Judgment : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for respondent no.1 and learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent no.2. 2. The only point which arises for my determination is:- Whether the impugned order is so illegal and perverse as to call for interference? 3. This revision application challenges order dated 3.3.2011 passed by Ad-hoc District Judge-2, North Goa, Panaji, rejecting the application of the petitioner filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. 4. Respondent no.1, being owner of the suit property bearing survey no. 23/1-B, is developing the property by constructing a residential complex. This property is land locked and has access only through one road situated on its western boundary. Road passes through plot of land belonging to the petitioner. It is the contention of respondent no.1 that this road (hereinafter called as suit road) providing access to the suit property is in existence even before the property through which it passes was acquired by the State Government for the development of the industry in the State of Goa. Before obtaining necessary licence for construction, predecessor in title of respondent no.1 had obtained NOC from the petitioner for use of the suit road as an access for the suit property. Respondent no.1 contends that he has acquired an easement of necessity and also by grant in respect of the suit road. However, it was noticed by respondent no.1 that the petitioner commenced work of digging of trenches on the western boundary of the suit plot but in it's land in the last week of October, 2010 in order to construct masonary wall to enclose the boundary. At that time, it was assured that the suit road, which is 6 metres wide, providing access to the suit property, would be left open. However, later on with oblique motive and illegal intention, the petitioner dumped construction material on the suit road so as to block the access to the suit property. 5. Left with no option, Respondent no.1 filed a civil suit against the petitioner and respondent no. 2 seeking relief of declaration in respect of easement of necessity and easement by grant and also permanent injunction. Respondent no.1 also obtained leave of the Court under section 80 of the CPC for dispensing with the mandatory notice. 6. The suit was resisted by the petitioner. Preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the suit was raised. 2 seeking relief of declaration in respect of easement of necessity and easement by grant and also permanent injunction. Respondent no.1 also obtained leave of the Court under section 80 of the CPC for dispensing with the mandatory notice. 6. The suit was resisted by the petitioner. Preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the suit was raised. It was also contended that the suit was liable to be rejected as it was barred under the law in view of non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 52-A of the Goa Industrial Development Act, 1965( hereinafter called as “GID Act” for short). All the averments regarding the use of the suit road before acquisition of the property for the petitioner by the State Government and also easement of necessity and easement by grant were denied. It was submitted that the wall that was being constructed along the boundary towards western side of the suit property was on the property of the petitioner and was well within powers of the petitioner Goa Industrial Development Act, 1965(hereinafter called 'the GID Act”). 7. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner also filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC which was later on prosecuted as an application under Rule 11(d) of the CPC only. It was submitted that Section 52A of the GID Act required giving of two months prior notice before institution of the suit and since the suit challenged the acts done by the petitioner in pursuance or in execution of the GID Act, compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 52A was a necessity and as it was not done, the suit was barred by the law. 8. The application was resisted by respondent no.1 contending that when the Court dispensed with the notice under Section 80 of CPC, notice as contemplated under Section 52A was also impliedly waived by the Court. It was also stated that the obstruction of the suit access was done by the petitioner with malafide intention and there was no statement in the plaint which would make the suit to be barred by any law. 9. After hearing both the sides, learned Ad-hoc District judge dismissed the application filed under order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC on 3.3.2011. It is this order which is under challenge in the present Civil Revision Application. 10. 9. After hearing both the sides, learned Ad-hoc District judge dismissed the application filed under order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC on 3.3.2011. It is this order which is under challenge in the present Civil Revision Application. 10. It is seen from the impugned order that the learned Ad-hoc District Judge, while rejecting the application has given the reason that once notice was dispensed with in exercise of power under Section 80(2) of CPC, it could be presumed that Court has impliedly granted leave to institute the suit and that notice under Section 52A GID Act was also deemed to have been waived after the authority chose to contest the suit on merits. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under the law there is no deemed waiver as the provisions of Section 80 CPC are not analogus to provisions of section 52A of GID Act. In support, he places reliance upon the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of SyedAbdul Razzak Vs. Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs, reported in 2009(111) Bom LR 3609. 12. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 submits that the provisions of Section 80 CPC and Section 52A GID Act may not be comparable with each other and, therefore, there may not be any deemed waiver of the notice required under Section 52A, but, the fact remains that the conclusion reached by the Lower Court is neither perverse nor against the well settled principles of law and therefore, order of the Lower Court need not be interfered with. He submits that it is well settled law that while considering an application under Order 7, Rule 11(d), merits of the contention cannot be gone into and Court has to decide on the basis of the averments made in the plaint as to whether or not suit is barred by any law, which is what the lower Court has done. He places his reliance upon the cases of Devi Singh Vs. Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad, (1973)4 SCC 66 and Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 . 13. On going through the provisions of Section 52A of GID Act and Section 80 of CPC, what strikes ones mind is that the two Sections are neither comparable nor analogus to each other. Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad, (1973)4 SCC 66 and Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 . 13. On going through the provisions of Section 52A of GID Act and Section 80 of CPC, what strikes ones mind is that the two Sections are neither comparable nor analogus to each other. The notice under Section 80 is required when the suit is filed in respect of any act purporting to be done by the public officer in his official capacity. The expression “act purporting to be done” is important and it would take within its fold even those acts which may not be actually part of the powers or duties of the public Officer, but are so intimately connected with the duties of the public officer as cannot be separated from them. This is not so, in case of Section 52A of the GID Act. There is no use of the expression “purporting to be done” therein and what is used is expression “in pursuance or execution or intending execution of this Act”, which expression appears to be narrower in connotation from the former expression used in Section 80. In the latter expression, the act complained of must be such as is performed in execution of the powers, functions and duties under the GID Act or in accordance with the provisions of the GID Act or should be in respect of alleged neglect or default in putting into effect the execution of the Act. Thus, the act complained of should have direct nexus with the powers, functions and duties under the Act. This may not be so in case of the act contemplated under Section 80 CPC and it would be enough if the act, though not strictly within the four corners of the officials capacity, has been done in the course of discharge of official functions. That apart, there is no provision under Section 52 A similar to sub-section (2) of Section 80, conferring power upon the Court to grant leave to file a suit without serving of any notice as required under sub-section (1) of Section 80. 14. Once we find that Section 80 CPC and Section 52A GID Act bear no similarity with each other, there can be no question of applying the principle of deemed waiver of the notice required under Section 52 A of the GID Act. 14. Once we find that Section 80 CPC and Section 52A GID Act bear no similarity with each other, there can be no question of applying the principle of deemed waiver of the notice required under Section 52 A of the GID Act. In the case of Syed Abdul Razzak (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court dealing with a similar question regarding requirement of mandatory notice to institute a suit under Section 89 of the Wakf Act, 1995, held that there being no similarity and analogy between Section 89 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and Section 80 of CPC , there is no concept of deemed waiver of the notice under Section 89 of the Wakf Act and same cannot be imported thereunder. The view so taken commends to me. 15. Learned Additional District Judge, has, therefore, incorrectly found that the notice under Section 52 A has been deemed to be waived in the facts and circumstances of the case. He is not also right when he says that once the authority i.e the petitioner has contested the suit on merits, it could not complain later on of non-service of notice under Section 52 A as petitioner would be deemed to have waived the notice. Requirement of Section 52 A, one need not say are mandatory, which is clear from its language. The Section places an embargo upon institution of the suit until the expiration of the period of two months next after notice in writing has been given to the corporation. The Section begins with the words “No suit shall lie against the corporation or against committee.......” and use of the word “shall” is sufficiently indicative of imperative nature of this Section. The Section also admits of no exceptional situation as it does not contain provision, unlike the one under sub-section (2) of Section 80 C.P.C., for dispensing with the notice. Therefore, learned District Judge fell in error in stating that there was deemed waiver of the requirement of Section 52 A of the GID Act. 16. The moot question, however, remains to be answered. Inspite of having given wrong reasons, whether the impugned order can be faulted with. It is well settled law that a rightly concluded order based upon wrong reasons cannot be upset or reversed only because the reasons are incorrect. 16. The moot question, however, remains to be answered. Inspite of having given wrong reasons, whether the impugned order can be faulted with. It is well settled law that a rightly concluded order based upon wrong reasons cannot be upset or reversed only because the reasons are incorrect. Therefore, it will have to be seen whether the statements made by the respondent no.1 in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute, show that the suit is barred by any law in force. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that upon bare perusal of the complaint itself it would become clear that the act complained of in the suit is something which is being done by the petitioner in pursuance of it's power to develop its own property in view of powers under Sections 30 to 34 of the GID Act and, therefore, from the statements made in the plaint itself, it would be clear that Section 52A notice is attracted and since it has not been given in this case, the suit is barred by law. 18. Learned counsel for respondent no.1, however, disagrees and submits that the averments in the plaint would show that the petitioner with malafide intentions is obstructing the suit road providing access to the suit property and the GID Act does not confer any power upon the petitioner to commit any act of illegality or in violation of the rights of the other party. He further submits that whether the petitioner has acted within it's powers or not is itself a disputed question which cannot be considered at the stage of deciding an application under Rule 11 (d) Order 7 of CPC. 19. From the law laid down in the cases of Popatand Kotecha Property (supra) and Devi Singh (supra), it is clear that while deciding an application under Rule 11(d) Order 7 CPC, Court cannot go beyond the averments made in the plaint and cannot decide the disputed questions of facts or law at that stage. In the instant case, the dispute between the parties is about illegally blocking the suit road providing access to the suit property. Respondent no.1 is claiming easement of necessity and easement by grant in respect of suit road and it is it's case that same is being denied to it. In the instant case, the dispute between the parties is about illegally blocking the suit road providing access to the suit property. Respondent no.1 is claiming easement of necessity and easement by grant in respect of suit road and it is it's case that same is being denied to it. On the other hand, it is the contention of the petitioner that what it is doing is on its own property and in exercise of it's powers and functions as provided under the various provisions of the GID Act. These rival contentions disclose that the question whether the acts complained of in the suit are within the scope and ambit of the provisions of the GID Act or beyond that is a disputed question, which cannot be resolved by mere reference to pleadings in the plaint. Such a dispute cannot be decided only by considering the averments made in the plaint. Therefore, I am of the view that merely on the basis of statements made in the plaint, it cannot be said that section 52A GID Act was applicable and its requirements ought to have been fulfilled before filing of the suit. The plaint, therefore, could not have been rejected under Rule 11(d) Order 7 of the CPC. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that respondent no.1 has no where made a statement in the plaint that the petitioner was not acting in pursuance of or in exercise of provisions of the GID Act and that would mean that it is presumed that the petitioner was acting in exercise of or in pursuance of the provisions of the said Act. I am not inclined to accept the argument. Even though such a statement is not made in the plaint, there are other statements made in the plaint, as for example, petitioner is acting with malafide intention or acting obliquely or obstructing enjoyment of easementary right and so on, which create a doubt about the petitioner acting in pursuance of or in exercise of provisions of the GID Act. 21. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that whether or not there is any specific averment as regards acting in violation of provisions of GID Act, Section 52A requirements being mandatory in nature, issuance of notice before institution of a suit is a condition precedent, and for this submission, he refers to me the case of SyedAbdul Razzak (supra) cited by him earlier. With due respect, I must say that I could not see any such proposition having been laid down in this case inasmuch as the language of Section 52 A being clear, compliance with its requirements would be necessary only when the act in respect of which the suit is instituted, is an act done in pursuance of or in exercise of provisions of the GID Act. 22. In view of the above, I find neither any illegality nor any perversity in the impugned order. It does not call for any interference. Point is answered accordingly. CRA, therefore, stands dismissed. 23. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.