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2014 DIGILAW 1068 (AP)

Datla Ashwini Swetha v. State of A. P.

2014-08-26

B.SIVA SANKARA RAO

body2014
ORDER Dr. B. Siva Sankara Rao, J. 1. This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 439(2) read with 482 Cr.P.C. by the petitioner-de facto complainant in Crime No. 45 of 2013 of Women Police Station, Vizianagaram District registered for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Act'). Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondent-State, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 and perused the material placed on record. 2. This is an application for cancellation of anticipatory bail order granted in favour of the 2nd respondent-A-1 among 15 accused based on the complaint of the petitioner-de facto complainant, no other than the wife of A-1, dated 18-5-2013 of the crime registered for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC and Sections 3 and 4of the Act; as can be seen from the record, the police after investigation filed chargesheet that was taken cognizance by the Court. This application is filed seeking cancellation of the bail order, passed by the learned Judge, Family Court-cum-III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram, dated 15-7-2014, in favour of the husband of the de facto complainant-A-1 in Crl.M.P. No. 276 of 2014. Operative portion of the order at para 11 speaks that the petition is allowed granting anticipatory bail by directing the petitioner-A-1 to surrender before the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Vizianagaram and on his surrender, the learned Magistrate shall release the petitioner on bail on his execution of personal bond for Rs.20,000/- with two sureties, for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Vizianagaram. The bail order is running in seven pages in eleven paras, reflecting the contentions and rival contentions of the propensity of the crime, role of A-1, leave about the other accused i.e., A-2 to A-15 and in formulating the point as entitlement of anticipatory bail by A-1 concerned, it is answered that as per the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Akhalaq Ahmed F. Patel v. State of Maharashtra 1998 Crl.L.J. 3969, where the petitioner-accused seeking anticipatory bail is in Government Service. there is no question of apprehension of absconding and at the late stage, considering the bail from the date of report in registering the crime, it is hardly be said that the accused is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere with the witnesses, thereby held deserves to grant anticipatory bail and the other expression referred is Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi v. The State AIR 1986 A.P. 345 , wherein it was held that 'the filing of a chargesheet by the police and issuing of a warrant by the Magistrate do not put an end to the power to grant bail under Section 438(1) Cr.P.C. and on the other hand, the High Court or the Court of Sessions got power to grant anticipatory bail to a person even after the criminal court has taken cognizance of the offence and issued process i.e., warrant of arrest to the accused; therefore, the Division Bench expression in Kamalakara Rao's case ( 1983 (1) APLJ 97 ) : 1983 Crl.L.J. 872 (supra), upholding the view of 1975 (2) APLJ (HC) 213 in N. Sasaratha Reddy's expression and another view of Crl.M.P. No. 884 of 1981 does not lay down the correct legal position in overruling the said expressions to that extent. The sum and substance of the two expressions, the learned Sessions Judge in granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner, who is a citizen of Austrial claimed as Government Service and for the very moving of bail application by the General Power of Attorney (GPA) holder-cum-father of A-1, held that as the petitioner is in Government Service and observed not going to abscond and the other observation is that even after chargesheet filed and taken cognizance by the learned Magistrate and even issued N.B.W. for securing presence of the accused shown in absconding, that is not bar to maintain anticipatory bail. In fact, that expression in Smt. Sheik Khasmi Bi referred supra of this High Court is the Full Bench expression. The Full Bench did not even alter the Division Bench's expression in Kamalakara Rao supra of anticipatory bail can even directly moved before the High Court without knocking the doors of the Court of Sessions but for saying the following earlier two single judge's expressions was not right in view of anticipatory bail cannot be granted at post cognizance stage. The Full Bench did not even alter the Division Bench's expression in Kamalakara Rao supra of anticipatory bail can even directly moved before the High Court without knocking the doors of the Court of Sessions but for saying the following earlier two single judge's expressions was not right in view of anticipatory bail cannot be granted at post cognizance stage. Once chargesheet filed and cognizance taken and N.B.W. issued, it is there from the learned Sessions Judge in para 10 of the bail order before referring to para 11 conditions detailed supra observed that the police filed chargesheet including against the petitioner/A-1 that was taken cognizance and from showing in the chargesheet as A-1 is in Ascendance, N.B.W. was issued against A-1 on 17-4-2014 and the cognizance taken is for the offence punishable under Section 498-A and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and almost all witnesses are interrelated and the question of tampering the evidence of witnesses does not arise and for all these circumstances even if the petitioner apprehended by police, no purpose would be served and in view of the above and by referring the two expressions supra, fell just and proper to grant the pre-arrest bail in the even of arrest of the accused. It is before saying anything regarding the merits of the said observation referring to the two expressions detailed supra needful to discuss the facts. Coming to the factual matrix, undisputedly the bail application is not moved by A-1, but for through the so-called GPA-cum-father of A-1, and leave about he filed his Vakalath. It is to say, admittedly he was not in India, much less, stated when would he can come over to avail the concession of bail even in its granting bail. 3. Coming to the factual matrix, undisputedly the bail application is not moved by A-1, but for through the so-called GPA-cum-father of A-1, and leave about he filed his Vakalath. It is to say, admittedly he was not in India, much less, stated when would he can come over to avail the concession of bail even in its granting bail. 3. From the above, coming to the core of the contentions of the de facto complainant in seeking cancellation of the bail, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the two expressions, one of the Kerala High Court and the other of the Madras High Court, in his saying the very granting of anticipatory bail is not sustainable within four corners of Section 438 Cr.P.C. and thereby and also for the reason, there is nothing to show from the reading of the bail application averments and bail order of when would probablise he could come to India and how he could stay in India to face the trial and these were not adverted to, much less taken into consideration in granting the bail by the lower Court, thereby the impugned order is not sustainable and hence, it requires cancellation of the bail. Before coming to discuss the two propositions referred by the de facto complainant, it is the rival contention of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-accused of the bail cancellation application for there is N.B.W. pending even from the above referred bail order and pending N.B.W., the anticipatory bail is granted and the warrant cancellation application filed by him, though he is unable to give the number for not obtained certified copy, was even ended in dismissal, thereby he could not come over to India to avail the concession of bail and that he filed a revision against the dismissal of the warrant and it is pending. There is nothing to say any interim orders suspending the N.B.W. concerned. It is important to say that, he is well conscious of the factum of N.B.W. is even pending against him by the time of his filing the anticipatory bail application at the post cognizance stage and also in submitting the argument referring to the Full Bench expression is Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi referred supra of anticipatory bail can be granted even N.B.W., pending that was issued at post cognizance stage and was considered by the learned Sessions Judge. 4. 4. Before discussing further, it is import to refer Session 438 Cr.P.C, which reads as follows: "438. Direction for grant of hail to person apprehending arrest:--(1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the even of such arrest, he shall be released on bail; and the Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely: (i) The nature and gravity of the accusation. (ii) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence; (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and (iv) Where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or either reject the application by having so arrested, Either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail. Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Sessions, has not passed any interim order under this sub-section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of accusation apprehended in such application. (1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the court. (1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice. (1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice. (2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may thinks fit, including- (i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required: (ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court; (iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of Section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. (3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of attest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail, and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1)." 5. As per Section 438 referred supra, the person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence for his applying the anticipatory bail, for a direction granting anticipatory bail under this that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail. The criteria for granting anticipatory bail is laid down in Section 438 sub-section (1) in four clauses, which are detailed supra, of which clause No. 3 is the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice. The criteria for granting anticipatory bail is laid down in Section 438 sub-section (1) in four clauses, which are detailed supra, of which clause No. 3 is the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice. From this, undisputedly the post cognizance stage, issuance of N.B.W. itself is sufficient to substantiate the apprehension of arrest from the pending N.B.W. that was also went unsuccessful in seeking recall, from which saying a revision is filed impugning the dismissal of the warrant recall application. Coming to the other criteria concerned in the bail application, there is nothing mentioned as required out of the four considerations under Section 438(1) Cr.P.C. of how there is a possibility of his not fleeing away from justice for not even mentioned, he wants to stay in India having any intention to come over to face trial in his seeking for anticipatory bail i.e., one of the pre requisites even to answer by the Court within the four corners of Section 438 sub-section (1) Cr.P.C. for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail as also laid down in Shoban Singh Khanka v. The State of Jharkhand 2012 (4) SCC 684 . Leave it as it is, that aspect of the requirement of the consideration of the satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 438(1) Cr.P.C. not practically considered, though required by the learned Sessions Judge in granting of anticipatory bail even from this expression in Shoban Singh Khanka referred supra. Even coming to Section 438(1)(b) Cr.P.C, the Court for the applicant having filed the anticipatory bail application not by himself, much less, by come over to India. Leave about the contention of the de facto complainant in seeking cancellation on that ground to answer later, did not visualize the scope of Section 438 sub-section (1)(b) Cr.P.C, which says the presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court. No doubt, here there is no application for requiring the presence of the accused either for the final hearing or at the time of passing order, as required from the learned Public Prosecutor in Section 438(1)(b) Cr.P.C. says if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor and the Court considers such presence necessary in the interests of justice. It in fact speaks without even application of Public Prosecutor the Court can direct if necessary. Apart from it, the other criteria for grant of anticipatory bail laid down in sub-section 2 of Section 438 Cr.P.C, when the High Court or the Court of Sessions make a direction referred in sub-section (1) supra, it may be include such conditions and such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as the Court may thinks fit, including, a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by the police officer as and when required, a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer, a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court and such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of Section 437 Cr.P.C. as if the bail were granted under that Section. It is to say, an anticipatory bail to be granted so far as the conditions concerned besides the conditions under sub-section 2 of Section 438 Cr.P.C, the other condition including those that are to be laid for granting regular bail contemplated by sub-section 3 of Section 437Cr.P.C. From the above, at the cost of repetition from the impugned order at page 11 of the learned Sessions Judge itself these aspects were not taken care of in imposing the conditions, but for a self bond with two sureties for his release in the event of arrest to the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate in directing to surrender. It is important to mention in the factual background, in particular that N.B.W. already pending, recall petition ended in dismissal from that pending N.B.W. at the post cognizance stage issued. On the arguments advanced by the accused to grant anticipatory bail, it was considered the conditions must be based on the N.B.W., whom it was directed by the Magistrate i.e., police at any time be arrested, as such to the satisfaction of the arresting authority. On the arguments advanced by the accused to grant anticipatory bail, it was considered the conditions must be based on the N.B.W., whom it was directed by the Magistrate i.e., police at any time be arrested, as such to the satisfaction of the arresting authority. Had it been taken care of, there can be no worry even for the accused, much less to seek recall or to file revision against the dismissal of N.B.W. application as the purpose of N.B.W. is to arrest and to secure presence of the accused before the Court and Section 438 Cr.P.C. contemplates more particularly, from sub-section (1) supra of enlargement by release from satisfaction of the conditions and in the event of arrest, there could be no purpose that can be served directing to surrender before the Magistrate that too having issued N.B.W. by the Magistrate and that the learned Sessions Judge is supposed to be taken care of. From the above, now coming to otherwise entitlement to the anticipatory bail or not from the two propositions placed reliance by the de facto complainant in its seeking cancellation, one is of the Kerala High Court in Souda Beevi v. S.I. of Police 2011 (4) Ker.L.T. 52 of a single judge expression and the other of Madras High Court single judge expression in Ravi alias Ravi Prakash v. State 2009 (2) Mad.L.W. 999. The Kerala High Court in the above expression of Souda Beevi's case concerned, on the scope of Section 438 Cr.P.C. particularly sub-section 2 observed from paras 8 and 9 that the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Gurubaksh Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab 1982 SCC 565 was followed in Sidharam Satlingappa Mehetre v. State of Maharashtra 2011 (1) SCC 694 , it was held that Section 438 sub-section 1 Cr.P.C. lays down the condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted for which the applicant must show that he has 'reason to believe' to arrest for a non-bailable offence and it is subject to belief of the applicant of likelihood of arrest by police is founded on reasonable grounds and mere fear is not belief as it must be supported by reason and to show that he has some sort of vague apprehension in the bail application and the other condition precedent is the apprehension of arrest for a non-bailable offence and thus averments must be in the bail application that are capable of being examined by the Court objectively to determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested since anticipatory bail is a device to secure the personal liberty, it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, 'likely or unlikely'. It is further observed that when sub-section 2 of Section 438 Cr.P.C. provides that the direction may include the conditions for granting anticipatory bail which includes the person shall not leave India without previous permission of the Court, it would indicate that the Court must be satisfied that the person concerned is either present in India or he must be able to be present in India immediately before the final hearing. If the person concerned is not present in India, the Court would not be able to stipulate the condition that he shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court, as contemplated by clause (iii) of sub-section (2) of Section 438 Cr.P.C. It is for the reason that the person absent from India, the question of he cannot leave India does not arise. The only irresistible conclusion that could be arrived at is that the person who is not in India or who does not intend to visit India soon, cannot conveniently remain abroad and move an application for anticipatory bail before a Court in India as a blanket order cannot be passed to enable a person wield that order whenever he finds pleasure to visit India and thereafter leave the country at his pleasure and flee from justice as Section 438 Cr.P.C. is not intended for such a purpose at all. The sum and substance of the expression indicates that it must be mentioned being a condition precedent for a person at a broad in moving an anticipatory bail and he must appear in India by the final hearing of the application or at least he should intend to visit India, by giving a probable time of visit, otherwise blanket order cannot be passed for a person at abroad. The other expression of the Madras High Court in Ravi's case referred supra, is in further stretching the Section 438(1) and (2) Cr.P.C. with reference to Section 438(1-B) referred supra, which is in fact giving directions to the Registry not to entertain the bail applications without such foundation that the application for anticipatory bail must be filed by the person, who apprehends arrest on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence and the provision cannot be compared with other provisions like 436 or 437 or 439 Cr.P.C, but for to the limited extent of the application of the conditions of Section 437 Cr.P.C. for Section438(2) Cr.P.C. As per condition No. 4 in Section 438(2) Cr.P.C. and none of the above provisions contemplate any application being filed by the person arrested for a direction for his release on bail. Those provisions simply deal with the powers of the Courts and the conditions that can be imposed while directing the release of the persons arrested. When the Section is very clear that the application should be filed by the person apprehending arrest, there is no question of entertaining an application at the instruction of any other person. Those provisions simply deal with the powers of the Courts and the conditions that can be imposed while directing the release of the persons arrested. When the Section is very clear that the application should be filed by the person apprehending arrest, there is no question of entertaining an application at the instruction of any other person. It is because in the case of an arrested person for regular bail, it is on a different footing for the reason that he shall not be in a position to come and instruct the counsel to file a bail application for his release and, therefore, any person who is a relative or friend or any other person interested in such arrested person is allowed to give instructions to file a petition on his behalf for his release of bail. Such a concession shall not be extended to a person seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. As the intention of the legislature from reading of Section 438 Cr.P.C. as a whole that can be culled out from the fact that the legislature has chosen to incorporate a sub-section (1-B) of Section 438 Cr.P.C. also making it obligatory on the part of the person seeking anticipatory bail to be present before the Court dealing with the anticipatory bail application, if such a direction would be issued on an application made to the Court by the Public Prosecutor. Even without such reference to that provision in sub-section (1-B), it shall be obvious that a petition for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. may be moved only by the person apprehending arrest and not by any other person acting on his behalf. Even without such reference to that provision in sub-section (1-B), it shall be obvious that a petition for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. may be moved only by the person apprehending arrest and not by any other person acting on his behalf. There is no factual scenario in the case on hand dealt with by the Madras High Court in Ravi's case supra as to the application was not filed by the accused apprehending arrest or he is at abroad; A reading of the judgment does not visualize the situation it appears, on the competency of a person at abroad, who could not immediately come for the purpose of filing an application, cannot maintain through a relative or general power of attorney holder by sending his Vakalat to engage Advocate for the application; that too, when the observation of the above judgment, referring to the scope of regular bail of a person under judicial custody when can be moved by any relative or other person on his behalf for getting the personal liberty to him from the judicial custody equally. It can be said more particularly from the basic principle under the cannons of Criminal Law that is available right from accusation till end of the trial to accused of where two view are possible, the view favourable to him has to be appreciated, to say where the accused is at abroad and immediately not in a position for circumstances not under his control to come over to move a bail application immediately; nothing can be barred for maintaining an anticipatory application through a relative or general power of attorney holder, even though a person like accused in judicial custody can do so; and from that analogy if the Court feels just, it can direct the accused person to be present before the Court either for the final hearing or while pronouncing the order within its power even under Section 482 Cr.P.C; even Section 438(1-B) Cr.P.C. speaks such exercise on moving by the learned Public Prosecutor, who opposes the bail concerned. Here in the factual scenario of the case on hand seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted, the learned Public Prosecutor did not require presence of the accused, much less considered by the Court. Here in the factual scenario of the case on hand seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted, the learned Public Prosecutor did not require presence of the accused, much less considered by the Court. Thereby, the expression of the Madras High Court no way takes away the right of the accused, who can invoke within the scope of Section 438 Cr.P.C. for anticipatory bail by filing application through a relative or general power of attorney holder, where the accused is in abroad by mentioning the said fact and the probable time by which he can come for hearing or to avail when passed; for where just for hearing the application, it is required to insist the presence of the accused-bail applicant, the Court can direct to appear. From this coming to the expression of the Kerala High Court in Souda Beevi's case referred supra, once it is observed therein also, more particularly from the plain wording of Section 438(1) Cr.P.C, the anticipatory bail order even granted comes into force only in the even of arrest of the accused to avail. The arrest may be either for his arrest by police or other arresting authority or submission to judicial custody from the wording of Section 44(2) Cr.P.C. Court is no doubt not barred in directing the accused to surrender before the learned Magistrate concerned for taking him to custody and for the purpose of enlarging pursuant to the bail order on his furnishing solvency and compliance of other conditions of the bail order. Here in the peculiar facts of the case on hand at the cost of repetition, at the post cognizance stage on the chargesheet filed by the police under Section 173 Cr.P.C. showing A-1, who is at Australia is in ascendance, the learned Magistrate having taken cognizance of the offence against the accused, issued the non-bailable warrant and the recall petition was ended in dismissal. From the pending N.B.W. is not a bar to the maintainability of application for anticipatory bail from the Full Bench expression of this Court in Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi (supra), when such is the condition must be in the event of arrest to release and not a direction to surrender before the Court. From the pending N.B.W. is not a bar to the maintainability of application for anticipatory bail from the Full Bench expression of this Court in Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi (supra), when such is the condition must be in the event of arrest to release and not a direction to surrender before the Court. All the while even the factual matrix from the propensity of the crime though otherwise entitles the accused to regular bail equally, to the anticipatory bail, but for satisfaction of the Court on the clause (3) of sub-section (1) of Section 438 Cr.P.C. and clause (3) of sub-section (2) of Section 438 Cr.P.C, viz., the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice and condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court. These two conditions in particular for the bail applicant is in abroad that must be taken care by the Court as the concession of bail as referred by the Apex Court in Sunil F. Shah v. Union of India (2000) 3 SCC 409 to mean release of the accused from the internment through the court would still be retained by the Court and the constructive control over him through sureties and through conditions of the bond given by the accused and the sureties. It is also as per the Halsbury's Law as of England, effect of granting bail is not to set the accused at liberty but to release him from the custody of law and entrust him to the custody of sureties who are bound to produce him in the Court of law for his appearance during enquiry/trial at specified times and places and the constructive control over the accused thereby still with Court. There is in fact no direction in the conditions imposed by the learned Sessions Judge to surrender the passport and not to leave the country without prior permission, for which the Court is competent to impose as one of the conditions while granting bail as laid down in Sidharam Satlingappa Mehetre's case referred supra, of deposit of title deed of property, deposit of bank account or freezing of bank account or surrender of the passport and the like. It is there from to say that the learned Sessions Judge though to some extent right in granting anticipatory bail, he could have imposed the necessary conditions as mandatory requirements of Section 438 sub-section 1 and 2 Cr.P.C. and also the scope in relation to Section 438 sub-section (1-B) Cr.P.C. But for, these practically so far as the cancellation of bail concerned, which is something onerous rather than grant or refusal as it is taking away personal liberty concession already conferred even to the limited extent. With the above observations, the criminal petition is allowed in part subject to the following conditions: "[1] Petitioner shall come over to India and execute a self-bond for ` 25,000/- [Rupees twenty five thousand only] with two sureties each for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the arresting authority in the event of arrest on his arrival else to surrender before the learned Magistrate and executed the bond with sureties supra to the satisfaction of the Learned Magistrate concerned within (15) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order for taking into custody and enlarge. The bond to be obtained is not only to appear before the court pending investigation and after filing of final report in the form of chargesheet or the like for enquiry/trial before said Court, but also thereafter before any other Court and even after trial before such Court to appear before revisional or appellate Court or other superior Court-vide decision-Pre-Legal Aid Committee, Jamshedpur v. State of Delhi 1982 (2) APLJ 43 (SC); so that existence and enforceable, without even insisting their further presence, such recourse quickens the proceedings at other stages before that Court or other Court without loss of time and it also to some extent complies with the requirement of Section 437A Cr.P.C. [2] Petitioner shall report before the Investigating Officer on every Sunday till filing of chargesheet and thereafter once in a month on 1st Sunday between 6.00 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. until further orders of learned Magistrate for assurance of his availability and non-interference in any manner with the witnesses. The relaxation of this condition in future can be sought before learned trial Magistrate to whom by this order power is conferred. The relaxation of this condition in future can be sought before learned trial Magistrate to whom by this order power is conferred. [3] Petitioner shall attend before the Court of law regularly in enquiry and trial without fail unless there is an order dispensing with the personal appearance and if not the bail shall be cancelled forthwith, without any further order so that, the learned trial Magistrate can also issue NBW by canceling the bail from the power under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. delegated to the trial Magistrate by this order during pendency of proceedings before the Court. [4] Petitioner shall furnish his full address either present or changed addresses if any from time to time and submit his passport, if any for enlargement on bail at least by the next hearing date before the trial Magistrate concerned for securing presence and obtaining of bond with sureties in future under Section 437A Cr.P.C. etc.), and he shall not leave India without prior written permission of the Magistrate including for obtaining travel permit under Section 6(2)(f) of the Indian Passport Act, 1967 failing which it is open to the learned Magistrate concerned by virtue of the power conferred by this order to cancel the bail. [5] the bail now granted is since a anticipatory one, till end of trial (without prejudice to the right to cancel meanwhile in case of need and/or for non-compliance of conditions supra) any absence of petitioner/s as accused for hearing/enquiry or trial, issuance of non-bailable warrant-NBW (unless cancelled before execution) and even its execution and production of accused as per the NBW; that does not tantamount to cancellation of bail including from the wording of Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. and as such in such an event no fresh bail application can be entertained. As it tantamounts to only cancellation of bail bonds earlier executed, (leave about the power of the court to issue surety notices by forfeiting bonds and for imposing penalty on the bonds forfeited); the proper course it to direct the accused to work out the remedy to pay penalty on the previous forfeited bonds as per Sections 441 to 446 Cr.P.C. and to submit fresh solvency with self bond for enlarging him by release from custody on payment of penalty of the earlier bonds forfeited without need of enforcing against earlier sureties again."