JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. 1. This revisional application is directed against an order dated 28th January, 2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Howrah in L.R. Misc. Case No. 3 of 2013 by which an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is rejected. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, an application under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act came to be filed by the opposite party no.1 against the petitioner and the opposite party nos.2 & 3 as an adjoining co-owner having longest common boundary. According to the plaint case, a land measuring .48 Decimals comprising in R.S. Dag No. 260 corresponding to L.R. Dag No. 253, J.L. No. 51 under Domjur Police Station, District- Howrah, was seized and possessed by opposite party nos.2 & 3 and four other persons. It is further averred that the opposite party nos.2 & 3 were having .36 Decimals of land out of .48 Decimals and sold, transferred and conveyed .24 Decimals to the petitioner on 18th October, 2012 for a consideration of L 1 Crore. The petitioner claimed his ownership in respect of a land comprised in R.S. Dag No. 258 corresponding to L.R. Dag No. 250 under Domjur Police Station, District-Howrah on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 4th July, 2008. The Schedule appended to the plaint would show that the description of the land is shown as bastu land for which the preemption is sought. The petitioner appeared in the suit and prayed for rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure as the preemption under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is not permissible in respect of bastu land. The Trial Court rejected the said application as it does not found that the bastu land is immune from being preempt taking aid of the definition of the land enshrined under Section 2 (7) of the said Act. 3. Before this Court, the argument at the bar is restricted on the solitary point as indicated above. 4. Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that prior to the amendment brought in the year 1981 giving effect from August 7, 1969, the definition of the holding has undergone a sea change. 3. Before this Court, the argument at the bar is restricted on the solitary point as indicated above. 4. Mr. Haradhan Banerjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that prior to the amendment brought in the year 1981 giving effect from August 7, 1969, the definition of the holding has undergone a sea change. According to him, the definition of the holding under Section 2 (6) of the said Act is declared as ultra vires in a subsequent judgment rendered in case of Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors. v. State of W.B. & Ors. reported in 1996 (2) CLJ 285. He strongly relies upon a judgment rendered in case of Punit Singh v. Sri Gour @ Gobinda Chandra Das & Ors. reported in 2007 (3) WBLR 93 in support of the proposition that the preemption in respect of a bastu land does not lie within the ambit of Section 8 of the said Act. According to him, the judgment rendered in case of Punit Singh (supra) was accepted and endorsed in case ofSmt. Tarulata Mahanta v. Sri Haripada Sarkar reported in 2012 (3) WBLR 309 (Cal). Taking aid of the aforesaid two judgments, Mr. Banerjee would submit that the Co-ordinate Bench is bound by the judgment of the another Co-ordinate Bench and cannot take a contrary view. He thus submits that if the Co-ordinate Bench did not agree with the judgment of the another Co-ordinate Bench, the appropriate course to be adopted is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. 5. Mr. Shakti Nath Mukherjee, the learned Senior Counsel submits that the definition of the land which originally stood was amended giving a retrospective effect and it would be apparent from the said definition that the homestead is brought within the aforesaid definition by an inclusive clause. He further submits that the definition of the raiyat has also been amended and, therefore, a restrictive meaning as stood prior to the amendment cannot be applied. He thus submits that the bastu land is capable of preempt because of the inclusive definition of the land under Section 2 (7) of the said Act. 6. He further submits that the definition of the raiyat has also been amended and, therefore, a restrictive meaning as stood prior to the amendment cannot be applied. He thus submits that the bastu land is capable of preempt because of the inclusive definition of the land under Section 2 (7) of the said Act. 6. Before proceeding to deal with the points as canvassed above, it would be profitable to quote certain provisions of the said Act which are as follows: "Sec.2 (6) "co-sharer of a raiyat in a plot of land" means a person, other than the raiyat, who has an un-demarketed interest in the plot of land along with the raiyat. (7) "land" means land of every description and includes tank, tank-fishery, fishery, homestead or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming, dairy or land comprised in tea garden, mill, factory, workshop, orchard, hat, bazar, ferries, tolls or land having any other sairati interests and any other land together with all interests, and benefits arising out of land and thinks attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to earth. (10) "raiyat" means a person or an institution holding land for any purposes whatsoever. (10) "raiyat" means a person or an institution holding land for any purposes whatsoever. Sec. 8 Right of purchase by co-sharer or contiguous tenant- (1) if a portion or share of a [plot of land of a raiyat] is transferred to any person other than a [co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land], [the bargadar in the plot of land] may, within three months of the date of such transfer, or] any [co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land] may within three months of the service of the notice given under sub-section (5) of section 5, or any raiyat possessing land [adjoining such plot of land] may, within four months of the date of such transfer, apply to the [Munsif having territorial jurisdiction,] for transfer of the said portion or [share of the plot of land] to him, subject to the limit mentioned in [section 14M,] on deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of 10% of that amount: (2) Nothing in this section shall apply to:- (a) a transfer by exchange or by partition, or (b) a transfer by bequest or gift, or hiba-bil-ewaz, or (c) a mortgage mentioned in section 7, or (d) a transfer for charitable or religious purposes or both without reservation of any pecuniary benefit [for any individual, or] (e) a transfer of land in favour of a bargadar in respect of such land if after such transfer, the transferee holds as a raiyat land not exceeding one acre[or 0.4047 hectare] in area in the aggregate." (3) Every application pending before a Revenue Officer at the commencement of section 7 of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 shall, on such commencement, stand transferred to, and disposed of by, the Munsif having jurisdiction in relation to the area in which the land is situated and on such transfer every such application shall be dealt with from the stage at which it was so transferred and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act, as amended by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972." 7. The original definition of the land as stood prior to the amendment was restricted to an agricultural land other than the land comprised in tea garden and includes the homestead. The original definition of the land as stood prior to the amendment was restricted to an agricultural land other than the land comprised in tea garden and includes the homestead. The definition of the raiyat was also restricted to a person who holds land for the purpose of agriculture. By West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1981 giving a retrospective effect from 7th August, 1969, the definition of the land saw the radical change and the definition as stood means land of every description which includes homestead as well. The explanation inserted thereto assigned the same meaning of homestead as in the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. 8. It admits no ambiguity to say that by using the expression means and includes the legislature intended to give a wider definition that its grammatical meaning (S.K. Gupta & another v. K.P. Jain & another reported in AIR 1979 SC 734 ). If the definition of the raiyat remained unchanged i.e. a person holding a land for agricultural purposes, it could probably be argued that such inclusive definition should be interpreted in tune with the dominant purposes. Simultaneously the definition of the raiyat was also changed by excluding the word agricultural and the definition which stood today does not restrict the land for agricultural purposes but for any other purposes. When the homestead is retained in an inclusive definition and the pre-dominant purposes, which originally stood for agriculture, has been changed to any other purposes, the restricted meaning that the pre-dominant purpose i.e. an agricultural purpose should still be adhere to would frustrate the intendment of the legislature which brought the amendments subsequently. 9. The judgment rendered in case of Kamaleswar Singha v. Bijoli Bhattacharya & Ors. reported in 1979 (2) CLJ 526 was delivered at a point of time when the amendment in the definition of the land and the raiyat was not in existence. In case of Punit Singh (supra), the Court was dealing the matter where the application for preemption was resisted on two-fold ground firstly; that the preemption in respect of a bastu land is not competent secondly; the application is barred by limitation. In the said report, the land was situated within the urban area and was not an agricultural land. In case of Punit Singh (supra), the Court was dealing the matter where the application for preemption was resisted on two-fold ground firstly; that the preemption in respect of a bastu land is not competent secondly; the application is barred by limitation. In the said report, the land was situated within the urban area and was not an agricultural land. Taking aid of the definition of the urban land giving under Section 2 (o) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and relying upon a judgment of the Division Bench in case of Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti (supra), it is held that the preemption in respect of a land other than the agricultural land situated within the Urban Agglomeration is not maintainable. The subsequent Co-ordinate Bench in case of Tarulata (supra) simply followed the judgment rendered in case of Punit Singh (supra) and arrived at the conclusion that the preemption in respect of bastu land is not maintainable. However, in case of Rajat Neogi v. Pradip Kr. Sen & Anr. reported in 2010 (1) CLJ 81 (Cal), another Co-ordinate Bench was poised with the question whether a land situated in the urban area is outside the purview of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act or not. The Coordinate Bench took note of Section 1 (2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act and held that the applicability of the said Act is extended to whole of the West Bengal except the area excluded in the said Section. It is further held that Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act does not contain the overriding clause so as to exclude the applicability of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act in a case covered under the said Act. 10. It is no longer res integra that a judgment is rendered per inquriam if it did not take notice of the statute. The judgments rendered in case of Punit Singh (supra) and Tarulata (supra) did not consider the amendment having brought to the definition of land and raiyat and, therefore, those cannot be said to have laid down the correct law. The Trial Court has extensively recorded its finding on the above issue and in my opinion, has correctly held that an application for preemption under Section 8 of the Land Reforms Act in respect of a bastu land is maintainable. 11. The Trial Court has extensively recorded its finding on the above issue and in my opinion, has correctly held that an application for preemption under Section 8 of the Land Reforms Act in respect of a bastu land is maintainable. 11. This Court does not find that any error is committed by the Trial Court in rejecting an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code. 12. The revisional application fails. 13. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 14. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis.