Moodabidri Gurugala Basadi v. Anantaraja Indira (Adult), Panthya Village
2014-12-12
B.V.NAGARATHNA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. Petitioner has filed this civil petition in the year 2006 being aggrieved by the order dated 24.07.1981 passed by the V Land Tribunal, Karkala, in Case No. TRL.1702.8081. 2. The relevant facts of the case are that respondent No.1 had filed Form No.7 seeking grant of occupancy rights of land bearing Sy. No.53/4B measuring 64 Cents in Pranthya Village, Karkala Taluk, Dakshina Kannada District, on the enforcement of the amendments made to Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. Before the Tribunal, one B. Nagakumara Shetty and Charukeerthi Pandithacharyavarya Swami, administrator of Pashwarnathadevara Bhandara, were arrayed as respondents. The latter, which is a Mutt / Basadi is the petitioner in this civil petition. Before the Land tribunal, the Mutt / Basadi was represented by one Sri Bhaskar Bhat, who is since deceased. By order dated 24.07.1981, the land Tribunal granted occupancy rights in respect of 64 cents in Sy. No.53/4B. That order was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in W.P. No.21916/1982. After the constitution of the appellate authority, this Court transmitted the case to the appellate authority. In 1990, the appellate authority was abolished and 90 days time was granted to the appellants therein to seek transfer of the appeal to this Court by filing of a civil petition. The petitioner herein has filed this civil petition on 18.11.2006 i.e., after a period of sixteen years after the abolition of the appellate authority and application has been filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the civil petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Addl. Government Advocate, who appears for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and perused the material on record as well as the original records. 4. The facts narrated above are not at all in dispute. Admittedly, the civil petition is filed after a period of sixteen years after the abolition of the appellate authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken pains to convince the Court that the petitioner is a Mutt / Basadi and that one Bhaskar Bhat was looking after the affairs of the Mutt.
Admittedly, the civil petition is filed after a period of sixteen years after the abolition of the appellate authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken pains to convince the Court that the petitioner is a Mutt / Basadi and that one Bhaskar Bhat was looking after the affairs of the Mutt. He was also incharge of accounts and legal proceedings pertaining to the Mutt and that he died and thereafter, the present Swamiji took over as the head of the Mutt and the present Swamiji had no knowledge about the affairs of Mutt / Basadi much less about the pendency of the appeal before the appellate authority when he took over and also the requirement of filing of a civil petition before this Court so as to seek transmission of the appeal from the appellate authority to this Court and that the delay of 16 years in filing the civil petition is due to bona fide reasons, which may be condoned. That the petitioner has a good case on merits and therefore, due to ignorance and not having knowledge about the proceedings, the civil petition could not be filed at an earlier point of time. This was compounded by the fact that Bhaskar Bhat, who was incharge of the affairs of the Mutt / Basadi had died and therefore, the delay in filing the civil petition may be condoned. 5. Per contra, learned Addl. Government Advocate representing respondent Nos.2 and 3 has drawn my attention to the fact that Bhaskar Bhat had appeared before the Land Tribunal and he was well aware of the proceedings. It is not known as to when Bhaskar Bhat died. That not being aware of the legal proceedings cannot be a ground to condone the delay in filing the civil petition. As there is gross delay in filing the civil petition the matter cannot be entertained on merits. 6. I have considered these submissions in light of the material on record and also after perusing the original records. From the original records, it is noted that Bhaskar Bhat had appeared before the Land Tribunal, which passed the impugned order on 24.07.1981. In fact, steps were taken to file W.P. No. 21916/1982 before this Court and the matter was transmitted to the appellate authority. On the abolition of the appellate authority, steps have not been taken in time to file the civil petition.
In fact, steps were taken to file W.P. No. 21916/1982 before this Court and the matter was transmitted to the appellate authority. On the abolition of the appellate authority, steps have not been taken in time to file the civil petition. In fact, the Amendment Act, 1990 stipulated that the civil petition had to be filed within 90 days from the date of enforcement of the Amendment Act. That would have expired by the end of December 1990, but the civil petition has been filed on 18.11.2006. It is not known as to when Bhaskar Bhat passed away. Ignorance of the legal proceedings or about filing of the civil petition before this Court on the abolition of the appellate authority cannot be a sufficient cause in law so as to condone the delay in filing the civil petition. In fact, the oftquoted maxim ignorantia juris non excusat aptly applies to this case. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Therefore, whatever may be the merits of the matter or even if the petitioner has a good case on merits, if petitioner has not been able to cross the bridge on the point of delay and laches, petition cannot be entertained on merits. Therefore, civil petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches by placing reliance on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, which though are with regard to entertainment of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are nevertheless applicable to this civil petition also as ultimately, this civil petition had to be converted into a writ petition if the delay had not occurred and as the limitation period of 90 days prescribed for filing this civil petition had long expired in December 1990. 7. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: (a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in State of Orissa & Another vs. Mamata Mohanty, 2011 AIR SCW 1332 the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. (b) In the case of Shankar Coop Housing Society Ltd. vs. M. Prabhakar & Others, 2011 AIR SCW 3033, the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ Court in approaching the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows; “53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law.
(3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” (c) Similarly, the Apex Court in Sawaran Latha And Others vs. State of Haryana and Others, 2010(4) SCC 532 has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged. (d) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Others vs. D.R. Lakshmi & Others, (1996) 6 SCC 445 wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(d) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Others vs. D.R. Lakshmi & Others, (1996) 6 SCC 445 wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (e) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Another vs. Shah Hyder Beig & Others, (2002) 2 SCC 48, it has been opined thus: “The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” (f) In fact, in S.S. Balu and Others vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 2 SCC 479 , it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time. (g) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. vs. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao & Others, (2012) 12 SCC 797 . 8. The aforesaid decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. I.A.I/2006 is dismissed as the delay of sixteen years in filing this civil petition cannot be condoned. Consequently, CP.KLRA No.3/2006 stands dismissed.