JUDGMENT Hon’ble Servesh Kumar Gupta, J. The instant appeal challenges the judgment and order of conviction dated 5.2.2003 rendered by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun in Sessions Trial No.186 of 1998, State Vs. Anand Kumar and two others. The said trial pertains to crime no.301 of 1998 at police station Doiwala, District Dehradun, wherein Anand Kumar (husband), Ratan Lal (father-in-law) and Ms. Rama Devi (mother-in-law) were tried for the offences u/s 498-A and 306 IPC. The trial culminated into the acquittal of Ratan Lal and Ms. Rama Devi while the appellant Anand Kumar was found guilty for both the offences, wherefor he has appropriately been sentenced by the Trial Judge. 2. As the facts emerging out from the first information report and other material available on record, it transpires that Ms. Reshma was married on 14.6.1993 with the appellant and she committed suicide in her matrimonial house on 25.9.1998 in the evening hours. This way, the incident took place within almost five years and three months of her marriage with the appellant. She died on account of burn injuries and as per her dying declaration, recorded by PW3 Ravindra Godbole, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar Dehradun, on 26.9.1998 at 11:50 AM, she sprinkled kerosene oil upon herself and set fire thereafter. The information of her critical condition was conveyed to her parents by Shyam Sunder (PW9). Her parents then rushed and reached first to the place of occurrence and subsequently in the hospital overnight from Ambala city. PW9 is another son-in-law of PW1 Laxmi Narayan (deceased’s father) who used to reside 200 yards away from the matrimonial house of victim. Struggling between the life and death, she breathed her last sometime in the intervening night of 5/6.10.1998 i.e. almost 10 days after the incident. PW1 Laxmi Narayan lodged the FIR on 26.9.1998 at 8:45 PM after running from pillar to post i.e. from police station to hospital and back therefrom. Having received the information, so extended by PW9 (his second son-in-law), PW1 came to the matrimonial house of victim in the morning and gathered information from the accused persons that his daughter had been admitted in the hospital, as she had suffered some burn injuries while boiling the milk. PW1 went to lodge the report at the police station but it could not be lodged and he was asked to see his daughter first. PW1 went to lodge the report at the police station but it could not be lodged and he was asked to see his daughter first. He, accordingly, came to the hospital and found his daughter in a serious condition. When the entire incident was disclosed to him by his daughter, he went to the police station for lodging the report and thus, remained successful in his such effort. The police then came into motion, Sub-Divisional Magistrate was called in the hospital, who, in presence of the Medical officer, recorded her dying declaration from 11:50 AM to 12:10 PM. This way the dying declaration could be recorded within 20 minutes under the certificate of the medical officer to the effect that during such recording, Ms. Reshma was conscious throughout. 3. To appreciate the narration from the mouth of Ms. Reshma, it would be in the fitness of things to reproduce the English translation of the same hereinunder: “Since when I got married, all the members of in-laws family used to harass me. They used to taunt my default in managing the cow dung and failure in grass cutting by passing sarcastic comments that I am urbanite. They used to beat and direct me to go out of the house. The children are small who were troubling me yesterday. My mother-in-law, father-in-law and husband were conversing to expel me from the house. I had boiled the milk. Meanwhile, Anand ran to beat me and then enraged. However, he did not beat me yesterday. I became angry. I then sprinkled kerosene oil upon me from the stove. Door of the room was open. Thereafter I set ablaze my body with a matchstick. Younger brother-in-law Bhim came to my rescue. It was 8 o’clock of the evening. Neither any member from the matrimonial house sprinkled kerosene oil upon me nor set ablaze me. They kept me in utter sadness and used to harass me too much asking me to leave the house. Whatever I did, it was all by myself.” 4. Learned Magistrate also took trouble to read the above-statement, once after recording the same, to the victim and then her thumb impression was obtained. 5. It would be worthwhile to keep in mind the admissibility and value of dying declaration which has been propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court time and again. Whatever I did, it was all by myself.” 4. Learned Magistrate also took trouble to read the above-statement, once after recording the same, to the victim and then her thumb impression was obtained. 5. It would be worthwhile to keep in mind the admissibility and value of dying declaration which has been propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court time and again. In the case of Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2012) 4 SCC 327 , Hon’ble Apex Court has propounded the law on the subject. It has been held in the said judgment that: - “The law is well-settled that a dying declaration is admissible in evidence and the admissibility is founded on the principle of necessity. A dying declaration, if found reliable, can form the basis of a conviction. A Court of facts is not excluded from acting upon an uncorroborated dying declaration for finding conviction. The dying declaration, as a piece of evidence, stands on the same footing as any other piece of evidence. It has to be judged and appreciated in light of the surrounding circumstances and its weight determined by reference to the principle governing the weighing of evidence. If in a given case a particular dying declaration suffers from any infirmity, either of its own or as disclosed by the other evidence adduced in the case or the circumstances coming to its notice, the Court may, as a rule of prudence, look for corroboration and if the infirmities are such as would render a dying declaration so infirm that it pricks the conscience of the Court, the same may be refused to be accepted as forming basis of the conviction.” 6. The principle of admissibility of dying declaration is based on the maxim ‘nemo moriturus prosumiture mentin’ i.e. a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth and this is a reason that in the matters of placing reliance upon the dying declaration, the requirement of oath and cross-examination has been dispensed with. The above-maxim has been highlighted by the Apex Court in the case of ‘Muthu Kutty vs. State, 2005(1) J.Cr.C. 591, S.C., D.B.’. 7. Now, it would also not be out of place to remind ourselves about the presumption, as has been adumberated u/s 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads as under: - 113A. The above-maxim has been highlighted by the Apex Court in the case of ‘Muthu Kutty vs. State, 2005(1) J.Cr.C. 591, S.C., D.B.’. 7. Now, it would also not be out of place to remind ourselves about the presumption, as has been adumberated u/s 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads as under: - 113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,” cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.” 8. Before this Court, learned counsel has read the statements of PW1 Laxmi Narayan (father of victim), PW2 Panna Lal (real uncle of victim), PW9 Shyam Sunder (husband of real sister of victim, who resided in the neighborhood) and PW10 Smt. Usha Rani (victim’s sister). An attempt was made to point out some inconsistencies in the statements of these witnesses to bring this case out from the ambit of ‘cruelty’, but this Court feels that minor discrepancies, in the statements of these witnesses, are not enough to lace the dying declaration from the mouth of victim, with such an infirmity as to make it unbelievable. There may be some exaggerations or even embellishments in the testimony of these witnesses, but in my opinion, there is no such criminal case which is free from these deformities, especially when these rustic witnesses are examined after a gap of years from the date of incident. In this case, the marriage was solemnized on 14.6.1993 while the occurrence took place on 25.9.1998 i.e. after almost five years and three months of wedding, and within this time period, she was subjected to cruel conduct on several scores. In this case, the marriage was solemnized on 14.6.1993 while the occurrence took place on 25.9.1998 i.e. after almost five years and three months of wedding, and within this time period, she was subjected to cruel conduct on several scores. She has categorically stated that even the accused persons were in the habit of beating her asking her to leave the house and on the fateful day, her husband also ran to beat her, however on that day, though she was spared later, but her husband expressed 6 his anger. This all drove her to end her life. Although, she was subjected to the physical cruelty as well, but even the spirit of law does not require the existence of physical cruelty on the bride every-time. Even if she was subjected to mental cruelty by the conduct, which was meted out to her in the matrimonial house, it is sufficient to bring this case within the purview of ‘cruelty, which is pre-requisite to draw presumption u/s 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. 9. It was next argued that on the same set of evidence, father-in-law and mother-in-law have been spared by the Trial Judge, so the appellant also could have been set free on the basis of that evidence. I am unable to agree with this contention for the reason that gravity of cruelty towards her was always gravest from her husband than the father-in-law and mother-in-law. The instant case is not that one where the principle, as stated above, can be made applicable because a woman, if protected with care and affection by her husband, may even bear some untoward behaviour from other members of in-laws house. Here the victim has not only been left hapless and helpless, but even felt constraint to bear a graver insatiable and cruel attitude from her husband. In such a situation, it is sufficient to presume that she was abetted by her husband to end her life. 10. As regards the demand of cash/dowry from the victim is concerned, PW1 Laxmi Narayan has deposed that just two months after the marriage, his son-in-law Anand Kumar (appellant) demanded Rs.10,000/- from him. PW1 could not make the payment in time so the accused began to harass and torture the victim. In this regards, father’s evidence is more reliable than the evidence of PW2 who is only the uncle of deceased. 11. PW1 could not make the payment in time so the accused began to harass and torture the victim. In this regards, father’s evidence is more reliable than the evidence of PW2 who is only the uncle of deceased. 11. So, in view of what has been discussed hereinabove, the Court feels that there is no force in this appeal which is liable to be dismissed. Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed by sustaining the impugned judgment and order of conviction of the appellant. He is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled and sureties are discharged. Let he be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the sentence so awarded to him by the trial court. 12. Let a copy of this judgment along with LCR be sent to the court concerned for compliance of the order forthwith.