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2014 DIGILAW 1059 (MAD)

P. Sankaran v. Somanathan and Company

2014-05-22

N.KIRUBAKARAN

body2014
ORDER : N. Kirubakaran, J. The defendant is before this court challenging the order passed in the application filed by the respondents herein before the executing court directing the petitioner herein to amend the schedule of property in E.P. No. 65 of 2005. The case has a long history right from the year 1974, which touched the Supreme Court twice and this court as many as three times in the earlier rounds. 2. Father of the petitioner, one Petchimuthu Asari, was a tenant in respect of the vacant land in Door No. 309, Palayamkottai Road, Tuticorin. The vacant site, originally belonged to Gunavel, under whom the father of the petitioner became a lessee in the year 1942 and thereafter he put up a shed in the site and was carrying on carpentry work. 3. Subsequently the respondent purchased the property on 27.02.1974 and filed O.S. No. 400 of 1974 for ejectment of the father of the petitioner. In the said suit, the father of the petitioner took out an application in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act for a direction to the respondent/landlord to sell the schedule property (vacant site). The said application was contested by the respondent and the Trial Court by order dated 29.9.1975 held that the petitioner's father Petchimuthu Asari was entitled to the benefit under the City Tenants Protection Act and entitled to purchase the land. 4. A review application in I.A. No. 1448 of 1975 was filed by the respondent and the Trial Court reviewed the earlier order and held that the City Tenants Protection Act is not applicable to the building put up prior to 25.6.1975, as the said Act was made applicable to Tuticorin Town, only with effect from 25.6.1995. As a result, Section 9 application filed in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 was dismissed. Against the dismissal of I.A. No. 1241 of 1974, C.M.A. No. 5 of 1976 was filed and the appeal was allowed, holding that the Petchimuthu Asari was entitled to the benefit of the Act and remanded the matter to determine the market value of the site payable by Petchimuthu Asari. The said order passed in C.M.A. No. 5 of 1976 was challenged unsuccessfully by the respondent in C.R.P. No. 1118 of 1977 which was dismissed on 6.5.1980. 5. The said order passed in C.M.A. No. 5 of 1976 was challenged unsuccessfully by the respondent in C.R.P. No. 1118 of 1977 which was dismissed on 6.5.1980. 5. After the demise of Petchimuthu Asari, the petitioner and the other legal heirs were impleaded. Challenging the order passed in C.R.P. No. 1118 of 1977, the respondent filed C.A. No. 1383 of 1984 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the same was dismissed on 14.10.1992. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner filed I.A. No. 1809 of 1994 before the Trial Court claiming that the land in question is a Government poramboke land and the petitioner is in possession of the land for more than 30 years and got the title by adverse possession and there was no necessity to deposit the amount towards the value of the site. Subsequently the said application was dismissed as not pressed. In view of the denial of title of the respondent by the petitioner, I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 filed under section 9(1) of the City Tenants Protection Act was dismissed by the Trial Court on 25.3.1994. The said order of the dismissal was challenged by the petitioner in C.M.A. No. 9 of 1996, which was allowed on 12.9.1996 with a direction to dispose of the I.A. No. 1241 of 1974. The order in C.M.A. No. 9 of 1996 was challenged in C.R.P. No. 2868 of 1996 unsuccessfully by the respondent and the revision was dismissed on 12.2.1997. This court held in the said order that the order of remand restricted the scope of enquiry and the petitioner herein is entitled to the benefit of the City Tenants Protection Act and only to decide the market value of the property, the remand was made. 7. Thereafter, the Trial Court allowed the I.A. No. 1244 of 1974 on 18.7.2001 and determined the market value at Rs. 13,058/-, which was directed to be deposited by the petitioner within one month from 18.7.2001. 8. The order made in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 for selling the vacant site under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act was assailed in C.M.A. No. 11 of 2001 by the respondent and the same was dismissed on 24.1.2002. On challenge the said order was confirmed in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 on 26.2.2003 by this Court. 9. The order made in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 for selling the vacant site under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act was assailed in C.M.A. No. 11 of 2001 by the respondent and the same was dismissed on 24.1.2002. On challenge the said order was confirmed in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 on 26.2.2003 by this Court. 9. Subsequently the petitioner took out an application for amendment of the decree with regard to the schedule of property showing that the petition property is measuring North to South 58.6, East to West 16.3 totalling 955.18 feet equivalent to 2.19 cents, as the measurement was wrongly given as 47 feet instead of 57 feet, though the description of the boundaries were correctly given. The said petition was opposed by the respondents stating that the identical relief was refused in I.A. No. 1505 of 1975 in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 and it is barred by res judicata and the claim relating to the same extent made by the petitioner in O.S. No. 602 of 1982 was negatived by this court in S.A. No. 506 of 1989. The trial court allowed the said petition filed by the petitioner by order dated 12.4.2002 and held that it is only a clerical mistake and therefore, the amendment was ordered. Against the said order dated 12.4.2002, the respondent filed C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002. This court allowed the CRP taking into consideration of the dismissal of the suit filed by the petitioner in O.S. No. 602 of 1989 claiming the first schedule property and the second schedule property as necessary for the petitioner's beneficial enjoyment of the first schedule property. By a judgment in S.A. No. 506 of 1989 dated 15.9.1989 this court held that the lease of the petitioner was in respect of 47 feet North to South alone and not to 58.6 feet. Moreover, the court also took into consideration the dismissal of the earlier application by the trial court by order dated 7.11.1975 in I.A. No. 1505 of 1975 filed by the petitioner's father Petchimuthu Asari for amendment of the same measurement. To review the said order, the petitioner preferred a review application in Review No. 146 of 2002 in C.R.P. No. 741 of 2002 and the same was dismissed on 27.6.2003. The Special Leave Petition filed against the said order was also dismissed on 23.3.2004. 10. To review the said order, the petitioner preferred a review application in Review No. 146 of 2002 in C.R.P. No. 741 of 2002 and the same was dismissed on 27.6.2003. The Special Leave Petition filed against the said order was also dismissed on 23.3.2004. 10. On 3.3.2003 the petitioner filed E.P. No. 65 of 2005 to execute the sale deed in his favour as per order passed in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 showing the measurement as 58.6" North to South, 16.3" East to West. In the said E.P. EA. No. 56 of 2006 was filed by the respondent to send for original documents and the entire case bundles to the file of the Executing Court. The said petition was allowed on 5.6.2006. Another application in I.A. No. 250 of 2006 was filed seeking direction to the petitioner to amend the measurements of the schedule of the property as 47 feet North South in E.P. No. 56 of 2005 as per order passed in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002 dated 5.10.2002 and review petition No. 146 of 2002 dated 27.6.2003. The said petition was allowed by the Trial Court by order dated 28.8.2006. The said order is being challenged before this court. 11. Meanwhile the petitioner filed O.S. No. 602 of 1982 claiming right to an extent of 58.6 X 16 feet and the rear portion and sought for injunction against the respondents. The said suit, on contest was decreed on 2.4.1986 and was confirmed in A.S. No. 152 of 1987 on 18.1.1989. However, the second appeal No. 506 of 1989 filed by the respondent was allowed setting aside the decree of injunction granted in favour of the petitioner on 15.9.1989. The petitioner in person submitted that the respondent is indulging in vexatious litigation. Even though the proceedings were initiated in 1974, it has not attained finality. Even after the petitioner succeeded before the Supreme Court arguing as party in person, the respondents initiated; so many proceedings and therefore, he is put to mental agony. His case is a straight forward case and the respondent's case is a false case. By his experience in this case as party in person he is able to know all the procedure of law and his request is only to make himself to conclude the proceedings and he should not approach the court hereafter. His case is a straight forward case and the respondent's case is a false case. By his experience in this case as party in person he is able to know all the procedure of law and his request is only to make himself to conclude the proceedings and he should not approach the court hereafter. The commissioner's report filed before the Trial Court speaks about the measurements as 58 ½" X 16¼" and based on the commissioner's report, the value of the property was fixed at Rs. 13058/- and the same was deposited by the petitioner on 20.7.2001. Even after depositing the amount, the respondent has been protracting the matter and deliberately failed to execute the sale in his favour. The orders passed in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 dated 18.6.2001 by the learned District Munsif, wherein the extent of the property was determined as 955.18 sq. ft. was confirmed by an order dated 24.1.2002 in C.M.A. No. 11 of 2001 and further confirmed by this court in the order dated 26.6.2003 in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002; Therefore, the order passed by the Executing Court allowing the amendment application regarding the measurement of the suit property has to be set aside. 12. The respondent also filed O.S. No. 584 of 1994 on 1.10.1994 against the petitioner and two others for permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with the respondent's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Schedule-I property excepting the second schedule property. In the said suit, I.A. No. 1466 of 1994 was filed and an order of interim injunction was obtained against the petitioner and two others. In O.S. No. 584 of 1994, I.A. No. 1501 of 1994 was taken out by the petitioner on 13.8.2004, seeking to punish the respondent/tenant contending that the respondent obtained the order of ad-interim injunction against the petitioner by misleading the court and making mis-representation. The said petition was filed under Order 39, Rule 2 (A) and under Section 151 of C.P.C. and the same was allowed holding that the respondent deliberately misrepresented the court and obtained the ad-interim injunction and was responsible for contempt of court and directed the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/- as fine. 13. Mr. The said petition was filed under Order 39, Rule 2 (A) and under Section 151 of C.P.C. and the same was allowed holding that the respondent deliberately misrepresented the court and obtained the ad-interim injunction and was responsible for contempt of court and directed the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/- as fine. 13. Mr. Praburajadurai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the Trial Court only passed orders based on the orders passed by this court in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002 and Review Application No. 146 of 2002. Even the petitioner's father took out an application in I.A. No. 1505 of 1975 to amend the measurement and the same was negatived by the Trial Court as early as 7.11.1974, which became final. In spite of that, the petitioner is only prolonging the matter unnecessarily. The petitioner made many allegations against the concerned judicial officers from whom he was unable to get favourable orders right from the beginning and that is his attitude. Therefore, the respondent seeks to confirm the order passed by the Trial Court. 14. The dispute is with regard to the extent of the property. According to the petitioner, the measurement of the property is 58 ½ X 16¼ feet, whereas the respondent contended that it is only 47 X 15 feet. Therefore it is relevant to look into the schedule of the property as shown in O.S. No. 400 of 1974 filed by the respondent. The schedule reads as follows: "The vacant land situate at Door No. 309, Palayamkottai Road, Tuticorin Municipal Town, within the Sub-Registration District of Tuticorin and Registration District of Palayamkottai." No boundaries were given. In fact, a perusal of the plaint would show no measurements were given. In the said suit, I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 was taken out by the petitioner's father Petchimuthu Asari under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act seeking a direction to the respondents/plaintiffs to sell the property to him. In the said application schedule has been given as follows: "The Vacant land measuring about 15 X 47 feet along with the path way on the rear side measuring 10 X 5 bounded on: North: Palayamkottai Road; South: Balavinayakarkoil Street East: Vincent Workshop at Door No. 310 Palayamkottai Road West: Thiagarajan Motor Works at Door No. 308, Palayamkottai Road. In the said application schedule has been given as follows: "The Vacant land measuring about 15 X 47 feet along with the path way on the rear side measuring 10 X 5 bounded on: North: Palayamkottai Road; South: Balavinayakarkoil Street East: Vincent Workshop at Door No. 310 Palayamkottai Road West: Thiagarajan Motor Works at Door No. 308, Palayamkottai Road. The boundaries of path way are as follows: South: Balavinayagar temple Street; North: 310, Palayamkottai Road; Vincent Workshop, No. 309, Palayamkottai Road and the property in possession of the Petchimuthu Asari; East: vacant land belonging to the respondent earlier occupied by Chockalinga Asari West: Vacant land belonging to the respondent earlier occupied by Raja Asari. 15. Thereafter the petitioner's father filed I.A. No. 1505 of 1975 seeking amendment of the schedule in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 stating that the measurements in North to South was mistakenly given as 47 instead of 57 feet. The said application was dismissed stating that DW 1 stated that the petition schedule property in the south was in possession of the Raju Asari and he handed over the said property to the plaintiff and that 10 feet was encroached upon by the petitioner's father after the suit was disposed of on 29.9.1975. However, what has to be seen is that the respondent/plaintiff did not give the measurement in the plaint, whereas the petitioner's father gave the measurements and boundaries, Even in response to the suit notice dated 14.3.1974, the petitioner's father gave a reply dated 25.4.1974, wherein the petitioner's father categorically stated that the property is measuring about 57" north to south. The said reply notice was also admitted by the respondent/plaintiff in paragraph-5 of the plaint. In view of that, it is very clear that though correct measurement was given in the reply notice dated 25.4.1974 i.e. 57 feet North to South and by mistake only the measurement was mentioned as 47" in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 filed under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. The reasons given by the Trial Court to dismiss the amendment petition in I.A. No. 1505/1975 filed by the petitioner's father on 7.11.1975 that the reply notice filed before the court was neither a certified copy nor an attested copy cannot be correct. The reasons given by the Trial Court to dismiss the amendment petition in I.A. No. 1505/1975 filed by the petitioner's father on 7.11.1975 that the reply notice filed before the court was neither a certified copy nor an attested copy cannot be correct. When the respondents themselves admitted the reply notice dated 25.4.1974 in para-5 of the plaint itself, the Trial Court should not have ignored the reply notice, especially when it was furnished to the Advocate Commissioner appointed to inspect the property. Therefore, the order passed by the Trial Court on 7.11.75 is contrary to the facts. That apart, the Trial Court relied upon the Commissioner's report dated 22.10.1975 to come to the conclusion that there is an encroachment of 10 feet and 4 inches in the south and the petitioner's father encroached upon the property after the dismissal of the suit. A perusal of the Advocate Commissioner's report dated 22.5.1974 would reveal that there is no mention about the alleged encroachment as stated by the trial court in the order dated 7.11.1975. It was only alleged by the counsel for the respondent that encroachment was made by the petitioner's father to an extent of 10.4 feet. Relevant paragraph of the commissioner's report dated 22.5.1974 read as follows: "The building is situate on the Palayamkottai Road, one of the main arteries of Tuticorin. It is about a furlong east of the Tuticorin Bus Stand. There is a petrol bunk opposite to the site. On the eastern side there is an engineering workshop under name and style of Kumar Engineering Works and on the West an auto workshop under the name and style of Thiagaraj Auto Works. About 50 years east of the site therein is a town bus stop. The Ramaiah lodge and New Gowri Shanakar Lodges are near to the site at a distance of about 150 years. The site is sin a busy locality and there are several shops and workshop nearby. The site is flanked on the northern side by Palayamkottai road and on the southern side by Balavinayagar koil Street. The length of the property from the place where the front tiles project to the southern and where the back tiles project is 58'1". The site is sin a busy locality and there are several shops and workshop nearby. The site is flanked on the northern side by Palayamkottai road and on the southern side by Balavinayagar koil Street. The length of the property from the place where the front tiles project to the southern and where the back tiles project is 58'1". Advocate for the respondent represented that the other side is entitled to only 47'9" from the front entrance in the Palayamkottai Road to the south and the shed in the southern 10'4" is an addition and encroachment after the filing of the suit. This is stoutly denied by the petitioner. There are two sheds. The northern shed runs upto 47'9" north to south from the Palayamkottai road. The southern shed measures 10'4" from the northern shed. The breadth of the site east to west at the southern end is 13'2" at the northern entrance of the shed is 10'9"and at the point where the tiles project at the entrance is 14'6". At 47'9" from north on the eastern side there is a gate. According to the petitioner it is the gate. According to the petitioner it is the gate opening to the pathway east of his site leading to Balavinayagar Koil Street. The lane or pathway is 4' X 19". This is disputed by the plaintiff. The lane according to the petitioner commences at the point of 47'9"and runs south. Plaintiff denies the land and claims that the alleged lane is part of 1 and. The eastern site owned by him. As it is there is no trace of any lane. Petitioner stated that the lane is fenced and blocked by the plaintiff." (emphasis supplied) Therefore, the finding reached by the District Munsif in the order dated 7.11.1975 is erroneous. Even though the said order attained finality, due to non-filing of any revision by the petitioner's father, there is no bar for this court to look into the matter in Toto especially, when the entire issue right from 1974 till date is continued in various proceedings before various courts and the dispute is only with regard to the extent. Therefore, this court is duty bound to independently consider the fact and decide the matter, de hors the order dated 7.11.1975 passed in the I.A. No. 1505/1975 by the District Munsif. 16. Therefore, this court is duty bound to independently consider the fact and decide the matter, de hors the order dated 7.11.1975 passed in the I.A. No. 1505/1975 by the District Munsif. 16. Section 9 application filed by the petitioner's father gives the correct boundaries. Irrespective of the extent, boundaries remain the same. The boundaries given in the Section 9 Application in I.A. No. 1241/1974 by the petitioner's father gives the following boundaries of the property. North-Palayakottai Road South-Balavinayagar Koil Street East-Vincent Workshop West-Thiagarajan Motor Workshop The very same boundaries are given in the Advocate Commissioner's report dated 22.10.1975. Therefore, it is evident clear boundaries are given. Even if there is any inconsistency with regard to the measurement and the boundaries, the boundaries alone prevail over the extent as settled by the Supreme Court in Subhaga v. Shobha (2006) 5 SCC 466 : LNIND 2006 SC 483 : (2007) 7 MLJ 826 as well as by this Court in Sundaram v. Selvam alias Selvan 2012 (2) MWN (Civil) 370 : LNIND 2012 MAD 1063 which declares that boundaries will prevail over the dimensions when there is a conflict in between them. Relevant portion of para-6 of Subhaga v. Shobha (supra) reads as follows: "That a property can be identified either by boundary or by any other specific description is well established. Hence the attempt had been to identify the suit property with reference to the boundaries and the commissioner has identified that property with reference to such boundaries. Even if there was any discrepancy normally, the boundaries should prevail". In view of the above settled position of law the boundaries have to be taken. 17. The petitioner and others filed O.S. No. 602 of 1982 seeking permanent injunction from putting up any construction blocking the pathway situated in the second schedule property. The suit was decreed and in appeal it was confirmed. This court in S.A. No. 506 of 1989 dismissed the suit on 15.9.1989 only on the ground that the petitioner has not pleaded any easement rights. More over at that point of time, the earlier proceedings in O.S. No. 400 of 1974 was pending. The suit was decreed and in appeal it was confirmed. This court in S.A. No. 506 of 1989 dismissed the suit on 15.9.1989 only on the ground that the petitioner has not pleaded any easement rights. More over at that point of time, the earlier proceedings in O.S. No. 400 of 1974 was pending. After judgment passed in the above S.A., I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 in O.S. No. 400 of 1974 filed by the petitioner was allowed on 18.7.2001 as per the directions of this court dated 6.5.1980 passed in C.R.P. No. 1118 of 1977, determining the value of the site at Rs. 13058 for the property measuring 58.6 feet North to South and 16.3 feet East to West to an extent of 955.18 sq. ft. equivalent to 219 cents. The said extent was determined by the Trial court based on the original commissioner's report dated 22.10.1975. The Trial Court observed that both the parties had no objections for the said commissioner's report. The said report was marked as Ex. C1. The relevant portion of the Commissioner's report dated 16.7.1982, which was relied upon by the Trial Court at the end of paragraph 14 of the judgment dated 18.7.2001 is extracted as follows: VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED Therefore, the extent of the petition property to be sold to the petitioner was determined based on the measurement shown in the Advocate Commissioner's report dated 16.7.1982 marked as Exs. C1 and the sketch C2. The measurements shown in the report are 58½" north to south and 16'3 east to west. It is seen in the order dated 18.7.2001 that both the parties have no objection for adopting the said report. The extent was determined and the value of the property was determined at Rs.3058/-. The said order was confirmed in C.M.A. No. 11 of 2001 by judgment dated 24.6.2002 and was further confirmed in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 on 26.2.2003. Therefore there cannot be any dispute with regard to the extent, as it attained finality before this Court on 26.2.2003. The petitioner paid Rs. 13058/- for the property measuring North south as 58.6 and East West 16.3 equivalent to 2.19 cents as per the Trial Court order in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 dated 18.7.2001. 18. The petitioner filed application in I.A. No. 337 of 2002 seeking amendment of the measurement of the property. The petitioner paid Rs. 13058/- for the property measuring North south as 58.6 and East West 16.3 equivalent to 2.19 cents as per the Trial Court order in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 dated 18.7.2001. 18. The petitioner filed application in I.A. No. 337 of 2002 seeking amendment of the measurement of the property. Though the said petition was allowed by the Trial Court on 12.4.2002, the same was set aside in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002 on 4.10.2002. However, it is to be seen that this court in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 by order dated 26.2.2003 already confirmed the measurement as well. 19. The order passed in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002 dated 4.10.2002 is based on only dismissal of the amendment application filed by the petitioner's father, by order dated 7.11.1975 alone. As already found in para-5 of this order, the said order dated 7.11.1975 is contrary to the facts. The order passed in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 dated 18.7.2001 as confirmed by this court in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 dated 26.2.2003 is based on measurement shown in advocate commissioner's report marked as Exs. C1 and C2 dated 16.7.1982, which was accepted by both the parties before the Trial Court without any objection. As found by the Trial Court order, when the case of the petitioner is based on fact as evidenced by the Advocate Commissioner's report, this court has to follow the order passed in C.R.P. No. 1237 of 2002 dated 26.2.2003, rather than the order dated 4.10.2002 in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002, which was mainly based on the earlier order dated 7.11.1975 passed by the trial court. 20. The petitioner deposited the entire amount, as determined by the Trial Court. The extent which the petitioner is entitled to was confirmed by this court on 26.2.2003. However, the respondent filed E.A. No. 250 of 2006 for deleting 58.6 X 16.3 and adding 47 X 15 as per order dated C.R.P. 751 of 2002. Though the Trial Court relied upon the order passed in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002 which set aside amendment order dated 12.4.2002 passed by the trial court, the executing court has not considered the earlier order passed in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 dated 18.7.2001 as confirmed in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 on 26.2.2003. Though the Trial Court relied upon the order passed in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002 which set aside amendment order dated 12.4.2002 passed by the trial court, the executing court has not considered the earlier order passed in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 dated 18.7.2001 as confirmed in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 on 26.2.2003. The said order is based on the measurement given by the Advocate Commissioner's report dated 16.10.1982. 21. Assuming for a moment, the Trial Court is justified in amending the extent as per the order passed in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002, it is a trite law that the boundaries prevail over the extent if there is any conflict between the two. In this case, boundaries are not at all in dispute and it is only the extent. As stated earlier, the boundaries were given as early as in 1974 in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 filed under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. Secondly the measurement was also correctly given in the reply dated 20.5.2014 given by the petitioner's father in response to the suit notice dated 14.3.1974, as admitted by the respondent themselves in paragraph 5 of the plaint. Thirdly neither measurements nor boundaries were given in the plaint in O.S. No. 400 of 1974 filed by the respondent. Fourthly, the first Advocate Commissioner's report dated 22.10.1975 gives the very same boundaries as that of the boundaries given by the petitioner's father in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974 filed under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. Sixthly the Commissioner's report dated 16.7.1982 gave the correct measurements, for which no objection has been filed by any of the parties. Fifthly, the extent of the property to be conveyed to the petitioner and the value of the property were determined by the Trial Court on 18.7.2001 as per the earlier orders passed by this Court in C.R.P. No. 1118 of 1977 dated 6.5.1980 and the trial court order dated 18.7.2001 was also confirmed by this court in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2003 on 26.2.2003 as stated above. 22. 22. When the respondent miserably failed to mention the boundaries in the plaint itself, they cannot take advantage of the judgment passed in S.A. No. 506 of 1989, which set aside the decree and judgment passed in favour of the petitioner in the suit in O.S. No. 602 of 1982 filed by him seeking permanent injunction. The said suit is not for declaration and it is only for permanent injunction, whereas, the EP is to get the property as per Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act, where the courts have already determined the extent and the measurement correctly. The respondent cannot seek to amend the schedule of the property for the first time in the E.P. especially the proceedings was initiated by the respondent in 1974 without giving measurements and boundaries. The reasonings are contrary to the facts as stated in the Commissioner's report and order of this Court in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 on 26.2.2003 confirming the order of the trial court order dated 18.7.2001 passed in I.A. No. 1241 of 1974. Therefore, the said contention is not sustainable. For the above reasons, the reasoning given by the Trial Court cannot be accepted and accordingly the Trial Court order is set aside and the amendment application taken out by the respondent stands dismissed. 23. Taking into consideration the pendency of the case from 1974 without any finality, the Trial Court is directed to pass appropriate orders in the E.P. within four weeks from the date of the receipt of a copy of the order. 24. Though the petitioner succeeds in this case, the petitioner argued the matter criticising the judiciary and other side unnecessarily. Merely because he was appearing in person and succeeded before the Supreme Court with cost, it does not mean that he could make uncharitable remarks about the justice delivery system during the hearing. The very fact that the petitioner succeeded in C.R.P. No. 1227 of 2002 on 26.2.2003 with a cost of Rs. 2500/- and Civil Appeal No. 1383 of 1984 on 14.12.2002 before Apex Court with a cost of Rs. 1000/- in his favour which he claims as a personal victory, is a proof that justice delivery system Junctions properly in this country. If the proceedings are there from 1974 onwards, it is not only due to the respondent, but also due to the petitioner equally. 1000/- in his favour which he claims as a personal victory, is a proof that justice delivery system Junctions properly in this country. If the proceedings are there from 1974 onwards, it is not only due to the respondent, but also due to the petitioner equally. It is the discretion of the party to approach the higher forum if he suffers an adverse order. The petitioner cannot expect the other side not to approach any appellate forum when the order was in the petitioner's favour, whereas when the order is against the petitioner, he thinks that it is his personal prerogative to file an appeal which is not available to other side. 25. Every litigant has got right to think and contend that his case is a genuine case. When the petitioner has got his right, he forgets about the availability of similar right to opposite party. He filed at-least three C.R.Ps and 2 SLPs besides many I.As. and CMAs in this case, when he suffered adverse orders. Similarly respondents filed three CRPs and one SLP apart from many I.As., and C.M.As. in this case and thus prolonging the matter for four decades. The proceedings usually reach this court after orders passed by the trial court and the appellate court. Therefore, definitely the proceedings will take time to attain finality. Legal process would be time consuming process in each stage, as every act of the Court is done as per the procedures contemplated under statutes and Acts and Rules. For that the petitioner cannot find fault with the justice delivery system. The petitioner cannot expect disposal of his case alone at the earliest as the Courts are bound to dispose of all the cases filed by the litigants like petitioner. 26. It is contended by the respondent that it is the habit of the petitioner to make allegations against the judicial officer, if adverse order is passed against him This has been pointed out by this court in order dated 24.8.2005 in Sub-Application S.R. No. 18355 of 2004. Paragraph-12 of the order in Review Application in 146 of 2002 dated 27.6.2003 and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the order dated 4.10.2002 passed in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002, are extracted as follows: Para-12 of order dated 27.6.2003 passed in Review Application No. 146/2002 reads as follows: "12. The review petitioner deliberately kept back/suppressed the findings in those proceedings. Paragraph-12 of the order in Review Application in 146 of 2002 dated 27.6.2003 and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the order dated 4.10.2002 passed in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002, are extracted as follows: Para-12 of order dated 27.6.2003 passed in Review Application No. 146/2002 reads as follows: "12. The review petitioner deliberately kept back/suppressed the findings in those proceedings. Not only that, he also chose to cast aspersions on the officers, who decided those cases. None of the criteria required for invoking Section 114, Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is present in the instant case. There is no injustice done to the review petitioner. Review is not an appeal, in disguise. Still I reexamined the whole question and I could not persuade myself to take a different from the one I have already taken. The review petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs." (emphasis supplied) Paras-7 and 8 of order dated 4.10.2002 in C.R.P. No. 751 of 2002 are extracted as follows: "7. Per contra, the party in person, besides filing written arguments and the entire records relating to the case, which are in his favour and leaving out the orders against him, addressed elaborate arguments as to how he had been fighting the battle from 1974, how he had been successful throughout, how he was awarded costs by the Supreme Court and how the Courts have been doing justice to him and how this Court also should do that. 8. The points actually raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were not really met by the party in person. As already noted, the order passed in the earlier application in I.A. No. 1505 of 1975 and the dismissal order of the subsequent suit filed by him in 1982 by this Court have not been made available by the respondent party in person. He made a feeble attempt to cast aspersions on the Judge who decided the application in I.A. No. 1505/75. He was, however, silent about the dismissal of the second appeal. It is, therefore, necessary to know about the order in I.A. No. 1505/75. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner has made available the order in the said application. He made a feeble attempt to cast aspersions on the Judge who decided the application in I.A. No. 1505/75. He was, however, silent about the dismissal of the second appeal. It is, therefore, necessary to know about the order in I.A. No. 1505/75. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioner has made available the order in the said application. In the affidavit in support of the said application, the respondent's father had stated as follows:" (emphasis supplied) In the order dated 24.8.2005 in Sub Application S.R. No. 18355 of 2004 in contempt petition No. 15 of 2004, this court observed in paragraph 26 of the orders as follows: "26. Number of Typed Sets have been filed by both the parties making allegations and counter allegations against each other. Respondents 3 to 6 have filed Typed Set of papers containing the petitions/Letters sent by the petitioner/Defendant wherein he has allegedly made serious allegations against the judiciary. It is stated that whenever orders are not passed in favour of the petitioner, it is the habit of the petitioner making allegations against the Judiciary. Respondents 3 to 6 have urged the Court to initiate suo motu Contempt Proceedings against the petitioner (Party in person). The scope of Enquiry in this proceedings is very limited. This Court is not inclined to open another round of litigation involving the parties. This is not appropriate Forum for Respondents 3 to 6 to ventilate their grievance against the petitioner, even if it is genuine." (emphasis supplied) From the above it is clear that the petitioner has been making unwanted remarks about the courts and justice delivery system. 27. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India AIR 1996 SC 2481 : (1996) 5 SCC 216 : LNIND 1996 SC 1083 held in paragraphs 35 to 37 as follows: "35. Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech which holds so dear in a democracy of ability to express freely. Freedom of expression produces the benefit of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the mistakes or bias or at times even corruption. It assists stability by tempered articulation of grievances and by promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts. Freedom of expression produces the benefit of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the mistakes or bias or at times even corruption. It assists stability by tempered articulation of grievances and by promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity, equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the protection of other fundamental human rights. Legal procedure illuminates how free speech of expression constitutes one of the most essential foundations of democratic society. Freedom of expression, therefore, is one of the basic conditions for the progress of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of free society. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. As stated hereinbefore, they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary. 36. In E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar a Bench of three Judges had held that the law of contempt stems from the right of a court to punish, by imprisonment or fine, persons guilty of words or acts which obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae by the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to them, even if committed outside the courts. 37. Scandalising the judges or courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect and disregard and tantamounts to contempt. All acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity or its majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contempt committed in respect of single judge or single court or in certain circumstances committed in respect of the whole of the judiciary or judicial system. All acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity or its majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contempt committed in respect of single judge or single court or in certain circumstances committed in respect of the whole of the judiciary or judicial system. Therein the criticism by the Chief Minister who described the judiciary as an instrument of oppression and the judges as guided and dominated by class hatred, class interest and class prejudices etc. was held to be an attack upon judges calculated to give rise to a sense of disrespect and distrust of all judicial decisions. It was held that such criticism of authority of the law and law courts constituted contempt of the court and the Chief Minister was found guilty thereof." In E.M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar AIR 1970 SC 2015 : (1970) 2 SCC 325 : LNIND 1970 SC 286 : (1971) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 315 in paragraph 33, the Honourable Supreme Court held that a law punishes not only acts which had in fact interfere with the Courts and administration of justice but also those who have the tendency, are likely to produce a particular result and likely effect of words must be seen and they clearly have effect of lowering the prestige of the judges and Courts in the eyes of the people. Paragraph No. 33 of the judgment is reproduced as follows: "33. Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon exhorted us to give consideration to the purpose for which the statement was made, the position of the appellant as the head of a State, his sacrifices, his background and his integrity. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the occasion (a press conference), the belief of the people in his word as a Chief Minister and the ready ear which many in his party and outside would give to him. The mischief that his words would cause need not be assessed to find him guilty. The law punishes not only acts which do in fact interfere with the Courts and administration of justice but also those which have that tendency, that is to say, are likely to produce a particular result. Judged from the angle of Courts and administration of justice, there is not a semblance of doubt in our minds that the appellant was guilty of contempt of Court. Judged from the angle of Courts and administration of justice, there is not a semblance of doubt in our minds that the appellant was guilty of contempt of Court. Whether he misunderstood the teachings of Marx and Engels or deliberately distorted them is not to much purpose. The likely effect of his words must be seen and they have clearly the effect of lowering the prestige of judges and Courts in the eyes of the people. That he did not intend any such result may be a matter for consideration in the sentence to be imposed on him but cannot serve as a justification. We uphold the conviction." 28. Therefore, this court has to deprecate this kind of attitude by the litigant. If such trend is allowed to continue, it will definitely paint a bad picture about the justice delivery system in the minds of the common people. For the above acts of the petitioner, this court slaps a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) to be paid by him as fine/cost to the Chief Justice Relief Fund within a period of two weeks from the date of the receipt of a copy of the order and file a copy of the receipt with the Tahsildar, Tuticorin. If the amount is not paid within two weeks and the receipt is not filed. The Tahsildar, Tuticorin is to take proceedings under Revenue Recovery Act and collect the amount and pay the amount to "the Chief Justice Relief Fund" within sixteen weeks thereafter. CRP is allowed. Consequently the connected M.Ps. are closed.