Order Petitioners are before this Court seeking quashing of order dated 20.2.2004 passed by respondent No.2 vide Annexure-‘F’ granting occupancy rights in respect of land bearing Sy. No. 81/3 measuring 30 guntas and Sy. No. 82/3 measuring 9 guntas of Hulimavu village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk in favour of respondent No.1. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that the properties in question were purchased by their father Mohammed Habebulla on 2.8.1971 from respondent No.1 and from that date, till his death, the petitioners’ father used to cultivate the lands and was in actual possession of the same and after the death of their father, the petitioners are in occupation of the lands. 4. The first respondent filed an application in Form No.7 before the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights in his favour on the ground that he is cultivating the said lands for the past eight years. It is the case of the first respondent that suit land was sold to the father of the petitioners by his family who in turn, leased the suit lands in their favour and since then, they are cultivating the suit lands and are in possession of the same. It was the contention of the father of the petitioners that he never leased the lands in favour of the first respondent’s family. After hearing, the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights in favour of first respondent vide order at Annexure-‘D’. Being aggrieved, the first petitioner filed W.P.No.671/1983 before this Court. This Court by its order dated 27.2.1985 remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal for reconsideration. After remand, the Land Tribunal once again conferred occupancy rights in favour of first respondent vide its order dated 12.3.1987. Against the said order, petitioners preferred W.P. No. 20599/1999 and this Court by its order dated 2.11.2000, again remanded the matter back to the Land Tribunal on the ground that the order of the Land Tribunal is not a speaking order and directed the Land Tribunal to decide the matter afresh after giving opportunity to both the parties. The Land Tribunal by its order dated 20.2.2004 vide Annexure-‘F’, conferred occupancy rights in favour of first respondent. Being aggrieved by the same, this petition is filed. 5. The Land Tribunal by its order dated 20.2.2004 vide Annexure-‘F’, conferred occupancy rights in favour of first respondent. Being aggrieved by the same, this petition is filed. 5. It appears, respondent No.1 sold the properties in dispute to the father of the petitioners on 2.8.1972 and that the father of the petitioners leased the land in favour of respondent No.1 ever since it was sold to him. It is pertinent to note, the entries made in the record of rights and pahani shows that from 1969-70 onwards upto 1973-74, the properties stood in the name of one Muniga who claims to be a tenant. Even on perusal of revenue records and pahani extract from 1968-73, no change is found either in the column of ownership or in the tenancy column. Both the parties specifically admit the fact that sale has taken place on 2.8.1971 in favour of Mohammed Habebulla. As per the provisions of sections 128 and 129 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, the entries should have been reflected in the revenue records by the revenue authorities within a reasonable time after sale transaction is effected. The revenue authorities have not entered the name of the owner. It is in clear violation of the mandate of sections 128 and 129 of the Land Revenue Act. What is to be noticed is that except oral testimony of the petitioner No.1, there is nothing on record to show that there was a tenancy created in favour of one Muniga by the purchasers of the properties in dispute after 1971 before 1.3.1974. Mere continuous possession does not amount to permissive possession. It appears, the oral testimony has been rebutted in the cross examination. It appears, taking advantage of continuous possession or symbolic possession, for want of non-entering the name of the purchaser in the relevant column of RTC and pahani, Muniga claims to be a tenant as on 1.3.1974 and his name is there in the original record. But what is pertinent to note is, the sale transaction between Muniga and purchasers of the disputed land has not been entered in the revenue records within a reasonable time. Apart from that, there is nothing on record to show that the suit lands were given for tenancy by the purchasers in favour of Muniga except some stray evidence on behalf of the tenant Muniga. Apart from that, there is nothing on record to show that the suit lands were given for tenancy by the purchasers in favour of Muniga except some stray evidence on behalf of the tenant Muniga. Based on the nonentry and also without proof of any rent being paid, the Land Tribunal proceeded to deal with the matter without verifying the factual possession and the fact that mere possession or symbolic possession does not amount to tenancy unless there is specific evidence. Misunderstanding by the Tribunal would amount to have a feeling that it is just the case of Muniga continuing to be in possession and he is to be treated as a tenant. That approach appears to be very strange unless specific documents are made available. Nowhere there is admission on behalf of the landlord with regard to Muniga being continued as tenant of the property even after 1.3.1974. 6. The argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents is that there is a clear admission on the part of the petitioners with regard to payment of ‘wara’ in favour of their father and on that count, it is sought to be contended that there is a clear admission on behalf of the first petitioner himself as to ‘wara’ being paid to the landlord. Accordingly, the respondents contended that the Tribunal has not committed any error. 7. However, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the document so relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is only a concocted document and also it is submitted that none of the members of the Tribunal have signed the document. As such, it is a disputed document and created for that purpose. He further submitted that it appears to be a document having no authenticity. There is no signature of either of the witnesses and also other members of the Tribunal. In the circumstances, how far this document is to be treated as a valid document is yet to be ascertained. What is being stated in the evidence of Mohammed Ismail is that the first respondent had given ‘wara’ one or two times to his father and except this, it could be seen that the first respondent is not paying any ‘wara’ to the petitioners and is cultivating the land as it is. What is being stated in the evidence of Mohammed Ismail is that the first respondent had given ‘wara’ one or two times to his father and except this, it could be seen that the first respondent is not paying any ‘wara’ to the petitioners and is cultivating the land as it is. As such, the application filed by the first respondent is sought to be scored off. The matter has to be looked into by the Tribunal once again whether wara is being paid by Muniga till 1.3.1974 and whether tenancy right was created or not or discontinued based on the overall evidence available on record. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of HANUMANTHARAYAPPA & ANOTHER V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANOTHER reported in AIR 2003 KAR. H.C.R. page 2389 and in the case of MATHAI MATHAI V. JOSEPH MARY @ MARYKKUTTY JOSEPH & OTHERS reported in 2014 AIR SCW page 2793. In Hanumantharayappa’s case, the Apex Court dealing with similar matter, has held that a person claiming tenancy rights must prove that he was a tenant of the land as on 1.3.1974 or immediately prior thereto. In the present case, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the continuation of the first respondent in occupation of the property even prior and thereafter after the sale deed is permissive possession and not tenancy. In view of some stray statements made in the evidence with regard to tenancy, the same cannot be taken note of for all practical purposes, as throughout it was the stand of the petitioners that respondent No.1 has continued to be in permissive possession, but not as tenant. This aspect requires reconsideration by the Land Tribunal after taking note of overall material available on record. 9. It is pertinent to note that as far as alleged tenancy is concerned, as on the date of the alleged sale as admitted by the respondent, he was in seventh standard and being minor, he can never be a tenant nor have capacity to sell and the sale, if any, which is said to have been made would be void. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Land Tribunal as provided under sections 10 and 11 of the Contract Act and same has to be looked into by the Land Tribunal. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Land Tribunal as provided under sections 10 and 11 of the Contract Act and same has to be looked into by the Land Tribunal. 10. In view of the above, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal. The Tribunal, immediately after receipt of record, is directed to dispose of the matter within three months. All the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties are left open to be urged before the Tribunal. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.