Judgment : 1. A student, namely, Jayakumar, aged 16 years (D.O.B.:23.07.1994), son of the petitioner, Tmt.Maheswari, W/o Paramasivam, had committed suicide by setting himself ablaze by pouring kerosene on him on 19.10.2010. 2. The alleged reasons behind the suicide, according to the petitioner, as narrated in the writ petition, in brief, are as follows: i. The deceased Jayakumar was studying 12th standard in Government Kallar Higher Secondary School, Vilampatti, Dindigul District. On 13.9.2010, some computers have been found missing, which were later found in the school toilet by the petitioner’s son and another student, namely Prabakaran, whose father was working as a Warden in the said school and they informed the same to a teacher of the school. Again on 13.10.2010, the same incident of missing the computers had taken place. In this regard, on 16.10.2010 at about 9.30 a.m., one Mr.Rajendran, Head Constable and a Police constable in civil dress, attached to 6th respondent police, came to the house of the petitioner and since her son was not there, informed the petitioner to send him to 6th respondent police station for enquiry. Since her son did not return till 6.00 p.m. on 17.10.2010, the petitioner went to the police station along with her mother and elder son Dhinesh and found her son, Jayakumar in the police station, later at about 9.30 p.m., the police released her son stating that ‘no fault on the part of her son’. On enquiry, the petitioner came to know that her son and another Student Prabhakaran were enquired and after leaving Prabhakaran, the police have tortured him both mentally and physically, which created mental agony in the mind of the petitioner’s son. ii. On the next day, i.e. 18.10.2010, the petitioner’s son went to school and returned home at 6.00 p.m. with very disturbed and sad mood and told the petitioner that it was very dishonour, disgrace and indignity to live since he happened to have visited the police station regarding a theft. Later at about 9.00 p.m., he went to his grand mother’s house for sleeping and at about 12.00 p.m., since he was in extreme mental agony because of torture given by the 6th respondent police, being in-tolerated of the same, he poured kerosene on his body and set ablaze himself. Later at about 9.00 p.m., he went to his grand mother’s house for sleeping and at about 12.00 p.m., since he was in extreme mental agony because of torture given by the 6th respondent police, being in-tolerated of the same, he poured kerosene on his body and set ablaze himself. After coming to know the incident, the petitioner and others took him to the government hospital on 19.10.2010 at 2.00 a.m. where, at 6.50 a.m. he died. 3. According to the petitioner, her son committed only due to the torture done by the police officials of the 6th respondent and hence, they were the abettors who abetted her son to commit suicide. The petitioner lodged a complaint, which was registered in Crime No.193 of 2010 under Section 174 Cr.P.C. According to the petitioner, the case should be registered under Section 306 IPC, but in order to escape from the criminal liability, the respondent police registered the same under Section 174 Cr.P.C., as if it was a suspicious death. Being aggrieved, the petitioner sent a representation dated 22.10.2010 to Chair Persons, National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi and State Human Rights Commission, Chennai, the Chief Secretary to Government, Government of Tamil Nadu and the respondents 1 to 5 for taking appropriate action against the erring police officials. Since no action has been taken and having apprehended that the 6th respondent police officials would not conduct the investigation properly, finding no other alternative, the petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition, praying for the issuance of Writ of Mandamus, to direct the respondent No.2 to withdraw the case in Crime No.193 of 2010 on the file of the respondent No.6 relating to the suicide of the petitioner’s son namely, Jayakumar, aged 17 years and entrust the same to the respondent No.3 for proper investigation, consequently to direct the 3rd respondent to depute a competent police officer to investigate the case in Crime No.193 of 2010 afresh and file charge sheet before the jurisdictional Magistrate within the time stipulated by this Court and also direct the respondent No.1 to pay Rs.5,00,000/- compensation to the petitioner for the death of her son. 4. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 6th respondent, wherein, while denying the averments made in the writ petition, it is stated that based on a complaint lodged by the petitioner, a case in Crime No.193 of 2010 under Section 174 Cr.P.C. has been registered and it is under investigation. It is also stated that two cases were registered in Crime Nos.171 and 190 of 2010 under Sections 457 and 380 IPC on 13.9.2010 and after having enquired into the matter, both the cases were closed as undetected on 31.01.2011 since no decipherable chances were developed as reported by the Inspector of Police (Finger Prints) to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, SDFP Bureau, Dindigul District vide C.No.98/SDC/DGL/10 and C.No.107/SDC/DGL/10, dated 14.09.2010 and 15.10.2010 respectively and necessary reports were also sent to the jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate. During the course of investigation, the respondent police are duty bound to enquire all the suspected and witnesses to reveal the truth and likewise, they summoned the son of the petitioner, another student along with Physical Training Instructor for enquiry and let off after interrogation on 18.10.2010. It is specifically denied that the petitioner’s son had committed suicide only due to the mental and physical torture given by the respondent police as baseless. After due preliminary enquiry and postmortem, viral organs were sent for viscera report on 22.11.2010 and the report is awaited and after receipt of the said report, investigation will be completed and final report will be filed. Therefore, it is stated that the 6th respondent police had not harassed the petitioner’s son at any point of time as alleged by the petitioner. He was called for enquiry along with another student and their PT Master in the matter of conducting investigation in a fair and impartial manner and hence, there is no need to order for transfer of investigation. With these averments, the 6th respondent sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. He was called for enquiry along with another student and their PT Master in the matter of conducting investigation in a fair and impartial manner and hence, there is no need to order for transfer of investigation. With these averments, the 6th respondent sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that in the matter of theft alleged to have taken place in a school, the respondent police conducted the inquiry in the manner prejudicial to the petitioner’s son, who is at tender age by taking him to the police station and tortured him, which had a considerable impact on him since it came to be known to all the students and staff of the school and created a stigma as if he committed theft and having felt very derogation, the boy had taken extreme step of ending his life by committing suicide and it is only because of the failure of the 6th respondent police in conducting the enquiry in the manner as envisaged in the statues relating to the juveniles. If the so-called enquiry had taken place in a proper manner, the boy’s life would not have ended unfortunately. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought for appropriate action against the concerned police and to order for investigation by deputing a competent officer and also to pay Rs.5 lakhs towards compensation. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions, viz., i. 2006 Crl.L.J.2202 ( Parbatabai Sakharam Taram versus State of Maharashtra and others); ii. 2010 Writ L.R. 851 ( T.Sekaran versus The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. By Home Secrtary and Others); iii. 2011 (1) MWN (Cr.) 462 ( Priya versus The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. By its Home Secretary and others); iv. 1983 Supreme Court 1086 (Rudul Sah versus State of Bihar and another) v. 1995 Crl.L.J.2920 (Smt.Kewal Pati versus State of U.P. and others) vi. (1997) 1 SCC 416 (D.K.Basu versus State of West Bengal) vii. 1998 Crl.L.J.4716 (Smt.Savitri Behera versus State of Orissa and 5 others) viii. 2000 Crl.L.J.1613 (Phoolwati alias Pullo versus National Capital Territory of Delhi and others) ix. AIR 2001 Supreme Court 1528 (Smt.Akhtari Bi versus State of Madhya Pradesh) x. 2003 Crl.L.J.1404 (Smt.S.Swathi and etc., versus Station House Officer and others) xi. 2010 Writ L.R.851 (T.Sekaran versus The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. 2000 Crl.L.J.1613 (Phoolwati alias Pullo versus National Capital Territory of Delhi and others) ix. AIR 2001 Supreme Court 1528 (Smt.Akhtari Bi versus State of Madhya Pradesh) x. 2003 Crl.L.J.1404 (Smt.S.Swathi and etc., versus Station House Officer and others) xi. 2010 Writ L.R.851 (T.Sekaran versus The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Home Secretary and others) xii. 2011(1) MWN (Crl.) 462 (Priya versus The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Home Secretary and others) xiii. 2013 (2) LW (Crl.) 700 (K.Elango and others versus The Secretary, State of Tamil Nadu, Home Department, Chennai) 6. The Supreme Court, by an order dated 12.10.2011, in W.P.No. Civil No.473 of 2005. while considering the various provisions of the Act, has observed as follows: “3.The Home Departments and the Director Generals of Police of the States/Union Territories will ensure that at least one police officer in every police station with aptitude is given appropriate training and orientation and designated as Juvenile or Child Welfare Officer, who will handle the juvenile or child in coordination with the police as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 63 of the Act. The required training will be provided by the District Legal Services Authorities under the guidance of the State Legal Services Authorities and Secretary, National Legal Services Authority will issue appropriate guidelines to the State Legal Services Authorities for training and orientation of police officers, who are designated as the Juvenile or Child Welfare Officers. The training and orientation may be done in phases over a period of six months to one year in every State and Union Territory. 4. The Home Departments and Director Generals of Police of the States/Union Territories will also ensure that Special Juvenile Police Unit comprising of all police officers designated as Juvenile or Child Welfare Officer be created in every district and city to coordinate and to upgrade the police treatment to juveniles and the children as provided in sub-section (3) of Section 63 of the Act. 5. The matter be listed in the first week of January 2012 when the State Governments and the Union Territories will file an affidavit stating steps taken by them pursuant to this order” 7. In a case of “Parbatabai Sakharam Taram Versus State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2006 CRI.L.J.2202” the Bombay High Court has held hereunder: “6...... 5. The matter be listed in the first week of January 2012 when the State Governments and the Union Territories will file an affidavit stating steps taken by them pursuant to this order” 7. In a case of “Parbatabai Sakharam Taram Versus State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2006 CRI.L.J.2202” the Bombay High Court has held hereunder: “6...... The petitioner has suffered torture in police custody which has left deep scars on her mind having undergone the life which was as if she was in hell in such a tender age which has spoiled not only valuable period of her childhood but even for future she lost all hopes for which the petitioner particularly blames respondents No.4 and 5 and the officials of the State and, therefore, seeks high level enquiry so that they can be punished and she should be duly compensated for the atrocities committed on her by the officials of the State under colourable exercise of their powers. 8. In “D.K.Basu Versus State of West Bengal and Ashok K.Johri Vesus State of U.P. reported in 1997 1 SCC 416 ” the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held hereunder: “Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a civilised society governed by the rule of law. The rights inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution require to be jealously and scrupulously protected. The expression “life or personal liberty” in Article 21 includes the right to live with human dignity and thus it would also include within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its functionaries. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 cannot be denied to convicts, under-trials, detenues and other prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established by law by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law. Police is, no doubt, under a legal duty and has legitimate right to arrest a criminal and to interrogate him during the investigation of an offence but the law does not permit use of third-degree methods or torture of accused in custody during interrogation and investigation with a view to solve the crime. End cannot justify the means. The interrogation and investigation into a crime should be in true sense purposeful to make the investigation effective. End cannot justify the means. The interrogation and investigation into a crime should be in true sense purposeful to make the investigation effective. By torturing a person and using third-degree methods, the police would be accomplishing behind the closed doors what the demands of our legal order forbid. No society can permit it. To check the abuse of police power, transparency of action and accountability perhaps are two possible safeguards which the Supreme Court must insist upon. Attention is also required to be paid to properly develop work culture, training and orientation of the police force consistent with basic human values. Training methodology of the police needs restructuring. The force needs to be infused with basic human values and made sensitive to the constitutional ethos. Efforts must be made to change the attitude and approach of the police personnel handling investigations so that they do not sacrifice basic human values during interrogation and do not resort to questionable forms of interrogation. With a view to bring in transparency, the presence of the counsel of the arrestee at some point of time during the interrogation may deter the police from using third-degree methods during interrogation. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above said decision, in paragraph 10 has observed what is meant by torture and the same is extracted hereunder: “10.”Torture” has not been defined in the Constitution or in other penal laws. “Torture” of a human being by another human being is essentially an instrument to impose the will of the “strong” over the “weak” by suffering. The word torture today has become synonymous with the darker side of human civilisation. “Torture” is a wound in the soul so painful that sometimes you can almost touch it, but it is also so intangible that there is no way to heal it. Torture is anguish squeezing in your chest, cold as ice and heavy as a stone, paralyzing as sleep and dark as the abyss. Torture is despair and fear and rage and hate. It is a desire to kill and destroy including yourself. 10. This Court, in the case of “T.Sekaran versus The State of Tamil Nadu, Represented by its Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, St. George Fort, Chennai-600 009 and others reported in 2010 Writ Law Reporter 851” has held as follows: “45. It is a desire to kill and destroy including yourself. 10. This Court, in the case of “T.Sekaran versus The State of Tamil Nadu, Represented by its Home Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat, St. George Fort, Chennai-600 009 and others reported in 2010 Writ Law Reporter 851” has held as follows: “45. Lord Wright explained that the Act gives the right of survivorship, by preventing the original right from getting extinguished. The legal right involved in such cases was summed up by him in the following words:- "A man has a legal right that his life should not be shortened by the tortuous act of another. His normal expectancy of life is a thing of temporal value, so that its impairment is something for which damages should be given." 46. In Chairman, Railway Board vs. Chandrima Das and Others{ 2000 (2) SCC 465 }, the Court was concerned with a writ petition filed by a practising lady Advocate of the Calcutta High Court, claiming compensation on behalf of a Bangladeshi National, who was gang raped by railway officials at the Howrah Railway Station. The High Court awarded compensation of Rs.10 lakhs, to be paid by the Railways and the same was challenged before the Supreme Court by the Railway Board. The first contention raised before the Apex Court was that the victim herself ought to have approached the Court in the realm of Private Law and invited a finding of fact on allegations of tortuous liability and that an Advocate had no locus standi to seek redressal under Article 226, on behalf of the victim. After referring to the distinction between public law and private law, as propounded in Common Cause vs. Union of India{ 1999 (6) SCC 667 }, the Court pointed out in para 9 of its decision that public law remedies have also been extended to the realm of tort. The Court listed in para 9, a series of cases starting from Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar{ 1983 (4) SCC 141 }, in which compensation was awarded for causing injuries, which amounted to tortuous act. In para 10, the Court listed another series of cases from Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa{ 1993 (2) SCC 746 }, in which compensation was awarded under the public law domain, in cases relating to custodial deaths and medical negligence. In para 10, the Court listed another series of cases from Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa{ 1993 (2) SCC 746 }, in which compensation was awarded under the public law domain, in cases relating to custodial deaths and medical negligence. After taking note of the series of decisions, the Court observed in para 11 that where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of fundamental rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the public law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under private law. 51. Once it is found that the family members of the victim are entitled to compensation, the next question to be considered is as to the quantum. There is no codified law, for arriving at the quantum of compensation in cases of this nature. Though special enactments such as the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1948, provide lot of indications for arriving at the quantum of compensation, in cases to which they apply, there is no enactment to cover cases of this nature. Even the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, does not provide adequate indications. The State of Kerala has a special enactment known as "The Kerala Torts (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976. But even the said Act, is primarily aimed at codifying the law relating to survival of causes of action, liability of joint tortfeasors and the liability in cases of contributory negligence in respect of torts. 57. In C.K.Subramania Iyer vs. T.Kunhikuttan Nair{ 1969 (3) SCC 64 }, the Supreme Court pointed out that there can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure to damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It was further pointed out that the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case and consequently there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life. The Court added that while conjecture to some extent is inevitable, considerations of matters which rest in speculation or fancy are to be excluded. 60. The Court added that while conjecture to some extent is inevitable, considerations of matters which rest in speculation or fancy are to be excluded. 60. Putting an end to speculation and prophecy in the matter of determination of compensation, Section 163A and the Second Schedule were inserted to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, by Amendment Act 54 of 1994. The Second Schedule prescribes multipliers, as well as the amounts that could be awarded under different heads. In M.S.Grewal vs. Deep Chand Sood{ 2001 (8) SCC 151 =2001 1 L.W. 491}, the Supreme Court even while following the law laid down in C.K.Subramania Iyer as laying down the basic guidance for assessment of damage, came to the conclusion that the multiplier method stands accepted by the Apex Court in its previous decisions. 11. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents would submit that absolutely no harassment or torture was meted out by the victim boy in the hands of the 6th respondent police, but in order to enquire the matter since they received a complaint from the school regarding missing of computers, they called the boy along with another and after interrogation, they sent him and they have done their duty. Therefore, the learned Government Advocate contended that the writ petition is not maintainable and it may be dismissed. 12. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate (Writs) for the respondents. 13. For deciding the issue, the relevant provision of Criminal Procedure Code viz., Section 160, which is amended and existed prior to 03.12.2013 is extracted hereunder: “160. Police officer's power to require attendance of witnesses – (1) Any police officer making an investigation under this Chapter may, by order in writing, require the attendance before himself of any person being within the limits of his own or any adjoining station who, from the information given or otherwise, appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case; and such person shall attend as so required: Provided that no male person *[under the age of fifteen years or above the age of sixty-five years or a woman or a mentally or physically disabled person] shall be required to attend at any place other than the place in which such male person or woman resides. *(Substituted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013) S.14 for under the age of fifteen years or woman” (w.r.e.f.3.2.2013) (2) The State Government may, by rules made in this behalf, provide for the payment by the police officer of the reasonable expenses of every person, attending under sub-section (1) at any place other than his residence.” 14. Furthermore, it is also useful to extract Sections 306 and 309 of Indian Penal Code and the same is extracted below: “306.Abetment of Suicide:- If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 309. Attempt to commit suicide – Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year [or with fine, or with both].” 15. With regard to the abetment of suicide, as defined under Section 306 of I.P.C., I do not want to render any finding in this Writ Petition. From the counter affidavit filed by the sixth respondent, it is seen that after due preliminary enquiry and post-mortem, viral organs were sent for viscera report on 22.11.2010 and the report is awaited and after receipt of the said report, investigation will be completed and final report will be filed. Hence, I am not inclined to grant relief sought for in the first portion of the prayer. In case, the investigation is not completed, the matter can be transferred to the third respondent. 16. As there is no evidence before this Court whether there was any abetment to commit suicide and that the matter is pending under investigation, I do not want to render any finding on that score. Per se suicide is illegal. In its decision reported in “P.Rathinam versus Union of India, reported in (1994) RLR 263”, the Delhi High Court has held that Article 221 of the Constitution of India, ‘right to live’ also include ‘right to terminate natural life’. Per se suicide is illegal. In its decision reported in “P.Rathinam versus Union of India, reported in (1994) RLR 263”, the Delhi High Court has held that Article 221 of the Constitution of India, ‘right to live’ also include ‘right to terminate natural life’. This Judgment was upheld by the two-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision “Rathinam/Nagabushan versus Union of India reported in (1994) 3 SCC 394 ”, holding that ‘right to live with human dignity’ under Article 21 of the Constitution includes ‘right to terminate natural life’ and that Section 309 IPC is unconstitutional and hence void. However, the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, in its decision “Smt.Gian Kaur, etc. Versus State of Punjab, etc. reported in (1996) 2 SCC 648 ” has held that there is no reason to hold that Section 306 and Section 309 IPC to be unconstitutional and consequently overruled its decision in “P.Rathinam case” (cited supra). The Constitution Bench has held that two provisions, viz., Sections 306 and 309 IPC are constitutionally valid and there is no violation of either Article 14 or 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that Article 21 provides for protection of life, right to live with dignity up to natural death, but does not comprehend extinction of life which amounts to unnatural death. 17. Therefore, without there being a finding on abetment based on the evidence recorded by the appropriate forum, this Court is unable to grant the relief for the suicide said to have committed by the student, which is ex facie illegal. Though this Court is saddened with the death of a tender aged boy, if compensation is ordered without any materials on record, it would be nothing but justifying suicide and pre-judging the issue regarding abetment which is under investigation. 18. With regard to the compensation of five lakhs demanded by the petitioner, the various citations quoted by the petitioner would only refer to the custodial torture and death, wherein the Court has ordered payment of compensation and they are not applicable to the present case wherein, the minor boy has committed suicide. 18. With regard to the compensation of five lakhs demanded by the petitioner, the various citations quoted by the petitioner would only refer to the custodial torture and death, wherein the Court has ordered payment of compensation and they are not applicable to the present case wherein, the minor boy has committed suicide. The attempt to commit suicide is a punishable offence under Section 309 IPC, which is congnizable, bailable, non compoundable and triable by the Magistrate and if the boy had escaped from the death, certainly the police could have arrested and taken action against him for having attempted to commit suicide. In that view of the matter, the compensation cannot be ordered. The police had taken the boy for enquiring him, it is the process of investigation for the alleged theft of computers/computer parts. The victim, aged over 16 years may be a juvenile as contemplated under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, but, as per Section 160 of Cr.P.C. which is extracted supra, the police is entitled to enquire any person, who is aged above fifteen years and the police has done their duty as contemplated. Hence, I find that there is no justification on the part of the petitioner seeking for compensation, when the boy had committed an illegal Act. Hence, the second part of the prayer also fails. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is not inclined to grant the relief sought for by the petitioner. Hence, this Writ Petition is dismissed. However, in case abetment is established after proper evidence, it is open to the petitioner to take appropriate steps in accordance with law seeking proper relief. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.