Judgment 1. Delivery of judgment on this writ petition has been sufficiently delayed, but not without a cause. In course of hearing, my attention was drawn by Mr. Chakraborty, learned advocate for the respondents 9 to 12 (hereafter the private respondents) to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2012) 8 SCC 748 (Jainendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors.). A Division Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court considered 13 (thirteen) previous decisions, and expressed the view that the question of application of different yardsticks in the matter of grant of relief to candidates who have deliberately suppressed information at the time of recruitment ought to be dealt with by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. With that in view, the matter (a civil appeal) was referred for consideration by a larger Bench. The judgment on this writ petition was kept pending, awaiting a decision on the reference. However, to the best of my knowledge, the reference is yet to be decided. I, thus, propose to decide the writ petition considering the authorities that have been cited before me. 2. Pursuant to an advertisement published on July 14, 2006, the 5 (five) petitioners had offered their candidature for recruitment as anganwadi workers. They were not successful in securing offers of appointment. The private respondents, who had also offered their candidature, were selected and offered appointment. It is not in dispute that the private respondents are continuing to discharge the duties and functions of anganwadi workers for over half a decade. 3. Once the petitioners were not selected, they started making enquiries and in due course of time came to learn that the private respondents had been considered for selection and consequent appointment despite not being eligible in terms of the advertisement to offer their candidature for appointment as anganwadi workers. Seized with such information, the petitioners approached the official respondents to take appropriate action against the private respondents including termination of their services but no positive action yielded. Seized with such information, the petitioners approached the official respondents to take appropriate action against the private respondents including termination of their services but no positive action yielded. Alleging that the private respondents are the beneficiaries of a tainted selection process, which despite being brought to the notice of the official respondents failed to activate them to act in accordance with law, this writ petition was presented on April 3, 2013 seeking inter alia orders on the official respondents to cancel and/or rescind the panel prepared for recruitment of anganwadi workers, to terminate the services of the private respondents, and to recast the panel with the eligible candidates and to appoint the most suitable candidate therefrom. 4. An affidavit-in-opposition to the writ petition has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 8, i.e. the Child Development Project Officer of Budge Budge – II, ICDS Project (hereafter the CDPO). Apart from referring to the selection of the private respondents and non-selection of the petitioners pursuant to the advertisement dated July 14, 2006, it is the pleaded case that after receipt of complaints from the petitioners, various letters dated November 6, 2009, February 28, 2011 and March 24, 2011 were sent to the Principals of Budge Budge College and Maheshtala College to ascertain the actual educational qualifications of 10 (ten) candidates (including the private respondents) but no response was received. It is also pleaded that notices were issued to all the 10 (ten) candidates including the private respondents vide Memo dated October 3, 2009 calling upon them to submit documents disclosing their actual educational qualifications. Further notices dated April 7, 2011 were issued to all the 10 (ten) candidates including the private respondents requesting them to submit an affidavit in the enclosed format (to be affirmed before the executive magistrate) in regard to their actual educational qualifications and that despite receiving such notices together with a format of the affidavit, the private respondents did not respond. Further notices dated February 5, 2013 were issued to the private respondents calling upon them to submit the required affidavits within March 31, 2013, failing which it would be presumed that they had suppressed their educational qualifications and in such an event appropriate steps would be taken in accordance with law. Further notices dated February 5, 2013 were issued to the private respondents calling upon them to submit the required affidavits within March 31, 2013, failing which it would be presumed that they had suppressed their educational qualifications and in such an event appropriate steps would be taken in accordance with law. In paragraph 3(k), the deponent has referred to the private respondents declaring at the time of their appointments on plain paper to the effect that they were not graduates. It is claimed that the official respondents had no reason to doubt the declarations of the private respondents at the time of offering them appointments and they were considered therefor upon being found successful in the selection process. Referring to the fact that the selection was conducted in 2007 and that the writ petition presented before the Court in 2013, i.e. after a lapse of about 6 (six) years, the CDPO prayed for dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 5. The private respondents have also opposed the writ petition by filing an affidavit-in-opposition, affirmed by the respondent no.10. Referring to the fact that the petitioners came to learn of empanelment of the private respondents for appointment on the posts of anganwadi workers as far back as on October 24, 2007, it is pleaded that the petitioners instead of approaching the Court continued to send non-statutory representations which have been cited as justification for the unreasonable delay of 6 (six) years in presentation of the writ petition challenging the process of recruitment whereby the private respondents were appointed. Being lethargic, indolent and tardy litigants, it has been urged that the Court may not entertain the writ petition and grant relief to the petitioners. Without express reference to the law laid down by the Special Bench of this Court reported in 2010 (3) CLT (HC) 232 (Rina Dutta & ors. v. Anjali Mahato & ors.), it has been contended that possessing a qualification higher than what was advertised cannot debar or disqualify the private respondents from securing appointment under the official respondents. 6. In seeking to justify their belated approach, the petitioners have filed a supplementary affidavit wherein it has been pleaded that some of the petitioners are widows having no source of income of their own while a couple of them belong to the backward classes. 6. In seeking to justify their belated approach, the petitioners have filed a supplementary affidavit wherein it has been pleaded that some of the petitioners are widows having no source of income of their own while a couple of them belong to the backward classes. It is also pleaded that some of the petitioners together with their husbands are unemployed. Due to acute financial crisis, the petitioners did not have the resources to approach the Court earlier. It was only in the later part of March, 2013 that legal advice was sought whereupon the writ petition was presented on April 3, 2013 based on the advice that was received. 7. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Mr. Maji, learned advocate for the petitioners invited my attention to the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 and in particular to clause 2, being the relevant clause, stipulating the qualifications that the aspirants were required to possess. The special note to sub-clause (ka) thereto provided that candidates who were graduates or postgraduates would not be considered eligible for recruitment. According to him, the petitioners had exercised their right under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereafter the RTI Act) and had come to learn that all the private respondents were graduates and possibly by suppressing such qualification/fact, they had participated in the selection process whereupon they were selected and ultimately appointed. Referring to special note to clause 4 of the advertisement, it was contended that such clause required each candidate to declare that as on July 15, 2006 she was neither a graduate nor a post-graduate, and the private respondents must have given false declarations to obtain offers of appointment or else they could never be considered. Since a fraud was committed by the private respondents by suppressing their actual educational qualifications, he submitted that this Court may direct the official respondents to terminate the services of the private respondents and to proceed afresh in accordance with law. 8. Reliance was placed by Mr. Maji on the following decisions of the Supreme Court: 1). Since a fraud was committed by the private respondents by suppressing their actual educational qualifications, he submitted that this Court may direct the official respondents to terminate the services of the private respondents and to proceed afresh in accordance with law. 8. Reliance was placed by Mr. Maji on the following decisions of the Supreme Court: 1). (2010) 11 SCC 702 (Manoj Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors.), for the proposition that if any candidate furnishes false or incomplete information or withholds or conceals any material information in his application, he would be debarred from securing employment and further that even if such a candidate has already been appointed, his service is liable to be terminated for furnishing false information; 2). (2008) 7 SCC 153 (Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission & Ors.) for the proposition that an appointment made contrary to the statute/statutory rules would be void in law; 3). (2008) 1 SCC 660 (R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police & ors.) for the proposition that exercise of equitable jurisdiction in favour of a candidate who has been denied appointment because of disclosure of wrong information by him, would not arise; 4). (2008) 13 SCC 170 (Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors.) for the proposition that selection of an employee conceived in deceit (having obtained appointment by producing false social status certificate) could not be saved by equitable considerations; 5). (2007) 4 SCC 54 (Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India & Ors.) for the proposition that if an appointment is illegal, it is non-est in the eye of law rendering the appointment a nullity and principles of equity in a case of such nature would have no role to play and that sympathy should not be misplaced; 6). (1994) 1 SCC 1 [S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu (dead) by lrs. v. Jagannath (dead) by lrs.] for the proposition that fraud which is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage and in order to gain by another’s loss, unravels everything; 7). (1994) 1 SCC 1 [S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu (dead) by lrs. v. Jagannath (dead) by lrs.] for the proposition that fraud which is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage and in order to gain by another’s loss, unravels everything; 7). (2002) 2 SCC 420 (Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan) for the proposition that it is the mandate of the Constitution as provided in Article 141 of the Constitution that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India and that it is impermissible for the High Court to overrule the decision of the Apex Court on the ground that Supreme Court laid down the legal position without considering a specific statutory provision; and 8). (1990) 3 SCC 655 (District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi) for the proposition that when an advertisement mentions a particular qualification and appointment is made in disregard to the same, it amounts to a fraud on public. 9. Anticipating that his adversaries might take the objection of delay and laches in presentation of the writ petition, Mr. Maji referred to the decisions reported in (2001) 2 SCC 259 (K. Thimappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India & Anr.), 1990 Supp SCC 770 (Vimla Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh) and AIR 1983 SC 845 (State of U.P. v. Bahadur Singh). 10. Mr. Maji concluded his arguments by referring to Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and contending that the fraudulent acts of the private respondents ought not to be excused in view of the larger public interest that is involved. 11. Mr. K. M. Hossain, learned advocate representing the official respondents submitted that on the basis of the complaints received from the petitioners, necessary enquiry was launched and the private respondents were also called upon to submit affidavits by March 31, 2013 disclosing therein their actual educational qualifications failing which legal action would be taken against them. However, with the presentation of the writ petition on April 3, 2013, the matter became sub judice and no further action was accordingly taken. However, with the presentation of the writ petition on April 3, 2013, the matter became sub judice and no further action was accordingly taken. It was submitted by him that the writ petition may be disposed of by this Court by granting liberty to the official respondents to take the enquiry to its logical conclusion by taking appropriate steps in accordance with law. 12. Mr. Chakraborty vehemently opposed the writ petition on behalf of the private respondents. According to him, the petitioners participated in the selection process without raising any demur and having found that they were unsuccessful in obtaining appointment as anganwadi workers, have challenged the recruitment process belatedly. On the point that unsuccessful candidates cannot question the recruitment process, reference was made to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1986 SC 1043 (Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla) and (1995) 3 SCC 486 (Madan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir). He contended that the Court of Writ ought not to entertain stale claims and particularly when third party rights have accrued between the dates of accrual of the cause of action and presentation of the writ petition. It was also contended that delay caused by unprovided for memorials is not excusable. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 (State of Madhya Pradesh & anr. Bhailal Bhai & ors.) and AIR 1973 SC 1343 (Jagdish Narain Maltiar v. State of Bihar). Relying on Rina Dutta (supra) and an unreported Division Bench decision of this Court on FMA 1510 of 2011 (Madhuri Roy & ors. v. The State of West Bengal & ors.), it was contended that higher qualifications of the appellants therein were held not to constitute sufficient ground for denying appointment on the post of anganwadi workers. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Chakraborty on another unreported decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court while disposing of W.P. No. 4280(W) of 2012 [Kakoli Kheto (Koley) v. The State of West Bengal & ors.] wherein, relying on Rina Dutta (supra), a show cause notice dated January 30, 2012 calling upon the petitioner therein to explain why her service would not be terminated for suppression of higher qualification was set aside. According to him, the issue raised by the petitioners is no longer res integra and the aforesaid decisions being binding precedents, the writ petition deserves outright dismissal. 13. The decision in Jainendra Singh (supra) and the decisions reported in (2007) 2 SCC 138 (U.P. Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh v. Data Ram Saroj), AIR 1962 SC 83 (Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey), (2003) 5 SCC 448 (State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer), 2001 (2) CHN (FB) 762 (Ahamed Hossain Sk. v. State of West Bengal & ors.), AIR 2007 Cal 223 (Sibnath Koley & ors. v. State of West Bengal & ors.) and 2008 (4) CHN 420 (Bhowanipore Gujrati Education Society & anr. v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation & ors.) were also cited by Mr. Chakraborty in support of the contention that if I were to disagree with the views expressed by the Special Bench in Rina Dutta (supra), the Division Bench in Madhuri Roy (supra) and the decision of the co-ordinate Bench in Kakoli Kheto (Koley) (supra), in keeping with judicial discipline, decorum and propriety, the matter ought to be referred for consideration by an appropriate Bench to be constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. 14. I have heard learned advocates for the parties, considered the materials on record and perused the decisions that have been cited at the bar. 15. The first question that would arise for decision is whether the writ petition ought to be entertained despite delay and laches in its presentation. If the answer to the aforesaid question is in the affirmative, the next question that would arise is whether being unsuccessful candidates, the writ petition at the instance of the petitioners is maintainable. If yes, it would require consideration as whether the issue raised in this writ petition as to whether appointments of the private respondents, allegedly made in clear deviation of the terms of advertisement, could be left undisturbed having regard to the decisions in Rina Dutta (supra), Madhuri Roy (supra) and Kakoli Kheto (Koley) (supra). Should the answer to the above question be in favour of the petitioners, I would be required to decide the nature and extent of relief that could be granted to them. 16. Should the answer to the above question be in favour of the petitioners, I would be required to decide the nature and extent of relief that could be granted to them. 16. Before proceeding to decide the contentious issues arising for decision, I consider it necessary to refer to two glaring omissions of the private respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition while strongly contending in favour of legality of the recruitment process and urging the Court to uphold it. Surprisingly, they have neither disclosed their actual educational qualifications nor pleaded receipt of the several notices issued to them by the CDPO calling upon them to disclose the same. One need not be a legal pundit to understand why the private respondents have maintained a deceptive silence. It is difficult, if not impossible, for these omissions to fade away from consideration. 17. I now propose to take up the question of belated approach first. My understanding of the law on the factors impeding grant of discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, including delay and laches, is this. The High Court’s jurisdiction under the said article is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restriction which is expressly provided therein. Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. One of the self-imposed limitations is that exceptions apart, interference would seldom be made if an alternative, speedy and efficacious remedy is available to the litigant. One other is that the conduct of the party approaching the Court under Article 226 ought not to be such that the same disentitles him to obtain any relief. The conduct may appear to be blameworthy if such party has approached the Court with unclean hands, either by suppressing material facts or by making misleading and incorrect statements or misrepresenting facts, or the Court despite being satisfied that the party before it has placed full and complete facts arrives at a conclusion that it is disabled to grant relief on the ground of intervening delay between accrual of the cause of action and the presentation of the writ petition, which is unexplained or even if explained, is unworthy of acceptance. Insofar as delay being attributed as a ground for not entertaining a writ petition, it has to be remembered that there is no prescribed period of limitation for approaching the Court of Writ but the Court has to be approached with utmost expedition and if any third party is involved, at least before or within a reasonable period after accrual of right in his favour. However, in an exceptional case, where the larger public interest so demands, accrual of a personal right of a third party/respondent may not stand in the way of judicial intervention in exercise of extra-ordinary writ powers. Insofar as service related disputes are concerned where it is alleged that an aspirant for the post has practised fraud on the employer to obtain public employment and the alleged fraud, on prima facie examination of facts, is found to be of an egregious nature vitiating the entire process of recruitment, it would amount to a miscarriage of justice if the Court of Writ were to uphold the contention of the beneficiaries of the fraud that the writ petition ought to be dismissed for no better reason than that they have continued in service for years. 18. Bearing in mind the above principles vis-à-vis the facts and the circumstances of the present case, I am not inclined to hold that the petitioners have delayed their approach to such unreasonable and abnormal extent that the writ petition should be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and laches. It would appear from the writ petition that the private respondents were appointed in July, 2007, whereafter complaint regarding illegality in the process of selection was lodged by the petitioner no.1 on October 24, 2007. Such complaint was addressed to the CDPO and copy thereof was forwarded to the District Magistrate, South 24 Parganas and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Alipore. For some unexplained reason, the registered envelope containing the complaint could not be served on the CDPO; the envelope was returned with the postal endorsement ‘refused’. Similar fate awaited the petitioner no.2, whose complaint dated November 1, 2007 was not received by the office of the CDPO. It appears that thereafter the petitioners applied for information under the RTI Act and it was on March 6, 2009 and September 2, 2009 that Maheshtala College and Budge Budge College respectively furnished credible information of the private respondents having graduated therefrom. It appears that thereafter the petitioners applied for information under the RTI Act and it was on March 6, 2009 and September 2, 2009 that Maheshtala College and Budge Budge College respectively furnished credible information of the private respondents having graduated therefrom. In between, on April 3, 2009, the petitioners had made another representation to the CDPO which was received by his office on April 6, 2009 following which a letter was issued on November 7, 2009 by him to the effect that correspondence would be made with Maheshtala College for having detailed information as to whether the respondent no.10 is a graduate or not. It appears from the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent no.8 that although on October 3, 2009 a notice was indeed issued to the private respondents calling upon them to provide specific information in regard to the specific points of query, they turned a blind eye. Further, letters dated November 6, 2009 were dispatched to Maheshtala College and Budge College but in the absence of information having been furnished by the said colleges, no further action was taken. Such action was repeated once again in 2011 upon receipt of further complaints by the petitioners and ultimately notices dated April 7, 2011 and February 5, 2013 were issued to all the private respondents. It is surprising that despite the private respondents not responding to such notices, the official respondents did not take appropriate action that they were empowered to take in the matter. It seems that the official respondents from time to time went to slumber and woke up only after receiving complaints/representations from the petitioners. They did not show the eagerness the situation called for upon being satisfied that the private respondents did receive the aforesaid notices. The private respondents were allowed to continue despite there being sufficient evidence of perceivable deceit, for reasons best known to the official respondents. The possibility of the two sets of respondents acting hands in glove to ensure that the complaints lodged by the petitioners are not taken to their logical conclusion cannot, in the circumstances, be ruled out. 19. The private respondents were allowed to continue despite there being sufficient evidence of perceivable deceit, for reasons best known to the official respondents. The possibility of the two sets of respondents acting hands in glove to ensure that the complaints lodged by the petitioners are not taken to their logical conclusion cannot, in the circumstances, be ruled out. 19. Be that as it may, even if the official respondents’ version that they were duped is to be accepted, the private respondents having allegedly indulged in deceit to secure appointments in their favour and being the alleged beneficiaries of a tainted selection process ought not to allowed to raise the plea that a right has accrued in their favour by reason of continuance in service for over a decade and that the writ petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The belated approach is not considered fatal for maintainability of the writ petition, having regard to the gravity of the allegation levelled, that is, the private respondents resorted to suppression of graduate degrees for deceiving the official respondents. Successful deceit amounts to fraud and any appointment secured thereby could be branded illegal and void [see Ajoy Kumar Sonkar (supra)]. Each beneficiary of such acts ought to be reminded that since fraud vitiates even the most solemn of acts, the delay in laying challenge will not cure the appointments of its voidness. In a case of the present nature, it is the larger public interest that must be kept in view; so viewed, it should be the duty of the Court not to legitimise a patently illegal and deceitful exercise undertaken by the private respondents by distancing itself. If indeed the Court were to adopt a technical view, justice would be a casualty. Generally speaking, in a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, perpetration of fraud by a party has to be viewed with utmost seriousness and concern and cannot ever be condoned notwithstanding lapse of some time in bringing it to the Court’s notice or else the edifice on which the institution of justice stands would stand eroded. 20. That apart, it is not a case where the petitioners were resting on the oars after the first complaint was lodged. 20. That apart, it is not a case where the petitioners were resting on the oars after the first complaint was lodged. They appear to be rustic village ladies, placed at a disadvantaged position in society, who had reposed faith and trust in the official respondents that needful action would be taken but perforce had to approach the Court because of the apathy and indifference of the official respondents. 21. Taking an overall picture, it cannot be said that the petitioners have been so indolent, tardy and lethargic in bringing to the notice of the Court such a serious matter that they should be told off at the gates without there being any adjudication on the merits of their claims. The first question is, therefore, answered in favour of the petitioners. 22. The objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that unsuccessful candidates of a recruitment process cannot complain after having participated thereat without demur, is urged to be rejected. The private respondents have failed to demonstrate that the petitioners took a chance of selection despite being aware of the fact of the former’s ineligibility to participate. In the decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 434 (Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. Dr. B.S. Mahajan), the Supreme Court laid down the law that although it is for the duly constituted selection committee to decide who is fit for a particular post, “the decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved malafides affecting the selection, etc.” (underlining for emphasis by me). The allegation here is that the selection is vitiated because of consideration of ineligible candidates for appointment and the process is tainted with illegality. If a process of selection results in selection and appointment of ineligible candidates, I wonder who else apart from the candidates who are deprived perceivably to make room for such ineligible candidates can question the process. The decisions cited by Mr. Chakraborty are distinguishable because the candidates there had taken a chance of selection and had approached the Courts after realising that they would not be successful, which is not the case here. Credible information about the ineligibility of the private respondents was received much after they were appointed. The decisions cited by Mr. Chakraborty are distinguishable because the candidates there had taken a chance of selection and had approached the Courts after realising that they would not be successful, which is not the case here. Credible information about the ineligibility of the private respondents was received much after they were appointed. There can hardly be any doubt that this writ petition at the instance of the petitioners, despite they not being empanelled, is maintainable. The second question is answered accordingly. 23. While proceeding to decide the third question, it is certain that if the decisions in Rina Dutta (supra), Madhuri Roy (supra) and Kakoli Kheto (Koley) (supra) provide a complete answer to such question, the writ petition would fail on merits. Hence, the aforesaid three decisions would have to be read in between lines to find out the ratio laid down by the respective Benches. 24. However, consideration of such decisions must be preceded by consideration of certain decisions of the Supreme Court having direct bearing on the third question. 25. While deciding Manoj Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court had the occasion to observe as follows: “8. There is no doubt that if any candidate furnishes false or incomplete information or withholds or conceals any material information in his application, he will be debarred from securing employment. It is also true that even if such an applicant is already appointed, his services are liable to be terminated for furnishing false information.” (underlining for emphasis by me) 26. In Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir (supra), it was laid down in paragraph 15 as follows: “15. An act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due, tantamounts to fraud. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter.* * *” Thereafter the Court proceeded to observe as follows: “18. Having considered the matter in the light of the aforesaid legal position, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court is untenable. As noted supra, the employee having accepted the finding of the Scrutiny Committee, holding that the caste certificate furnished by the employee was false, the very foundation of her appointment vanished and her appointment was rendered illegal. Having considered the matter in the light of the aforesaid legal position, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court is untenable. As noted supra, the employee having accepted the finding of the Scrutiny Committee, holding that the caste certificate furnished by the employee was false, the very foundation of her appointment vanished and her appointment was rendered illegal. Her conduct renders her unfit to be continued in service and must necessarily entail termination of her service. Under these circumstances, there is absolutely no justification for her claim n respect of the post merely on the ground that she had worked on the post for over twenty years. The post was meant for a reserved candidate but she usurped the same by misrepresentation and deception. In our opinion, the fact that caste certificate was referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification after ten years of her joining the service and a long time was taken by the Scrutiny Committee to verify the same is of no consequence inasmuch as delay on both the counts does not validate the caste certificate and the consequent illegal appointment. 19. We are also unable to persuade ourselves to agree with learned counsel for the employee that in the absence of any finding of fraud having been played by the employee, the order of the High Court is equitable and should not be interfered with. As noted above, the selection of the employee was conceived in deceit and, therefore, could not be saved by equitable considerations.” (underlining for emphasis by me) 27. In R. Radhakrishnan (supra), relief was denied because the appellant had not disclosed his involvement in a criminal case although he had been acquitted later. The Court expressed that the question of exercising equitable jurisdiction in his favour would not arise. 28. The statements of law in Manoj Kumar (supra), Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir and R. Radhakrishnan (supra) were not brought to the notice of the respective Benches of this Court, which decided Rina Dutta (supra), Madhuri Roy (supra) and Kakoli Kheto (Koley) (supra). 29. In Rina Dutta (supra), the Special Bench was considering a question referred by a Division Bench of this Court (of which I was a member) by order dated July 29, 2008. 29. In Rina Dutta (supra), the Special Bench was considering a question referred by a Division Bench of this Court (of which I was a member) by order dated July 29, 2008. The following question was referred for decision by a larger Bench: “When a particular qualification is laid down in an advertisement, specially creating a distinct class of candidates that would be eligible, can the candidates possessing qualifications higher than those advertised be considered and appointed on the post?” The answer of the Special Bench to the question referred by the Division Bench was in the following words: “18. As regards the question referred by the Division Bench, we are of the view that the question can be answered only after examining the scheme for the concerned post and the nature of the duties required to be performed and the nature of the services to be rendered by the holder of a post and the qualifications prescribed. Nevertheless, the general answer would be as follows: When a particular qualification is laid down in an advertisement relating to a distinct class of candidates, the candidates possessing a qualification higher than that advertised can ordinarily not be debarred or disqualified, but it is open to the employer to make a rule providing for disqualification of candidates possessing qualification higher than the prescribed qualification, but the burden would be on the employer to justify such a rule.” (underlining for emphasis by me) 30. The answer to the specific question that was referred makes the position abundantly clear regarding the course of action that the Court ought to follow for deciding a matter that comes up before it, where a particular qualification is laid down in an advertisement specially creating a distinct class of candidates that would be eligible and candidates possessing qualifications higher than those advertised are considered and appointed on the post. 31. It is noted that a “general answer” was also given by the Special Bench. While appreciating the impact of the “general answer”, the facts giving rise to the appeal cannot be overlooked. The appellants, who were graduates, had been appointed as anganwadi workers. Their selection was challenged before the Writ Court by non-graduates who could not match the appellants. 31. It is noted that a “general answer” was also given by the Special Bench. While appreciating the impact of the “general answer”, the facts giving rise to the appeal cannot be overlooked. The appellants, who were graduates, had been appointed as anganwadi workers. Their selection was challenged before the Writ Court by non-graduates who could not match the appellants. The learned single Judge upheld the challenge for the reasons that the appellants being graduates were not entitled to be appointed, and that there might have been other graduate women who did not apply looking at the advertisement and denial of their right to be considered for appointment would result in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. When the writ appeal came up for consideration before the Division Bench, it noticed that another Division Bench in the decision reported in 1996 WBLR (Cal) 213 (Ganga Chowdhury v. B.D.O., Tamluk & ors.) had taken the view that over-qualification prima facie does not disentitle a person from being considered for appointment and the fact that a candidate is over-qualified by itself cannot be a ground for setting aside his appointment. The reference was made on July 29, 2008 by the Division Bench bearing in mind the decision in M. Tripura Sundari Devi (supra). Their Lordships of the Special Bench observed that the advertisement under consideration provided that candidates in the age group of 18 to 45 years “who have passed in Matriculation or equivalent examination with Bengali) are eligible to apply. Graduate women are not meant for the said post”. Their Lordships were of the view that the scheme of 1985 under which the advertisement in question had been issued required the advertisement to state that should a candidate suppress any relevant information or furnish false information particularly regarding her age, residence and educational status, her appointment may be terminated at any time, but such clause was not mentioned in the advertisement; the advertisement merely stated that those who are matriculates are eligible to apply and that graduate women are not meant for such post. This sentence in the advertisement, in the considered view of Their Lordships, could hardly be considered as a prohibition against graduate women applying for the post nor could it be treated as a ground to disqualify or penalize a graduate woman for not having mentioned her graduate qualification in the application. This sentence in the advertisement, in the considered view of Their Lordships, could hardly be considered as a prohibition against graduate women applying for the post nor could it be treated as a ground to disqualify or penalize a graduate woman for not having mentioned her graduate qualification in the application. Following such view, it was held in paragraph 17 that the advertisement did not specifically debar or disqualify graduate women from applying for the post of anganwadi workers and, therefore, the engagement of the appellants therein and other candidates, who were graduates, as anganwadi workers could not be said to be illegal on the touchstone of the advertisement. The objection regarding suppression of over-qualification was also overruled having regard to the terms of the advertisement that was issued. Their Lordships also observed that if the provisions of the scheme were to be applied, the graduate women would be in difficulty; however, having regard to the fact that they were appointed way back in 1998 and had continued in employment for the last 12 (twelve) years and the advertisement specifically did not disqualify or debar graduate women, their appointments were not liable to be disturbed. On such reasoning, the appeal was allowed and the writ petition dismissed. The impact of the “general answer”, in my considered view, cannot therefore be comprehended divorced from the facts that fell for consideration of the Special Bench and such “general answer” would not apply ex proprio vigore to a case involving special facts of the nature noted in the question that was referred for answer by the Division Bench. 32. In order to apply the ratio of the decision in Rina Dutta (supra), the contents of the advertisement that was under consideration there and the advertisement pursuant whereto the petitioners and the private respondents applied have to be compared. If it is found that the advertisements differ materially, the decision in Rina Dutta (supra) would be distinguishable. 33. It would be worthy of being noted that the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 was issued pursuant to a Memorandum dated January 25, 2006, of the Department of Women & Child Development and Social Welfare, Government of West Bengal, laying down guidelines for recruitment of anganwadi Workers and anganwadi helpers. Clause 7 of the guidelines provided as follows: “7. 33. It would be worthy of being noted that the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 was issued pursuant to a Memorandum dated January 25, 2006, of the Department of Women & Child Development and Social Welfare, Government of West Bengal, laying down guidelines for recruitment of anganwadi Workers and anganwadi helpers. Clause 7 of the guidelines provided as follows: “7. Qualification of Anganwadi Workers through direct recruitment: a) Age: A Woman should be in the age group of 18-45 years. b) Academic Qualification: Minimum Madhyamik/School Final/High Madrasah Examination passed or equivalent examination passed from any recognized Board. Candidates belonging to scheduled castes/schedules (sic) tribes will be eligible for selection to the post of Anganwadi Workers with a minimum qualification of Class VIII pass. I. All candidates will have to give a declaration regarding her maximum academic qualification. II. Candidates who are graduates will not be eligible for a post of Anganwadi Worker. If a graduate candidate suppresses her academic qualification and if selected to a post of Anganwadi Worker her services will be terminated forthwith without assigning any reason. III. A women candidate may apply for a post of Anganwadi Worker if the result of the final degree examination has not been published before the date of issuing of the notice inviting applications.” (underlining for emphasis by me) 34. The advertisement dated July 14, 2006 that followed these guidelines, in adequate measure, sought to convey that graduates/post-graduates were not eligible to apply for appointment on the post of anganwadi worker. Not only did the special note to clause 2 (ka) of the advertisement mention that applications by graduates and post-graduates would be regarded ineligible, every candidate was required to declare that as on July 15, 2006 she is neither a graduate nor a postgraduate. In fact, from the affidavit-in-opposition of the CDPO, it further appears that all the private respondents in their respective applications pursuant to the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 had declared that if any statement made in their respective applications is subsequently found to be wrong or incorrect, their applications could be treated as cancelled in accordance with Government norms. That (the norms) would obviously mean the guidelines for appointment underlined supra. 35. It is well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. That (the norms) would obviously mean the guidelines for appointment underlined supra. 35. It is well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The decision in Rina Dutta (supra) appears to be distinguishable for reasons more than one. First, the recruitment in question was not made in terms of the guidelines contained in Memorandum dated January 25, 2006 which specially created a distinct class of candidates who were eligible to apply. Secondly, the terms of the advertisements dated December 6, 1996 that was under consideration there and the present one dated July 14, 2006 are not identical in terms. The clear indication in the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 that candidates having a particular qualification would be ineligible for the post was absent in the advertisement that the Special Bench was called upon to consider. An indication in the advertisement that the post for which applications are invited is not meant for graduates is materially different from an advertisement that contains a clear stipulation that graduates are ineligible to apply. Thirdly, the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 by reason of its terms ought to be read as debarring graduates from applying for appointment on the post of anganwadi workers in line with the relevant guidelines dated January 25, 2006, extracted supra. Similar stringent terms are conspicuous by their absence in the advertisement that the Special Bench considered. Fourthly, the private respondents were also required and they did declare that they are non-graduates on July 15, 2006 and that any false information given by them in their applications for appointment would make their applications liable to cancellation. This was also not a requirement in terms of the advertisement dated December 6, 1996. On a comparative study of both the advertisements and the declarations that each aspirant for the post was required to give as per the advertisement dated July 14, 2006, it seems to leave none in doubt that the factors of eligibility were clearly indicated in such advertisement together with the consequence one is likely to suffer if she dares to apply suppressing facts. Fifthly and finally, allegation relating to commission of deceit leading to fraud was not an issue in Rina Dutta (supra). Fifthly and finally, allegation relating to commission of deceit leading to fraud was not an issue in Rina Dutta (supra). I am, therefore, of the considered view that the Special Bench decision in Rina Dutta (supra) has to be read in the context of the facts that arose for consideration and cannot extend to cases where a show cause notice is issued not on the ground that the noticee is over-qualified for the post on which she has been appointed but for the good reason that the appointment is perceived to have been obtained by practising and perpetrating fraud. I am afraid, the decision in Rina Dutta (supra) cannot come to the rescue of the private respondents. 36. I have noticed that the Special Bench in Rina Dutta (supra) considered the decision reported in (2007) 11 SCC 681 (State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi), wherein it was observed that incumbents appointed on the posts of anganwadi workers do not hold posts under a statute and that the State is not required to comply with the constitutional scheme of equality as adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such observations were made while distinguishing an earlier decision of the Supreme Court on what a civil post is. It had been submitted on behalf of the appellant State that advertisement is not required to be issued for filling up the posts and that provisions of recruitment rules are not required to be complied with. The observation that the State is not required to comply with Articles 14 and 16 must be read as one which was made in the given fact situation, for, the guidelines for appointment of anganwadi workers, with passage of time, have undergone substantial changes. As would be evident from the factual narrative of the present controversy, advertisements are being issued in West Bengal inviting the eligible candidates to participate in the process of selection. The object is to ensure maximum participation of a special class of candidates and to conduct a fair and transparent selection process among them. A decision rendered in a fact situation where appointments are made not in pursuance of advertisements could hardly apply in a fact situation where selection is more broad based giving every eligible candidate a fair chance of being appointed. A decision rendered in a fact situation where appointments are made not in pursuance of advertisements could hardly apply in a fact situation where selection is more broad based giving every eligible candidate a fair chance of being appointed. The point before me cannot, therefore, be decided by referring to Ameerbi (supra), which is an authority on the point as to whether the post of anganwadi worker is a civil post or not. 37. The decisions in Madhuri Roy (supra) and Kakoli Kheto (Koley) (supra) also do not advance the cause of the private respondents. Perusal of the said decisions would reveal that the respective Benches did neither refer to the question that was posed by the Division Bench by order dated July 29, 2008 for an answer nor considered the Special Bench’s answer to the specific question [that it needs examination of the scheme for the concerned post, the nature of the duties required to be performed and the nature of the services to be rendered by the holder of such post, and the qualifications that are prescribed]; only the latter part of paragraph 18 giving a “general answer” was considered and it is doubtful whether such “general answer” given by the Special Bench could be construed as the law laid down in regard to the question that was referred by the Division Bench, having universal application in identical cases where appointment is given to candidates having qualification higher than what is advertised. If the object underlying the scheme for appointment of anganwadi workers is examined bearing in mind the qualification prescribed together with the nature of duty to be performed and nature of service to be rendered by them, the conclusion is inevitable that less literate village ladies who would not look for greener pastures in the near future were encouraged to come forward to assist pregnant women, lactating mothers and children belonging to the lower economic strata of the society. 38. Significantly, the Bench while deciding Madhuri Roy (supra) considered whether the appellants “should be removed from service for having higher educational qualification”. 38. Significantly, the Bench while deciding Madhuri Roy (supra) considered whether the appellants “should be removed from service for having higher educational qualification”. According to Their Lordships, the appellants were not given any extra weightage for the higher qualifications and hence the decisions reported in (2003) 3 SCC 541 (P.M. Latha v. State of Kerala), (2003) 3 SCC 548 (Yogesh Kumar v. Government of NCT, Delhi) and AIR 2005 SC 3485 (Dilip Kumar Ghosh v. Chairman) had no manner of application. It was also held that the State had in the meanwhile introduced modified guidelines for appointment lifting the restriction on graduates from applying for being appointed as anganwadi workers realising that the restriction was not proper. 39. Apart from the fact that the issue raised by the petitioners is substantially different from the one considered by the Division Bench, two of the decisions cited before it seem to clinch the issue in favour of the petitioners. 40. In P. M. Latha (supra), although holders of Teacher’s Training Certificate (TTC) were called upon to respond for appointment as primary teachers, candidates possessing BEd degrees were appointed although it was not a prescribed qualification. While holding that candidates possessing TTC were only entitled to compete for selection and appointment, being the prescribed qualification, the Court held: “10. We find absolutely no force in the argument advanced by the respondents that BEd qualification is a higher qualification than TTC and therefore, the BEd candidates should be held to be eligible to compete for the post.………. we cannot consider BEd candidates, for the present vacancies advertised, as eligible. 11. The Division Bench in the impugned order upheld the decision of the Single Judge that in terms of the advertisement, BEd candidates were not eligible to take up the selection test and to be included in the rank list. We fail to understand that having thus upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge, what was the justification for the Division Bench to refer to statutory recruitment rules applicable to teachers in private primary schools, aided by the Government and the judgments rendered by the High Court in their cases, for reversing the judgment of the Single Judge and maintaining the rank list including names of the BEd candidates and their appointments on the basis of rules yet to be framed. **************** 13. **************** 13. Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and interpreted equitably but equity cannot override written or settled law. The Division Bench forgot that in extending relief on equity to BEd candidates who were unqualified and yet allowed to compete and seek appointments contrary to the terms of the advertisement, it is not redressing the injustice caused to the appellants who were TTC candidates and would have secured a better position in the rank list to get appointment against the available vacancies, had BEd candidates been excluded from the selections. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is both illegal, inequitable and patently unjust. The TTC candidates before us as appellants have been wrongly deprived of due chance of selection and appointment. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench, therefore, deserves to be set aside and of the learned Single Judge restored.” (underlining for emphasis by me) 41. Yogesh Kumar (supra) also involved similar controversy regarding appointment of BEd candidates despite not being the qualification mentioned in the advertisement. The same Bench of the Supreme Court that decided P. M. Latha (supra) observed: “8. ***** Recruitment to public services should be held strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post. Merely because in the past some deviation and departure was made in considering the BEd candidates and we are told that was so done because of the paucity of TTC candidates, we cannot allow a patent illegality to continue. ………..we cannot consider BEd candidates for the present vacancies advertised as eligible. In our view, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that BEd candidates were rightly excluded by the authorities from selection and appointment as primary teachers* * *.” (underlining for emphasis by me) 42. These two decisions are authorities on the point that departure from the terms of the advertisement is not permissible. Reason therefor is not far to seek; if allowed, it would breed corruption. The Division Bench in Madhuri Roy (supra) distinguished these decisions on a ground which, with due respect, does not seem to be relevant. 43. These two decisions are authorities on the point that departure from the terms of the advertisement is not permissible. Reason therefor is not far to seek; if allowed, it would breed corruption. The Division Bench in Madhuri Roy (supra) distinguished these decisions on a ground which, with due respect, does not seem to be relevant. 43. In the decision reported in (1997) 4 SCC 18 (Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chandra Shekhar), it has been authoritatively laid down that “(w)here applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that and that date alone”. In view thereof, consideration of the modified guidelines relating to appointment of any anganwadi worker in Madhuri Roy (supra) seems to be inapt. 44. There is one other distinguishing feature. Neither Madhuri Roy (supra) nor Kakoli Kheto (Koley) (supra) addressed the problem from the angle of deceit, which is alleged to have been successfully committed by the graduates and, therefore, I am unable to hold that these decisions lay down a principle of law having precedential value on how a fraudulent exercise is to be dealt with. 45. Question of reference to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, as urged by Mr. Chakraborty, does not arise since I have found the decisions in Rina Dutta (supra), Madhuri Roy (supra) and Kakoli Kheto (Koley) (supra) to be distinguishable. The third question is, accordingly, answered by holding that while the aforesaid decisions cannot be considered as authorities relying whereon the appointments of the private respondents could be left undisturbed, the law laid down in P. M. Latha (supra), Yogesh Kumar (supra), Manoj Kumar (supra), Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir (supra), R. Radhakrishnan (supra), Ashok Kumar Sonkar (supra) and M. Tripura Sundari Devi (supra) when applied to the facts of the present case unmistakably points to the conclusion that the petitioners’ grievance is not without substance. 46. When an appointment is sought to be made on a non-civil post or a non-statutory post by the State and the incumbents on such posts are to be paid salary/honorarium from the public exchequer, it is for the State to ensure that no candidate steals a march over another candidate by fraud or misrepresentation or the like. Decisions are galore that a fraudulent act cannot be condoned. Decisions are galore that a fraudulent act cannot be condoned. Here, it was made known to the world at large with the issuance of the advertisement dated July 14, 2006 that appointment on the post of anganwadi workers would be made from amongst lady candidates between 18 and 45 years of age, who are residents of a particular area and are undergraduates. The private respondents despite being ineligible having regard to the laid down qualifications for the post allegedly took a chance of selection, acting unscrupulously. There might have been other ladies, who are graduates, who scrupulously followed the advertisement and did not apply. If only it were known to such graduates that irrespective of whatever qualification was advertised applications from graduates would be entertained and they would be considered for selection, can the possibility of they not having applied showing respect to the advertisement be ruled out? The answer cannot but be in the negative. It is alleged that on the one hand the private respondents misrepresented to the authorities that they were not graduates and on the other hand created a situation which led to the official respondents to appoint them. If the private respondents have indeed suppressed their actual educational qualifications, does the selection process not suffer from a gross illegality leading to likely commission of a fraud on the public? The answer has to be in the affirmative. There is another way of looking at the problem. The appointments were to be made from amongst undergraduates. The petitioners are all undergraduates, whereas the private respondents are graduates. None can dispute that in the present system, a graduate is considered to be more knowledgeable than a candidate who is “Higher Secondary” passed. It would not be unreasonable to presume that questions might have been set for testing the relative merits of the aspirants keeping in mind that the same are to be answered by “Higher Secondary” passed candidates, and that such questions could be answered better by graduates. At the onset of the process of selection, there was no level playing field inasmuch as the private respondents by misrepresentation of their educational qualifications (if at all) might have been able to secure entry in the selection process to compete with “Higher Secondary” passed candidates and derived undue benefit by not having to compete with fellow graduates. At the onset of the process of selection, there was no level playing field inasmuch as the private respondents by misrepresentation of their educational qualifications (if at all) might have been able to secure entry in the selection process to compete with “Higher Secondary” passed candidates and derived undue benefit by not having to compete with fellow graduates. To my mind, this is such a type of conduct that does not deserve kindness, generosity or empathy. 47. Suppression may be resorted to for deceiving a person and a deceit succeeding would amount to fraud. It is settled law that fraud unravels everything, and a fraudulent activity ought not to be validated by stamp of approval from the Court of Writ. Discretion vested in the Court has to be exercised judiciously and not to come to the aid of a party who took a chance of selection despite being over qualified, participated in the process with “Higher Secondary” passed candidates who are intellectually inferior, did not have to compete with equally or more qualified candidates who did not offer their candidature abiding by the terms of the guidelines, and obtained employment through the back door. 48. The Supreme Court in Jainendra Singh (supra) considered, as observed earlier, 13 (thirteen) previous decisions of the Supreme Court. The principles laid down in paragraph 29 of the decision are cardinal without doubt, which ought to be borne in mind by every Court before granting any relief to any candidate who secures appointment by fraud, misrepresentation or the like. Although the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 31 that certain co-ordinate Benches have taken different views, I do not perceive those decisions as laying down law for being treated as a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution. Perusal of the said decisions drives me to hold that the same contain directions issued by the Supreme Court in the exercise of power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution. Viewed in the light of the cardinal principles laid down in paragraph 29 and its several sub-paragraphs, there can be no dispute that selection that is conceived in deceit cannot be saved by equitable considerations. Public interest would suffer if the private respondents, despite the facts that have surfaced, are left unscathed. Viewed in the light of the cardinal principles laid down in paragraph 29 and its several sub-paragraphs, there can be no dispute that selection that is conceived in deceit cannot be saved by equitable considerations. Public interest would suffer if the private respondents, despite the facts that have surfaced, are left unscathed. I, therefore, hold that if any of or all the private respondents has/have secured appointment(s) as anganwadi worker(s) despite being graduate(s) by giving wrong declaration about her/their educational qualification(s) in the application(s) made pursuant to the advertisement dated July 14, 2006, and she/they having agreed to have her/their application(s) cancelled upon subsequent detection of any incorrect/wrong information given therein, it is well within the right of the petitioners to urge the official respondents to proceed against her/them in accordance with law, notwithstanding the lapse of time, for promoting justice and setting things right. 49. For the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that interest of justice would be best served if the writ petition is disposed of with the following directions. The time for the private respondents to respond to the notices dated April 7, 2011 and February 5, 2013 is extended by a month from date. Upon receipt of information that might be provided by the private respondents or if no information is received within the aforesaid period, the CDPO shall proceed to conclude the enquiry in accordance with law. Follow-up orders shall be passed by him as early as possible thereafter but positively by the year end. The petitioners shall be informed of the final result within the aforesaid time frame. 50. Needless to observe, observations made in this judgment are for the purpose of a decision on the writ petition and the private respondents are left free to raise appropriate defence in answer to the show cause notices, whereupon the CDPO or the competent authority shall give decision considering the merits of the defence that is raised. 51. The writ petition stands disposed of. Parties shall bear their own costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, shall be furnished to the applicant at an early date.