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Rajasthan High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 1053 (RAJ)

Gopal v. Murlidhar

2014-04-29

BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2014
Judgment 1. The present second appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC by the appellants-defendants is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31/8/2013 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge No.3, Beawar (hereinafter referred to as 'the Appellate Court') in Regular First Appeal No.22 of 2012(26/02), whereby the Appellate Court has allowed the said appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 20/4/2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Beawar (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court') in Suit No.234 of 1977. 2. The facts in net-shell giving rise to the present appeal are that the original plaintiff Rameshwari Devi widow of Banshidhar, the predecessor-in-title of the respondents had filed the suit against the original defendant Ram Lal S/o. Sukhchand, the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, seeking eviction in respect of the suit shop on the ground of committing default in the payment of rent, and on the ground of nuisance, on 21/9/1977. It was alleged in the plaint inter-alia that the suit shop was let out to the defendant on the monthly rent of Rs.18/- plus house tax. The defendant had paid the rent upto Bhadva Sudi 15th of 2032 as per the Hindu Calendar and the rent was due since Asaj Badi 1st of 2032. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had committed default by not making the payment of rent for more than six months. It was also alleged that the defendant tenant was creating nuisance by consuming alcohol, and therefore, the suit for eviction was filed. The said suit was resisted by the original defendant by filing the written-statement on 14/2/1978 denying the allegations made in the plaint, and further contending inter-alia that though the defendant had tried to pay the rent through money order, the plaintiff had refused to accept the same. 3. It appears that the Trial Court determined the provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950(hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'), on 21/3/1978. The plaintiff thereafter filed an application on 15/11/1983 for striking out the defence of the defendant under Section 13(5) of the said Act on the ground that the defendant had not paid the rent for the month of July, 1980, due on 11/8/1980 within the specified time limit. The plaintiff thereafter filed an application on 15/11/1983 for striking out the defence of the defendant under Section 13(5) of the said Act on the ground that the defendant had not paid the rent for the month of July, 1980, due on 11/8/1980 within the specified time limit. The defendant thereafter filed an application on 5/7/1984 seeking condonation of delay of nine days on the ground that the defendant had deposited the rent on 20/8/1980 instead of 11/8/1980. The Trial Court dismissed the said application of the plaintiff filed under Section 13(5) of the said Act, and allowed the application of the defendant for the condonation of delay, vide the order dated 17/8/1984. The plaintiff thereafter again filed an application on 8/10/1998 for striking out the defence of the defendant under Section 13(5) of the said Act on the ground that the defendant had not paid the rent for the month of September, 1993, due on 15/10/1993 within the specified time limit. The defendant filed the reply on 1/9/1999 to the said application and also filed an application on 28/2/2002 seeking condonation of delay of 12 days for the month of September, 1993. The said application was resisted by the plaintiff by filing the reply on 14/3/2002. The Trial Court allowed the said application of the defendant vide the order dated 18/3/2002, and then dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide the judgment and decree dated 20th April, 2002, granting the defendant benefit under the provisions contained in Section 13(6) of the said Act. Since during the pendency of the suit, the original-plaintiff and original defendant had expired, their respective legal representatives were brought on record. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the respondent Nos.1 to 5 had preferred an appeal being F.A. No.22/12(26/02) before the Appellate Court against the present appellants, showing the present respondent Nos.6 to 12 as the respondents in the cause title of the appeal memo. The said appeal came to be allowed by the Appellate Court by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 20/4/2002 passed by the Trial Court and directing the appellants-defendants to hand over the vacant possession of the suit shop to the appellants-plaintiffs within two months of the said order. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present second appeal has been filed by the appellants-defendants. 4. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present second appeal has been filed by the appellants-defendants. 4. The learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ashok Mehta for the appellants vehemently submitted that the Appellate court has committed an error of law in misinterpretating the provisions contained in Section 13 of the said Act and in allowing the Appeal of the respondents, in utter disregard of the legal position settled by this Court in various decisions. Placing heavy reliance on the decision in case of Jamna Lal vs. Kanhiyalal, 1982, WLN 751 as also in case of Lal Chand vs. Santram, AIR 1979 Raj. 140 , he submitted that the application for extension of time could be made within the period specified in Section 13(4) of the said Act or even thereafter. According to him, the appellants-defendants had already deposited the rent on 20/8/1980 instead of 11/8/1980 for the month of July, 1980, which was within the permissible period of 15 days after the expiry of first 15 days, though the application for condonation of 9 days was filed subsequently on 5/7/1984. Similarly though there was delay of 12 days in making the rent for the month of September, 1993, it was deposited within the permissible period of fifteen days. He further submitted that merely because the application for condonation of delay or for extension of time was filed subsequently after the expiry of permissible period, it could not be said that the appellants had committed any default in complying with the provisions contained in Section 13(4) of the said Act. Distinguishing the recent decision of this Court in case of Gopal Singh vs. Civil Judge (Junior Division) and others, AIR 2011, Rajasthan 14, and also the decision of Apex Court in case of Nasiruddin & Ors. vs. Sita Ram Agrawal, (2003) 2 SCC 577 , he submitted that in the said cases, the issue was as to whether the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the provisions contained in Section 13(4) of the said Act or not. According to him, the issue whether the tenant could have filed the application seeking extension of time after the expiry of permissible period specified in the said provision under Section 13(4) of the said Act or not, was not considered. According to him, the issue whether the tenant could have filed the application seeking extension of time after the expiry of permissible period specified in the said provision under Section 13(4) of the said Act or not, was not considered. He also submitted that the Trial Court had rightly exercised its discretion in favour of the appellants, which has been wrongly set aside by the Appellate Court. 5. However, the learned counsel Mr. Jai Prakash Gupta for the respondents-plaintiffs heavily relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Nasiruddin & ors. vs. Sitaram Agarwal (supra) and the decision of this Court in case of Gopal Singh vs. Civil Judge (Junior Division) (supra) submitted that the appellants-defendants having not sought any order from the Court within the permissible period specified in Section 13(4) and the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act being not applicable to the said provisions contained in the said Act, the Appellate Court has rightly set aside the decree passed by the Trial Court. Drawing attention of the Court to the record of the case, Mr. Gupta submitted that on both the occasions of default, the appellants had not filed any application seeking extension of time or condonation of delay, till the respondents-plaintiffs filed the application for striking off the defence under Section 13(5) of the said Act. 6. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the learned counsels for the parties, it would be beneficial to reproduce the relevant part of section 13, which reads as under :- “13. Eviction of tenants:- ........... (3) “In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1) with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the Court shall, on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the Court may fix in this behalf which shall not be more than three months after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issues, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent there to upto the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable upto the date of determination : Provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section, the Court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of the filing of the suit. (4) The tenant shall deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in Court or pay to the landlord, month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time; not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the Court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the Court under sub-section (3). (5) if tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the Court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. (6) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-section (4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall be passed by the Court against him. Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section, if having obtained such benefit or benefits under Section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months.” 7. Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this sub-section, if having obtained such benefit or benefits under Section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months.” 7. From the bare perusal of the above said provision, it transpires that in a suit for eviction on the ground that the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months, the Court on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the Court may fix in this behalf, has to provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in Court or paid to the landlord by the tenant as per sub-section (3) of Section 13. Further, Sub-section (4) of Section 13 mandates that the tenant shall deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord such amount as determined by the Court under sub-section (3), within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the Court. It further appears that the tenant has to continue to deposit or pay the monthly rent, month by month subsequent to the period upto which the determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteenth days as may be extended by the Court. It further appears that non-compliance of the provision contained in subsection (4) would entail the consequence of striking out of defence of the defendant under sub-section (5) thereof. 8. In the instant case, the question that falls for consideration before the Court is, whether in case of default in making the payment or deposit in the Court the amount of rent determined by the Court, the tenant should seek extension of time by making application to the Court before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (4) of Section 13, or he could seek extension even after the expiry of such specified time. 9. 9. This Court in case of Lalchand vs. Santram (supra) and in case of Jamna Lal vs. Kanhaiyalal (supra) had held inter-alia that the provisions of Section 13 were amended so as to remove the hardship of the tenant where the tenant was unable to deposit the rent month by month within the specified time on account of some genuine difficulties or unforeseen obstacle, and therefore, beneficial construction should be given to the amended provisions of sub-section (4). The Court, therefore, had held that in absence of any restrictive provisions for making application, the Court could extend the time for making the deposit at any time, subject to the condition that such extension could not be made for a period of more than 15 days, after the expiry of 15 days from the end of the month. Of course, it was also observed that it is not the right of the tenant to obtain such an extension, but the Court has a discretion which should be exercised in a judicial manner. 10. It is further required to be noted that subsequently in case of Gopaldas vs. Nathulal Bariya, AIR 1983 Rajasthan 222, this Court held that an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of deposit of rent in terms of section 13(4) of the Act was maintainable. The said decision was rendered having regard to the insertion of Section 13-A of the said Act, by the Amendment Act of 1975. However, the view taken by the Court in Gopaldas case (supra) was reconsidered by the Larger Bench of five judges in case of Sita Ram Agarwal vs. Nasiruddin & Ors. reported in RLR 1997(1) 686. In the said case, out of five three Hon'ble Judges of the Bench held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable, where there is default in deposit of arrears of the rent within specified period, whereas two members of the Bench held to the contrary. reported in RLR 1997(1) 686. In the said case, out of five three Hon'ble Judges of the Bench held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable, where there is default in deposit of arrears of the rent within specified period, whereas two members of the Bench held to the contrary. The said judgment of Full Bench of five Judges was carried to the Apex Court, and the Apex Court in the said case of Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 held that wherever the special Act provides for extension of time or condonation of default, the Court possesses the power therefor, but where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the Court does not find the power to do so. It was further held that in absence of such provisions in the present Act i.e. the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, the Court did not have the power to either extend the period to deposit the rent or to condone the default in depositing the rent. On the issue whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable where there was a default in depositing the rent by the tenant under Section 13(4) of the said Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that by filing an application after the expiry of period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute, cause of action must arise and that the Court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise. The Apex Court, therefore, held that Section 5 of the Limitation is not applicable to the provisions contained in Section 13(4) of the said Act. 11. It is pertinent to note that the Apex Court in the said case of Nasiruddin & ors. vs. Sita Ram Agarwal also observed that rent control statues are welfare legislation not entirely beneficial enactments for the tenant, but also for the benefit of the landlord. Therefore, balance has to be struck while interpreating the provisions of the rent Acts. The Apex Court further held as under :- “37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. Therefore, balance has to be struck while interpreating the provisions of the rent Acts. The Apex Court further held as under :- “37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression “shall or may” is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is directory of mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character. 38. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. It is a well-settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified......” 12. Following the aforestated ratio laid down by the Apex Court in case of Nasiruddin (supra), this Court while dealing with the scope and ambit of Section 13(4) of the said case, in case of Gopal Singh vs. Civil Judge (Junior Division), AIR 2011 Raj. 14 held as under : “13. In case the tenant were to file his application after the statutory period of fifteen days is over, he would be required to file an application for condonation of delay for his failure to perform his statutory duty within the statutory stipulated period. 14 held as under : “13. In case the tenant were to file his application after the statutory period of fifteen days is over, he would be required to file an application for condonation of delay for his failure to perform his statutory duty within the statutory stipulated period. However, according to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin ( AIR 2003 SC 1543 ) (supra), the power to condone the delay under the Limitation Act has not been bestowed upon the Court in an application filed under Section 13(4) of the Act. Therefore, in cases the tenant wants the Court to extend the period for depositing the amount, obviously the application has to be filed before the completion of fifteen days. Therefore, in the present case, both the learned Court below were justified in holding that since the application for extension of time was not filed within the stipulated period of fifteen days, the application deserves to be dismissed.” 13. In view of the aforestated legal position settled by the Apex Court as well as by this Court, there remains no shadow of doubt that when Section 13(4) of the said Act imposes mandatory duty upon the tenant to pay the amount determined under Section 13(3) of the said Act within 15 days, the said mandatory provision has to be fulfilled within the period specified under Section 13(4) , meaning thereby the tenant has to deposit or pay the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination and continue to deposit or pay month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made, by the fifteen day of each succeeding month. Though the Court is empowered to extend the said time for further period, not exceeding 3 months in the former case, and not exceeding 15 days in the later case, the tenant must seek such extension within the time specified therein. Again it is to be noted that the tenant can not claim extension of three months or fifteen days as the case may be, as a matter of right and it is the sole discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension within the specified time or not. Again it is to be noted that the tenant can not claim extension of three months or fifteen days as the case may be, as a matter of right and it is the sole discretion of the Court whether to grant such extension within the specified time or not. The very expression “as may be extended by the Court” presupposes the extension before the expiry of specified period, and therefore, the extension of time upto permissible period should be sought by the tenant before the expiry of the said specified period. If he fails to do so, his defence would be liable to be struck off under Section 13(5) of the said Act. 14. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not disputed that the appellants had not deposited the monthly rent for the month of July, 1980 by fifteenth day of the succeeding month and had deposited the same on 20th August, 1980 and that no extension was sought or application was made by him till the respondents filed an application on 15/11/1983 for striking out the defence of the appellants under Section 13(5) of the said Act. On such application having been made by the respondents, the appellants on 5/7/1984 had made an application for condonation of delay of nine days for making the payment of rent for the month of July, 1980. The said application of the appellants was allowed and the application of the respondents to strike out the defence of the appellant was dismissed by the Trial Court vide the order dated 17/8/1984. Again the appellants committed default in making the payment of the rent for the month of September, 1994, and filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 12 days on 28/2/2002, which came to be allowed by the Trial Court on 18/3/2002. Since the appellants on both the occasions of default had not sought extension of time from the Trial Court within the period specified in Section 13(3), and had sought condonation of delay by making applications years thereafter, their such applications were not maintainable and their defence was liable to be struck off, which has been rightly struck off by the Appellate Court. The appellants having not complied with the mandatory provisions contained in the sub Section (4) of Section 13, had rendered themselves liable to the consequences contained in sub-section (5) thereof. 15. The appellants having not complied with the mandatory provisions contained in the sub Section (4) of Section 13, had rendered themselves liable to the consequences contained in sub-section (5) thereof. 15. In that view of the matter, the Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Appellate court. The present appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.