Judgment : S.V. Gangapurwala, J. 1. The petitioner vide the present writ petition assails the notification issued U/Sec. 4 and the declaration U/Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter referred as to the "Act of 1894" for the sake of brevity) in respect of the property bearing Sy. No. 148/1 admeasuring 4H 59R.50 square meter situated at Shirdi, Tq. Rahata, Dist. Ahmednagar. 2. The land of the petitioner admeasuring 4H 59R . 50 square meter in land Sy. No. 148/1 is sought to be acquired for Shirdi Sansthan for construction of the Dharmashala. The notification U/Sec. 4 of the Act of 1894 is published in the news paper on 27.09.2000. The petitioner raised her objection to the said acquisition U/Sec. 5A of the Act of 1894. The said objection is rejected. Thereafter, declaration U/Sec. 6 of the Act of 1894 is published on 21.09.2001. This Court vide order dated 29.04.2002 admitted the petition and directed the parties to maintain status quo until further orders. 3. Mr. S. D. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the petitioner with all humility at his command put forth the following propositions: (a) The acquisition of the land for Shirdi Saibaba Sansthan which is a public trust by the Government under the provisions of the Act of 1894 cannot be termed as "public purpose" within the meaning of Sec. 3(f) of the Act of 1894. The acquisition of the land for the purpose of construction of Dharmashala, parking, kitchen hall, etc. of the public trust i. e. respondent No. 4 cannot be said to be a public purpose. (b) The acquisition of land is not bonafide. The same is politically motivated. The acquisition is malafide one. To buttress the said submission the learned counsel relies on following instances. (i) The respondent No. 4 Sansthan has various lands admeasuring 230 acres. It can use the said lands for construction of Dharmashala. Recently the Sansthan has purchased 150 acres of land from Maharashtra State Farming Corporation. The Sansthan has about 40 lands either agricultural or non agricultural in Shirdi town, hence there is no requirement of any other land. (ii) Some of the lands which were reserved for respondent No. 4/Sansthan have been deleted from reservation. (iii) In the past two acres of the land has been given by the petitioner for bus stand without any compensation. (ii) Some of the lands which were reserved for respondent No. 4/Sansthan have been deleted from reservation. (iii) In the past two acres of the land has been given by the petitioner for bus stand without any compensation. Three acres of land has been given to the Sai Hall without any compensation. Twenty acres of land having 500 rooms is taken from the possession of petitioner's father for nominal consideration by the Sansthan. Even 13 H 19R land excluding disputed land is taken from the petitioner for various other purposes, such as hospital, Dharmashala, bus stand, police station, society office, B.S.N.L., vegetable market. During the pendency of present proceedings two more lands from the same Sy. No. 148/1 are acquired i. e. 27R for ring road and 3 R land for Shirdi Nandurki road. The repeated acquisitions of the land from the same person when there are other properties available would show colourable exercise of powers and malafides. (iv) In 2013 said Sansthan has constructed 1056 rooms, in 1993-1994 constructed 500 rooms, in 2001-2002 constructed 200 rooms and 192 halls in 2013 and hence there is no requirement for the purpose of Dharmashala. There are more than 323 hotels and lodging boardings in Shirdi. (v) More than 47,000 acres of Maharashtra State Farming Corporation's Land is available for different public purposes and nearby lands of Shirdi are reserved for public purposes. The said lands can be utilized for the purpose of Sansthan. (c) The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 (hereinafter referred as to "Act of 2013" for the sake of brevity) has come into operation from 01.01.2014. Referring to Sec. 114 of Act of 2013, the learned counsel states that, there is no saving clause in the said Act. There is only provision of repeal. The proceedings under the old Act of 1894 are not saved. When there is no such saving clause in the new Act, then, the proceedings under the old Act cannot continue further. For the same purpose new proceedings will have to be initiated under the new Act. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 2000 SC 811 (1). For the same purpose new proceedings will have to be initiated under the new Act. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and another Vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 2000 SC 811 (1). (d) As the award has not been passed under the old Act, then in such case the whole proceedings under the old Act would lapse. Sec. 24 of the new Act of 2013 would not come to the aid of respondents. On the contrary will abort the proceedings under the old Act of 1894. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Gajraj Singh Vs. State Transport reported in AIR 1997 SC 412 . The learned counsel also relies on the judgment in a case of Pune Municipal Corporation and another Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others in Civil Appeal No. 877 of 2014 with other connected Civil Appeals dated 24.01.2014 and submits that, the Apex Court in said case confirmed the judgment of Bombay High Court in nine writ petitions, out of which two were filed before making award and seven were filed after the award and in all the matters the Apex Court has held that, the proceedings under Act of 1894 have lapsed. The intention of legislature is clear that, in certain cases, where the award has not been made and possession of land has not been taken before commencement of the new Act, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. (e) In view of the scheme of the Act of 2013, it will not be possible to apply certain sections of the Act while determining the amount of compensation. (f) When the Act is repealed, the effect thereof is to obliterate the Act completely from the record of the Parliament as if same has never been passed and it never existed for the purpose of those actions which were commenced. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Gajraj Sing Vs. State Transport reported in AIR 1997 SC 412 . 4. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that, the contention of the petitioner that, after acquisition of the subject land, the petitioner will be rendered landless is incorrect. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Gajraj Sing Vs. State Transport reported in AIR 1997 SC 412 . 4. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that, the contention of the petitioner that, after acquisition of the subject land, the petitioner will be rendered landless is incorrect. The petitioner has other lands as detailed in affidavit in reply filed by the State. The land is required for public utility. The objection raised by the petitioner is considered and the same is rejected. The land of the petitioner is adjacent to the existing land of the respondent No. 4/Sansthan i. e. Sy. No. 148/2. In the said Sy. No. 148/2 the Sansthan has constructed 200 rooms for devotees and, therefore, the land of the petitioner is convenient and useful for the further construction of Dharmashala to accommodate the large number of devotees. The inflow of devotees has increased manifold and the existing Dharmashala is not in a position to cater to the requirements and the residential accommodations of the devotees. The acquired land will be useful for the purpose of construction of Dharmashala and providing facilities to the pilgrims, so also for the purpose of generator room, parking, kitchen room, etc. The purpose of acquisition is service oriented for the public at large. It is not a case of colourable exercise of power, nor any malafides can be attributed in initiating acquisition proceedings. 5. Mr. R. N. Dhorde, the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 4/Sansthan in his erudite style canvassed following submissions : A. The land Sy. No. 148 was owned and possessed by family of the petitioner. Haribhau Shelke had two wives. The land Sy. No. 148 was divided into Sy. No. 148/1 and Sy. No. 148/2. The land Sy. No. 148/2 was allotted to one Smt. Shantabai Haribhau Shelke and her daughter. The said land is acquired by respondent/Sansthan for valuable consideration on 30th September, 1998. On the said land Dharmashala is constructed comprising 200 rooms and same is already in use. The present subject land Sy. No. 148/1 has fallen to the share of petitioner. The land Sy. No. 148/2 was allotted to one Smt. Shantabai Haribhau Shelke and her daughter. The said land is acquired by respondent/Sansthan for valuable consideration on 30th September, 1998. On the said land Dharmashala is constructed comprising 200 rooms and same is already in use. The present subject land Sy. No. 148/1 has fallen to the share of petitioner. The requirement of trust has increased due to large inflow of pilgrims, more accommodation facilities are required and it is necessary to construct more building for the purpose of Dharmashala and as such request was made to acquire the immediate adjoining piece of land i. e. Sy. No. 148/1. B. The trust is taken over by the State Government and now Shirdi Sansthan is Statutory authority controlled by the State Government. C. The purpose of acquisition is a public purpose as is contemplated U/Sec. 3(f) of the Act of 1894. The definition of "public purpose" is inclusive and not exhaustive. The present purpose being for the benefit of the society is a public purpose. D. The Government is the best Judge to consider whether the purpose is public purpose or not. The declaration made by the State is a conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is needed for public purpose. The declaration as to public purpose by the Government is final. The learned senior counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Smt. Somawanti and others Vs. The State of Punjab and others reported in 1963 SC 151(1). The present purpose is a public purpose. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Daulat Singh Surana and others Vs. First Land Acquisition Collector and others reported in AIR 2007 SC 471 . E. The acquisition is not malafide or politically motivated. No personal malafide is attributed to any official. The earlier acquisitions are for consideration. The lands which are sought to be purchased from the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation are situated outside Shirdi. The Dharmashala having 200 rooms is already constructed on Sy. No. 148/2. The present land Sy. No. 148/1 is situated immediately adjacent to the said Sy. No. 148/2 and as such the present land is being acquired for construction of further Dharmashala. Devotees are increasing day by day. On holiday and religious occasions lacs of devotees visit the Shirdi Devasthan. The Dharmashala having 200 rooms is already constructed on Sy. No. 148/2. The present land Sy. No. 148/1 is situated immediately adjacent to the said Sy. No. 148/2 and as such the present land is being acquired for construction of further Dharmashala. Devotees are increasing day by day. On holiday and religious occasions lacs of devotees visit the Shirdi Devasthan. It cannot be said to be colourable exercise of power. F. The trust functions within the scheme and has various objects and activities. Such as to ensure the perpetuation of the traditional forms of worship of Shri Sai Baba at Samadhi Mandir, Dwarkamai, Guru Paduka, etc. To celebrate the conventional festivals and fairs and to maintain and expand library of Shri Sai Literature and to start religious centres, libraries, to feed the poor from the funds established, to give alms to the poor to provide medical relief by starting hospital, medical centres, sanatoriums, etc. The inflow of the pilgrims every day has increased manifold and it is increasing day by day. All the pilgrims cannot afford the hotel tariffs, as such arrangements are required to be made for their stay at cheaper rates, such as Dharmashala. The present land is needed for construction of Dharmashala. G. The new Act of 2013 would not render the proceedings initiated under the earlier Act redundant. The repeal of old Act does not affect the proceedings which are initiated under the repealed Act. The same can be proceeded under the old Act of 1894 as if, the New Act has not been passed. The learned senior counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of M. C. Gupta Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Dehradun reported in 2012 AIR SCW 5198. H. Even as per Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the proceedings under the old Act would be saved. I. The learned senior counsel submits that, even in respect of payment of compensation and passing of award the old Act would apply to proceedings. Till the stage of Sec. 9 proceedings were completed under the Act of 1894. However, because of the interim orders passed by this Court, the further proceedings could not be continued. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the same. Till the stage of Sec. 9 proceedings were completed under the Act of 1894. However, because of the interim orders passed by this Court, the further proceedings could not be continued. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the same. The compensation will also be required to be paid under the old Act, as it is because of the interim orders, the further proceedings could not take place. Otherwise the award would have been passed long back. J. Section 11A of the Act of 1894 will not apply, because of stay granted by this Court. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of Apex Court in a case of L. N. Venkatesan Vs. State of T. N. and others reported in AIR 1997 SC 2426 and in a case of M. Ramalinga Thevar Vs. State of T. N. and others reported in 2000 AIR SCW 1503. 6. Before we proceed to advert to submissions canvassed by the learned counsel for respective parties, it would be relevant to refer to the various provisions. LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 1. ........... 2. .......... 3. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, - (a) ............. (b) ............. 6. Before we proceed to advert to submissions canvassed by the learned counsel for respective parties, it would be relevant to refer to the various provisions. LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 1. ........... 2. .......... 3. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, - (a) ............. (b) ............. (f) the expression “public purpose” includes – (i) the provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village sites; (ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning; (iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of securing further development as planned; (iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State; (vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a state, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State; (vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority; (viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office, but does not include acquisition of land for Companies;] THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 1. .......... 2. ......... 24. .......... 2. ......... 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),- (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, (then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions this Act. 114. Repeal and saving.- (1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals. 7. After having heard the learned counsel for respective parties at length the moot questions involved in the present matter can be culled out as under : (I) Whether the acquisition is for the public purpose? (II) Whether the acquisition is bonafide and not malafide? 7. After having heard the learned counsel for respective parties at length the moot questions involved in the present matter can be culled out as under : (I) Whether the acquisition is for the public purpose? (II) Whether the acquisition is bonafide and not malafide? (III) What would be the effect of Act of 2013 to the acquisition initiated under the old Act of 1894 continued upto the notification U/Sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and the further proceedings not being taken up due to prohibitory orders of this Court? 8. In construing the terminology "public purpose" we will have to refer to definition of "public purpose" as detailed in Act of 1894 as the acquisition proceedings are initiated under the said Act. Perusal of the definition of public purpose as enshrined in Sec. 3(f) of the Act of 1894, it is manifest that the said definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. The said definition is used in a generic sense. It includes any purpose in which even a small segment of the society may be interested or may be benefited. The fact that, the acquisition is basically for a trust will not affect the validity of the acquisition. The phraseology "public purpose" has to be liberally construed. The concept of public purpose would change with changing times, changing circumstances, changing environment. It also changes with the passage of time, need and the requirement of the community or the society at large. Acquisition of site for construction of Dharmashala by which large number of devotees would be benefited and would be a source of temporary shelter, when they visit the Shridi Devasthan would be within the realm of "public purpose". The concept of public purpose cannot be static and rigid. Now it is well established that, phrase public purpose includes a purpose of which object and aim is for the benefit of and in the general interest of the society or the community as opposed to the particular interest of individual. Considering the said aspect of the matter, it can safely be concluded that the acquisition of land for construction of Dharmashala so as to cater to the needs of the large number of pilgrims would be within the purview and scope of the phraseology public purpose. Further as has been held by the Apex Court in a case of Smt. Somawanti and others Vs. Further as has been held by the Apex Court in a case of Smt. Somawanti and others Vs. The State of Punjab and others referred supra that the declaration made by the State that a particular land is needed for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that, it is so needed and the only exception is where the said declaration is a colourable exercise of power. The acquisition in the present case is for public purpose. 9. After the notification U/Sec. 4 of the Act of 1894 was issued, opportunity was given to the petitioner to raise objection and the compliance of Sec. 5A was done. The objection of the petitioner was considered and rejected. The declaration about a particular land being needed for public purpose is to be made by the Government on the basis of material placed before it. A declaration made U/Sec. 6(1) of the Act of 1894 is as per Sec. 6(3) of the said Act. The same is conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is needed for public purpose. The Dharmashala is constructed on land Sy. No. 148/2 having 200 rooms. The present subject land under acquisition is immediately adjacent to the Sy. No. 148/2. As the said Dharmashala is insufficient to cater to all the devotees and pilgrims, the need for construction of additional Dharmashala arose and the writ land is a convenient site as it is immediately adjacent to the existing Dharmashala on Sy. No. 148/2. These aspects seem to have been considered by the Government before issuance of declaration U/Sec. 6 of the Act of 1894. The accommodation is to be provided to the devotees/pilgrims at concessional rate in a Dharmashala. As such, the existence of various hotels in the said down would be of no avail. The prima dona consideration would be existence of public purpose as on the date of declaration U/Sec. 6 of the Act of 1894. It would not be relevant to enter into the debate about the manner of earlier acquisitions and land owned by the Sansthan outside the city limits. Considering the aforesaid factual matrix, it cannot be said that the acquisition by the State for the purpose of construction of Dharmashala by the respondent No. 4 on Sy. No. 148/1 is a colourable exercise of power or the same is malafide. 10. Considering the aforesaid factual matrix, it cannot be said that the acquisition by the State for the purpose of construction of Dharmashala by the respondent No. 4 on Sy. No. 148/1 is a colourable exercise of power or the same is malafide. 10. The Act of 2013 came into force from 01st January, 2014. Sec. 114(1) of the Act of 2013 repeals Act of 1894. Sub section 2 of Sec. 114 of the Act of 2013 clarifies that repeal under sub section 1 shall not affect the application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeals, Sec. 24(1) of the Act of 2013 starts with an non obstante clause. Meaning thereby that the said provision has overriding effect over all other provisions of the Act of 2013. The present case would be governed by Sec. 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013. The language of Sec. 24(1)(a) is abundantly clear and unambiguous. Though Act of 2013 does not provide for a saving clause, and Sec. 114(1) of Act of 2013 states that Act of 1894 stands repealed. However, sub-section 2 of Sec. 114 makes section 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable with regard to the effect of repeal. Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act very succinctly provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or affects any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to all types of repeals. General saving of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under a repealed Act by force of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, are subject to a contrary intention evinced by the repealing Act. In case of a bare repeal, there is hardly any room for a contrary intention, but when the repeal is accompanied by fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the New Act will have to be looked into to determine whether and how far the new Act evinces a contrary intention affecting operation of Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. It is the repealing Act, which has to manifest the contrary intention so as to exclude the operation of Sec. 6. 11. It is the repealing Act, which has to manifest the contrary intention so as to exclude the operation of Sec. 6. 11. In fact, in view of Sec. 24 of the Act of 2013, there is no room for any ambiguity or interpretation of a statute. Sec. 24(1) starts with a non obstante clause. The general purpose is to give the provision contained in the non obstante clause an overriding effect in the event of conflict between it and the rest of the sections, having overriding effect over other provisions of the said Act. The said non-obstante clause clarifies the whole position and does not leave any room for speculation. The proceedings will have to be governed by Sec. 24 of the Act of 2013. In a case of Pune Municipal Corporation and another Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others referred supra, the Apex Court was considering sub section 2 of Sec. 24 of the Act of 2013. The nine matters decided by High Court were with regard to non-compliance of various provisions of Act of 1894. In seven matters award was passed and in two matters award was not passed. The Apex Court considered sub-Sec. 2 of Sec. 24 of the Act of 2013 and on the ground compensation is not paid for five years after passing the award dismissed the appeals. 12. In the present case, the matter is governed by provisions of Sec. 24(1)(a). Sub Section 2 deals with a situation wherein award has been passed under the Act of 1894 five years prior to the commencement of present Act, but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, then in that event, it states that, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. The scenario in the present matter is different. Here the award U/Sec. 11 of the Act of 1894 has not been passed. In such a case, the provisions of the Act of 2013 would apply to the extent of determination of compensation. The proceedings which were initiated and continued under the old Act, till the stage of notice U/Sec. 9 would not lapse. Sec. 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 does not give room for any ambiguity and the said provision will have to be construed strictly. The proceedings which were initiated and continued under the old Act, till the stage of notice U/Sec. 9 would not lapse. Sec. 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 does not give room for any ambiguity and the said provision will have to be construed strictly. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 4 that for payment of compensation also the old Act would apply as because of the operation of the order of stay the further proceedings could not be continued cannot be accepted. The Land Acquisition Act 1894 stands repealed by virtue of Sec. 114 of the Act of 2014. As is held in case of Gajraj Singh Vs. State Transport referred supra by the Apex Court that, the effect of repeal of the Act is to obliterate the Act completely from the record of Parliament as if it had never been passed by it, it never existed except for the purpose of those actions commenced, prosecuted or concluded. When a repeal is followed by fresh legislation, the Court has to look to the provisions of such act only for the purpose of determining whether new Act indicates different intention. In view of Sec. 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, the proceedings till the stage of notice U/Sec. 9 under Act of 1894 would be saved, but, the said provision mandates that compensation will have to be determined as per the provisions of the Act of 2013. Sec. 24(1) of the Act of 2013 as stated above begins with non obstante clause having overriding effect over all other provisions. It does not give option to consider any contingencies including the present one. 13. In the light of the above, we pass the following order. ORDER The writ petition challenging the notification U/Sec. 4 and declaration U/Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is dismissed, however, it is clarified that the compensation shall be determined as per the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to the determination of compensation. Rule accordingly disposed of. No costs.