Judgment : This petition is filed under section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C.No.11 of 2008 on the file of the Special Judge for SPE & ACB cases, Vijayawada. The factual matrix leading to filing of the present petition, briefly, is as follows: In the month of March, 1999, the petitioner was working as Assistant Engineer in Vijayawada Municipal Corporation. On 16.03.1999, the ACB officials registered a case in Cr.No.11/RCA-ACB-VGT/00 under Section 13 (2) r/w 13 (e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act’) against the petitioner. On 17.03.1999 the ACB officials conducted search on the residential premises of the petitioner and his relatives and found the petitioner in possession of disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs.4,39,106-88 ps to his known sources of income. The Government of Andhra Pradesh in Memo No.2268/Vig.I(2)/2001-10 MA dated 26.11.2007 accorded permission for prosecution of the petitioner. After completion of investigation, the investigating officer laid charge sheet against the petitioner under Section 13 (2) r/w 13 (e) of the Act on 29.02.2008. The Special Court, after satisfying itself with the material available on record, has taken cognizance of offence under Section 13 (2) r/w 13 (e) of the Act against the petitioner and numbered the charge sheet as C.C.No.11 of 2008. The petitioner filed Crl.M.P.No.413 of 2009 under Section 227 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court for discharge. However, the said petition was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed Crl.R.C.No.1055 of 2010 before this Court. On 23.08.2010 the said revision case was dismissed as withdrawn giving liberty to the petitioner to avail other remedies available to him under law. The contention of Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, the leaned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner is three fold. I) The trial Court has taken cognizance of the offence without taking into consideration the Memo No.700/SC.D/88-4, Genl. Administration (SC.D) Dept, dated 13.02.1989. II) This Court, while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., can take into consideration the Memos issued by the State Government in order to decide the prima facie case; and III) continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would certainly amount to abuse of process of Court as the alleged disproportionate assets found in possession of the petitioner is 19.48% of total assets which is within the permissible limit as per the Memo dated 13.02.1989. Per contra, Si B. Thimmareddy, the learned standing counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for ACB cases submitted that the Memos issued by the State Government have no legal sanctity and they are not binding on the department. Before going into the merits of the rival contentions, it is apposite to refer to the case law cited by both the counsel. The learned Senior Counsel Sri T. Niranjan Reddy relied on the following decisions: i. Seeta Hemchandra Shashittal and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2001) 4 SCC 525 ). As per the principle enunciated in this case, if the allegations made in the complaint prima facie do not satisfy the ingredients of Sectin 13 (2) of the Act, the Court can quash the proceedings by exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. ii. Rajiv Thapar and Others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 ) wherein the Hon’ble apex Court held at para No.30 as follows: 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- 30.1 Step one: Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising (therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. iii. Prashant Bharti Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) ( (2013) 9 SCC 293 ). In this case, the principle laid down by the Hon’ble apex Court in Rajiv Thapper case was reiterated. iv. C.K. Jaffer Sharief Vs. State (Through CBI) (2013) 1 SCC 205 ) wherein the Hon’ble apex Court held at para Nos.17 and 18 as follows: 17. ………..That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under section 13(1)(d) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant. A similar view has also been expressed by this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar vs. State of Kerala[1] while considering the provisions of section 5 of Act of 1947. If the totality of the materials on record indicate the above position, we do not find any reason to allow the prosecution to continue against the appellant. Such continuance, in our view, would be an abuse of the process of court and therefore it will be the plain duty of the court to interdict the same. 18. For the aforesaid reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order dated 11.04.2012 of the High Court and the order dated 27.01.2010 of the learned trial court and quash the proceedings registered against the accused-appellant. In reply, Si B. Thimmareddy, the learned standing counsel has drawn my attention to the following decisions: i. State of Bihar Vs. For the aforesaid reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order dated 11.04.2012 of the High Court and the order dated 27.01.2010 of the learned trial court and quash the proceedings registered against the accused-appellant. In reply, Si B. Thimmareddy, the learned standing counsel has drawn my attention to the following decisions: i. State of Bihar Vs. Rajendra Agrawalla (1996) 8 SCC 164 ) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “The inherent power of the court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the court, if such power is not exercised. So far as the order of cognizance by a Magistrate is concerned, the inherent power can be exercised when the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint together with the other materials collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged. At that stage it is not open for the court either to shift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out.” ii. State of M.P. Vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta and others (2004) 1 SCC 691 ) wherein the Hon’ble apex Court held that: “………..The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under Section 482 of the Code, which cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. When the factual position of the case at hand is considered in the light of principles of law highlighted, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in quashing the investigation and proceedings……..” Reverting to the facts of the case, as per the allegations made in the charge sheet, during the check period, the total income of the petitioner was arrived at Rs.22,53,551-82 ps. During the relevant period the expenditure comes to Rs.12,96,073-70 ps. The savings of the accused officer comes to Rs.9,57,463/-. (Rs.22,53,551-82 ps. - Rs.12,96,073-70 ps.). As per the allegations made in the charge sheet, the petitioner was found in possession of assets worth Rs.13,96,575/-. Therefore, the disproportionate assets come to Rs.4,39,106-88 ps. (Rs.13,96,575/--Rs.9,57,463/-) If a mathematical calculation is applied, the percentage of disproportionate assets would come to 19.48% of total assets. The savings of the accused officer comes to Rs.9,57,463/-. (Rs.22,53,551-82 ps. - Rs.12,96,073-70 ps.). As per the allegations made in the charge sheet, the petitioner was found in possession of assets worth Rs.13,96,575/-. Therefore, the disproportionate assets come to Rs.4,39,106-88 ps. (Rs.13,96,575/--Rs.9,57,463/-) If a mathematical calculation is applied, the percentage of disproportionate assets would come to 19.48% of total assets. 10% of the disproportionate assets comes to Rs.2,19,553/-. The percentage of disproportionate assets will be decided taking into consideration the total known sources of income of the Government servant. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether this Court can quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner by placing reliance on the Memos issued by the State Government by exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued Memo No.700/SC.D/88-4, Genl. Administration (SC.D) Dept, dated 13.02.1989. Clause IV of the said Memo reads as under: “In deciding whether a case of disproportionate assets is fit for prosecution or not, the Anti-Corruption Bureau must take into account the tenure of the service of the accused Government servant, his general reputation, his habits and style of living and the extent of disproportion and other facts and circumstances of the case. Considering the fact that it is not possible for a Government servant to prove his defence with mathematical exactitude, it is desirable to take a liberal view of the excess of the assets over the receipts of the known sources of income and a reasonable margin upto 20% of the total income of the Accused Government Servant may be allowed, while computing the disproportionate assets, after taking the above mentioned factors into consideration.” (underlined by me) Again the State Government issued another Memo No.368/Spl. B/2002-1 Genl. Admn. (Spl. B) Dept., dated 28.02.2003. The relevant portion of the said Memo reads as follows: “In the reference 6th cited, the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad has informed that the order of 20% margin is not in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court I Krishnanand Agnihotri Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and the Supreme Court of India, in subsequent judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others. The Supreme Court held that it would be inappropriate, indeed undesirable, to extend the principle of deduction beyond 10% in calculating Disproportionate Assets of a delinquent officer for prosecution. State of Madhya Pradesh and the Supreme Court of India, in subsequent judgment in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others. The Supreme Court held that it would be inappropriate, indeed undesirable, to extend the principle of deduction beyond 10% in calculating Disproportionate Assets of a delinquent officer for prosecution. Therefore, he has stated that instructions issued in the reference 1st and 2nd cited, needs to be reviewed with respect to margin for deciding on prosecution of the case and that in all cases of disproportionate assets even below 10% of margin needs to be placed at least for detailed enquiry either in TDP or Departmental Action and margin above 10% should be considered for prosecution.” (underlined by me) Again the State Government issued another Memo No.623/SPL.C/2008-2, dated 15.10.2008. The relevant portion of the said Memo reads as follows: “After detailed deliberations with the representatives of the Associations, the concerned Heads of Departments/Departments on the issues raised by the representatives of the Confederation, the Group of Ministers have submitted a report containing recommendations on the issues for consideration of the Government. The Government, after careful examination, have accepted the recommendation of the Group of Ministers, that while evaluating the disproportionate assets, the existing margin of 10% may be enhanced to 20%.” (underlined by me) From a perusal of the above Memos at a glimpse, it is manifest that the State Government issued the Memos for the benefit of the Government employees, who involved in ACB cases. The Government servant is entitled to the benefit of the said Memos in respect of disproportionate assets as given below: 20% margin from 13.2.1989 to 27.02.2003 10% margin from 28.2.2003 to 14.10.2008 20% margin from 15.10.2008 onwards. The learned senior counsel Sri T.Niranjan Reddy strenuously submitted that the petitioner is entitled to claim the benefit of the Memo, which was in force as on the date of the alleged offence. The FIR was registered on 16.03.1999 on which date the first Memo, dated 13.02.1989 was in existence. The State Government accorded permission for prosecution of the petitioner on 26.11.2007. As on the date of according permission i.e. 26.11.2007 and filing of the charge sheet i.e. 29.02.2008, the second memo was in existence. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the Court has to quash the proceedings extending the benefit, to the petitioner, covered under Memo dated 13.02.1989. As on the date of according permission i.e. 26.11.2007 and filing of the charge sheet i.e. 29.02.2008, the second memo was in existence. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the Court has to quash the proceedings extending the benefit, to the petitioner, covered under Memo dated 13.02.1989. The State Government accorded permission for prosecution of the petitioner by scrupulously following the procedure contemplated under Section 19 of the Act and also keeping in mind the 2nd memo referred supra. It is a settled principle of law that the State Government may issue administrative or executive instructions by way of Memos and G.Os in pursuance of the power conferred on it under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It is needless to say that Memos or G.Os issued by the State Government must be in consonance with the provisions of the Act. The Government cannot, however, supersede the statutory provisions by way of administrative instructions. No instructions can be issued or be read contrary to the statutory provisions in force. In the instant case, the criminal proceedings are initiated against the petitioner under Section 13 (2) r/w 13 (e) of the Act. It is not mentioned in these Memos that the instructions have been issued by exercising power under a specific provision of the Act. Utmost the Memos may be treated as guidelines for ACB officials, without any statutory force. The Parliament enacted Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by repealing the Act II of 1947. Even assuming without conceding that the State Government has power to make necessary Rules under the Act, but under any circumstances those Rules should not run contrary to the provisions of the Act. In order to fortify my view, I am placing reliance on M. Krishna Reddy Vs. State Deputy Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad ( AIR 1993 SC 313 ) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “23. In addition, Mr. Rao fervently pleaded that the appellant is entitled for the benefit of the Government Memo No.700/SC D/88-4 dated 13.2.89 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh giving certain guidelines to the Anti Corruption Bureau to give allowance of a reasonable margin of 20% on the total income of a Government servant while computing disproportionate assets. In addition, Mr. Rao fervently pleaded that the appellant is entitled for the benefit of the Government Memo No.700/SC D/88-4 dated 13.2.89 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh giving certain guidelines to the Anti Corruption Bureau to give allowance of a reasonable margin of 20% on the total income of a Government servant while computing disproportionate assets. In support of his plea he had placed reliance on the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh rendered in Criminal Appeal No.450 of 1989.5. Thiremolaiah v. State of A.P. Inspector of Police II A.C. B. Karnool Range, Karnool in which the learned Judge has given the benefit of this Government Memo to the appellant therein though the appellant in that case was prosecuted in the year 1983, that is 6 years before the issue of this Memo as in the case on hand. The Government Memo relied on by the learned Counsel is only a guideline for the anti corruption Bureau in computing disproportionate assets of a Government servant. Be that as it may, we do not like to express any opinion on the applicability of the Government Memo by laying down any proposition of law based upon it……..” In view of the observations made by the Hon’ble apex Court in the above case, while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the Court should not express any opinion with regard to the legality of these Memos. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in State of Andhra Pradesh, the Courts are considering 10% margin of disproportionate assets while deciding the cases under the Act. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to ratio laid down in Krishnanand Agnihotri Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1977 SC 796 ). The Hon’ble apex Court at para No.33 held as follows: “33. It will, therefore, be seen that as against an aggregate surplus income of Rupees 44,383.59 which was available to the appellant during the period in question, the appellant possessed total assets worth Rupees 55,732.25. The assets possessed by the appellant were thus in excess of the surplus income available to him. but since the excess is comparatively small - it is less than ten per cent of the total income of Rs. The assets possessed by the appellant were thus in excess of the surplus income available to him. but since the excess is comparatively small - it is less than ten per cent of the total income of Rs. 1,27,715.43 - we do not think it would be right to hold that the assets found in the possession of the appellant were disproportionate to his known sources of income so as to justify the raising of the presumption under Sub-section (3) of Section 5. We are of the view that, on the facts of the present case the High Court as well as the Special Judge were in error in raising the presumption contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 5 and convicting the appellant on the basis of such presumption.” As per the principle enunciated in the case cited supra, disproportionate assets to the tune of 10% is permissible. The learned standing counsel has drawn my attention to the ratio laid down in B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1996 SC 484 (1)) wherein the apex Court held as under: “It is true that a three-judge Bench of this Court in Krishanand's case (supra) held in para 33, that if the excess was comparatively small (it was less than 10% of the total income in that case), it would be right to hold that the assets found in the possession of the accused were not disproportionate to his known source of income raising the presumption under sub-section (3) of Section 5. It is to be remembered that the said principle was evolved by this Court to give benefit of doubt, due to inflationary trend in the appreciation of the value of the assets. The benefit thereof appears to be the maximum. The reason being that if the percentage begins to rise in each case, it gets extended till it reaches the level of incredulity to give the benefit of doubt. It would, therefore, be inappropriate, indeed undesirable, to extend the principle of deduction beyond 10% in calculating disproportionate assets of a delinquent officer.” As per the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra 10% margin is permissible that too after full fledged trial. It would, therefore, be inappropriate, indeed undesirable, to extend the principle of deduction beyond 10% in calculating disproportionate assets of a delinquent officer.” As per the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra 10% margin is permissible that too after full fledged trial. The apex Court rendered the above two decisions by interpreting the scope of Section 5(3) of Act 2/47, which reads as follows: “In any trial of an offence punishable under Sub-Section (2) the fact that the accused person or any other person on his behalf is in possession, for which the accused person cannot satisfactorily account, or pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income may be proved, and on such proof the Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused person is guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty and his conviction therefor shall not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely on such presumption.” There is no provision corresponding to Section 5(3) of the Old Act in the new Act, 1988. Under Clauses 1 and 2 of Section 20 of the new Act, 1988, the Court can draw a presumption in certain circumstances unless the contrary proved. Sub-Section 3 of Section 20 enables the Court to decline to draw a presumption in its opinion the gratification is so trivial. The Parliament in its wisdom incorporated Sub Section 3 of Section 20 to safeguard the interest of the public servant. Section 13 (1) (e) falls outside the purview of Section 20 of the new Act. The Hon’ble apex Court extended the benefit of 10% margin in case of disproportionate assets after full fledged trial only. For one reason or the other, the petitioner did not challenge the sanction order for not extending the benefit of 20% margin to him. The disproportionate assets shown in the charge sheet is only a prima facie figure. The possibility of variation of margin of disproportionate assets at the time of trial cannot be ruled out completely. This Court can quash the proceedings if the point involved or the questions raised are purely a question of law without any element of question of fact being involved. In the present case, the various questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are mixed questions of fact and law. This Court can quash the proceedings if the point involved or the questions raised are purely a question of law without any element of question of fact being involved. In the present case, the various questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are mixed questions of fact and law. Therefore, the same cannot be decided while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is a settled principle of law that the Court has to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C with great care, caution and circumspection that too in rarest of rare cases. The Court can quash the proceedings if the allegations made in the complaint or charge sheet do not constitute the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused. In the instant case, the allegations made in the complaint / charge sheet prima facie constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner under Section 13 (2) r/w 13 (e) of the Act. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the Memos has to be considered after full fledged trial and not at this stage. Even if criminal proceedings are allowed to be continued against the petitioner, certainly, it would not amount to abuse of process of Court. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble apex Court in M.Krishna Reddy, Krishnanand Agnihotri case and B.C. Chaturvedi case (7, 8 & 9 supra) whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Memo dated 28.02.2003 cannot be decided by this Court while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Viewed from any angle, this is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this point of time. For the foregoing discussion, I see no merit in this petition and accordingly this Criminal Petition is dismissed. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial of the case without being influenced by the observations of this Court, if any. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions if any pending in this Criminal Petition shall stand closed.