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2014 DIGILAW 1073 (KER)

K. Vijayan v. Jacob Job

2014-12-19

ANIL K.NARENDRAN, ANTONY DOMINIC

body2014
JUDGMENT Anil K. Narendran, J. 1. The petitioner in these O.P.(KAT)s is the 3rd respondent in O.A.Nos.2054/2013 and 671/2013 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal at Thiruvananthapuram. 2. The 1st respondent in O.P.(KAT)No.174/2014 filed O.A.No.671/2013 before the Tribunal seeking an order to quash Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 correcting the date of birth of the petitioner in these O.P.(KAT)s as 29.10.1957' in his service book, in the place of the existing entry 25.3.1956'. He also sought declarations to the effect that, the correction of date of birth in the service book of the petitioner based on the application submitted on 20.11.1995, after the time limit stipulated in Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.11.1991, is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction; and that the inclusion of the name of the petitioner in Annexure A12 proposal sent by the State Police Chief to the Government in May, 2012, for preparation of a select list of the officers of the State Police Service for appointment to Indian Police Service (IPS) by promotion, on the basis of the date of birth corrected as per Annexure A7 Government Order, is arbitrary and illegal. 3. Similarly, respondents 1 to 3 in O.P.(KAT) No.173/2014 filed O.A.No.2054/2013 before the Tribunal seeking an order to quash Annexure A4 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 (same as Annexure A7 in O.A.No.671/2013) correcting the date of birth of the petitioner in these O.P.(KAT)s in his service book. They also sought a declaration that, the correction of date of birth in the service book of the petitioner as evidenced by Annexure A4 is illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction or authority and that the petitioner is not entitled for any service benefit based on the correction of his date of birth in the service book. 4. The Tribunal, by an order dated 30.4.2014, produced as Ext.P11 in O.P.(KAT)No.173/2014 and as Ext.P4 in O.P.(KAT) No.174/2014, allowed O.A.Nos.671/2013 and 2054/2013, holding that Annexure A4/A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 has been issued in gross violation of the conditions contained in Annexure A1/A2 Government Order dated 30.12.1991 and therefore Annexure A4/A7 order dated 19.8.2010 is manifestly illegal in the light of the law laid down in Annexures A8, A9 and A10 judgments produced in O.A.No.671/2013 and also the binding judgments of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Francis , 2012 (4) KLT 722 . The Tribunal also held that, the Original Applications are not barred by limitation. Accordingly, the Tribunal quashed Annexure A4/A7 order dated 19.8.2010. It is aggrieved by order dated 30.4.2014 of the Tribunal in O.A.Nos.671/2013 and 2054/2013, the petitioner is before us in this O.P.(KAT)s. 5. We heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner in these O.P.(KAT)s, the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 in O.P.(KAT)No.173/2014, the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent in O.P.(KAT)No.173/2014 and the learned Senior Government Pleader for the official respondents. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that, the Tribunal went wrong in interfering with Annexure A4/A7 order dated 19.8.2010 since delay, if any, occurred on the part of the Commissioner for Government Examinations in correcting the date of birth in the SSLC Book, being not attributed to the petitioner. The learned counsel contended further that, the applicants before the Tribunal have no locus standi to challenge the aforesaid Government Order and that, the challenge made in that O.A.s was barred by limitation. 7. The learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents contended that the Government have ample power to review Annexure A2/A1 Government Order dated 17.4.1997, by which the earlier request made by the petitioner for correction of date of birth in service records was rejected, and that Annexure A4/A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 is perfectly legal. 8. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant in O.A.No.671/2013 and the learned counsel for the applicants in O.A.No.2054/2013 supported the reasoning of the Tribunal in its order dated 30.4.2014. They contended further that, any interference with order dated 30.4.2014 of the Tribunal would result in the revival of Annexure A4/A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010, which is manifestly illegal. 9. We have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. 10. Since almost all relevant documents are produced in O.P.(KAT)No.173/2014 arising out of O.A.No.671/2013, we shall refer Annexures and Exhibits as marked in that O.P.(KAT). 11. At the time of filing the O.A.s before the Tribunal, the 1st and 2nd applicants in O.A.No.671/2013 and the applicant in O.A.No.2054/2013 were holding the post of Superintendent of Police (Non-IPS). The 3rd applicant in O.A.No.671/2013 retired from service, while holding the post of Superintendent of Police (Non-IPS). The petitioner in these O.P.(KAT)s, who is the 3rd respondent in those O.A.s, was also holding the post of Superintendent of Police (Non-IPS). 12. The 3rd applicant in O.A.No.671/2013 retired from service, while holding the post of Superintendent of Police (Non-IPS). The petitioner in these O.P.(KAT)s, who is the 3rd respondent in those O.A.s, was also holding the post of Superintendent of Police (Non-IPS). 12. In the year 1981, the petitioner entered service as Sub-Inspector of Police. The date of birth entered in his school records and also in his service book was 25.3.1956'. As borne out from Annexure A2 Government order dated 17.4.1997, while working as Circle Inspector of Police, the petitioner moved an application dated 24.9.1992, for correction of date of birth in his service book as 29.10.1957'. 13. The correction of date of birth in the service record is governed by Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991. Till the issuance of Annexure A1, as per the then existing Government orders, a Government employee could apply for correction of date of birth entered in his service book upto two years preceding his retirement, reckoned with reference to the date of birth as originally entered in the service book. The Government, in order to discourage the growing tendency of the Government employees to get the date of birth corrected at the fag end of their career, ordered in Annexure A1, in modification of all the existing orders, that after 30.12.1991 correction of date of birth if any needed in the case of a Government employee shall be made within five years of one's entry into service. In the case of those who have already crossed this limit, one year time from 30.12.1991 shall be allowed, provided they apply beyond the two years period preceding retirement, reckoned with reference to the date of birth as recorded in the service book. 14. Going by Annexure A1, the applications for correction of date of birth in service book shall be submitted to the Government in the Administrative Department concerned, through proper channel. It is made clear in Annexure A1 that, the applications for correction of date of birth in service book, in the case of those who have attended a school, shall be supported by attested copies of SSLC/SSC book or extract of school record as corrected. Further, mere correction of date of birth in the school records does not entitle the employee for consequential correction of date of birth in service book which will remain unchanged. Further, mere correction of date of birth in the school records does not entitle the employee for consequential correction of date of birth in service book which will remain unchanged. It is also made clear in Annexure A1 that, applications for condonation of delay and for entertainment of applications in relaxation of the conditions regarding time limit shall be summarily rejected. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Annexure A1 Government order dated 30.12.1991 read thus; "4. The conditions that such applications, in the case of those who have attended a School, shall be supported by attested copies of SSLC/SSC Book or extract of school record as corrected and that mere correction of date of birth in the school record does not entitle the employee for consequential correction of date of birth in Service Book will remain unchanged. Each case will be considered by Government on merits and orders passed. 5. Applications for condonation of delay and for entertainment of applications in relaxation of the condition regarding time limit shall be summarily rejected." 15. In terms of Annexure A1 Government order, for correction of date of birth in service book, the petitioner should have made an application before the Government, supported by attested copy of the SSLC Book as corrected, before 30.12.1992. It is not in dispute that, the petitioner moved the Commissioner for Government Examinations, Kerala, for correction of date of birth in the SSLC Book only on 27.4.1992 and the date of birth in the SSLC Book was got corrected as 29.10.1957', only on 23.8.1995, by an order passed by the said authority. Therefore, by Annexure A2 order dated 17.4.1997, the Government rejected the request made by the petitioner for correction of date of birth in the service book, stating that, his application submitted on 29.4.1992 was not supported by corrected school records. The specific finding in Annexure A2 Government order is that, the application submitted by the petitioner on 29.4.1992 cannot be considered as a valid one in accordance with the provisions in Annexure A1 Government order dated 30.12.1991 and the request is therefore time barred and not entertainable. 16. The specific finding in Annexure A2 Government order is that, the application submitted by the petitioner on 29.4.1992 cannot be considered as a valid one in accordance with the provisions in Annexure A1 Government order dated 30.12.1991 and the request is therefore time barred and not entertainable. 16. After a lapse of more than 9 years, the petitioner submitted Annexure A3 representation dated 24.7.2006 before the Government, seeking review of Annexure A2 order dated 17.4.1997, pointing out that, though application for correction of date of birth in the SSLC Book was made on 27.4.1992, it was got corrected only by order dated 23.8.1995 of the Commissioner for Government Examinations. Thereafter, application for correction of date of birth in service book was submitted before the Government on 20.11.1995, which was summarily rejected by Annexure A2 Government Order dated 17.4.1997 without going into the merit of the application and without considering the fact that the delay was not due to his fault. 17. Annexure A3 representation was followed by Annexure A4 reminder dated 30.4.2009. Later, the petitioner approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.25406/2009 and the said Writ Petition was disposed of by Annexure A6 judgment dated 14.9.2009, after taking note of the contention of the learned Government Pleader that, Annexure A3 application filed by the petitioner seeking review of Annexure A2 order is belated and is otherwise not maintainable as well. This Court directed the Government to take a decision on Annexure A3 within three months of receipt of a copy of the judgment. But, it was made clear in Annexure A6 judgment that, the Government may decide on the question of maintainability of Annexure A3 and also the desirability of the request contained therein. 18. Subsequent to Annexure A6 judgment, the Government by Annexure A7 order dated 19.8.2010 ordered correction of date of birth in the service book of the petitioner as 29.10.1957' in the place of the existing entry 25.3.1956'. The reasoning in Annexure A7 order is that, though the petitioner applied for correction of date of birth in the SSLC Book on 27.4.1992, the Commissioner for Government Examinations ordered correction of date of birth as 29.10.1957' only on 23.8.1995. Therefore, the petitioner could not apply for correction of date of birth in the service book in time due to the delay in the office of the Commissioner for Government Examinations. Therefore, the petitioner could not apply for correction of date of birth in the service book in time due to the delay in the office of the Commissioner for Government Examinations. Since the petitioner is not responsible for the delay occurred in that office, such delay should not be a disadvantage to the claim of the petitioner. 19. As we have already noticed, in terms of Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991, the application for correction of date of birth in the service book, in the case of those who have attended a School, should be supported by attested copy of the SSLC book or extract of the school record as corrected, and such an application should be made before 30.12.1992. In the present case, the application submitted by the petitioner on 29.4.1992 was not supported by any such document, which was rightly rejected by the Government by Annexure A2 order dated 17.4.1997. 20. In Annexure A8 judgment in W.P.(C)No.6999/2008, a learned Judge of this Court, held that the prescription of time frame in the system evolved by the Government in Annexure A1 order for entertaining and disposing of applications for correction of date of birth in service book is part of that system. The application has to be considered and disposed of strictly in terms of Annexure A1 order, the terms of which would be binding not only on the Government servants, but also on the Government. If the Government acts in deviation of Annexure A1 order, the action will have to be branded as one vitiated by an illegal exercise, which could, even, be termed as an abuse of power. Such orders would fit into the description of orders that are unconstitutional, in the sense that they are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge quashed the order of the Government permitting correction of date of birth in service book of a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the General Executive Branch, in deviation of Annexure A1 order. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment read thus; "8. It cannot be gainsaid that the Government has the power to stipulate conditions regarding entertainment and disposal of application for correction of date of birth in the service records. In fact, the Government could have declared that under no circumstances it will entertain an application for correction of date of birth. It cannot be gainsaid that the Government has the power to stipulate conditions regarding entertainment and disposal of application for correction of date of birth in the service records. In fact, the Government could have declared that under no circumstances it will entertain an application for correction of date of birth. This is within the competence of the Government. If that be so, it is also within the competence of the Government to say that an application for correction of date of birth, if it is to be entertained, will have to be filed within one year from the date of Ext.P1 order. The stipulation contained in Ext.P1 order is, therefore, one within jurisdiction. Once this position is clear, then it also follows that the Government has evolved unto itself a system for entertaining and disposing of applications for correction of date of birth. Prescription of a time frame in that regard is part of the system, which the Government has adopted. The order is published (It is in fact Gazetted) and going by the very nature of the implications that would come about, whenever there is an order accepting the application for correction of date of birth, it can be said that the order contemplates civil consequences to many. It can, even, be said to be one regulating the service conditions of the Government servants in the sense that even if there has to be a change in correction of date of birth in the service records, the application is to be considered and disposed of strictly in terms of Ext.P1. Ext.P1 would be binding not only on the Government servants, but on the Government also, subject, of course, to the competence of the Government to amend Ext.P1 or modify the same. But, as long as Ext.P1 is in force, the Government, as also the Government servants, would be bound by the same. 9. If that be so, a deviation from Ext.P1 would be justified only if there is a residuary discretion reserved by the Government unto itself either under Ext.P1 Government order or in any supervening order. There is no such power to entertain cases of deviation in relaxation of the stipulation contained therein. 9. If that be so, a deviation from Ext.P1 would be justified only if there is a residuary discretion reserved by the Government unto itself either under Ext.P1 Government order or in any supervening order. There is no such power to entertain cases of deviation in relaxation of the stipulation contained therein. In other words, if the Government acts in deviation of Ext.P1, the action will have to be branded as one vitiated by an illegal exercise, which could, even, be termed as an abuse of power. Such orders would fit into the description of orders that are unconstitutional, in the sense that they are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 21. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge in Annexure A8 judgment that, the order impugned was one issued in gross violation of Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991 was affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in Annexure A9 judgment in W.A.No.965/2008, observing that, the State Government has not in Annexure A1 reserved any power to entertain applications beyond the time limit prescribed therein. Civil Appeal No.3412/2009 filed against that judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court by Annexure A10 judgment dated 8.5.2009. Paragraph 3 of Annexure A10 judgment of the Apex Court reads thus; "3. Having carefully perused the judgment and order passed by the High Court, in our considered view, the Court has understood the purport, object and purpose of the Government order in the proper perspective and has correctly come to the conclusion that the State Government while considering the claim of the appellant could not have diluted its own order to assist the appellant who has not complied with the conditions stipulated in the Government order." 22. In State of Kerala and others v. M. A. Francis, 2012 (4) KLT 722 , a Division Bench of this Court held that, if the application for correction of date of birth in service book filed in terms of Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991 is not accompanied by corrected SSLC book, even if the application is submitted in time, the same cannot be entertained. In that case, the petitioner therein contended that, if the Commissioner for Government Examinations did not dispose of the application for correction of SSLC Book on time, it was not a mistake of the petitioner and he cannot be denied his right for the fault of someone else. In that case, the petitioner therein contended that, if the Commissioner for Government Examinations did not dispose of the application for correction of SSLC Book on time, it was not a mistake of the petitioner and he cannot be denied his right for the fault of someone else. It was also contended that, once an application is submitted within time as contemplated in Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991, nothing else need to be done by the petitioner, except supporting the application by supplying necessary documents and submission of documents need not be along with the application for correction of date of birth, as long as it is made within one year. Further, he claimed correction of date of birth in service book relying on two orders issued by the Government, deviating from Annexure A1. But, the said contentions were repelled by the Division Bench of this Court, and paragraphs 8, 10 to 13 of the judgment reads thus; "8. As against this, learned counsel for writ petitioner/respondent contends that procedure at Ext. P4 contemplates submitting an application within a period of one year if the period of five years is crossed from the date of entry into service. Therefore, the application was submitted within time and if Commissioner for Government Examinations did not dispose of the application at Ext. P1 on time it was not a mistake of the writ petitioner and he cannot be denied his right for the fault of someone else. He also contends that once an application is submitted within time as contemplated at Ext. P4, nothing else need to be done by the petitioner except supporting the application by supplying necessary documents and submission of documents need not be along with the application for correction of date of birth as long as it is made within one year. xxx xxx xxx 10. So far as the circumstance in which modification of procedure for correcting date of birth, this Court in Mariamma (supra) had gone in depth why such occasion arose and what is the purpose of such modification. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 are relevant which reads as under: '8. Government have issued executive order dated 30/12/1991 so as to curb the tendency of filing applications by the Government employees to get the date of birth corrected when they are about to retire. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 are relevant which reads as under: '8. Government have issued executive order dated 30/12/1991 so as to curb the tendency of filing applications by the Government employees to get the date of birth corrected when they are about to retire. Procedure for submitting applications is also stated in the said Government Order. Reason for issuing such an order, and the necessity of complying with the procedure laid down in the said order strictly, are discernible from the order itself. The order was necessitated due to the growing tendency of Government employees to get date of birth corrected on the eve of their retirement. It is pertinent to note the need for correction should not arise at all, once one's date of birth is entered in the service book because it is the date furnished by him for selection to the post and it is again based on the proof furnished by the employee himself. One realises his date of birth in his life time on the number of occasions, such as when he gets his SSLC Book or secures extract from School Admission Register. He is also aware of his date of birth in modern times, when he applies for driving licence, or when he applies for passport, and on various occasions. Therefore, it cannot be said that a person is unaware of his date of birth on all those occasions. One is also aware of his date of birth, when he applies for higher studies and also when he applies for various posts. In several cases, the date of birth in the SSLC Book or college records is very relevant for applying for various jobs. Certain notifications restrict the age limit also. In certain cases, employees enter service on the basis of date of birth entered in the SSLC Book. In certain cases employees do not apply for the post because of age restriction. For instance, if the applications are invited from persons between the age group of 18 and 25, and if, on the basis of date of birth entered in the SSLC Book, he is over-aged he cannot apply, and if he is under-aged also, he cannot apply. Therefore, date of birth is very crucial even in the matter of appointment. For instance, if the applications are invited from persons between the age group of 18 and 25, and if, on the basis of date of birth entered in the SSLC Book, he is over-aged he cannot apply, and if he is under-aged also, he cannot apply. Therefore, date of birth is very crucial even in the matter of appointment. Therefore, having secured the appointment on the basis of date of birth entered in the school records, it is not just and fair to have it corrected later on for getting the service extended. Therefore, there may be cases where, if the service book is ultimately corrected on the basis of the corrected date of birth in the SSLC Book, the employee could not have even applied for the post due to age restriction. It shows the importance of the date of birth entered in the admission register as well as in the SSLC Book, which obviously determines the future of a person at the time of applying for a job. 9. In many cases persons who enter service or are continuing in service taking note of their future prospects. Therefore age of retirement of seniors will be closely watched by juniors to get promotion. Cases also not unknown when a person accepts appointment keeping in view the date of retirement of his immediate senior. Therefore, if a senior gets his date of birth corrected at the fag end of his career, and continues in service, that will affect the promotion chances of his juniors as well. This aspect was considered by the Supreme Court in Secy. & Commr. v. Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155. 10. Looking at the above mentioned principles, needless to say that Government Order has to be strictly followed. As per the Government Order dated 30/12/1991, an application submitted by the employee shall be supported by attested copies of SSLC/SSC book or extract of school record as corrected and that mere correction of date of birth in the school record does not entitle the employee for consequential correction of date of birth in service book. Therefore, the mere fact that petitioner submitted an application within one year from the date of the Government Order would not suffice. Petitioner has to submit the application with all relevant documents which are necessary to establish his case. Therefore, the mere fact that petitioner submitted an application within one year from the date of the Government Order would not suffice. Petitioner has to submit the application with all relevant documents which are necessary to establish his case. Those evidence which the petitioner produces should amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Petitioner cannot put in some application or representation before the Government, and then go on collecting evidence. If he is relying on the date of birth as corrected in the SSLC Book, he has to produce the same along with the application at least within one year from the date of the Government Order. In other words, Government have given one year time to the employees to collect evidence and prove their correct date of birth. It is also for the petitioner to produce whatever documents necessary for carrying out the correction of date of birth in the service records, within the stipulated time. Contention of counsel for the petitioner that petitioner has applied for correction of date of birth before the Commissioner for Government Examinations in time and the delay had occurred at the office of the Commissioner for Government Examinations, I am of opinion, cannot be countenanced. It is the responsibility of the employee to see that all documents are collected and produced along with the application within one year from the date of the Government Order. Therefore, the contention of counsel for the petitioner that since the delay had occurred in the office of the Commissioner for Government Examinations, her application should have been considered by the Government cannot be accepted.' 11. While emphasizing the purpose for which Ext. P4 came into force this Court clearly held that the seriousness and the purpose with which Ext. P4 came to be issued is in the light of several facts referred to above and therefore the modification of the procedure would become purposeful only if there is strict adherence to the procedure contemplated at Ext. P4. Therefore, it is needless to say that there has to be strict compliance of procedure contemplated at Ext. P4 whenever correction of date of birth in service book is sought. Submitting necessary documents upon which reliance is placed for correction of date of birth is one of the important aspect an applicant has to follow at the time of submitting an application. P4 whenever correction of date of birth in service book is sought. Submitting necessary documents upon which reliance is placed for correction of date of birth is one of the important aspect an applicant has to follow at the time of submitting an application. In view of already a particular date of birth is indicated at the time of entry into service, there has to necessarily be a document why such correction is sought for. It could be SSLC Book or date of birth certificate issued by a Panchayat or Municipality or any other similar document. In that view of the matter, it need not be SSLC Book in every case as it could be a different document upon which reliance could be placed by the applicant. 12. In the present case, apparently the applicant though filed the application on 01/12/1992, did not supply necessary documents where correction of date of birth is indicated. Admittedly, the document he relies upon is SSLC Book. Though he submitted application as early as on 20/11/1991, Commissioner for Government Examinations disposed of the application only in 1997. Therefore, it was factually impossible for the applicant to supply corrected SSLC Book while submitting application at Ext. P5. So far as disposal of the application by the Commissioner for Government Examinations, we note that even after submitting such application, he had almost 11 months before he applied for correction of date of birth as per Ext. P5. As on 01/12/1992, he had not obtained the corrected SSLC Book; but nothing prevented the writ petitioner to approach this Court in 11 months' time seeking a direction against the concerned Commissioner for disposal of his application. Having not done so and having not complied with the procedure contemplated at Ext. P4, is it open to the writ petitioner to demand similar treatment to him placing reliance on Exts. P11 and P12. In the case of Gursharan Singh (supra), paragraph 9 is relevant which reads as under: '9. Apart from that even if it is assumed that concession was shown to such stall - holders by the NDMC the appellants cannot make grievance in respect of discrimination under Art.14 of the Constitution. Having agreed to the terms of allotment they cannot legitimately claim that they should also be treated in the same manner. Apart from that even if it is assumed that concession was shown to such stall - holders by the NDMC the appellants cannot make grievance in respect of discrimination under Art.14 of the Constitution. Having agreed to the terms of allotment they cannot legitimately claim that they should also be treated in the same manner. There appears to be some confusion in respect of the scope of Art.14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State or an authority which can be held to be a State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution, so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same, but they cannot claim orders which are not sanctioned by law in their favour on principle of equality before law. Neither Art.14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Art.226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has, been a discrimination. None of the 98 stall holders was impleaded a party to the writ petitions. The appellants questioned the validity of the allotment of 98 stall holders was impleaded a party to the writ petitions. None of the 98 stall holders was impleaded a party to the writ petitions. The appellants questioned the validity of the allotment of 98 stall holders was impleaded a party to the writ petitions. The appellants questioned the validity of the allotment of 98 shops on concessional rates, without trade zoning restrictions in favour of the stall-holders of Panchkuian Road, but they were primarily interested that same concessions in respect of licence fee and relaxation in trade zoning restrictions, be also extended to them. Any such claim on their behalf cannot be entertained on the basis of concept of equality before law as enshrined in Art.14 of the Constitution.' 13. Reading the above judgment, it is very clear that one cannot expect the authority to perpetuate the mistake for ever. If there was legal order or decision on earlier occasion, in the light of strict compliance of directions at Ext. P4, it was open to the appellant authority at clauses 4 and 5 of Ext. P4 if at all they had done so as per Exts. P11 and 12. On that account the writ petitioner cannot seek equal treatment of his application. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, though there was ample opportunity for the writ petitioner to get the date of birth in his SSLC Book corrected before he approached the authorities with Ext. P5 he did not choose to do so. Therefore, in the absence of strict compliance of Clauses 4 and 5 of Ext. P4, we are of the opinion, no benefit would survive to him as directed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, we are of the opinion, judgment of the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside." 23. Going by Annexure A1 order dated 30.12.1991, the Government issued the said order in order to discourage the growing tendency of the employees to get the date of birth in service book corrected at the fag end of their career. It is made clear in Annexure A1 that, the applications for correction of date of birth in service book, in the case of those who have attended a school, shall be supported by attested copies of SSLC/SSC book or extract of school record as corrected. Further, applications for condonation of delay and for entertainment of applications in relaxation of the conditions regarding time limit shall be summarily rejected. Further, applications for condonation of delay and for entertainment of applications in relaxation of the conditions regarding time limit shall be summarily rejected. When the action of the Government in the matter of correction of date of birth in service book is governed by the provisions in Annexure A1 order, it should be compelled to follow those provisions on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of those provisions. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, 1979 (3) SCC 489 the Apex Court held that, "it is well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them." The Apex Court reiterated this principle in B.S.Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, 1983 (4) SCC 582 . In Home Department v. R. Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155 the Apex Court held that, "correction of the date of birth of public servant is permissible, but that should not be done in a casual manner. Any such order must be passed on materials produced by the public servant from which the irresistible conclusion follows that the date of birth recorded in the service book was incorrect. While disposing of any such application, the Court or the Tribunal, has first to examine, whether the application has been made within the prescribed period under some rule or administrative order. If there is no rule or order prescribing any period, then the Court or Tribunal has to examine, why such application was not made within a reasonable time after joining the service." 24. Therefore, in the matter of correction of date of birth in service book, there has to be strict compliance of the provisions in Annexure A1 Government Order. Submitting necessary documents upon which reliance is placed for correction of date of birth in service book is one of the important aspect an applicant has to follow at the time of submitting an application. Therefore, the mere fact that petitioner has submitted an application within one year from the date of Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991 would not suffice. He has to submit the application supported by attested copies of SSLC/SSC book or extract of school record as corrected, which are necessary to establish his case. Therefore, the mere fact that petitioner has submitted an application within one year from the date of Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991 would not suffice. He has to submit the application supported by attested copies of SSLC/SSC book or extract of school record as corrected, which are necessary to establish his case. It is the responsibility of the petitioner to see that all necessary documents are collected and produced along with the application submitted before the Government within one year from the date of Annexure A1 Government Order. He cannot put in some application before the Government, and then go on collecting evidence. Further, the delay occurred in the office of the Commissioner for Government Examinations in correcting the SSLC book is not a valid ground to entertain his request for correction of date of birth in service book in gross violation of the provisions in Annexure A1 Government Order. In such circumstances, we find absolutely no illegality or irregularity in the conclusion made by the Tribunal in its order dated 30.4.2014 that Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 has been issued in gross violation of the provisions in Annexure A1 Government Order dated 30.12.1991 and that the said order is manifestly illegal in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court, in the decisions referred to in the order of the Tribunal. 25. The further contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that, the applicants before the Tribunal have no locus standi to challenge Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 and that, the challenge made in the O.A.s was barred by limitation. 26. The petitioner herein and the applicants before the Tribunal were Superintendents of Police (Non-IPS) in the Kerala Police Service. Appointment by promotion to Indian Police Service is governed by the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 made under Rule 9(1) of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954. Regulation 5 of the said Regulations lays down the procedure for preparation of list of suitable officers of the State Police Service. As per proviso to Regulation 5(2), for including a candidate in the zone, he must have 8 years of continuous service, officiating or substantive, in the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police or any other post declared equivalent thereto by the State Government. As per proviso to Regulation 5(2), for including a candidate in the zone, he must have 8 years of continuous service, officiating or substantive, in the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police or any other post declared equivalent thereto by the State Government. Regulation 5(3) provides that, the selection committee shall not consider the case of members of State Police Service who have attained the age of 54 years on the 1st day of January, of the year for which the select list is prepared. 27. In Annexure A11 final seniority list of Deputy Superintendents of Police in the General Executive Branch of the Police Department as on 1.12.2008, published vide G.O.(P) No.82/2010/Home dated 6.4.2010, the date of birth of the petitioner was 25.3.1956'. If the said date is taken as his date of birth, he should not have been considered for inclusion in the select list for the year 2011, for appointment by promotion to IPS. But, based on the correction of date of birth granted in Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010, the name of the petitioner was included in Annexure A12 proposal dated 25.5.2012 of the 3rd respondent addressed to the 2nd respondent. The applicants in both O.As. were included in the zone of consideration for the year 2011. According to them, in case the date of birth of the petitioner was not corrected, he would not have been considered for conferment of IPS during the year 2011, in which event, one among them would have been conferred with IPS. 28. The minutes of the Selection Committee which met on 21.12.2012, for preparation of select list for the vacancies of 2010 and 2011 (marked as Annexure A6 in O.A.No.2054/2013) would show that in the year 2010, there were 13 vacancies in the promotion quota for IPS of Kerala cadre. Out of the 13 candidates selected by the committee, Sl.No.1 D.Madhu was included in the list provisionally subject to clearance of the criminal proceedings pending against him and grant of integrity certificate by the State Government. For the year 2011, there were 8 vacancies and the petitioner was included as Sl.No.3 in that list. Out of the 8 candidates selected by the committee, Sl.No.1 B.Asokan (Sr.) was included in the list provisionally subject to grant of integrity certificate by the State Government. For the year 2011, there were 8 vacancies and the petitioner was included as Sl.No.3 in that list. Out of the 8 candidates selected by the committee, Sl.No.1 B.Asokan (Sr.) was included in the list provisionally subject to grant of integrity certificate by the State Government. Sl.No.7 T.K.Haridas was included in the list provisionally subject to clearance of the criminal proceedings pending against him and grant of integrity certificate by the State Government. Annexure- II to the said document would further indicate that, the applicants in O.A.No.2054/2013 were included as Sl.Nos.13 to 15 in the field of choice for the year 2011 and their overall relative assessment was "very good". Therefore, if the petitioner and other persons facing proceedings were excluded, the applicants would have been included among the selected persons for the year 2011. 29. The Tribunal noticed that, going by the materials on record, if the petitioner was excluded, at least, the 1st applicant in O.A.No.2054/2013 would have been included in the select list notified by the Central Government for conferment of IPS during 2011. Applicants came into the field of choice since the grading of all of them was "very good". If the petitioner was excluded, the 1st applicant would have found a place in the list. It was in such circumstances, the Tribunal, in its order dated 30.4.2014, concluded that the applicants are clearly affected by the decision of the Government in Annexure A7 order dated 19.8.2010. 30. In Lakhi Ram v. State of Haryana, 1981 (2) SCC 674 ) the Apex Court held that, "the effect of expungement of adverse remarks in the confidential report of respondent No.6 is to prejudice the chances of promotion of the appellant and if the appellant is able to show that the expungement of the remaks was illegal and invalid, the adverse remarks would continue to remain in the confidential report of respondent No.6 and that would improve the chances of promotion of the appellant vis a vis respondent No.6. ...... The appellant had, in the circumstances, locus standi to maintain the writ petition." Paragraph 1 of the judgment reads thus; "1. The only ground on which the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court is that the appellant has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. ...... The appellant had, in the circumstances, locus standi to maintain the writ petition." Paragraph 1 of the judgment reads thus; "1. The only ground on which the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court is that the appellant has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. The appellant filed the writ petition challenging the action of the Government expunging the adverse remarks made in the annual confidential report of respondent No. 6. The High Court took the view that the appellant was not entitled to complain against the expungement of adverse remarks made in the confidential report of another officer. But this view is, in our opinion, erroneous because the effect of expungement of adverse remarks in the confidential report of respondent No. 6 is to prejudice the chances of promotion of the appellant and if the appellant is able to show that the expungement of the remaks was illegal and invalid, the adverse remarks would continue to remain in the confidential report of respondent No. 6 and that would improve the chances of promotion of the appellant vis a vis respondent No. 6. The appellant was, therefore, clearly entitled to show that the Government acted beyond the scope of its power in expunging the adverse remarks in the confidential report of respondent No. 6 and that the expungment of the adverse remarks should be cancelled. The appellant had, in the circumstances, locus standi to maintain the writ petition and the High Court was in error in rejecting it on the ground, that the appellant was not entitled to maintain the writ petition." 31. We also notice that, Annexure A8 judgment of this Court in W.P.(C)No.6999/2008 is a judgment rendered at the instance of a junior in service who approached this Court against the correction of date of birth in service book of his senior. In that case, the petitioner and respondent No.3 were working as Deputy Superintendents of Police in the General Executive Branch. By an order dated 16.1.2008, the Government accorded sanction for correction of date of birth in service book of respondent No.3, as a very special case. One of the contention raised by the petitioner was that, his career prospects would have been positively advanced if respondent no.3 had retired from service on 31.1.2008, going by the original date of birth. By an order dated 16.1.2008, the Government accorded sanction for correction of date of birth in service book of respondent No.3, as a very special case. One of the contention raised by the petitioner was that, his career prospects would have been positively advanced if respondent no.3 had retired from service on 31.1.2008, going by the original date of birth. The learned Single Judge entertained the challenge made against Government Order dated 16.1.2008, according sanction for correction of date of birth in service book of respondent No.3, and quashed the said order. The said judgment was affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in Annexure A9 judgment in W.A.No.965/2008 and Civil Appeal No.3412/2009 filed against that judgment also ended in dismissal by Annexure A10 judgment of the Apex Court, dated 8.5.2009. 32. Relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in Devki Nandan Verma v. State of Haryana, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 431 and in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (4) SCC 465 the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that, the applicants have no locus standi to challenge Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 and they would not fall under the category of 'person aggrieved' by the said order. In Devki Nandan Verma's case (supra) the Apex Court held that, "when correction regarding date of birth is made in the service record of a person, the State Government is doing what is required under law. A person has a right to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation. When wrong date of birth is entered in the service record, the right of the person to remain in service till superannuation is obviously infracted. Rectification of the date of birth is a matter between the person concerned and the State Government and no other person has locus standi to prefer a caveat in such a matter." A reading of the above judgment of the Apex Court indicate that, it was not a case in which correction of date of birth in service book of the employee was governed by an order similar to one in the present case, i.e., Annexure A1 Government Order, which curtails the right of an employee to seek correction of date of birth in service book, beyond the time time limit prescribed therein. Further, as noticed by the Tribunal, the said decision does not lay down any general principle that no affected employee can challenge the decision of the Government to correct the date of birth of a senior, whatever be the illegality in that order. 33. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan's case (supra) the Apex Court has reiterated that, "a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons." The Apex Court further held that, "under ordinary circumstances, a third person, having no concern with the case at hand, cannot claim to have any locus-standi to raise any grievance whatsoever." A reading of the above judgment of the Apex Court indicate that, in that case, the competent authority issued a caste certificate dated 19.10.1989, after following due procedure, in favour of the appellant stating that he does in fact, belong to Bhil Tadvi (Scheduled Tribes). On the basis of the said certificate, he was appointed as Senior Clerk in the Municipal Corporation of Aurangabad, on 6.2.1990, against the vacancy reserved for persons under the Scheduled Tribes category. The Corporation referred the caste certificate for verification to the Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee. The Scrutiny Committee, on the basis of the Vigilance Report and other documents, issued a validity certificate to the appellant dated 23.5.2000. After a lapse of 9 years, respondent No.5, who does not even belong to the Scheduled Tribes category, filed complaint dated 9.1.2009, before the Scrutiny Committee, for the purpose of recalling the said validity certificate, on the ground that the appellant had obtained employment by way of misrepresentation, and that he does not actually belong to the Scheduled Tribes category. Therefore, the judgment of the Apex Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan's case (supra) is on an entirely different factual matrix. 34. The expression, 'person aggrieved' takes within its sweep one, those whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. Further, the existence of a legal right is the foundation of the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Court and such right must ordinarily be that of the person who complains of infraction of such legal right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. Further, the existence of a legal right is the foundation of the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Court and such right must ordinarily be that of the person who complains of infraction of such legal right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. Going by the decision of the Apex Court in Lakhi Ram's case (supra) the applicants have locus standi to challenge Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 and they would fall under the category of 'person aggrieved' by that order. Therefore, we find absolutely no grounds to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal to that effect in its order dated 30.4.2014. 35. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the challenge made against Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 is belated and therefore, is barred by limitation. Section 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read thus; "20. Application not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted:- (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances, - (a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial." "21. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial." "21. Limitation:- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application, - (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates ; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or , as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section(2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period." 36. As per Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act, the Tribunal shall not admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. Going by clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, for the purposes of Sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances, if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance. Similarly, going by clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, the Tribunal shall not admit an application, in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. But, going by Sub-section (3) of Section 20, notwithstanding anything contained in Sub- section (1) or Sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of Sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in Sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 37. In D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India, 2003 (6) SCC 186 the Apex Court held that, where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. So far as the commencement of period of limitation for filing the review petition is concerned the expression 'the date of that order' as occurring in Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961, has to be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge of the order to the review- petitioner. So far as the commencement of period of limitation for filing the review petition is concerned the expression 'the date of that order' as occurring in Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961, has to be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge of the order to the review- petitioner. Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment read thus; "13. In Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC 398 this Court pressed into service two legal maxims guiding and assisting the Court while resolving an issue as to calculation of the period of limitation prescribed, namely, (i) the law does not compel a man to do that which he could not possibly perform, and (ii) an act of the court shall prejudice no man. These principles support the view taken by us hereinabove. Any view to the contrary would lead to an absurdity and anomaly. An order may be passed without the knowledge of anyone except its author, may be kept in the file and consigned to record room or the file may lie unattended, unwittingly or by carelessness. In either case, the remedy against the order would be lost by limitation though the person aggrieved or affected does not even know what order has been passed. Such an interpretation cannot be countenanced. 14. How can a person concerned or a person aggrieved by expected to exercise the right of review conferred by the provision unless the order is communicated to or is known to him either actually or constructively? The words the date of that order, therefore, mean and must be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed." 38. In Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2010 (5) SCC 23 the Apex Court has reiterated that, for seeking the remedy the limitation starts from the date on which the order was communicated to the parties affected or the date on which it was pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of the order and what it contains. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded and binding on him. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded and binding on him. Otherwise the party affected by it will have no means of obeying the order or acting in conformity with it or of appealing against it or otherwise having it set aside. Paragraph 43 of the judgment reads thus; "43. In CEE v. M.M. Rubber and Co. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 471, a three-Judge Bench highlighted a distinction between making of an order and communication thereof to the affected person in the context of Sections 35-E (3) and (4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Bench noted the scheme of Section 35, distinction between sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof and held that in case where the order is subject to appeal, the same is required to be communicated to the affected person. Relevant portions of that judgment are extracted below: (SCC pp.474-77, paras 5, 8-11 &13) "5. Before we discuss the arguments of the learned counsel, it is necessary to set out some relevant provisions in the Act. Section 35 of the Act provides for an appeal by a person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under the Act by a Central Excise Officer lower than a Collector of Central Excise and that such an appeal will have to be filed "within three months from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order". Sub-section (5) of Section 35-A requires that on the disposal of the appeal, the Collector (Appeals) shall communicate the order passed by him to the appellant, the adjudicating authority and the Collector of Central Excise. Section 35-B provides for a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by, among other orders, (1) an order passed by the Collector (Appeals) under Section 35- A and (2) a decision or order passed by the Collector of Central Excise as an adjudicating authority. Such an appeal will have to be filed "within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Collector of Central Excise or as the case may be the other party preferring the appeal". Such an appeal will have to be filed "within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Collector of Central Excise or as the case may be the other party preferring the appeal". The Appellate Tribunal also is required to send a copy of the order passed in the appeal to the Collector of Central Excise and the other party to the appeal. .......... xxx xxx xxx 8. At this stage itself we may state that sub-section (4) of the Act provides that the adjudicating authority shall file the application before the Tribunal in pursuance of the order made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) 'within a period of three months from the date of communication of the order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) to the adjudicating authority'. 9. The words 'from the date of decision or order' used with reference to the limitation for filing an appeal or revision under certain statutory provisions had come up for consideration in a number of cases. We may state that the ratio of the decisions uniformly is that in the case of a person aggrieved filing the appeal or revision, it shall mean the date of communication of the decision or order appealed against. However, we may note a few leading cases on this aspect. 10. Under Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act, 1860 the starting point of limitation for appeal by way of suit allowed by that section was the passing of the Survey Officer's decision and in two of the earliest cases, namely, Annamalai Chetti v. Col. J. G. Cloete ILR (1883) 6 Mad 189 and Seshama v. Sankara, ILR (1889) 12 Mad 1 it was held that the decision was passed when it was communicated to the parties. In Secretary of State for India in Council v. Receiver ILR (1911) 34 Mad 151 construing a similar provision in the Survey and Boundary Act, 1897 the same High Court held that a decision cannot properly be said to be passed until it is in some way pronounced or published under such circumstances the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing what it contains. 'Till then though it may be written out, signed and dated, it is nothing but a decision which the officer intends to pass. 'Till then though it may be written out, signed and dated, it is nothing but a decision which the officer intends to pass. It is not passed so long it is open to him to tear off what he has written and write something else.' In Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500 construing the proviso to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which prescribed for applications seeking reference to the court, a time-limit of six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award whichever first expires, this Court held that the six months period will have to be calculated from the date of communication of the award. In Transport Commissioner v. Nand Singh, (1979) 4 SCC 19 construing the provision of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, it was held that for an aggrieved party the limitation will run from the date when the order was communicated to him. 11. The ratio of these judgments were applied in interpreting Section 33-A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in Muthia Chettiar v. CIT AIR 1951 Mad 204 with reference to a right of revision provided to an aggrieved assessee. Section 33-A(1) of the Act on the other hand authorised the Commissioner to suo moto call for the records of any proceedings under the Act in which an order has been passed by any authority subordinate to him and pass such order thereon as he thinks fit. The proviso, however, stated that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under that sub-section 'if the order (sought to be revised) has been made more than one year previously'. Construing this provision the High Court in Muthia Chettiar case held that the power to call for the records and pass the order will cease with the lapse of one year from the date of the order by the subordinate authority and the ratio of date of the knowledge of the order applicable to an aggrieved party is not applicable for the purpose of exercising suo moto power. Similarly in another decision reported in Viswanathan Chettiar v. CIT, (1954) 25 ITR 79 (Mad) construing the time-limit for completion of an assessment under Section 34(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which provided that it shall be made 'within four years from the end of the year in which the income, profit and gains were first assessable,' it was held that the time-limit of four years for exercise of the power should be calculated with reference to the date on which the assessment or reassessment was made and not the date on which such assessment or reassessment order made under Section 34(2) was served on the assessee. xxx xxx xxx 13. So far as the party who is affected by the order or decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he should be made aware of passing of such order. Therefore courts have uniformly laid down as a rule of law that for seeking the remedy the limitation starts from the date on which the order was communicated to him or the date on which it was pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of the order and what it contains. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded and binding on him. Otherwise the party affected by it will have no means of obeying the order or acting in conformity with it or of appealing against it or otherwise having it set aside. This is based upon, as observed by Rajmannar, C.J. in Muthia Chettiar v. CIT AIR 1951 Mad 204 a salutary and just principle'. The application of this rule so far as the aggrieved party is concerned is not dependent on the provisions of the particular statute, but it is so under the general law. (emphasis supplied)" 39. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that, Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010, ordering correction of date of birth in service book of the petitioner, is one passed without notice to the applicants. The said order was passed by the Government on Annexure A3 representation dated 24.7.2006 submitted by the petitioner, seeking review of Annexure A2 order dated 17.4.1997. The said order was passed by the Government on Annexure A3 representation dated 24.7.2006 submitted by the petitioner, seeking review of Annexure A2 order dated 17.4.1997. The petitioner filed the said representation before the Government, after a lapse of more than 9 years from the date of the order sought to be reviewed. Annexure A7 Government Order is not one passed on any representation submitted by the applicants. Further, the said order is one passed without notice to them. Admittedly, copy of the said order was never circulated among the officers like the applicants, whose chances of promotion are prejudiced, or communicated to the applicants. Since the knowledge of the party affected by an order being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the affected persons like the applicants, who were neither heard at the time of disposal of Annexure A3 representation submitted by the petitioner nor communicated with a copy of Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010, can challenge the same before the Tribunal, within one year from the date of knowledge of such order being passed by the Government. 40. Going by the averments in O.A.No.671/2013, on coming to know that the petitioner is included in the zone of consideration for promotion to IPS (Kerala Cadre) for the vacancy year 2011 also, the applicant made enquiries, which revealed that, subsequent to Annexure A11 seniority list issued in April, 2010, the date of birth of the petitioner was corrected in service book. The applicant obtained copy of Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010 about three weeks prior to the filing of the O.A. and thereafter, obtained copy of Annexure A6 judgment in the writ petition filed by the petitioner and other supporting materials. Annexure A12 proposal sent by the 3rd respondent to 2nd respondent for preparation of select list of officers of the State Police Service for appointment to IPS by promotion for the year 2013 is dated 25.5.2012. The name of the petitioner was included in Annexure A12 list, based on the correction of date of birth ordered in Annexure A7 Government Order. The applicant filed O.A.No.671/2013 before the Tribunal on 2.4.2013. The name of the petitioner was included in Annexure A12 list, based on the correction of date of birth ordered in Annexure A7 Government Order. The applicant filed O.A.No.671/2013 before the Tribunal on 2.4.2013. Going by the averments in O.A.No.2054/2013, to the vacancy for the year 2010 and 2011, the UPSC convened the meeting of the Selection Committee only on 21.12.2012 and Annexure A6 produced in that O.A. is a communication dated 7.1.2013 of the UPSC forwarding the minutes of the said Selection Committee to the 2nd respondent. The applicants filed O.A.No.2054/2013 before the Tribunal in September, 2013. 41. Relying on various documents produced along with the counter affidavit, the petitioner contended that, the applicants had sufficient notice of the date of birth correction carried out in his service book based on Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010. The Tribunal noticed that, Annexure R3(d) communication dated 25.6.2011 relied by the petitioner does not indicate what is his date of birth and Annexures R3(f) communication dated 8.3.2012 and R3(g) communication dated 26.11.2011 are departmental communications which were not marked to the applicants. Relying on Annexure A11 seniority list of Deputy Superintendents of Police in the General Executive Branch published on 6.4.2010, the petitioner contended that, the applicants knew in 2010 itself about the correction of his date of birth, as his date of birth is shown as 29.10.1957. As rightly noticed by the Tribunal, Annexure A11 seniority list was published on 6.4.2010, whereas, correction of date of birth in service book was ordered to be carried out, only by Annexure A7 order dated 19.8.2010. So, the correction done under Annexure A7 order dated 19.8.2010 cannot find a place in Annexure A11 seniority list already published on 6.4.2010. Some scribbling done by someone in Annexure A11 cannot be taken as sufficient notice to the applicants herein. Neither the petitioner nor the official respondents have a case that Annexure A7 Government Order was either circulated or communication to the applicants or others whose chances of promotion are prejudiced due to correction of date of birth in service book of the petitioner. None of the documents produced in these O.P(KAT)s are sufficient to draw an inference that, the applicants have knowledge of the date of birth correction carried out in his service book based on Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010. None of the documents produced in these O.P(KAT)s are sufficient to draw an inference that, the applicants have knowledge of the date of birth correction carried out in his service book based on Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010. In such circumstances, the Tribunal cannot be found fault with in accepting the case of the applicants that they came to know of the correction of date of birth in service book of the petitioner only recently, as stated in their pleadings. 42. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions of the Apex Court in support of his contention that the O.A.s filed before the Tribunal ought to have been dismissed as barred by limitation. In Hukam Raj Khinvsara v. Union of India and others, 1997 (4) SCC 284 the Apex Court held that a final order passed by the Tribunal is executable under Section 27 of the Act within one year from the date of its becoming final. Since the application was filed well beyond one year, the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the application was barred by limitation. But that was a case in which the applicant before the Tribunal filed a petition under Section 27 of the Act to execute the order passed by the Tribunal beyond the period of one year from the date of such order. In Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Udham Singh Kamal, 1999 (8) SCC 304 the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which, the O.A. filed before the Tribunal could not have been admitted and disposed of on merits in view of the statutory provision contained in S.21(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The submission made before the Apex Court was that, if there be any delay, the same may be condoned. The Apex Court held that, it was open to the first respondent to make proper application under Section 21(3) of the Act for condonation of delay and having not done so, he cannot be permitted to take up such contention at this late stage. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 (10) SCC 765 the Apex Court held that, law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 (10) SCC 765 the Apex Court held that, law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. But, that was a case in which the Apex Court found that, the principle of limitation starting from date of knowledge of award being applicable only to Section 18 and not to Section 28A the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants, who claimed the said benefit as they were not parties to the reference in which the award was passed, are barred by limitation from applying under Section 28A of the Act. In Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., 2008 (14) SCC 445 the Apex Court held that, limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, a Court or an Adjudicating Authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits. But, that was a case in which the Apex Court found that, the first proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 55 of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, prohibits the Registrar from entertaining the dispute unless such dispute is presented to him within thirty days from the date of the order impugned. The above judgments of the Apex Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were rendered on entirely different factual matrix and have no application to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that, the Original Applications are not barred by limitation can only be sustained and we do so. 43. The above judgments of the Apex Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner were rendered on entirely different factual matrix and have no application to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that, the Original Applications are not barred by limitation can only be sustained and we do so. 43. In Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma, 2013 (11) SCC 451 the Apex Court held that, "there may be a statutory provision, which causes great hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigor." When the prescription of time frame in the system evolved by the Government in Annexure A1 order for entertaining and disposing of applications for correction of date of birth in service book is part of that system, the application submitted by the petitioner should have been considered and disposed of strictly in terms of the said order, the terms of which are binding not only on the Government servants like the petitioner, but also on the Government. 44. It is now well settled that the mere fact that an order of an authority is illegal need not lead to it being quashed by this Court, if such quashing would result in restoration or revival of another order, which is also illegal. This proposition was laid down by the Apex Court in Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 . Any interference with order dated 30.4.2014 of the Tribunal would result in the revival of Annexure A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010, which is manifestly illegal. Therefore, we find considerable force in the contention raised in this regard, on behalf of the applicants. 45. We find absolutely no illegality or irregularity in order dated 30.4.2014 of the Tribunal in O.P.(KAT)Nos.173/2014 and 174/2014, warranting any interference by this Court. Therefore, the Tribunal rightly allowed O.A.Nos.671/2013 and 2054/2013, thereby quashing Annexure A4/A7 Government Order dated 19.8.2010. In the result, O.P.(KAT)Nos.173/2014 and 174/2014 are dismissed.