JUDGMENT : Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. - The petitioner-Management, being the first party member in the Court below, has filed this petition assailing the order dated 31.3.2013 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar upon a reference made under sub-section (4) of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which has been registered as I.D. Case No. 12 of 2000 holding, inter alia, that the termination of the opposite party workman, 2nd party member, in the guise of superannuation with effect from 1.2.1995 is bad in law and accordingly, he is entitled to all the consequential benefits. The fact of the case in hand, is that, the opposite party-workman while working as Koyal-cum-Mate at Danpur Departmental Purchase Centre of the petitioner-Management was asked by letter dated 11.7.1991 followed by a reminder dated 10.9.1992, to furnish the particulars relating to himself and his family members in the prescribed form in terms of the circular dated 27.6.1991 issued by the head of office of the petitioner-Management since the opposite party-workman at the time of initial engagement or at the time thereafter had not submitted any certificate regarding his age or date of birth. Accordingly, the opposite party-workman submitted a declaration on 27.9.1992 along with affidavit dated 22.10.1992 declaring his date of birth as 11.2.1949. While the age of the first son was shown as 22 years in the said declaration, the age of the second son, who was then working under the petitioner-Management, was not furnished. According to the Matriculation Certificate, the date of birth of the second son of the opposite party-workman, namely, Amarketan Swain was mentioned as 19.11.1962. By Office order dated 20.12.1994 opposite party-workman was intimated that his service would be discontinued with effect from 31.1.1995 as he had crossed 58 years of age. While offering ex-gratia payment at the rate of 15 days wages for every completed year of continuous service, opposite party-workman was also given opportunity to make an appeal and to avail the opportunity of being examined by a Medical Board for determination of his age. In response to the same, opposite party-workman preferred an appeal on 23.12.1994 expressing his inability to produce any certificate from the school showing his date of birth on the plea that old records are not available in the school. In response to the same, opposite party-workman preferred an appeal on 23.12.1994 expressing his inability to produce any certificate from the school showing his date of birth on the plea that old records are not available in the school. Therefore, the petitioner-Management had to stick to its earlier decision by which the services of the opposite party-workman were terminated on 31.1.1995. On 20.1.1995 the opposite party-workman for the first time produced the certificate purported to have been issued by the school authorities indicating his date of birth as 29.5.1941. Since the opposite party-workman had furnished contradictory statement relating to his date of birth, the petitioner-Management gave another opportunity to produce the certificate in proper form along with declaration showing his name and date of birth and particulars of his children. Considering the above mentioned facts, petitioner-Management by office order dated 20.12.1994 terminated the services of the opposite party-workman with effect from 31.1.1995 in the guise of superannuation. Challenging the said office order dated 20.12.1994 superannuating him with effect from 31.1.1995, the opposite party-workman approached this Court by filing O.J.C. No. 13169 of 1996. By order dated 15.7.1998 after hearing the parties this Court dismissed the said writ application. 2. Having failed in his attempt, the opposite party-workman lodged a complaint before the District Labour Officer, Kendrapara and on being noticed the petitioner gave its written reply on 15.12.1998 stating, inter alia, that Jute Corporation of India is not an industrial establishment or undertaking within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After consideration of the complaint made by the opposite party-workman, conciliation proceeding was initiated and the same having failed, the matter was referred by the appropriate Government under sub-section (4) of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Industrial Tribunal vide order No. 2426 dated 15.2.2000 of the Labour and Employment Department for adjudication as to Whether the alleged illegal termination of services of Sri Judhistira Swain, Koyal-cum-Mate in the guise of superannuation with effect from 1.2.1995 is legal and/or justified? If not to what relief Sri Swain is entitled to? 3. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar entertained the reference for adjudication by registering the same as I.D. Case No. 12 of 2000 and called upon the parties to furnish their reply. Accordingly, the parties adduced their oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their contentions for just and proper adjudication. 3. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar entertained the reference for adjudication by registering the same as I.D. Case No. 12 of 2000 and called upon the parties to furnish their reply. Accordingly, the parties adduced their oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their contentions for just and proper adjudication. That apart, both the parties were permitted to be represented through their lawyers. The 2nd party-workman, opposite party herein, took a plea that he had submitted his school leaving certificate and copies thereof on number of occasions, but some official who had issued acknowledgment receipt, kept the original with him and gave him 2nd page carbon copy and to substantiate such contention also no such receipt had been filed either before the Court below or before this Court in the earlier writ application. He stated that one K.N. Jena, Office Manager had taken his signature in a blank form and had himself filled up the family particulars in the said form and the said Office Manager has also been examined as witness on behalf of the petitioner-Management, who categorically denied such allegation. In order to substantiate such contention, the petitioner-Management also adduced documentary evidence to show that Sri Ratnakar Satpathy before whom the opposite party-workman had submitted his school leaving certificate in 1984 at the Regional Office was not at all working at the relevant point of time, rather he was working as Vizianagaram from 1983 to 1986 and he was relieved from Cuttack on 11.5.1983 and again joined at Cuttack on 10.5.1986. Without considering the materials available on record in proper prospective, oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned presiding officer, Industrial Tribunal passed the impugned order under Annexure-1 holding that the termination of the services of the opposite party-workman in the guise of superannuation with effect from 1.2.1995 is neither legal nor justified and observing that he is entitled to reinstatement in service till he attains the age of superannuation with all consequential benefits. Hence, this writ petition. 4. Mr. Hence, this writ petition. 4. Mr. S.K. Dash, learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that on 20.12.1994 the opposite party-workman was given an opportunity to submit an appeal or representation in respect of his grievance in the matter of proposed retirement with effect from 31.1.1995, but he submitted such representation only after his retirement was given effect to on 31.1.1995 by enclosing copy of the said affidavit dated 22.10.1992 and reiterating that hi;, date of birth is 11.2.1949. Apart from the same the opposite party-workman has not furnished any document certifying his date of birth available in the school where he was reading, but subsequently, when he came to know that he could not have become the father of the second child at the age of 13 years he manipulated the records and claimed that he was born on 29.5.1941, almost eight years before the date of birth furnished by him i.e. 11.12.1949 by furnishing school leaving certificate. With regard to the direction given by the learned Tribunal for reinstatement and payment of back wages, Mr. Dash, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. and Another Vs. Udai Narain Pandey, Allahabad Jal Sansthan Vs. Daya Shankar Rai and Another and Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another Vs. S.C. Sharma. wherein the Apex Court has settled the law that awarding of back wages is not automatic consequence of setting aside a retrenchment or termination He has also relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vs. K.P. Agrawal and Another, and referring to the same he urged that consequential benefits cannot be taken to include back wages 5. Mr. K.P. Agrawal and Another, and referring to the same he urged that consequential benefits cannot be taken to include back wages 5. Mr. RC Sahoo, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party strenuously urged that in the guise of superannuation, the petitioner has been terminated from service Therefore, he is entitled to get reinstatement and consequential service benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, it is stated that the opposite party-workman was working as a Koyal-cum-Mate under the petitioner-Management on 5.9.1976 and was posted in Danapur Departmental Purchase Centre After 25 days of service the petitioner-Management directed him to produce school leaving certificate for the purpose of making entry in his service roll and accordingly he submitted the original school leaving certificate which has been duly acknowledged by the management He further submitted that after rendering 16 years of service when he was called upon again by the management to produce the school leaving certificate, he approached the Headmaster of School, who declined to issue such duplicate school leaving certificate Therefore, he submitted an affidavit on 22.10.1992 declaring his date of birth as "11.12.1949" as per the direction of the management As it did not satisfy the management, again he approached the Headmaster of the School Subsequently duplicate school leaving certificate had been submitted before the Management along with affidavit on 20.1.1995 wherein his date of birth has been recorded as 29.5.1941 In spite of production of such document, the management terminated the services of the opposite party-workman with effect from 31.1.1995, which was assailed before this Court in O J C No. 13169 of 1996, but the same was dismissed with liberty to the opposite party-workman to seek-relief in appropriate Court of law Therefore, he had approached the Industrial Forum under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act After due adjudication, the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal on the basis of the materials available on record and on perusing the evidence adduced by the parties has come to a definite finding that the opposite party-workman was all along in the employment of the petitioner-Management for the period from 5.9.1976 to 1.2.1995 when his services were terminated in the guise of superannuation and it is the admitted position that no enquiry was conducted against the workman for his lapses Ext 4, the office order dated 20.12.1994 is a vital piece of evidence and clause-4 thereof states that the services of such casuals shall remain discontinued till determination of their age by the Medical Board If the decision of the Medical Board goes in favour of the casual, then their services shall be deemed to have continued from the date of discontinuation up to the age of 58 years as determined by the Medical Board Admittedly no medical test was conducted by the petitioner Management to determine the age of the opposite party-workman, from which the management could have inferred the age of the workman 6. So far as date of birth of his 2nd son vis-?-vis the opposite party-workman is concerned, if the date of birth recorded in the school leaving certificate of the opposite party-workman is taken into consideration, it may not be in conflict with the date of birth of his son rather by the time his second son was born, there was age difference of 21 years if the date of birth is taken into consideration as 29.5.1941. Be that as it may, evidence to that extent has not been led before the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, rather for the first time such document has been produced before this Court to draw such conclusion. The reliance placed on the judgments mentioned supra, it is stated that awarding Of back wages is not an automatic consequence of setting aside retrenchment or termination. The proposition of law advanced by Mr. Dash, learned Counsel for the petitioner remains no more res integra, rather the same governs the field and the same is the settled principle of law laid down by the Apex Court and there is no dispute on the said score. However the said judgments may not apply to the Case in hand in view of the fact that it is not because of a disciplinary proceeding of any misdeed, the workman has faced termination, rather the only dispute is with regard to his date of birth. Such action has been taken though the school leaving certificate produced by the opposite party-workman indicates that his date of birth is 29.5.1941. If such date of birth is taken into consideration; the superannuation of the workman with effect from 31.1.1995 amounts to termination of service Without assigning reasons thereby. More so, once the petitioner-Management has expressed its opinion to refer the opposite party-workman to the Medical Board, without causing any proper enquiry and giving opportunity to the Opposite party workman, drastic action of termination in the guise of superannuation prematurely with effect from 31.1.1995 is unwarranted, thereby the opposite party-workman has been prevented from discharging his duties though there is no allegation of any irregularity committed by him in the course of his employment. In U.P. State Brassware Corporation. In U.P. State Brassware Corporation. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has held as follows; The Industrial Disputes Act was principally established for the purpose of pre-empting industrial tensions, providing the mechanics of dispute resolutions and setting up the necessary infrastructure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counterproductive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of goodwill. The Industrial Courts while adjudicating on disputes between the management and the workmen, therefore, must take such decisions which would be in consonance with the purpose the law seeks to achieve. When justice is the buzzword in the matter of adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, it would be wholly improper on the part of the superior Courts to make them apply the cold letter of the statutes to act mechanically. Rendition of justice would bring within its purview giving a person what is due to him and not what can be given to him in law. 7. On the basis of the document in Ext. 8, the transfer certificate, and Ext. 11, the admission register, and Ext. 12, the copy of the counter foil of the transfer certificate, learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal is justified in holding that the termination of services of the workman in the guise of superannuation is neither legal nor justified and allowing the consequential service benefits to the opposite party-workman. 8. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court finds that the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal has not committed any illegality or irregularity in holding that the termination of the services of the opposite party-workman in the guise of superannuation with effect from 31.1.1995 is neither legal nor justified. Therefore, he is entitled to get reinstatement in service till he attains the age of superannuation and all consequential benefits. 9. So far as "consequential benefits" is concerned, much reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in J.K. Synthetics (supra), the relevant portion of which is quoted below: There is also a misconception that whenever reinstatement is directed, "continuity of service" and "consequential benefits" should follow, as a matter of course. 9. So far as "consequential benefits" is concerned, much reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in J.K. Synthetics (supra), the relevant portion of which is quoted below: There is also a misconception that whenever reinstatement is directed, "continuity of service" and "consequential benefits" should follow, as a matter of course. The disastrous effect of granting several promotions as a "consequential benefit" to a person who has not worked for 10 to 15 years and who does not have the benefit of necessary experience for discharging the higher duties and functions of promotional posts, is seldom visualized while granting consequential benefits automatically. Whenever Courts or tribunals direct reinstatement, they should apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances to decide whether "continuity of service" and/or "consequential benefits" should also be directed. Coming back to back wages, even if the Court finds it necessary to award back wages, the question will be whether back wages should be awarded fully or only partially (and if so the percentage). That depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In view of the above, "consequential benefit" to a person does not mean only back wages. It includes much more things beyond back wages, such as promotion, fixation of seniority and grant of financial benefits admissible to the post etc. Therefore, if the termination of the opposite party-workman in the guise superannuation has been declared as illegal and unjustified, then the opposite party-workman is entitled to get all the consequential service benefits admissible to the post. Back wages may be one facet of getting monetary benefits, but that is not the conclusive one. On the other hand, service benefit, which would have accrued to him had he continued in service cannot be denied by the petitioner-Management. Apart from the same, at best, the petitioner-Management may contend that since the opposite party-workmen has not rendered service for the period for which he was not in employment, he may not be entitled to get back wages. The said fallacy is not justified in view of the fact that it is the illegal and arbitrary action of the authorities for which the poor workman was out of employment on the plea of discrepancy in the date of birth. Had it been the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding and a punitive measure, then in that case consideration would have been different. Had it been the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding and a punitive measure, then in that case consideration would have been different. But in the present case, because of the lapses on the part of the petitioner-Management, the opposite party-workman was out of employment and was deprived of discharging his duties. That ipso facto does not disentitle him to get the legitimate claim admissible to the post. Therefore, the writ application so filed challenging the award passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal merits no consideration. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed and the award is confirmed. Final Result : Dismissed