JUDGMENT : G.B. Shah, J. Present petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been directed against the order dated 02/04/2013 passed by respondent No. 1 herein - Deputy Secretary, Government of Gujarat in Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department, Gandhinagar by which, the appeal No. 24 of 2011 filed by the petitioner herein challenging the order dated 29/06/2011 passed by the Collector, Banaskantha at Palanpur, respondent No. 2 herein, was rejected. 2. Facts in nutshell of the case of the petitioner are that the respondent No. 2 - The Collector, Banaskantha herein had issued a Notification dated 02/01/2010 for opening the Fair Price Shops in rural area (Pandit Din Dayal Upadhyay Grahak Bhandar) (for brevity 'shops') for local educated unemployed/selfhelp groups at various Talukas of Banaskantha District, which includes Village: Kaprupur, Taluka: Bhabhar, to be allotted to the different categories of people as mentioned therein. Pursuant to the said Notification, the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 3 amongst others, applied for the same. The applications thus received, were verified by the Taluka Civil Supply Advisory Committee on 26/02/2010 and thereafter, by the Rural Vigilance Committee on 27/05/2010, after which, the Mamlatdar, Bhabhar, submitted the proposal to the respondent No. 2 herein - The Collector, Banaskantha on merits, wherein, the petitioner stood at serial No. 3. Thereafter, the District Civil Supply Advisory Committee also discussed the proposal submitted by the Mamlatdar, as aforesaid, and also prepared the merit and accordingly, the respondent No. 2 herein, by order dated 07/06/2010, allotted the Fair Price Shop to respondent No. 3 herein - Shri Maldhari Svasahay Juth, Village: Kaprupur, Taluka: Bhabhar, District: Banaskantha (for brevity 'Juth'). The said order was challenged by the petitioner before the respondent No. 1 herein by way of filing the Appeal No. 53 of 2010, which came to be partly allowed and order dated 07/06/2010 passed by the respondent No. 2 herein was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded back to him for a fresh decision. The respondent No. 2 heard the matter on merits and eventually, by order dated 29/06/2011, confirmed his earlier decision dated 07/06/2010, allotting the shop to the respondent No. 3 herein. The said order was carried into appeal by the petitioner before the respondent No. 1 herein by way of filing the Appeal No. 24 of 2011. The respondent No. 2 heard the matter on merits and eventually, by order dated 29/06/2011, confirmed his earlier decision dated 07/06/2010, allotting the shop to the respondent No. 3 herein. The said order was carried into appeal by the petitioner before the respondent No. 1 herein by way of filing the Appeal No. 24 of 2011. It is the case of the petitioner that without verifying the record and the Government Resolution in letter and spirit and the criteria set out in the Application Form itself, by common order dated 02/04/2013, the respondent No. 1 herein rejected the appeal of the petitioner, which is the subject matter of the present petition. 3. By order dated 19/07/2013, this Court (Coram: Anant S. Dave, J.) has admitted the petition and also granted the interim relief in terms of para 8(C) of the petition by which the respondent No. 3 is restrained from running the said shop. 4. Heard, Mr. Sandip M. Patel, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Bhavesh Hajare, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Ms. Vidhi J. Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3. 5. Mr. Sandip M. Patel, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that as per the Notification dated 02/01/2010 issued by the respondent No. 2 herein inviting the applications for allotment of Fair Price Shops, to be allotted to the educated unemployed/Svasahay Juths, so far as Village: Kaprupur is concerned, the same was to be allotted to a person belonging to Socially and Educationally Backward Class (SEBC) category. He submitted that the petitioner, who belongs to SEBC category, has studied up to B.A. and also an educated unemployed and in spite of the said facts, the respondent No. 2 allotted the shop to the respondent No. 3 Juth, which even does not possess a valid permission of District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) and the Certificate to be issued by them. He, drawing attention of the Court to para 8 (page 49) of the Application Form, further submitted that the said Application Form itself, in the said paragraph, provides that in case of nonavailability of educated unemployed persons, allotment of shops to the Mahila Svasahay Juths shall be taken into consideration. He, drawing attention of the Court to para 8 (page 49) of the Application Form, further submitted that the said Application Form itself, in the said paragraph, provides that in case of nonavailability of educated unemployed persons, allotment of shops to the Mahila Svasahay Juths shall be taken into consideration. He submitted that it is not in dispute that the petitioner belongs to the SEBC category and also an educated unemployed, and in spite of the said fact, the respondent No. 2 has allotted the shop to the respondent No. 3 Juth. Moreover, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the respondent No. 3 has produced two certificates, issued by two different authorities in which, the name of the respondent No. 3 Juth differs. Moreover, the date of commencement of work by the respondent No. 3 Juth also differs in both the certificates, which creates doubt about the genuineness of the said certificates, however, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have not considered the said aspect and even not taken care to verify the said certificates. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner further submitted that the educational qualification of the members of the respondent No. 3 Juth is maximum 6th Standard, whereas, for allotment of shop, minimum qualification required is 10th Standard and accordingly, the members of the respondent No. 3 Juth did not possess requisite educational qualification and on that count also, the respondent No. 3 Juth was also not eligible for allotment of the shop. Further, he submitted that the respondent No. 3 Juth does not run the shop at the place for which it is allotted but is running the shop at a place two kilo-meters away from their registered place, in an agricultural field. Lastly, he submitted that the respondent has, ignoring all these aspects, acted arbitrarily and allotted the shop to the respondent No. 3, which is confirmed by the respondent No. 1 and hence, present petition may be allowed in the interest of justice. 6. Per contra, Ms. Vidhi J. Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 Juth, at the outset, submitted that this Court, sitting in appeal, cannot interfere in the decision taken by the respondent No. 2 and confirmed by the respondent No. 1 after appreciating the facts and material on record. 6. Per contra, Ms. Vidhi J. Bhatt, learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 Juth, at the outset, submitted that this Court, sitting in appeal, cannot interfere in the decision taken by the respondent No. 2 and confirmed by the respondent No. 1 after appreciating the facts and material on record. She submitted that the scope of judicial review in a petition filed under Article 226 is very limited because it is review of the decision making process and not of the decision itself and the High Court cannot re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts found by the fact finding authority under the statute and hence, the petition should not be entertained by this Court. In support of her submissions, she relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal and others v. M/s. Gopinath & Sons and others, reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 (para 8) and in Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Nathubhai Patel and others, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 200 (paras 18 and 23). She further submitted that, even on merits also, there are concurrent findings of two authorities in favour of respondent No. 3, who have, after appreciating the facts and material on record, allotted the shop to the respondent No. 3 Juth, and the said concurrent findings, hence, do not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. She submitted that the respondent authority has rightly allotted the shop to the respondent No. 3 as allotment of Fair Price Shops, at the relevant time, was governed by the Government Resolution (GR) dated 21/08/2006 and as per para 5 of the said GR, for allotment of the Fair Price Shops, 50% is reserved for local Svasahay Juths and remaining for local educated unemployed. Besides, para 5.1.6 of the said GR provides for preference to be given to a mixed Juth comprising of both male and female members, when only one new shop is to be opened in a village. She submitted that the respondent No. 3 Juth is also a mixed Juth comprising of male and female members, to be precise, 01 male member and 09 female members and is registered as such at a District Level on 08/06/2007 vide Registration No. 245. She submitted that the respondent No. 3 Juth is also a mixed Juth comprising of male and female members, to be precise, 01 male member and 09 female members and is registered as such at a District Level on 08/06/2007 vide Registration No. 245. Further, she submitted that Maldhari Svasahay Juth and Maldhari Hariyali Svasahay Juth are one and the same and are not different. The respondent No. 3 Juth was registered in the name of Maldhari Svasahay Juth on 11/06/2007 and the Project Manager of Jilla Jalstrav Vikas Ekma has issued a Certificate to this effect on 11/01/2010. Last but not the least, she submitted that in view of the aforesaid facts and also the concurrent findings of two respondent authorities recording just, proper and plausible reasons, the present petition deserves no interference at the hands of this Court and may be dismissed. 7. On behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Mr. Bhavesh Hajare, learned Assistant Government Pleader, has produced the copies of the Government Resolutions (GRs) dated 02/04/2004 as well as 21/08/2006 regarding Policy as to the Fair Price Shops. Referring to the said GRs, he submitted that it is the fact that as per GR dated 02/04/2004, priority was to be given to the educated unemployed persons, however, as per another GR dated 21/08/2006 issued thereafter, taking into consideration GR dated 02/04/2004, it was decided to give priority to the Mahila Svasahay Juths as per the policy of the State Government. He submitted that Clause 5 of the GR dated 21/08/2006 throws light on the issue involved in the present petition. Lastly, he submitted that both the aforesaid orders, impugned herein, have been passed in line of the GR dated 21/08/2006 and there appears no perversity and hence, present petition being devoid of merits, may be dismissed. 8. It is pertinent to note that, as stated by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, at the threshold he had requested to the earlier bench conducting this matter to call for the record and proceedings related to the orders impugned in this petition so as to ascertain the veracity of the certificates at Annexure 'H', page Nos. 66 and 67. Accordingly, oral direction was given to the learned Assistant Government Pleader to verify both the certificates and to ascertain whether the original certificates are there on the record or not. 66 and 67. Accordingly, oral direction was given to the learned Assistant Government Pleader to verify both the certificates and to ascertain whether the original certificates are there on the record or not. He submitted that right now the concerned official is present with original record and proceedings with him and he has verified the same and declared that original certificates are lying in the record and accordingly, the said original documents of page Nos. 66 and 67 have been verified by all the concerned. 9. Before dealing with the rival submissions, this Court would like to have a glance on the decisions on an issue of scope of judicial review in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, upon which the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 has placed reliance, relevant paragraphs of which are extracted hereunder: 9.1. In H.B. Gandhi (supra), the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 has relied upon para 8, which reads as under: “8. But here what was assailed was the correctness of findings as if before an appellate forum. Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.” 9.2. In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel (supra), the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 has relied upon paras 18 and 23, which read as under: “18. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.” 9.2. In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel (supra), the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 has relied upon paras 18 and 23, which read as under: “18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the Court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.” 19. xxx 20. xxx 21. xxx 22. xxx 23. There is no denying the fact that in the light of clear stipulation in subsection (4) of Section 32 of the Act, because of equality of votes the election result had to be decided by draw of lots and this is what the Presiding Officer did. But, the moot question is whether the detention of the two councillors was such a trivial factor in the subject election, which could be overlooked by the Presiding Officer. It is manifestly clear from the material on record that he was made aware of the said development. In the light of some of the circumstances, viz. But, the moot question is whether the detention of the two councillors was such a trivial factor in the subject election, which could be overlooked by the Presiding Officer. It is manifestly clear from the material on record that he was made aware of the said development. In the light of some of the circumstances, viz. (i) after arresting councillors Anilbhai Patel and Meenaben Gohil at around 12.30 p.m., just half an hour before the scheduled time for elections, the police officers did not produce them before the Magistrate immediately, but took them around Anand town in the police van and produced them before the Magistrate only at about 5.00 p.m., by which time the elections were already held and the results were also declared; (ii) no circumstance brought on record by the police to show that it would have been inexpedient to wait till the elections were over before effecting arrest of Anilbhai Patel and Meenaben Gohil. Both the councillors are residents of Anand and their co-accused in the respective offences were released by the police officers themselves after arresting them on 5.11.2005; and (iii) there was no circumstance to show that the two councillors would have escaped and avoided arrest if they were allowed to go inside the meeting hall for voting at 1.00 p.m. and if they were not arrested till the meeting for electing President and Vice-President was over. We have no hesitation in holding that the detention of the two councillors, a few minutes before the election meeting was a relevant factor which ought to have been taken into account by the Presiding Officer to decide whether to continue with the election or to postpone it and call the meeting on some other day in terms of Rule 10. Failure to do so not only offends against procedural propriety, it makes his decision to go ahead with the election meeting perverse and irrational, a facet of unreasonableness, warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error of law and/or jurisdiction in setting aside the election of the appellant as President of the Anand Municipality.” 10. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court has not committed any error of law and/or jurisdiction in setting aside the election of the appellant as President of the Anand Municipality.” 10. In light of the aforesaid submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the parties, I have carefully gone through the two GRs respectively dated 02/08/2004 and 21/08/2006, copies of which have been supplied by the learned Assistant Government Pleader to the learned advocates appearing for the parties as well as to the Court. Referring to GR dated 02/08/2004 it appears that so far as new Fair Price Shop to be approved is concerned, the weight-age was given to the educated unemployed persons and educated unemployed persons were given special attention in allotting the shops in question and the ranked top comparing the rest of the categories as mentioned in para 5 of the said resolution. So far as next resolution dated 21/08/2006 is concerned in which GR dated 02/08/2004 was also taken into consideration, it is resolved that while considering the issue related to allotment of new Fair Price Shops, 50% shops were required to be allotted to the Local Svasahay Juths and 50% were to be allotted to the Local Educated Unemployed. Moreover, as mentioned in para 5.1.6 of the said resolution dated 21/08/2006, out of Svasahay Juths also, first priority is required to be given to the Mahila Svasahay Juths and in case of nonavailability of a Mahila Svasahay Juth, priority is required to be given to a Female and Male Mishra (Mix) Svasahay Juth. In sub-para No. 6.2(6) of para 6 of the said resolution dated 21/08/2006, it is further resolved that in absence of above-referred both the Svasahay Juths, priority for allotment of Fair Price Shop is to be given to the educated unemployed as mentioned in para 5.3 of the said resolution dated 21/08/2006. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that so far as respondent No. 3 i.e. Shri Maldhari Svasahay Juth is concerned, it consists of 08 female members and 01 male member and accordingly, the respondent No. 3 falls within the category of Local Mishra (Mix) Svasahay Juth, which should be given priority in comparison to the educated unemployed, more particularly when, as per the strength of population of village Kaprupur, only one Fair Price Shop could be opened. 10.1. 10.1. Referring to page No. 80 which is the draft of Public Notice dated 02/01/2010 to be published in local newspaper inviting applications, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that in the first paragraph of the said notice it is clearly provided that if educationally unemployed candidate is not available, Svasahay Juth will be taken into consideration and accordingly, in the said notice, priority has been given to the local educated unemployed and by making oblique (/) sign thereafter, Svasahay Juth has been mentioned and thus, it is clear that if local educationally unemployed candidate is available, priority was to be given to the said educationally unemployed person and considering the same, the application of the petitioner was required to be considered but this important aspect has not been properly considered by both the authorities whose orders are under challenge by way of this petition. In light of the said submissions, I have carefully perused both the impugned orders herein and it transpires that while passing the orders impugned herein, both the authorities have taken into consideration the extant policy of the Government, which is reflected in GR dated 21/08/2006 and accordingly, in my view, the respondent No. 3 Juth has rightly been given priority by all concerned for the reason that, as discussed herein above, as per GR dated 21/08/2006, top priority in allotting the shop is given to Local Mahila Svasahay Juths and in absence of said Juths, the next priority is given to the Local Famale and Male Mishra (Mix) Svasahay Juths and in absence of both the said Juths, Local Educationally Unemployed persons are required to be considered. So far as the case on hand is concerned, only one shop was to be approved and allotted considering the population of Kaprupur village and in view of the GR dated 21/08/2006, the respondent No. 3 comes prior to the petitioner in priority and hence, there appears no substance in the aforesaid submission made by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner. 10.2. Further, referring to the grounds (e) and (f) of the petition, much has been submitted by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner regarding genuineness of both the certificates on which the respondent No. 3 has placed reliance, copies of which are at Annexure 'H', page Nos. 66 and 67. As discussed above, originals of certificates at Annexure 'H', page Nos. 66 and 67. As discussed above, originals of certificates at Annexure 'H', page Nos. 66 and 67 are there on the record and while deciding the issue, the concerned authority has gone through the same and after verifying both the certificates, they did not find the same bogus and/or concocted. So far as certificate at page No. 67 is concerned, it is issued in the name of “Maldhari Svasahay Juth” and so far as certificate at page No. 66 is concerned, the word “Hariyali” appears to have been added while issuing the said certificate and only on this count, it cannot be said that the certificates are not genuine more-so-when both the authorities have verified the record related to the same and when the code number as well as the registration number are also mentioned in both the certificates. It is also the fact that so far as page No. 67 is concerned, the date of existence of the Juth is shown as 08/06/2007 while in the certificate at page No. 66, the date of existence of the Juth is shown as 11/06/2007 but because of this difference in the dates it cannot be said that both the certificates have been fraudulently prepared and produced before the concerned authorities more particularly when both the authorities have verified the same and have not created any doubt regarding the genuineness of the said certificates which appear to have been taken birth in the year 2007 i.e. much prior to the date of publication of the notice inviting the applications in the year 2010 and hence, I do not find any substance in the averments made in the above-referred grounds (e) and (f). 10.3. It has also been submitted by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner that the educational qualification of the members of the respondent No. 3 is maximum up to 6th standard while the basic requirement for allotment of a Fair Price Shop is minimum 10th standard i.e. S.S.C. and accordingly, the respondent No. 3 is not having requisite educational qualification and this aspect has been ignored by both the authorities while passing the impugned orders. The above ground is required to be considered when the question is to be decided for an educated unemployed person, but when the respondent No. 3 Juth falls within the category of Local Female and Male Mix Svasahay Juth then their education is, as such, not required to be taken into consideration, is the submission made by the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 and there appears substance and force in the same. 11. Further, I have considered the ratio laid down in both the above-referred decisions on which the learned advocate appearing for the respondent No. 3 has placed reliance and in light of the same, I have carefully gone through both the impugned orders dated 02/04/2013 passed by respondent No. 1 herein - Deputy Secretary, Government of Gujarat in Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department, Gandhinagar in appeal No. 24 of 2011 filed by the petitioner herein and 29/06/2011 passed by the Collector, Banaskantha at Palanpur, respondent No. 2 herein. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has failed to point out any perversity and/or arbitrariness in the conclusion recorded and findings arrived at by the competent authorities in the same. Under the circumstances, the present petition having found without any substance, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. Ad-interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated forthwith. No costs. Petition dismissed.