Order Aggrieved by order dated 25.08.2012 in Case No. 82/Koker I.A/2012, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 2. The writ petitioner has averred that, pursuant to application dated 28.08.1975, the respondent no. 3 issued letter dated 20.05.1975 allotting a piece of land admeasuring 21780 Sq. feet in the name of one Sudhir Kumar Singh. Thereafter, certificate of provisional registration was issued on 01.11.1975 in the name and style of M/s Sudhir Fabricator and it was allotted a certificate as small scale industry. A letter dated 20.02.1979 was issued by the respondent no. 5 containing terms and conditions in relation to lease period of 99 years. The sole proprietor of the petitioner-company died on 16.07.2012 and thereafter, order dated 25.08.2012 was passed cancelling the allotment of the piece of land admeasuing an area of 21780 Sq. feet as well as additional piece of land admeasuring 7519 Sq. feet which was subsequently allotted by order dated 20.02.1979. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that a general notice was published on 16.07.2012 in a local newspaper in which the date of hearing was fixed as 29.08.2012 whereas, the impugned order has been passed on 25.08.2012 without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. It is further submitted that in identical cases, the notices issued to other writ petitioners were quashed by this Court and Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the Ranchi Industrial Area Development Authority has been dismissed vide order dated 10.12.2013 and therefore, the notice issued to the petitioner dated 25.08.2012 is also liable to be quashed by this Court. It is further submitted that the impugned notice has been issued by the Managing Director, RIADA which is without jurisdiction. The allotment can be cancelled by the “Authority”, a term which has been defined in the Act to mean Chairman, Managing Director and other three members and since, the impugned order has been passed by the Managing Director, it is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. 4. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents on record. 5. 4. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents on record. 5. A perusal of impugned order dated 25.08.2012 would indicate that vide letter dated 28.06.1991, 10.12.1999 and 07.10.2010 show-cause notices were issued to the petitioner and the reply submitted by the petitioner was found unsatisfactory. The impugned order dated 25.08.2012 also records that as on 01.04.2012, an amount of Rs. 85,548.61/has remained outstanding against the petitioner-company. The order passed in L.P.A. No. 80 of 2013 and batch cases indicates that the order passed in the said case has been made applicable only to those writ petitioners. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on order dated 10.12.2013 in L.P.A. No. 80 of 2013 and batch cases is thus, misplaced. Moreover, I find that in the impugned order dated 25.08.2012 several other grounds have been taken for cancellation of allotment to the petitioner-company and it has not been brought on record in the present proceeding whether in L.P.A. No. 80 of 2013 and batch cases also notices were issued to the allottees on earlier occasions. Thus, the order passed in the other cases is not applicable in the present case. 6. Referring to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the date of hearing was fixed on 29.08.2012, the impugned order has been passed on 25.08.2012 and thus, the impugned order has been passed in gross violation of the principle of natural justice, I am of the opinion that in the present case, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate and establish any prejudice caused to it. Earlier also, the petitioner was issued notice dated 28.06.1991, 10.12.1999 and 07.10.2010 and its reply was found unsatisfactory. It is wellsettled that the rules of natural justice cannot be confined in a straightjacket formula. A person alleging violation of the rules of natural justice has to plead and prove prejudice caused to him. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, “it is not only difficult but also not advisable to spell out any straight jacket formula which can be applied universally to all cases without variation.” In “K.L. Tripathi Vs. A person alleging violation of the rules of natural justice has to plead and prove prejudice caused to him. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, “it is not only difficult but also not advisable to spell out any straight jacket formula which can be applied universally to all cases without variation.” In “K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India & Ors.”, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 43 , the delinquent employee challenged the order of dismissal on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, as the delinquent employee was not afforded opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Holding that noncompliance to the principles of natural justice must cause some real prejudice to the delinquent officer, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus; “31. ...........There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth.” 7. In “Aligarh Muslim University & Ors. Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan”, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 529 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking note of K.L. Tripathi case observed that, “since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases.” It was further observed that, “there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example, where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary.” 8. In the present writ petition, even if the impugned order is interfered by this Court on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice, it would be only a futile writ because the petitioner has not disputed and established, atleast primafacie, that it has not committed breach of several conditions of allotment and leasedeed. 9. In so far as, the plea taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Managing Director has no authority to pass the impugned order cancelling the allotment, in view of the facts of the case and plea taken in the present writ petition, I find no substance in the contention. 10. 9. In so far as, the plea taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Managing Director has no authority to pass the impugned order cancelling the allotment, in view of the facts of the case and plea taken in the present writ petition, I find no substance in the contention. 10. I find not merit in the writ petition and accordingly, it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.