Judgment : Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J. This appeal is at the instance of appellant/writ petitioner against an order dated July 8, 2014 passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting his prayer to rescind / revoke the directions dated September 7, 2007 and September 27, 2007 issued by the respondent No. 1, the Official Trustee of West Bengal. By the said directions the respondent No. 1 terminated the service of the appellant as the durwan-cum-caretaker of Premises No. 2 Royd Street, Kolkata (hereinafter described as “the said premises”) and directed the appellant to quit the said premises on the expiry of the month of October, 2007. In the year 1941, the said premises was transferred to the respondent No. 1, Official Trustee. According to the appellant, as per the communication dated October 14, 1977, the respondent No. 1 appointed him as a darwan-cum-caretaker of the said premises. The said communication dated October 14, 1977 expressly records that the appellant was appointed as a durwan-cum-caretaker in respect of the said premises, purely on temporary basis, with effect from July 01, 1977 and his service was terminable on one month’s notice without assigning any reason whatsoever. The appellant was allowed by the respondent No. 1 to occupy one room of the said premises, as an incidence to his said service in respect of the said premises. From the date of his appointment and until October, 2007, the appellant never raised any complain about his service all along remaining temporary. By an order dated April 13, 1986 passed in a matter being Matter No. 609 of 1986 (William Michael Coria and Anr. Vs. the Official Trustees of West Bengal) this Court permitted the respondent No. 1, to grant a long-term lease, for ninety nine years, in respect of the said premises to the respondent No. 2 with the right to construct a multi storied building thereat. Subsequently, the respondent No. 4 obtained assignment of the said lease. The respondent No. 4 obtained possession the said premises from the respondent No. 1 and constructed the new multi storied building at the said premises. Thus, the respondent No. 1 ceased to have any obligation for the security of the said premises, or to keep the appellant as a durwan of the said premises. The respondent No. 4 obtained possession the said premises from the respondent No. 1 and constructed the new multi storied building at the said premises. Thus, the respondent No. 1 ceased to have any obligation for the security of the said premises, or to keep the appellant as a durwan of the said premises. The appellant, however, continued to receive the monthly salary from the office or the respondent No. 1 and remained in occupation of the said room of the said premises. The respondent No. 4 raised objections to the respondent No. 1 about the occupation of the appellant in respect of the said room. In the year 2000, the appellant filed a title suit, against the respondent No. 4, before the learned City Civil Court at Calcutta and obtained ad interim order of injunction. The said title suit was dismissed in August, 2012. The appellant contended that he remains to be a durwan of the said premises engaged by the respondent No. 1 and as such he is entitled to occupy the said room of the said premises. By a notice dated August 24, 2007, the respondent No. 1 requested the appellant to appear before him on September 7, 2007 along with all relevant papers and documents to substantiate his claim as a durwan-cum-caretaker of the said premises. On September 7, 2007 the appellant appeared before the respondent No. 1 and in support of his claim produced the said communication dated October 14, 1977. The representative of the respondent No. 4, lessee also attended the said hearing. After considering the documents produced by the appellant as also the facts of the case, the respondent No. 1 held that after the said lease of the said premises in favour of the respondent No. 4, his office has no reason to keep a durwan or caretaker of the said premises and the appointment by the appellant was purely on temporary basis terminable by one month’s notice. Thus, the respondent No. 1 passed the said order dated September 7, 2007 terminating the temporary service of the appellant with the expiry of the month of October, 2007 and directed the appellant to quit and vacate the said premises by the end of October, 2007. The said order expressly records that the contents of the said order was explained to the appellant. The said order expressly records that the contents of the said order was explained to the appellant. By a communication dated September 7, 2007 the respondent No. 1 once again informed the appellant that his services as a durwan-cum-caretaker of the said premises stands dispensed with, his appointment as durwan-cum-caretaker do stand terminated on and from the expiry of the month of October, 2007 and he should vacate the said premises on the expiry month of October 7, 2007. The appellant received his monthly salary for the month of October, 2007 and from the month of November, 2007 the respondent No. 1 stopped payment of salary to the appellant. The appellant, however, did not vacate the said premises and in February, 2008 he filed the above writ petition. On February 8, 2008, a learned Single Judge of this Court passed ad interim order directing the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the appellant’s possession in the disputed property. After completion of all pleadings, the writ petition came up for final hearing before the learned Single Judge. After considering all the records produced by the parties and the submissions made by the respective parties, the learned Single Judge rejected all the contentions of the appellant/writ petitioner that the order dated September 7, 2007 contains stigma against him, the said order was passed without granting appropriate opportunity of hearing to him, the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to issue either the said order dated September 7, 2007 or the memorandum dated September 27, 2007. While rejecting the writ petition, the learned Single Judge held that the impugned order of the respondent No. 1 is an order terminating the temporary service of the petitioner and the same does not contain any stigma. The learned Single Judge further held that the writ petitioner was given adequate opportunity of hearing and upheld the contention of the respondent No. 1 with the handing over possession and control of the said premises to the respondent No. 4, the service of the writ petitioner is no longer required. The learned Single Judge further held that the writ petitioner was given adequate opportunity of hearing and upheld the contention of the respondent No. 1 with the handing over possession and control of the said premises to the respondent No. 4, the service of the writ petitioner is no longer required. With regard to the issue of jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1 to pass the impugned order dated September 7, 2007 the learned Single Judge held that having not disputed or denied the authority of the respondent No. 1 towards his appointment, the petitioner cannot turn back and challenge the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1 towards issuance of the order and the memorandum. Assailing the aforesaid decision of the learned single Judge, Mr. Soumya Majumder learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner submitted before us that since July 1977 the appellant had been working as a durwan-cum-caretaker engaged by the respondent No. 1 and as such after all these years the respondent No. 1 could not have held the service of the appellant to be temporary. He further argued that the order dated September 7, 2007 was passed by the respondent No. 1 without granting adequate opportunity of hearing to the appellant and in any event the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to terminate the service of the appellant. According to Mr. Majumder, the respondent No. 1 even had no jurisdiction to direct the appellant to vacate the said premises. Mr. Majumder further relied on the following finding of the learned Single Judge at the last page of the judgment: “The petitioner, having not disputed and denied the authority of the respondent No. 1 towards appointment to the concerned post, cannot turn back and challenge the jurisdiction of the said respondent No. 1 towards issuance of the impugned order and the memorandum.” Mr. Majumder argued that by making the above observation the learned single Judge held that the appellant was holding a “post” and as such the service jurisprudence does not authorize (the) termination of the appellant’s service in the manner as had been done in the instant case. Mr. Majumder argued that by making the above observation the learned single Judge held that the appellant was holding a “post” and as such the service jurisprudence does not authorize (the) termination of the appellant’s service in the manner as had been done in the instant case. Mr. Deba Prasad Samanta, learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 1, however, submitted that as the respondent No. 1 had already made over the possession and control of the said premises to the respondent No. 4 who had constructed a multi-storied building of the said premises, there was no necessity of the respondent No. 1 to continue the appellant’s service in respect of the said premises. According to Mr. Samanta, since the appointment of the appellant all along remained on temporary basis, there was no infirmity in the decision of the respondent No. 1 terminating the service of the appellant and directing him to vacate the said premises. Mr. Samanta argued that the appellant being a caretaker/durwan never acquired any interest in the said premises and in support of such contention, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Ors. Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) Through LRS., reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 . Mr. Sanjoy Bose, learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 4 adopted the submission of Mr. Samanta. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties, as also the documents produced by the respective parties. So far as the first contention of Mr. Majumder, that as the appellant was working as a durwan-cum-caretaker at the said premises from July 1977, his service cannot be treated as temporary service, we find that the appellant himself has relied on the said communication dated October 14, 1977 issued by the respondent No. 1 expressly stating that his said appointment in respect of the said premises was purely on temporary basis and the appellant could not disclose any document to substantiate that the status of his temporary service had ever been changed. The appellant could not substantiate that his said service in respect of the said premises was governed by any Rules or Regulations framed by any appropriate authority. Thus, we find no merit in the first contention of the appellant. So far as the second contention of Mr. The appellant could not substantiate that his said service in respect of the said premises was governed by any Rules or Regulations framed by any appropriate authority. Thus, we find no merit in the first contention of the appellant. So far as the second contention of Mr. Majumder about inadequate opportunity of hearing to the appellant, we find that the appellant received the notice dated September 7, 2007 issued by the respondent No. 1. The appellant appeared before the respondent No. 1 on September 7, 2007 and in support of his claim he produced and relied upon the aforesaid communication dated October 14, 1977 issued by the respondent No. 1. The said order dated September 7, 2007 expressly records that the contents of the said order was explained to the appellant, the appellant also received the communication dated September 7, 2007 along the said order dated September 7, 2007. There was no communication from the appellant to the respondent No. 1, alleging that either the contents of the said order dated September 7, 2007 was not explained to him or that he wanted to produce some more documents. In the premises, we uphold finding of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioner was given adequate opportunity of hearing by the respondent No. 1. With regard to third contention of Mr. Majumder about the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1 to pass the impugned order dated September 7, 2007 and the said communication dated September 27, 2007 we find that the learned Single Judge rightly held that having admitted the authority of the respondent No. 1 to appoint him as a durwan-cum-caretaker in respect of the said premises, the appellant could turn back and challenge the jurisdiction of the said respondent No. 1 towards issuance of the impugned order and the memorandum. The respondent No. 1 himself was the Official Trustee and Mr. Majumder could not point out anyone else with whom the right to terminate the service of the appellant vested. Thus, we are in respectful agreement with the learned Single Judge that respondent No. 1 had the authority to terminate the service and the appellant. Further, the appellant himself all along been contended that he was entitled to occupy the said premises, as he was the durwan-cum-caretaker of the said premises engaged by the respondent No. 1. Thus, we are in respectful agreement with the learned Single Judge that respondent No. 1 had the authority to terminate the service and the appellant. Further, the appellant himself all along been contended that he was entitled to occupy the said premises, as he was the durwan-cum-caretaker of the said premises engaged by the respondent No. 1. In other words the appellant’s contention was that his right to occupy the room of the said premises was attached with his service at the said premises. It is settled principle of law that a caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire any interest in the property irrespective of his long possession; the caretaker or servant has to give up possession forthwith on demand. In this regard Mr. Samanta rightly placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Ors. Vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) Through LRS., reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 . Thus, having terminated the temporary service of the appellant, the respondent No. 1 had all the authority to direct the appellant to vacate the said premises on the expiry of the month of October, 2007. Finally, we are afraid that we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Majumder that by observing “The petitioner, having not disputed and denied the authority of the respondent No. 1 towards appointment to the concerned post ………” the learned single Judge accepted, that the appellant held a post and his appointment was no more temporary appointment. In the instant case, it is evident that all along the service of the appellant was restricted to the said premises only, that too on a temporary basis and the mere user of the word “post” by the learned Single Judge as argued by Mr. Majumder cannot change the basis of the service of the appellant. In view of the aforesaid we find no merit in the instant appeal. However, there will be no order as to costs.