JUDGMENT Dr. B. Siva Sankara Rao, J. 1. The claimant-injured (1st respondent to the appeal) filed the claim petition, in M.V.O.P. No. 679 of 2005 on the file of the Chairman of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-I Addl. District Judge Nellore (for short, 'Tribunal') against the owner and insurer of the motor cycle bearing No. AP26CT/R 3842 for the injuries sustained by him in the motor accident dated 12.10.2004 while he was riding his motor cycle with pillion rider with learner's licence from collusion of both vehicles, for claim of Rs. 8,00,000/- since awarded by the tribunal of Rs. 4,92,500/- out of the amount arrived of Rs. 9,85,000/- with the finding of contributory negligence on the part of the claimant also being the opposite motor cycle rider of each 50% with joint liability, for which the Insurer preferred the appeal with the contentions in the grounds of appeal that the quantum of compensation arrived by the Tribunal is exorbitant and excessive and not rationale on the medical expenses awarded of Rs. 4,00,000/- and for disability another Rs. 4,00,000/-, leave about the other sums under different heads and the tribunal should have seen that there was violation of permit and policy conditions from the 1st respondent-owner of the crime motor cycle referred supra was having only learner's driving licence and as per rule 3 of the circular, the M.V. Rules read with Sec. 3 of the Act, he must take assistance of an experienced person as a pillion rider while riding that was not done and the tribunal should have exonerated thereby the Insurer and thereby sought exonerating the insurer from liability. It is also the contention that the cross-objections filed by the claimants are not maintainable in view of the specific ruling of this Court Division Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Vasireddy Sujatharani from Section 173 of the M.V. Act not specifically provided any right to provide cross-objections so also Rule 473 of the A.P.M.V. Rules and the cross-objections filed under Order XLI Rule 22 won't lie and liable to be rejected. 2. Vasireddy Sujatharani from Section 173 of the M.V. Act not specifically provided any right to provide cross-objections so also Rule 473 of the A.P.M.V. Rules and the cross-objections filed under Order XLI Rule 22 won't lie and liable to be rejected. 2. The 1st respondent-owner of the motor cycle did not put forth his appearance having remained ex-parte before the tribunal and the claimant contended that the fixing of 50% contributory negligence on the part of the injured-claimant is without any basis and unsustainable for the fault entirely lies with the 1st respondent and once the learner's licence is a valid licence under law and the trial Court having considered the same in fixing joint liability on the Insurer and insured, for this Court while sitting in the appeal there is nothing to interfere so also on the quantum of compensation but for to enhance as sought in the cross-objections, that rate of interest at 7%p.a. awarded is utterly low to enhance. It is also contended that in view of the settled propositions of the law of the apex Court of cross-objections maintainable and it is not a case of there is any specific bar under M.V. Act with any non-obstante clause to say the CPC has no application, said decision relied upon on by the Insurer will not come in the way to maintain the cross-objections, hence to enhance the compensation by reducing the contributory negligence percentage to just amount. Perused the material on record. The parties hereinafter are referred to as arrayed before the Tribunal for the sake of convenience in the appeal. 3. Now the points that arise for consideration in the appeal are: 1. Whether the award of the tribunal fixing 50% contributory negligence on the part of the injured as well as the opposite motor cycle rider-1st respondent to the claim petition with joint liability of insurer and the quantum of compensation arrived are unsustainable and if so whether the Insurer is liable to be exonerated from saying the 1st respondent to the claim petition was having so called learner's license and violated the statutory provisions by not taking assistance of experienced person as pillion rider with license? 2. Whether the cross-objections filed by the claimant won't lie? 3. To what result? 4. 2. Whether the cross-objections filed by the claimant won't lie? 3. To what result? 4. Before coming to decide point No. 1 for consideration, the point No. 2 for consideration regarding maintainability of cross-objections from rival contention is taken up for decision. 5. The Division Bench in Vasireddy Sujatharani (supra) it was also in MACMA with cross-objections, by judgment dt.19.01.2011, held that section173 of the M.V. Act from its wording (from paras 19-21) not specifically provided application of order XLI CPC to the claims under M.V. Act and the A.P.M.V. Rules 1989 as Rule 473 speaks the provisions of the Schedule-I of C.P.C. shall so far as may be applied before the claims tribunal namely, Order V Rules 9 to 13, Order IX Rules 15 to 30, Order XIII Rules 3 to 10, Order XVI rules 21, Order XVII and Order 28 Rules 1 to 3. By so referring, it was by following, the Apex Court's expression in Superintending Engineer Vs. B. Subbareddy on maintainability of cross-objections under Order XLI rule 22 under Section 43 of the Arbitration Act 1940, when the appeal is not filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act to say cross-objections can be filed, the cross-objections won't lie. Also referred another expression of the apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. INTNL Security and Intelligence Agency Limited where it was held that under the Arbitration Act, 1940 when the appeal is not maintainable, the cross-objections filed won't lie under self-same provision. In fact, from decision of Subbareddy (supra) it was observed categorically that the cross-objections is no other than an independent appeal. In INTNL (supra) it was not held cross-objections won't lie; but defective for appeal won't lie. It is therefrom the Division Bench of this Court observed that as section 173 of the Act does not provide for filing cross-objections in the absence of any such specific provision the cross-objections did not deserve for consideration and accordingly they stand rejected. 6. In fact, Section 173 of the M.V. Act is the only provision to file appeal by any person against the award of the tribunal under Section 163 or 140or 163-A or 166 read with 165 of the M.V. Act. 6. In fact, Section 173 of the M.V. Act is the only provision to file appeal by any person against the award of the tribunal under Section 163 or 140or 163-A or 166 read with 165 of the M.V. Act. Once such is the case, when cross-objections is no other than the independent appeal to consider under the self-same provision, nothing more is required to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the claimants. In fact, the Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs R. Swaminathan under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988 held that in the appeal by the insurance company as the claimants did not file any independent appeal or cross-objections under the provision, for the Division bench of the High Court to enhance the compensation that was reduced by Single Judge in L.P.A. the Division Bench is not justified to enhance the compensation for the reason of cross-objections not filed and the appellate Court has no power to grant higher relief to the awarded. It is clear therefrom in referring the section 173 of the M.V. Act that cross-objections are maintainable under the M.V. Act. In fact, the apex Court in Swaminathan (supra) referred the earlier expression in Banarsi Vs. Ramphal in this regard. Further in another expression of the Apex Court in Ranjan Prakash V. Divisional Manager, it was observed with reference to section 173 of the M.V. Act and Order XLI particularly Rule 33 C.P.C. that even the claimant had not independently challenged the award passed by the tribunal, the High court was not justified in reducing the compensation as it can allow the claimants to substantiate the quantum on one ground or another. For that conclusion the observations made with regard to the appeal filed by the owner/insurer were as follows:- 6. We are of the view that High court committed an error in ignoring the contention of the claimants. It is true that the claimants had not challenged the award of the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal had failed to take note of future prospects and add 30% to the annual income of the deceased. But the claimants were not aggrieved by Rs. 23,134/- being taken as the monthly income. There was therefore no need for them to challenge the award of the Tribunal. But the claimants were not aggrieved by Rs. 23,134/- being taken as the monthly income. There was therefore no need for them to challenge the award of the Tribunal. But where in an appeal filed by the owner/insurer, if the High Court proposes to reduce the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimants can certainly defend the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, by pointing out other errors or omissions in the award, which if taken note of, would show that there was no need to reduce the amount awarded as compensation. Therefore, in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the appellant can certainly put forth a contention that if 30% is to be deducted from the income for whatsoever reason, 30% should also be added towards future prospects, so that the compensation awarded is not reduced. The fact that claimants did not independently challenge the award will not therefore come in the way of their defending the compensation awarded, on other grounds. It would only mean that in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the claimants will not be entitled to seek enhancement of the compensation by urging any new ground, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objections. 7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate Court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court also to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate Court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seeks compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by owner/insure for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation. 7. Therefore, these two expressions are crystal clear about the maintainability of the cross-objections. Once from the statutory provision under Section 173 of the M.V. Act appeal is maintainable, the cross-objection is also like of cross-appeal automatically maintainable even Order XLI Rule 22 not quoted as mere non-quoting it makes no difference. As in Ranjan Prakash (supra), the apex Court further observed that not only Order XLI Rule 22 for cross-objections but also the inherent power of the Court under Order XLI Rule 33 applies to the appeal. Thereby the contention of the Insurer that the cross-objections is not maintainable is liable to be negated. Accordingly, point No. 2 is answered. Point No. 1: 8. The 1st respondent-owner-cum-rider of the motor cycle got L.M.V. driving licence which is Ex.A.91 that was filed by the claimants by obtaining certified copy of the original driving license filed in the criminal case. The 1st respondent also deposed that the original driving licence was seized by the police and did not return despite he asked though he did not obtain duplicate driving licence might be for the reason of original licence is in the criminal Court to take return of the document. Once that is established and it is not the case of the Insurer including by the recall of R.W.1-1st respondent for further cross-examination of same is a fake one by summoning RTO concerned with the particulars so to correlate to such contention. Once that is established and it is not the case of the Insurer including by the recall of R.W.1-1st respondent for further cross-examination of same is a fake one by summoning RTO concerned with the particulars so to correlate to such contention. Once that Ex.A.91 driving license produced shows 1st respondent-rider of the crime motor cycle was having learner's license and when he is stated that another person is a pillion rider got licence or not he does not know ( pillion rider is also a competent person to guide) that itself cannot be a breach much less substantial breach of the Rule 3 even taken for arguments sake that as per Rule 3 he can ride with the assistance of a person to guide him and not that the person to guide must hold license. The only suggestion is that the pillion rider has no capacity to guide and nothing more. Thus, there is nothing to draw any adverse inference against the 1st respondent as the license is before the Court undisputedly. Even from his say that he does not know of Central Rules read with Section 3 of the M.V. Act, it no way improves defence of insurer, much less to exonerate the insurer from liability or to order pay and recover by modifying the joint liability fixed by the tribunal within its discretion under Section 168 read with 149 of the M.V. Act. In fact, the Tribunal in this regard referred the settled proposition of the apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Swaran Singh observations regarding the learner's license as a statutory and valid license. Once there is valid license, the insurer cannot escape from liability to indemnify the insured as rightly concluded by the tribunal. Thus for this Court while sitting in appeal there is nothing to interfere for no defect in the license in view of the expression in Swaran singh (supra). 9. Now coming to the contributory negligence, if any, concerned, though it is the contention of the claimants as cross-objectors to the appeal that P.W.2's evidence shows the 1st respondent in riding the crime motor cycle came in wrong side that was not properly appreciated by the tribunal. 9. Now coming to the contributory negligence, if any, concerned, though it is the contention of the claimants as cross-objectors to the appeal that P.W.2's evidence shows the 1st respondent in riding the crime motor cycle came in wrong side that was not properly appreciated by the tribunal. This contention also has no force from the fact that both the vehicles are coming in opposite direction and there is head on collusion and there is nothing even to say by filing any rough sketch of scene of offence or M.V.I. report with particulars of the damage to the vehicles and the place on the road where the accident exactly took place and condition of the road that too when the tribunal having discussed the evidence and came to a right conclusion, for this Court while sitting in appeal, it cannot be interfered merely because some other view is also possible. 10. Coming to the quantum of compensation arrived by the Tribunal concerned, from Ex.A.5 permanent disability certificate coupled with the Ex.P.6 and evidence of P.W.3 and 4 doctors among whom P.W.4 is the doctor who issued permanent disability certificate of Apollo First Med Hospital, Chennai from the petitioner is suffering permanent disability of 60%, the tribunal is right in considering said disability. However, instead of applying multiplier method from the age of the claimant 26 years, the tribunal wrongly fixed lumpsum of Rs. 4,00,000/-. The contention of the appellants is said lumpsum as exorbitant. In fact, the claimant was as on the date of accident studying M.Sc., degree and failed and later completed and the tribunal observed from the evidence that he was an average student from Ex.A.89 and 90 marks lists as in 4 subjects he failed and only 5 subjects he completed in the first semester of 1 year as well as second semester of 1 year respectively. Even from the same and otherwise the claimant able bodied being M.SC, final year student as on the date of accident even average in performance academically, the earnings can be assessed as on the date of accident i.e. 12.10.2004 by following the Apex Court's in Latha Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar that even there is no proof of income and earnings, it can be reasonably estimated with a minimum of Rs. 3,000/- p.m. for any non-earning member, in the present case from his qualification of post-graduate the earnings as on the date of accident with proportionate increase the prospective earnings can be taken at Rs. 5,0007- p.m. and 60% therein comes to Rs. 3,000/- p.m. x 12 x 17 = Rs. 6,12,000/-. 11. Coming to the medical expenses awarded by the tribunal of Rs. 4,00,000/- what P.W.2 also deposed of Rs. 4,00,000/- required as observed by the tribunal in para-17. The amounts towards advance and other deposits shown paid by the claimant comes to Rs. 2,80,000/-whereas the bills in total about RS.1771/-+ Rs. 8163.50/-+ Rs. 4505/-Rs.40,000/- it comes to Rs. 1,53,440/- and no now final bill is filed by the claimant. Thereby Rs. 4,00,000/- as medical expenses taken by the tribunal is untenable but for at best to confine to the advance paid of Rs. 2,80,000/- to the maximum. Then it comes to Rs. 8,92,000/-. Coming to the other expenditure of future medical expenses of Rs. 1,00,000/- concerned, there is no basis as no further bills even filed thereafter as on date and thereby that amount is also to be negated. Coming to other sums like extra nourishment and incidentally charges and guest house charges of Rs. 14,400/- + transport charges to the hospital of Rs. 5,000/-+attendant charges Rs. 6,000/- even taken in all, it comes to Rs. 9,16,400/- to be rounded to 9,17,000/- and it requires no interference so also towards pain and sufferance from the fracture and for disfiguration in all Rs. 60,000/- Rs. 9,77,000/- and in addition to that an amount of Rs. 23,000/- can be awarded towards loss of earnings during long period of treatment which in all comes to Rs. 10,00,000/-and 50% therein contributory negligence comes to Rs. 5,00,000/- and the interest awarded at 7% to be enhanced to 71/2% p.a. as per TN Transport Corporation v. Raja Priya (2005) 6 SCC 236 from the latest expression of the Apex Court in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh 2013 ACJ 1403 : (4) ALT-35 (SC). Accordingly Point No. 1 is answered. Point No. 3: 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the Cross-objections of the claimants is allowed in part by enhancing the compensation awarded by the tribunal of Rs. 4,92,5007- to Rs. 5,00,000/- as well as enhancing the rate of interest from 7 to 71/2% p.a. from the date of petition till realization. Point No. 3: 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the Cross-objections of the claimants is allowed in part by enhancing the compensation awarded by the tribunal of Rs. 4,92,5007- to Rs. 5,00,000/- as well as enhancing the rate of interest from 7 to 71/2% p.a. from the date of petition till realization. Rest of the award holds good. There is no order as to costs. 13. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed. Appeal dismissed