Judgment : 1. Heard Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant and Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4 and Mr. Dangui, learned Additional Government Advocate, on behalf of the respondents no. 1 to 3. 2. Admit. By consent heard forthwith. 3. By this application, the applicant seeks review of the judgment and order dated 04/07/2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 207 of 2013 and prays to dismiss the said writ petition. 4. Respondent no. 4 had filed the said Writ Petition for following reliefs: “(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to quash and set aside the order dated 08/01/2013 passed by respondent no.1; (b) Issue a direction to quash and set aside the Caste Certificate dated 11/04/2012 and Caste Validity Certificate in favour of respondent no.4 as belonging to OBC.” 5. The said writ petition was thereafter amended and following prayer clause (bb) was added: "(bb). to declare that the notification dated 01/03/2013 is prospective in nature and consequently, the validity of the Caste Certificate issued by respondent no. 3 in favour of respondent no. 4 be valid from the date of the said notification i.e. 01/03/2013 and not prior to the date of passing of the said notification." 6. Respondent no. 4 was the petitioner whereas the applicant was the respondent no. 4, in the said Writ Petition. Respondents no. 1, 2 and 3 were the respondents no. 1, 2 and 3 in the said Writ Petition. Parties shall, hereinafter, be referred to as per their status in the Writ Petition No. 207/2013. 7. During the course of arguments in the said Writ Petition, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in view of the addendum dated 01/03/2013, published in the official gazette dated 07/03/2013, the petitioner was not pressing for reliefs (a) and (b), but would press for the relief in terms of prayer clause (bb) only. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had further argued that the said notification was prospective, whereas the learned Counsel for respondent no. 4 had argued that the same was clarificatory in nature and hence, effective from the date of original notification i.e. 03/03/1997. Learned Counsel for the petitioner had further argued that the said notification was prospective, whereas the learned Counsel for respondent no. 4 had argued that the same was clarificatory in nature and hence, effective from the date of original notification i.e. 03/03/1997. Hence, the issue that arose for consideration and as framed by the Court was whether the notification dated 01/03/2013 was prospective or only clarificatory in nature. Ultimately, the Court partly allowed the petition by allowing the prayer clause (bb). 8. Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 4, submitted that by order dated 08/01/2013, the Scrutiny Committee for verification of the Caste Certificate found that the certificate issued by respondent no. 3 in favour of respondent no. 4 was valid and hence, without quashing and setting aside the said order dated 08/01/2013 passed by the Scrutiny Committee, a declaration that the Caste Certificate was valid from the date of notification i.e. from 01/03/2013 could not have been granted. He further submitted that once the petitioner had given up the prayer clauses (a) and (b), prayer clause (bb) could not have been granted. He clarified that once the prayers to set aside the order dated 08/01/2013 passed by the Scrutiny Committee and to set aside the Caste Certificate dated 11/04/2012 were given up, the said order dated 08/01/2013 and the Caste Certificate dated 11/04/2012 had become final and hence, the later part of the prayer clause (bb) to declare that the Caste Certificate issued in favour of the applicant to be valid from the date of notification i.e. from 01/03/2013 could not have been granted. According to him, the Court granted the relief which was given up by the petitioner. Counsel submitted that there was absolutely no adjudication at all in respect of the validity of the Caste Certificate dated 11/04/2012. He urged that the finding of the Scrutiny Committee was not exclusively based on the notification issued by the Government on 03/03/1997 but also on the analysis of the concept of “Kharvi”. Counsel canvassed that the said findings of the Scrutiny Committee had not been held to be wrong. He urged that all the time in the petition, respondent no. 3 had argued that the Caste Certificate was valid. He contended that the certificate was issued by respondent no. Counsel canvassed that the said findings of the Scrutiny Committee had not been held to be wrong. He urged that all the time in the petition, respondent no. 3 had argued that the Caste Certificate was valid. He contended that the certificate was issued by respondent no. 3 prior to the promulgation of notification dated 01/03/2013 and, therefore, merely by holding that notification dated 01/03/2013 added new categories to the existing category, the certificate issued to respondent no. 4 could not be held to be valid from the date of the said notification dated 01/03/2013. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the only discussion in the impugned judgment was whether the notification dated 01/03/2013 was retrospective or prospective. He, therefore, contended that the judgment proceeds on an erroneous assumption and, therefore, suffers from an error apparent on the face of record. Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the decision rendered by this Court on 19/06/2013 in M.C.A. No. 326/2013 in Writ Petition No.191/2011 has not been taken note of by the Court while holding that the notification dated 01/03/2013 was prospective and not retrospective in nature. He urged that the impugned judgment and order runs counter to the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the order dated 19/06/2013 and, therefore, on this ground also, the impugned judgment and order suffers from an error apparent on the face of record and, therefore, deserves to be reviewed and set aside. Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel, relied upon the following judgments : (i) Kali Bin Bhiwaji Vs. Vishram Mawaji, [(1877) Volume I Indian Law Reports Bombay Series 543]; (ii) Mt. Jamna Kuer Vs. Lal Bahadur and others, [AIR 1950 F. C. 131]; (iii) Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another Vs. The Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others, [ AIR 1954 SC 526 ]; (iv) RajenderSingh Vs. Lt. Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, [ AIR 2006 SC 75 ]. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the prayer clause (bb) included the prayer clauses (a) and (b) and that the said prayer clause (bb) was not a consequential prayer, but a composite independent prayer. Lt. Governor of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, [ AIR 2006 SC 75 ]. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the prayer clause (bb) included the prayer clauses (a) and (b) and that the said prayer clause (bb) was not a consequential prayer, but a composite independent prayer. Learned Counsel submitted that Goa State Commission for Backward Classes had tendered advice to the Government to include by way of explanation "Saleiro" or "Salt Extractor" as part of "Kharvi" community due to which the order dated 08/01/2013 was passed by the Scrutiny Committee. According to the learned Counsel, prayer clause (bb) has the effect of giving up prayer clauses (a) and (b). He urged that petitioner did not need the quashing/setting aside the Caste Certificate and that he was satisfied with the order that the said Caste Certificate was prospective as from the date of notification dated 01/03/2013. Mr. Sardessai further submitted that the respondent no. 4 was well aware of the consequence of giving up prayer clauses (a) and (b) at the time of final disposal of the Writ Petition No. 207 of 2013. He questioned as to why the respondent no. 4 did not canvas at the right time that by giving up prayer clauses (a) and (b), the prayer clause (bb) could not be granted. He, thus, urged that there may be an error within the jurisdiction, but the same cannot be termed as an error apparent on the face of record. The learned Counsel for petitioner relied upon the following judgments : (i) HaridasDas Vs. Usha Rani Banik (smt) and others, [ (2006) 4 SCC 78 ]; (ii) T. Vijaya Laxmi and others Vs. United India Insurance Co. and another, [ (2005) 13 SCC 450 ]; (iii) SpancoLtd. Vs. A2Z Maintenance and Engineering Services Ltd. and another, [2010(6) All M R 572]. 10. We have gone through the material on record and considered the rival submissions and the Judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the parties. 11. The contention that the effect of giving up reliefs (a) and (b) by the petitioner was to render the petitioner disentitled to relief (bb) was never canvassed by the respondent no. 4 before the Court. There is no dispute that any deletion of prayer would be at the risk of the petitioner. 11. The contention that the effect of giving up reliefs (a) and (b) by the petitioner was to render the petitioner disentitled to relief (bb) was never canvassed by the respondent no. 4 before the Court. There is no dispute that any deletion of prayer would be at the risk of the petitioner. After the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the Addendum dated 1st March 2013, published in the Official Gazette dated 7th March 2013, the petitioner was not pressing for reliefs (a) and (b), the contention of the petitioner was that the said Addendum dated 01/03/2013 was prospective in nature. The learned Counsel for the respondent did not contend that the petitioner was not entitled for relief (bb) as he had given up the reliefs (a) and (b). The learned Counsel for the respondent no. 4 urged that the said Notification dated 01/03/2013 was declaratory or clarificatory in nature and, as such, the petitioner was not entitled to the relief in terms of prayer clause (bb). In view of the said rival submissions, the point for consideration was framed as to whether benefit of Notification dated 1st March 2013 can be given to respondent no. 4 or in other words whether the Notification dated 1st March 2013 was prospective or only clarificatory in nature. The consequence of deletion of the reliefs (a) and (b), now for the first time alleged in review petition, was accepted silently by the respondent no. 4, without raising the same during the course of final hearing of the matter and the matter was allowed to be disposed of on the point raised. Hence, the respondent no. 4, after the disposal of the petition, cannot be heard to say that the Court committed an error apparent on the face of the record. At the time the final arguments in the Writ petition No. 207/2013 were being advanced and at the time the Judgment and order in that writ Petition was passed, the respondent no. 4 was aware that the effect of giving up reliefs (a) and (b) by the petitioner may render the petitioner disentitled to relief (bb) and there was no reason for not pointing that out to the Court at the relevant time. By contending that once the prayer clauses (a) and (b) were given up, prayer clause (bb) could not have been granted, what the respondent no. By contending that once the prayer clauses (a) and (b) were given up, prayer clause (bb) could not have been granted, what the respondent no. 4 wants in this review petition is dismissal of the said Writ Petition No. 207/2013. It is well settled that the object of review is not to enable the court to write a second judgment. Even if it is found that the judgment and order is wrong, the same cannot be re-considered and corrected in a review petition since review by no means is an appeal. 12. In the case of “Kali Bin Bhiwaji” (supra), it was held that a review may be admitted on any ground, whether urged at the original hearing of the appeal or not, whenever the Court considers that it is necessary to correct an evident error or omission, or is other wise requisite for the ends of justice. In the case of “Mt. Jamna Kuer” (supra), the review petition was dismissed by the learned Judges of the High Court in spite of the finding that the appellant was entitled to a declaration as regards all the properties mentioned in the written statement dated 20th August 1936, on the technical ground that no error on the face of the record was held to be established. In the appeal, before the Federal Court, it was found that the mistake as to the items of property regarding which Mt. Jamna Kuer had laid claim was apparent on the face of record. The Federal Court observed that in this situation it would have been appropriate if the High Court had corrected this error on the review petition and saved the appellant the trouble and expense of an appeal to the Privy Council or to the Federal Court. In the circumstances above, it was held that whether the error occurred by reason of the counsel's mistake or it crept in by reason of an oversight on the part of the Court was not a circumstance which could affect the exercise of jurisdiction of the court to review its decision. The Federal Court held that there was no doubt that the error was apparent on the face of the record and the question as to how the error occurred was not relevant to this enquiry. A mere look at the trial Court's decision indicated the error apart from anything else. The appeal was allowed. The Federal Court held that there was no doubt that the error was apparent on the face of the record and the question as to how the error occurred was not relevant to this enquiry. A mere look at the trial Court's decision indicated the error apart from anything else. The appeal was allowed. In the above cases relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 4, the error was such which did not require any arguments at all to understand the same but mere perusal of the record and the judgment revealed that there was evident and apparent mistake. The facts in the case before us are different and the principles laid down in those cases are not applicable to the facts of the case before us. In the case of “Rajender Singh” (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power of judicial review of its own order by the High Court inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice. The power extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Court should not hesitate to review its own earlier order when there exists an error on the face of the record and the interest of justice so demands in appropriate cases. There is no dispute about the above general principles of law governing the review. 13. In the case of “Haridas Das”(supra), the Apex Court has held thus: “13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 of the CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the Court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are prescribed in Order XLVII of the CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the explanation to Rule 1 of Order XLVII which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (in all the Appeals) v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur, [AIR 1964 1372] held as follows: "There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out." 14. In the case of “T. Vijaya Laxmi and others” (supra), the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal passed an award for a sum of Rs. 8,62,000/- with interest @ 9% p.a. The Insurance Company filed an appeal which came to be dismissed by an order dated 23/12/2002 on the ground that an insurance company cannot maintain an appeal against quantum of compensation without obtaining specific permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 8,62,000/- with interest @ 9% p.a. The Insurance Company filed an appeal which came to be dismissed by an order dated 23/12/2002 on the ground that an insurance company cannot maintain an appeal against quantum of compensation without obtaining specific permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In fact, the Insurance Company had already obtained permission under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but though this was within the knowledge of the Insurance company, they did not point it out to the Court. The Insurance Company then filed a review petition. The High Court allowed the review petition and reduced the compensation to Rs. 7,51,847/-. In the Appeal, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court erred in not noticing that there was no ground for review and at the time the original order was passed, the Insurance company was aware that they had already got leave under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act and there was no reason for not pointing that out to the High Court when the order dismissing the appeal was passed. 15. In the case of “Spanco Ltd.” (supra), learned Division Bench of this Court has held thus: “There are basically three grounds on which the review may be allowed. Those are: (i) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made; (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason. In the instant case, since the counsel for the review petitioner did not advance any argument at the time of hearing of the Writ Petition, ground no. (i) is not attracted at all. So far as the mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is concerned, the scope of review is for review of an error apparent only and not to review the judgment or order even if the parties are in a position to satisfy the Court that the order under review is an erroneous order. So far as the mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is concerned, the scope of review is for review of an error apparent only and not to review the judgment or order even if the parties are in a position to satisfy the Court that the order under review is an erroneous order. The object of review is not to enable the Court to write a second judgment even if it is presumed that the first one was wrong since review is by no means an appeal whereby a wrong decision can be reconsidered and corrected.” 16. In view of the principles laid down in the above Judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, as discussed above, the review petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed. 17. After the judgment was pronounced, Mr. Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submits that operation of the order be stayed for a period of four weeks and the order dated 27/08/2013 passed in Civil Application No. 158/2013 be continued to operate for said four weeks, as the applicant wishes to challenge the judgment passed in Review Application as well as the judgment pronounced in Writ Petition No. 207/2013, for which Mr. Raghunandan, learned Counsel for respondent no.4 objects. 18. However, since by order dated 27/08/2013 passed in C. A. No. 158/2013, by way of interim relief, this Court had directed that operation of the judgment pronounced on 04/07/2013 in Writ Petition No. 207 of 2013 stands stayed by expediting the hearing of the review petition, we are of the view that the said stay should be continued and judgment passed today in Review petition should be stayed in the interest of justice. 19. In view of the above, the stay granted by order dated 27/08/2013 shall continue for a period of four weeks from today and the operation of the judgment passed today also stands stayed for said period.