ORDER 1. Calling in question tenability of order dated 13.12.2013, passed by respondent No.1 – The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, this writ petition has been filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, in Writ Petition No. 22347/2013. The order under challenge in Writ Petition Nos. 2268/2014 and 3207/2014 are dated 17.1.2014. 2. As common questions of law and fact are involved in all these three cases, they are being decided by this common order and for the sake of convenience, the documents and pleadings available in Writ Petition No. 2268/2014 is being referred to in this order. 3. The only question of law involved in all these cases are ‘as to whether a permit can be granted for plying of a stage carriage in a route for which formulation of the route under section 68(3)(ca) is yet to be made’. 4. In all these three cases, the application for grant of stage carriage permit was submitted on a date much before the formulation of the route under the statutory provision, but when the permit was granted the route formulation was effected. The Tribunal by the impugned order has held that even an application for grant of permit before the formulation of the route is not permissible and, therefore, these writ petitions are filed. 5. In Writ Petition No. 2268/2014, an application for grant of permit was made on 6.12.2013, the route was formulated on 20.2.2013 and the permit was granted on 22.4.2013. Similarly, in Writ Petition No.22347/13, the petitioner applied for counter signature of the permit granted on 15.10.2009, objections were called for vide order dated 12.1.2012 and the permit was granted on 28.8.2012. In Writ Petition No.3207/2014 petitioner applied for grant of permit on 14.3.2011 and the permit was granted on 3.4.2012. 6. Shri H.C. Kohli, learned counsel for the petitioners, argued that for the purpose of grant of permit the only requirement under law is formulation of the route at the time of grant of permit. Referring to the provisions of section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the words ‘an application can be filed any time? appearing therein; the provision of section 69 and the words’ for plying of a vehicle? Referring to the provisions of section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the words ‘an application can be filed any time? appearing therein; the provision of section 69 and the words’ for plying of a vehicle? used in section 68(ca), learned counsel argued that an application for grant of permit is maintainable even before formulation of the route and the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ashish Kumar Jain v. MP STAT, Gwalior, 2010 (11) MPJR 190, to the contrary does not lay down the correct proposition of law, as the statutory provisions have not been taken note of. Learned counsel took us through the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Mithilesh Rani v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others, 1997 AIH 771; a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of MP State Road Transport Corporation v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others, 2003(2) MPLJ 473 ; and, a judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of Premlal v. Government of Kerala, 2005 (1) ACC 6, in support of his contentions. 7. That apart, it was argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents did not raise any objection when the applications for grant of permit was made, they did not raise any objection when consideration of the applications was made, but it is for the first time that by filing a revision in the Tribunal that the objections were made. Therefore, his second contention is that the objections were not sustainable. 8. Shri Rahul Jain, learned Deputy Advocate General, refuted the aforesaid and supported the order passed by the Tribunal. 9. Shri P.R. Bhave, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Ajay Ojha and other counsel, argued for the private respondents and submitted that all the aspects of the matter, including the question of maintainability of the application before formulation of the route is no more in dispute and based on various judgments of the Supreme Court, as a Coordinate Bench of this Court has decided the issue in the case of Ashish Kumar Jain (supra), therefore, no further indulgence into the matter is called for. It was argued by Shri Bhave, learned Senior Advocate, that the interpretation given by the petitioner with reference to section 80 and other provisions, if accepted, would lead to a situation where even before the formulation of the route an application would be filed by certain persons and this will be adverse to public interest. It is said that no application is maintainable in the light of the law laid down in the case of Ashish Kumar Jain (supra) and, therefore, in allowing the revision it is stated that the learned Tribunal has not committed any error. 10. Shri Bhave, learned Senior Advocate further argued that the judgment in the case of Smt. Mithilesh Rani (supra) has already been considered by the Division Bench in the case of Ashish Kumar Jain (supra). Learned Senior Advocate further submits that in view of the Full Bench judgment in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators Association v. State of MP, 2003(1) JLJ 105 = 2003(1) MPHT 226 , the judgment of the Division Bench is binding on this Court and, therefore, the objections are liable to be dismissed. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the records. 12. In the case of Ashish Kumar Jain (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court has taken note of the provisions of section 68 of the Motor Vehicle Act; the provisions of section 70 pertaining to application for grant of stage permit; the judgment in the case of Smt. Mithilesh Rani (supra); and, by going into each and every aspect of the matter in detail has laid down the principle of law which goes to show that even an application for grant of stage carriage permit is not maintainable unless the route is formulated as required under section 68(3)(ca) by the State Government. 13. Shri H.C. Kohli, learned counsel for the petitioners, wants us to differ from the aforesaid judgment on the ground that in the procedure for applying for grant of permit as contemplated under section 80, an application for grant of permit of any kind is said to be permissible and made at any time. 14. 13. Shri H.C. Kohli, learned counsel for the petitioners, wants us to differ from the aforesaid judgment on the ground that in the procedure for applying for grant of permit as contemplated under section 80, an application for grant of permit of any kind is said to be permissible and made at any time. 14. The words ‘any kind’ or ‘made at any time’ appearing in section 80 cannot be made applicable as the general rule for grant of stage carriage permit when a specific provision for grant of stage carriage permit and submission of application for this purpose is contemplated under section 68(3)(ca) and the procedure for submission of an application is contemplated under section 70 and section 72. Infact the provisions of section 80 pertains to making of a general application, whereas section 70 in particular deals with application for grant of stage carriage permit. 15. The learned Bench in the case of Ashish Kumar Jain (supra) after taking note of the provisions of section 68, 70 and 72 has decided to issue and nothing is brought to our notice to take a different view from the view already taken by a Coordinate Bench of this Court. We find that the legal question involved in this case is already covered by the judgment rendered in the case of Ashish Kumar Jain (supra), and we see no reason to take a different view with regard to the principle of law laid down in the said case. 16. As far as the contention of Shri Kohli, learned counsel for the petitioners, to say that the respondents did not raise any objection at the time when the application was filed or when the grant was made, but raised the objections only when the revision was filed is concerned, once a legal error or lacuna in the matter of grant of permit is pointed out and when it is found that the permit is granted contrary to the set principles of law, on such technical grounds we see no reason to interfere into the legal order passed by the Tribunal. 17. Accordingly, finding no ground to interfere, all the three writ petitions are dismissed.