balancing test or balancing process - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case". It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that is not the only course open to the Court, and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. At the same time, it has been observed that is not the only course open to the Court, and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case." In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Appala Swamy, 2007 (14) SCC 49 , the Apex Court has held that unless the delinquent shows and establishes that because of the delay in initiation and conclusion of the departmental enquiry grave prejudice is caused to the delinquent, the departmental proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of delay and laches alone. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Appala Swamy, [ 2007 (14) SCC 49 ] is squarely applicable to the facts, present case and the enquiry against the appellant cannot be said to have vitiated on the ground of delay. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 17. The legal position regarding the power of the High Court of judicial review in cases of disciplinary action is well settled. In the case of State of U.P. v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha, 2009 (8) SCC 310 , High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, 2000 (1) SCC 416 and Pandey Gajendra Prasad (supra), relied upon by Mr. A.S. Supehia, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, the ratio that can be culled out is that in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employer is very limited. The Courts are primarily concerned with the question whether the enquiry has been held by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural justice have been followed. The Court can also consider whether there was some tangible evidence for proving the charge against the delinquent and such evidence reasonably supports the conclusions recorded by the competent authority. The Court can also consider whether there was some tangible evidence for proving the charge against the delinquent and such evidence reasonably supports the conclusions recorded by the competent authority. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was held in consonance with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported by some tangible evidence, men there is no scope for interference with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to impose the particular punishment except when the same is found to be wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or shocks the conscience of the Court. 18. As regards the last contention of Mr. Gandhi that a Judge doing justice is likely to err is concerned, in the decision of K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1034, relied upon by learned Advocate for the petitioner, in the present case, we are of the opinion that the misconduct committed by the petitioner is not an inadvertent error or due to lack of experience on his part. The evidence, which has come on record during the enquiry manifestly exhibits that the petitioner had indulged into rampant corruption. The Judges, at whatever level may be, represent the State and its authority, unlike the bureaucracy or the members of the other service. Judicial service is not merely an employment nor the Judges merely employees. They exercise sovereign judicial power. They are holders of public offices of great trust and responsibility. If a judicial officer "tips the scales of justice, its rippling effect would be disastrous and deleterious". The Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil, 1997 (6) SCC 339 : 1997 AIR SCW 2592 : AIR 1997 SC 2631 , has aptly observed as under: "The lymph nodes (cancerous cells) of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary and the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self-imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under the doctrine of control enshrined in Arts. 235, 124(6) of the Constitution. 235, 124(6) of the Constitution. It would, therefore, be necessary that there should be constant vigil by the High Court concerned on its subordinate judiciary and self-introspection." In the present case, the Enquiry Officer has recorded the findings on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence that the petitioner had indulged into corrupt practices and the charges levelled against him are found to have been proved. Our powers of judicial review are fettered by the settled legal position. It is well settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is not within the competence of the High Court to substitute or interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority merely on the ground that the High Court feels that it is on higher side. The High Court on judicial side does not sit in appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority. The scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employer is very limited. The Courts are primarily concerned with the question whether the enquiry has been held by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural justice have been followed. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the punishment inflicted on the petitioner is not shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the petition, and hence, the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.