Judgment : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, C.J. (Oral) This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 30th August, 2012, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No.968 of 2011, titled as Arpana Kumari vs. State of H.P. and others, whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner (appellant herein) came to be dismissed, (for short, the impugned judgment). 2. In the writ petition, the writ petitioner-appellant had questioned the order, dated 30th September, 2009, passed by the District Collector, Mandi, (Annexure P-12), and the order, dated 23rd April, 2010, (Annexure P-10), made by the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, read with the order dated 24th December, 2010 (Annexure P-11), made by the Financial Commissioner (Appeals), on the grounds taken in the writ petition. 3. The Writ Court after examining all the orders and the averments contained in the writ petition came to the conclusion that the orders made were legal one and had been passed by the competent Authorities while exercising the jurisdiction vested with them. While going through the impugned judgment, it also came to our notice that when the Writ Court was about to dismiss the writ petition, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant sought permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a civil suit, which prayer was declined by the Writ Court. 4. The orders, impugned in the writ petition, have been passed by the Authorities under the provisions of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, cannot be made subject matter of the writ petition unless the orders are made without jurisdiction or having been passed in breach of the mandatory provisions of law or have caused miscarriage of justice. In the instant case, the Authorities below have recorded a finding of fact that the writ petitioner/appellant has violated the provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable. 5. This Court in the judgment, dated 4th August, 2014, passed in CWP No.4622 of 2013, titled M/s Himachal Futuristic Communications Ltd. vs. State of H.P. and another, while relying upon the latest decision of the Apex Court in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. M/s Hindalco Industries Ltd., 2014 AIR SCW 3157, has held that finding of fact recorded by the Authorities cannot be interfered with by the Writ Court. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the decision (supra) of the Apex Court hereunder: “16. …………………..The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised…………………….. 17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this court in Harjinder Singh’s case (AIR 2010 SC1116) (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: “10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.”(State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 p.928, para 10.) 18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an Order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an Order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant” [Emphasis added] 6. Applying the test to the instant case, the appeal merits to be dismissed. 7. We have gone through the impugned judgment, is legally sound and needs no interference. Therefore, the present appeal is dismissed, with pending CMPs, if any.