Ramdulari w/o. Matabadalsingh v. Meerabai wd/o. Bharatsingh Baghel
2014-01-18
S.B.SHUKRE
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : This is an application for review filed under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. 2. The review of judgment dated 28/4/2008 delivered by this Court in Second Appeal No. 116 of 1992 has been sought by the applicants on the ground that there has been an error apparent on the face of the record in recording a finding as regards ownership of the non-applicants and that this finding has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 3. The non-applicants filed a civil suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No.144 of 1976 against the applicants claiming that they became the owners of field No.6/1 having area of about 29 acres situated at Mouza Dadapur, Tah. Warora, Distt. Chandrapur, hereinafter called as 'suit property', for the sake of convenience, by virtue of registered will executed in their favour in the year 1973 by one Bharatsingh. It was their case that original non-applicant No.1 Meerabai was the legally wedded wife of Bharatsingh and non-applicant No.2 was his son and that Bharatsingh was the owner of the suit property. They submitted that way back in the year 1952. Bharatsingh gave possession of the suit property to Meerabai for her maintenance. But later on, in the year 1964, Bharatsingh claimed back possession from Meerabai and he also filed a civil suit against her for possession. The suit was dismissed by the concerned Court, which was the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Warora and in the appeal filed against the decree of dismissal of the suit before the District Court, Chandrapur, the suit was allowed and decree was granted in favour of Bharatsingh. The second appeal was preferred by the non-applicants before the High Court in the year 1966. During the pendency of this appeal, Bharatsingh executed an agreement of maintenance in the year 1968 in favour of Meerabai and later on, in the year 1977 also executed a registered will in favour of Meerabai as well as non-applicant No.2 bequeathing the suit property to them. Bharatsingh died on 01/5/1974 and, thereafter, as per the said will, the applicants claimed that they became absolute owners of the suit property. Meanwhile, Second Appeal No.187 of 1966, pending in the High Court, came to be abated on 13/02/1975 and as no legal representatives were brought on record, it was disposed of on 13/02/1975.
Bharatsingh died on 01/5/1974 and, thereafter, as per the said will, the applicants claimed that they became absolute owners of the suit property. Meanwhile, Second Appeal No.187 of 1966, pending in the High Court, came to be abated on 13/02/1975 and as no legal representatives were brought on record, it was disposed of on 13/02/1975. The non-applicants submitted that the applicants falsely claiming themselves to be the cousins of Bharatsingh and thus the legal heirs of Bharatsingh, filed execution proceedings to execute the decree of possession passed by the Court of District Judge, Chandrapur. The non-applicants submitted in these execution proceedings that they were not noticed by the applicants and thus, without their knowledge, got the decree of possession executed against them. The non-applicants further submitted that they came to know about the said fraud of the applicants only on 23/11/1975 when Meerabai was summoned by Tahsildar for mutating the names of the applicants in revenue record as owners in respect of the suit property. Therefore, the non-applicants filed the said suit bearing Regular Civil Suit No. 144 of 1976 for declaration that they were the owners of the suit property and for recovery of possession of the suit property against the applicants. 4. The applicants resisted the suit. They denied relationship of the non-applicants with Bharatsingh. They denied execution of the alleged will in favour of the non-applicants. They denied that the non-applicants were not aware of the execution proceedings and the decree was got executed by them by playing fraud upon the non-applicants. They submitted that the non-applicants were not the legal representatives of Bharatsingh. They also submitted that the suit as filed was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. 5. On these pleadings, several issues were framed by the trial Court and after considering the evidence adduced by the rival parties, the suit was decreed by the trial Court. It was found by the trial Court that Bharatsingh had executed a maintenance agreement in favour of Meerabai as well as will and that they were valid. It was also found that the applicants had failed to prove that Meerabai did not become the owner of the suit property by virtue of the will.
It was found by the trial Court that Bharatsingh had executed a maintenance agreement in favour of Meerabai as well as will and that they were valid. It was also found that the applicants had failed to prove that Meerabai did not become the owner of the suit property by virtue of the will. It was further found that Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh, the common ancestors, were joint in property and were co-sharers in the property and that Bharatsingh was the heir of Ramnathsingh. It was further found that the applicants were not the heirs of Bharatsingh and were not entitled for possession of the suit property. 6. Upon challenge to all these findings before the Court of the District Judge, the learned District Judge repelled the same and confirmed the findings recorded by the trial Court. He also found that the suit as filed by the non-applicants was not barred under law. Being aggrieved by these concurrent findings, Second Appeal No.116 of 1992 came to be preferred before this Court by the applicants. This appeal was admitted upon substantial questions of law and after hearing learned Counsel for the applicants/appellants and non-applicants/respondents, learned Judge of this Court, by his judgment delivered on 28/4/2008, dismissed the appeal. The review of this judgment has been sought in this application filed by the applicants/appellants. 7. I have heard Shri Joshi, learned Counsel for the applicants and Shri Badhe, learned Counsel for the non-applicants. With their assistance, I have carefully gone through the judgment delivered by this Court on 28/4/2008, the plaint of the non-applicants, written statement filed by the applicants and record of the trial Court. Now, the only point which arises for my consideration is : Whether the judgment dated 28/4/2008 delivered by this Court suffers from any error apparent on the face of the record and, if so, whether it has resulted in causing of miscarriage of justice? 8. Learned Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the first error apparent on the face of the record is in the nature of not answering the first substantial question of law on which this appeal was initially admitted. He submits that there is absolutely no reference to this first substantial question of law and it has resulted in miscarriage of justice.
He submits that there is absolutely no reference to this first substantial question of law and it has resulted in miscarriage of justice. According to learned Counsel for the applicants, what is referred to as the first substantial question of law, in fact, is not a substantial question of law as could be seen from paragraph-7 of the judgment sought to be reviewed by the applicants. 9. Upon perusal of what is stated in paragraph-7 of the judgment dated 28/4/2008, I find that learned Counsel for the non-applicants is right. For the sake of convenience, the relevant portion of paragraph-7 is reproduced as under. : "7. The appeal was initially admitted by Mutalik, J. on the following substantial question of law. "Even though there is concurrent finding of facts given by both the courts below, taking into consideration the validity of so-called Wills in or about the years 1884 and 1904 and the previous litigation between the parties, Second appeal stands admitted." 10. It is obvious from the above statement that even though the appeal was stated to be admitted on the substantial question of law, the fact was that no substantial question of law was formulated in precise terms. This statement only reflected the reasons for admission of the second appeal, which were not further translated into a specific substantial question of law. This was a procedural defect, which appears to have been cured by this Court by framing in precise terms three more substantial questions of law, which have been reproduced in the later part of paragraph-7 of the said judgment. After having framed the additional substantial questions of law specifically and precisely, no need for making any reference to the statement recorded by this Court while admitting the second appeal remained there and, therefore, I do not find that there is any error apparent on the face of the record in not referring to and dealing with a statement of reasons termed as the first substantial question of law. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument of learned Counsel made in this regard. 11. Shri Joshi, learned Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the field, which has been described to be the suit property in the said judgment dated 28/4/2008, was field Survey No. 6/1 having area of about 29 acres situated at Mouza Dadapur, Tahsil Warora.
Therefore, I find no substance in the argument of learned Counsel made in this regard. 11. Shri Joshi, learned Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the field, which has been described to be the suit property in the said judgment dated 28/4/2008, was field Survey No. 6/1 having area of about 29 acres situated at Mouza Dadapur, Tahsil Warora. He further submitted that in the written statement, in paragraphs-12 and 13, the applicants had only admitted that Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh, jointly possessed field No.6 having area of 58.37 acres in occupancy rights. He further submits that this admission of a joint possession in occupancy rights of a field was in respect of field Kh.No. 6 area 58.37 acres and not in respect of the suit property bearing field Kh.No.6/1 having area of about 29 acres. But, he further submits, the learned Judge of this Court mistook this admission contained in the written statement for admission of the applicants about the joint ownership and possession of the suit property by Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh. He further submits that on the basis of such an erroneous assumption of fact, which was not in existence at all, the learned Judge of this Court recorded a finding that even according to the applicants, Ramnathsingh had half share in the suit property and with such an admission of title of Ramnathsingh, the title would naturally pass in favour of Bharatsingh, the grand son of Ramnathsingh. He further submits that it was for this reason only and nothing more that this Court confirmed the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below as regards ownership of the non-applicants in respect of the suit property. He argues that this is an error which is patently manifest on the face of the record and which has caused miscarriage of justice to the applicants. He submits that if this mistake is removed, whole basis of the findings recorded by this Court is taken off and the result would be recall of the judgment and rehearing of the appeal. 12.
He submits that if this mistake is removed, whole basis of the findings recorded by this Court is taken off and the result would be recall of the judgment and rehearing of the appeal. 12. On the other hand, Shri Badhe, learned Counsel for the non-applicants submits that the jurisdiction of this Court in reviewing the judgment is extremely limited and it is limited only to the errors apparent on the face of the record and that this Court cannot rehear the appeal only because another view is possible or the error is of such a nature as can be detected only through a long drawn process of reasoning. He submits that in the instant case, there is no such manifest error which can be detected simply by looking on the face of the record and therefore any reconsideration of the judgment sought to be reviewed now would virtually amount to sitting in appeal by this Court over the judgment delivered by the same Court, which is not permissible under the law. 13. On going through the judgment of this Court dated 28/4/2008, plaint, written statement and relevant part of the record of the trial Court, I do not find myself in agreement with the learned Counsel for the applicants and I am of the opinion that there is substance in the argument of learned Counsel for the non-applicants that this is not a case which falls within the parameters laid down for exercising review jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code by this Court. 14. In this case, the review power invoked by the applicants is under that part of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. which relates to judicial action which is manifestly incorrect. The rule stated in Order 47, Rule 1 is in two parts, first relating to acts attributable to the applicant, and second to jural actions patently erroneous. For convenience, it is reproduced thus - "1.
The rule stated in Order 47, Rule 1 is in two parts, first relating to acts attributable to the applicant, and second to jural actions patently erroneous. For convenience, it is reproduced thus - "1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved, (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order." 15. In the case of M. Shankaraoah & another Vs. State of Karnataka & others reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC page 596, referred to me by learned Counsel for the applicants, the principles governing the review power relating to judicial action have been stated in paragraphs-18 and 19 of the judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that, basic philosophy inherent in the review power is the universal acceptance of human fallibility and yet, in the realm of law, the Courts lean strongly in favour of finality of decisions legally and properly made. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that exceptions both statutorily and judicially nave been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. These exceptions are to be found when the order is passed under a mistake apparent on the face of record or upon assumption of some facts which in reality never exist and its continuation results in miscarriage of justice. The relevant observations appearing in paragraph-18 and are reproduced thus; "...
These exceptions are to be found when the order is passed under a mistake apparent on the face of record or upon assumption of some facts which in reality never exist and its continuation results in miscarriage of justice. The relevant observations appearing in paragraph-18 and are reproduced thus; "... If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error... " 16. Same principles have been reiterated with further clarifications in subsequent cases referred to me by learned Counsel for the non-applicants. These cases are; (1) Devaraju Pillai vs. Seliayya Pillai AIR 1987 SC 116 . (2) Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury - AIR 1995 SC 455 . (3) Parsion Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi- 1997 (8) SCC 715 . (4) M. Ahammedkutty Haji Vs. Tahsildar, Kozhikode - AIR 2005 SC 1967 . (5) Haridas Das Vs. Usha Rani Banik - AIR 2006 SC 1634 : [2007 ALL SCR 2065]. (6) T. Thimmaiah (D) by L.Rs. Vs. Venkatachala Raju (D) By L.Rs. AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1993 : [2008 ALL SCR 1823]. (7) Inderchand Jain (D) Through L.Rs. Vs. Motilal (D) Through L.Rs. AIR 2009 SCW 5364 : [2010 ALL SCR 345]. Brief summary of the principles laid down in these cases could be made as follows : A) For the Court to exercise its review jurisdiction, mistake should be apparent on the face of the record and not the one which is not as evident and which requires detection by process of reasoning. B) If the order is passed upon assessment of a fact which in reality never existed and the continuation of such an order has resulted in miscarriage of justice, review of the judgment is in order. C) It is not permissible to review a judgment or order passed earlier merely because the reviewing Court takes a different view on construction of the document. D) While exercising review power, the reviewing Court does not sit in judgment over the decision of the Court deciding the case earlier. 17.
C) It is not permissible to review a judgment or order passed earlier merely because the reviewing Court takes a different view on construction of the document. D) While exercising review power, the reviewing Court does not sit in judgment over the decision of the Court deciding the case earlier. 17. Now, keeping in mind these well settled principles governing the exercise of review powers under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C., it has to be seen as to whether any mistake of fact apparent on the face of the record has been committed by the Court earlier and whether or not it has resulted in miscarriage of justice. It must be noted here that to review a judgment, it is not merely detection of manifest or patent error apparent on the face of record which is sufficient, but it is also necessary that such an error must have caused miscarriage of justice to the party seeking review of the earlier decision. 18. On going through the judgment sought to be reviewed, it can be seen that this Court mainly relied upon the admission given by the applicants in their written statement as regards the title of Ramnathsingh in respect of the suit property and keeping this admission in mind, this Court recorded a finding that since Ramnathsingh had a title in respect of the suit property, it would naturally pass over to Bharatsingh, he being the grandson of Ramnathsingh. Relevant admissions of the applicants as appearing in their written statement have been considered by this Court in paragraph-17 of the said judgment. Consideration of these admissions appears in the following terms : "...The defendants have pleaded in para 11 of the written statement that the suit property belonged to Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh jointly. It is pleaded that Hanumansingh had half share in the suit field. Naturally even, according to defendant, Ramnathsingh had half share in the suit property...". 19. The admissions given by the applicants were not in paragraph-11 but in paragraphs -12 and 13 of the written statement and these admissions were not in respect of the suit property, but in respect of field bearing Kh.No.6 having area of 58.37 acres.
Naturally even, according to defendant, Ramnathsingh had half share in the suit property...". 19. The admissions given by the applicants were not in paragraph-11 but in paragraphs -12 and 13 of the written statement and these admissions were not in respect of the suit property, but in respect of field bearing Kh.No.6 having area of 58.37 acres. There is no dispute about the fact that the suit property bearing No.6/1 is a part of the larger field bearing Kh.No.6 having area of 58.37 acres and the area of the suit property admittedly is of about 29 acres, which is half of the larger field bearing Kh. No.6. The admissions appearing in paragraphs-12 and 13 of the written statement un-mistakenly point out that the applicants admitted the fact that Ramnathsingh had half interest in the larger field bearing Kh. No.6. This Court did consider the said admission, but while expressing itself on that aspect of the dispute between the parties, this Court stated that the half share of Ramnathsingh was admittedly in the "suit property". Actually, it should have been in respect of the field bearing Kh. No.6 and not the suit property bearing Kh. No.6/1. This is a patent mistake committed by this Court and as rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the applicants, it is ascertainable by merely looking on the face of the record. 20. No doubt, while considering the admissions of the applicants, this Court should have stated that Ramnathsingh had half share in the field bearing Kh. No.6 and not in the "suit property". But, it appears that this mistake has occurred inadvertently and has had no bearing on the final conclusion reached by this Court, for, what has been ultimately found by this Court is the ownership and title of Ramnathsingh only in respect of the suit property ad-measuring about 29 acres and not in respect of the entire field bearing Kh. No.6. This would mean there is no miscarriage of justice in this case. 21. For exercising review power, as can be seen from principles of law stated earlier, two conditions must be fulfilled namely (1) the mistake should be apparent on the face of the record, and (2) it should result in miscarriage of justice. Attainment of both of these conditions is essential for reviewing a decision passed earlier by the same Court.
21. For exercising review power, as can be seen from principles of law stated earlier, two conditions must be fulfilled namely (1) the mistake should be apparent on the face of the record, and (2) it should result in miscarriage of justice. Attainment of both of these conditions is essential for reviewing a decision passed earlier by the same Court. If only one of these two conditions is fulfilled, the Court will not have any jurisdiction to review its own judgment. 22. In the instant case, while the first condition of error apparent on the face of the record has been fulfilled, the second condition regarding miscarriage of justice has not been. The finding finally recorded by this Court as stated earlier, is that Ramnathsingh had a title in the suit property ad-measuring 29 acres only. This Court has not found that he had a title in the larger field bearing Kh. No.6 admeasuring 58.37 acres. This finding is consistent with the admissions given by the applicants and as are found in paragraph-12 of the written statement, wherein the applicants have specifically admitted that Ramnathsingh had half an interest in the field bearing Kh. No.6 having area of about 58.37 acres. The finding as regards ownership of the non-applicants through Bharatsingh is only in respect of this half interest of Ramnathsingh in larger field Kh. No.6. If this Court, upon erroneous assumption of the facts not in existence, had recorded a finding that Ramnathsingh had a title in respect of the entire field bearing Kh. No.6, then, it could have been said that injustice was caused to the applicants. But, that is not the case here. It was only due to inadvertence that this Court mentioned about the admissions appearing in the written statement of the applicants as relating to the suit property, in stead of larger field bearing Kh. No.6. This mistake, however, ultimately, has not been continued by this Court in reaching a conclusion about the title of Ramnathsingh in respect of the suit property, which was half of field Kh. No.6. Therefore, I find no merit in the argument of learned Counsel for the applicants that this is a fit case for review of the judgment delivered on 28/4/2008. 23.
No.6. Therefore, I find no merit in the argument of learned Counsel for the applicants that this is a fit case for review of the judgment delivered on 28/4/2008. 23. Learned Counsel for the applicants invited my attention to some of the admissions given by original applicant No.1 Ramdulari in the cross-examination taken on behalf of the non-applicants. In this cross-examination, some of the admissions in the nature of denials of pleading that the suit field was owned by Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh have appeared. It is on the basis of these admissions, learned Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the admissions given by the applicants about Ramnathsingh having half share in field Kh. No.6 were retracted and since there has been no reference made to these admissions in the nature of denial of the pleadings by this Court in the said judgment, it is yet another mistake apparent on the face of the record calling for review of the judgment. Learned Counsel for the non-applicants disagrees. He submits that this Court has considered the overall nature of pleadings and evidence on record and reached to a conclusion as regards ownership of Ramnathsingh in respect of tile suit property, which conclusion now cannot be reopened by a reviewing Court, as it would amount to sitting in appeal over the judgment of same Court. 24. Let us see what these admissions stated to be in the nature of denials of the pleadings are. They read thus; "It is not true that the suit field was owned by Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh. The contents to that extent in paras 12, 13 in my written statement (Exh.21) as marked A & B are false..." These statements of facts made by Ramdulari cannot be said to be retraction of her averments in the written statement that Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh jointly owned field bearing Kh.No.6 and that in this field, Ramnathsingh had half an interest. By the said statement of Ramdulari, what is denied is that the suit property involved in the suit, which was not the field Kh. No.6 but field No.6/1, was owned by Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh. The suit field or suit property never jointly belonged to both these brothers and as per the averments in the written statement, it has to be understood that the suit property representing half portion of field Kh. No.6 belonged to Ramnathsingh.
No.6 but field No.6/1, was owned by Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh. The suit field or suit property never jointly belonged to both these brothers and as per the averments in the written statement, it has to be understood that the suit property representing half portion of field Kh. No.6 belonged to Ramnathsingh. Therefore, the further statement of fact made by Ramdulari that the contents in paragraphs-12 and 13 in the written statement to the extent of joint ownership of Hanumansingh and Ramnathsingh in the suit property were false, cannot also be read as an act of resiling from her original stand. These admissions never really ran counter to the averments appearing in paragraph-12 or paragraph-13 of the written statement. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument of learned Counsel for the applicants in this regard. 25. Learned Counsel for the applicants has further argued that in the judgment under review, reliance has been placed upon entries in revenue record to give a finding about title, which is not permissible. In support, he places reliance upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of H.P. Vs. Keshav Ram & others (1996) 11 SCC 257 , which lays down that an entry in the revenue papers cannot form basis of declaration of title. While there is no dispute about this principle of law, there is no occasion for this Court to consider the same for it's application or otherwise in review jurisdiction. Doing so would amount to rehearing the appeal on merits, which is not permissible under this jurisdiction. 26. Learned Counsel for the applicants has further submitted that it is well settled law that merely on the basis of admissions, title cannot be held to be established. In support, he refers to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Purushotam Dass Tandon & another reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 720. With due respect, it must be stated here that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has not laid down as a preposition of law that in all cases clear and unambiguous admissions cannot be used as reliable pieces of evidence to record a finding about title of a person.
With due respect, it must be stated here that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has not laid down as a preposition of law that in all cases clear and unambiguous admissions cannot be used as reliable pieces of evidence to record a finding about title of a person. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the admissions before being relied upon must be unambiguous and must not be vague and if there is any ambiguity or vagueness, then, it is obligatory upon the party relying upon them to put them to a witness before they can be used. Therefore, I find no substance in the argument that admissions can never be used to record a finding about title. That apart, this is not something which can be considered by a Court in exercise of review jurisdiction. This is a matter of merits and therefore would have to be considered by the appropriate Court in appeal. 27. In the result, I find that review application cannot be allowed. The point is answered accordingly. I. The review application stands dismissed. II. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. III. At this stage, learned Counsel for the applicants has prayed for continuation of the interim stay to the effect and operation of the decrees passed by the courts below for a period of eight weeks to enable the applicants to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter. IV. The request has been strongly opposed by learned Counsel for the non-applicants on the ground that the applicants have been deprived of by the possession for a very long period of time and that this would result in keeping them out of the possession for a more period of time, even though they have succeeded in securing the relief. V. Considering the fact that interim stay was already in operation, I do not think that continuation of the same for some more period of time would really cause any prejudice to the rights of the non-applicants. Therefore, it would be in the interest of justice that the prayer so made is granted and accordingly interim stay is continued for a further period of eight weeks from the date of the order. Application dismissed.