JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the order dated 29.01.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in SBCWP No.2957/2005, whereby the learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, has quashed the orders dated 08.10.1997 and 30.10.2012 passed by the appellate authorities and directed the appellants to grant family pension as well as retrial benefits as admissible by treating the respondent to be the widow of deceased Government servant with interest at the rate of 8% from the date of death of her husband as mentioned in the death certificate. The learned Single Judge has further directed to calculate the retrial benefits and release the same as expeditiously as possible within two months from the receipt of the impugned order. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the husband of the respondent was serving as Mechanic Gr.II with the appellant - Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'the RSRTC' hereinafter) at Hanumangarh. It is contended by the respondent in the writ petition that on 25.03.1994, her husband - Surajbhan was having abdomen pain, therefore, he went for check up to the Doctor but did not return home. In respect of the same, a missing person report was lodged at Police Station, Hanumangarh on 30.03.1994, however, when her husband was not traced out, his death certificate, declaring him dead on 25.03.1994, was issued on 10.04.2001. In the meantime, the RSRTC initiated disciplinary proceedings against the husband of the respondent and when he did not appear before the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority has passed the order dated 08.10.1997 and dismissed the services of the husband of the respondent. 3. Being aggrieved with the dismissal order dated 08.10.1997, the respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, however, the same was dismissed vide order dated 30.10.2002 while treating the appeal time barred. 4. Being aggrieved with the above action of the appellants, the respondent preferred a writ petition with a prayer for quashing of the dismissal order dated 08.10.1997 and the order dated 30.10.2002 passed by the appellate authority. The respondent has also prayed for retrial benefits with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. 5. 4. Being aggrieved with the above action of the appellants, the respondent preferred a writ petition with a prayer for quashing of the dismissal order dated 08.10.1997 and the order dated 30.10.2002 passed by the appellate authority. The respondent has also prayed for retrial benefits with interest at the rate of 8% per annum. 5. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties concerned, has allowed the writ petition, while holding that the missing report of the husband of the respondent was lodged with the police, however, he could not be traced out and finally he was declared dead. It has been observed by the learned Single Judge that the death certificate dated 10.04.2001, declaring the husband of the respondent having died on 25.03.1994, is not disputed. After observing this, the learned Single Judge has held that the termination order of the husband of the respondent was passed exparte in his absence when he is already supposed to have died and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained. It has further been observed by the learned Single Judge that the death certificate has been issued after a lapse of seven years and as such, the order dismissing the appeal of the respondent as time barred too is not sustainable. 6. The appellants, in this appeal, have challenged the finding of the learned Single Judge, wherein it is held that the husband of the respondent will be presumed to be dead on 25.03.1994. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the presumption raised under section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'the Evidence Act' hereinafter) is a limited presumption, which is confined only to presuming the factum of death of the person who's life or death is in issue. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that as per section 108 of the Evidence Act, though it will be presumed that the person is dead but there cannot be any presumption as to the date or time of death of the person. It is further contended that as per section 108 of the Evidence Act, the presumption as to the death of a person would arise only on lapse of seven years and not at any time short of it. It is further contended that as per section 108 of the Evidence Act, the presumption as to the death of a person would arise only on lapse of seven years and not at any time short of it. In support of above contentions, the learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.I.C. of India v. Anuradha, AIR 2004 SC 2070 . 8. The learned counsel for the appellants has further argued that the learned Single Judge has grossly erred in quashing the order dated 08.10.1997 and the order passed by the appellate authority on 30.10.2012, and has further erred in directing the appellants to grant family pension as well as the other retrial benefits to the respondent, while treating her to be the widow of deceased employee of the RSRTC and contended that such directions are liable to be quashed and set aside and the impugned order is also liable to be set aside. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality in presuming the date of death of the husband of the respondent as 25.03.1994 and the termination of the husband of the respondent by the appellants has also rightly been quashed by the learned Single Judge. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on decisions of this Court as well as of other High Courts in Smt. Shakuntla Kanwar v. Union of India & Ors., 2002 (4) WLC (Raj.) 315 ; Manohar Kanwar (Smt.) & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2007 (2) RLW 1579 ; Smt. Prema v. State of Raj. & Ors., 2009 (2) WLC (Raj.) 327 ; Smt. Rajvan Devi v. Union of India & Ors., 2009 (3) WLC 786 ; Indira v. Union of India, 2005 (3) KLT 1071 ; Mariamma Samuel v. State of Kerala, 2012 (4) KHC 799; and Zishan Khan v. District Inspector of Schools, Varanasi & Ors., 2012 (4) ADJ 501 . 10. Heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the impugned orders as well as the material placed on record. 11. It is not in dispute that the husband of the respondent went missing on 25.03.1994. It is also not in dispute that the services of the husband of the respondent were dismissed by the appellants vide order dated 08.10.1997. 12. 11. It is not in dispute that the husband of the respondent went missing on 25.03.1994. It is also not in dispute that the services of the husband of the respondent were dismissed by the appellants vide order dated 08.10.1997. 12. Now the question arises whether in the absence of exact date and time of death of the husband of the respondent, the presumption as to his death would arise from what date. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.I.C. of India v. Anuradha (supra), while taking into consideration the provisions of sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act has held as under: "14.......The law as to presumption of death remains the same whether in Common Law of England or in the statutory provisions contained in Sections 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the scheme of Evidence Act, though Sections 107 and 108 are drafted as two Sections, in effect, Section 108 is an exception to the rule enacted in Section 107. The human life shown to be in existence, at a given point of time which according to Section 107 ought to be a point within 30 years calculated backwards from the date when the question arises, is presumed to continue to be living. The rule is subject to a proviso or exception as contained in Section 108. If the persons, who would have naturally and in the ordinary course of human affairs heard of the person in question, have not so heard of him for seven years the presumption raised under Section 107 ceases to operate. Section 107 has the effect of shifting the burden of proving that the person is dead on him who affirms the fact. Section 108, subject to its applicability being attracted, has the effect of shifting the burden of proof back on the one who asserts the fact of that person being alive. The presumption raised under Section 108 is a limited presumption confined only to presuming the factum of death of the person who's life or death is in issue. Though it will be presumed that the person is dead but there is no presumption as to the date or time of death. There is no presumption as to the facts and circumstances under which the person may have died. Though it will be presumed that the person is dead but there is no presumption as to the date or time of death. There is no presumption as to the facts and circumstances under which the person may have died. The presumption as to death by reference to Section 108 would arise only on lapse of seven years and would not by applying any logic or reasoning be permitted to be raised on expiry of 6 years and 364 days or at any time short of it." (Emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has erred in holding that the husband of the respondent was dead on 25.03.1994. In the absence of any evidence produced by the respondent to prove the death of her husband before the expiry of seven years from 25.03.1994, no such presumption as to the date and time of death of her husband can be drawn. In such circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge treating the date of death of the husband of the respondent as 25.03.1994 cannot be sustained and the same is hereby set aside. 14. It is noticed that the appellants have dismissed the services of the husband of the respondent vide order dated 08.10.1997 in exparte proceedings, though in the order dated 08.10.1997, it is mentioned that the notices were sent to the husband of the respondent through registered post but the same were returned unserved and thereafter the notices were published in daily newspaper but none had appeared and, therefore, the exparte proceedings were initiated against the husband of the respondent. 15. In the appeal preferred by the respondent against the termination order dated 08.10.1997, she mentioned that after missing of her husband Surajbhan, she went to Hisar, Haryana along with her children to live with her parents and she was not aware about the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her husband at Hanumangarh. It is not the case of the appellants that they have informed the respondent about the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against her husband and despite the said information, the respondent did not join the enquiry. 16. It is not the case of the appellants that they have informed the respondent about the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against her husband and despite the said information, the respondent did not join the enquiry. 16. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that proper opportunity of hearing was not provided to the respondent before passing of the order dated 08.10.1997, whereby the services of her husband were terminated. In such circumstances, the order dated 08.10.1997 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellants are directed to conduct disciplinary proceedings afresh against the husband of the respondent after affording full opportunity of hearing to the respondent. Since the matter is very old, it is expected that the appellants will conclude the disciplinary proceedings in respect of their employee Surajbhan Sharma expeditiously preferably within six months from the date of receipt of this order. 17. Needless to say that the entitlement of the respondent regarding the family pension and retrial benefits would depend upon the decision of the disciplinary proceedings in respect of the enquiry initiated against the husband of the respondent. With the above observations and directions, this appeal is disposed of.Stay petition also stands disposed of.Appeal disposed of. *******