JUDGMENT : - Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice Petitioners have called in question the searches and seizures conducted by the Punjab Police on 15th and 16th November, 2013, at their premises at Village Jodhapur, Barotiwala and Bhatolikalan, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., on the grounds that the Punjab Police has not followed the due procedure and mandate of law and are without any jurisdiction. 2. Precisely, the case of the petitioners is that the Punjab Police had no jurisdiction to enter into the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Himachal Pradesh and to conduct the searches and seizures in the said premises and have sought the following reliefs amongst the others, on the grounds taken in the memo of writ petition: “Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India for issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction humbly beseeching this Hon'ble Court to declare the purported searches and seizures conducted by Punjab Police at the premises of the petitioners in the State of Himachal Pradesh on 15.11.2013 and 16.11.2013 without following mandate law to be illegal, null and void ab-initio. Further for issuance of appropriate writ, order or directions to Respondents No. 1, 2, 4 and 6 (police authorities in the State of Himachal Pradesh) to register a case and investigate the role of various persons including police personnel from Punjab who had conducted alleged searches and seizures in duly licensed premises of petitioner; lifted licensed stock of Ephedrine/Pseudoephedrine (controlled substances under NDPS Act, 1985) without being accompanied by or associated with the officials of Licensing Authority viz. State Drugs Controller-cum-Licensing and Controlling Authority Himachal Pradesh (Respondent No. 3), whereby such acts of omission/commission tantamount to serious cognizable offences of criminal trespass, criminal misappropriation, criminal intimidation and other such cognate offences. Further for issuance of appropriate writ, order or directions to the police as well as Drug Authorities in the State of Himachal Pradesh to formulate such procedural safeguards by way of guidelines etc. Further for issuance of appropriate writ, order or directions to the police as well as Drug Authorities in the State of Himachal Pradesh to formulate such procedural safeguards by way of guidelines etc. so as to ensure that premises of licensed manufacturers under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 as well as Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 are not allowed to be searched without the association of Drug Licensing Authority of the State and without local police as also local public witnesses, thereby, ensuring no breach of law, equity or justice is perpetrated within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Himachal Pradesh by police of another state in a wholly slipshod, illegal and arbitrary manner. Further for issuance of writ, order or directions to the official respondents in the State of Himachal Pradesh to ensure that licenced stock pertaining to Ephedrine and Pseudoephedrine illegally and unlawfully taken away by the Punjab police from the licensed premises of the petitioners is brought back to the State of Himachal Pradesh and dealt with in an appropriate manner.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while addressing arguments, was asked to justify the maintainability of the writ petition. He was also asked to place on record the copy of the order made by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Mohali (hereinafter referred to as “the JMIC, Mohali”). He sought time to produce the same, but addressed the arguments on 7th July, 2014. The judgment was reserved, but the learned counsel for the petitioners failed to produce of the copy of the said order. Accordingly, the case was again listed before this Court on 15th July, 2014, when Mr. Deven Khanna, Advocate, appeared and sought adjournment. Thereafter, he had moved CMP No. 12052 of 2014 for placing on record the copy of the order made by the JMIC, Mohali, alongwith some other documents, which are taken on record. 4. On a bare perusal of the writ petition alongwith the documents annexed therewith, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that FIR No. 56 of 2013 was lodged on 15th May, 2013, at Police Station Banur, District Patiala, for commission of offences punishable under Sections 379, 411, 473, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”) and Sections 21, 22, 61 and 85 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the NDPS Act”). During investigation, the Investigating Officer was of the view that the search is to be conducted at various places, also in the premises of the petitioners at Solan and accordingly, sought permission in terms of the mandate of Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “the CrPC”). The JMIC, Mohali, after examining the request and the contents contained in the motion, granted the permission and permitted the Investigating Officer to conduct search in the said premises at Solan vide order, dated 14th November, 2013. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of order, dated 14th November, 2013, made by JMIC, Mohali, herein: “Heard on the application filed by the I.O. through Ld. APP for the State for issuance of search warrants for conducting the search of following premises:- 1. MBP Pharma Private Limited, Village Jodhapur Kalka Road, Badi, Distt. Solan (HP) 2. Montek Bio Pharmtec Plot No. 45, Batouli Kalan, Distt. Solan (HP) 3. Tulip formulation, Village Damtaal, Himachal Pradesh, near Pathankot. List of the accused persons attached with the FIR would reflect the names of Jagjit Singh and Paramjit Singh to be owner of premises to be searched by the Investigating Officer. The police has asserted that the manufacturing of huge quantity of alleged narcotic drugs already recovered in the present case used to take place in the above said factories/premises. Further apprehension has been asserted by the I.O. that there is likelihood that during the course of investigation the accused persons may not produce such machines/raw material used to manufacture above said drug before him, if they are summoned under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. and may destroy the same. The apprehension expressed appears to be reasonable and accused person may indulge in destroying such incriminating substances/tools, if called upon to produce the same by the court. In the considered view of this court, looking at the gravity of the matter involved prima facie case is made out for issuance of search warrants as this search can help the police in getting importants leads with respect to the investigation in the present case. As such, keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice, the request of the investigating agency stands allowed and the search warrants are issued against the aforesaid premises detailed of which has been given above. As such, keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice, the request of the investigating agency stands allowed and the search warrants are issued against the aforesaid premises detailed of which has been given above. The search warrants are entrusted to I.O., P.S. Banur for compliance, as per law. The search would conduct aforesaid premises only. Papers be attached with the record of the case. Now, to come up on 19.11.2013 for report by the I.O.” 5. The petitioners have not questioned the said order of JMIC, Mohali, in terms of which the Investigating Officer has conducted the search. If, at all, the petitioners were aggrieved by the search, which is in sequel to the order (supra), the petitioners had to challenge the same before the Court of competent jurisdiction and to seek appropriate remedy, but for the reasons best known to the writ petitioners, without questioning the same, have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, though has made the foundation of the writ petition on the said order. 6. The writ petitioners had also invoked the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by the medium of CWP No. 88 of 2013, titled as Jagjit Singh Chahal versus State of Punjab and others. 6. The writ petitioners had also invoked the jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by the medium of CWP No. 88 of 2013, titled as Jagjit Singh Chahal versus State of Punjab and others. It is apt to reproduce the reliefs sought by the petitioners in CWP No. 88 of 2013 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court herein: “i. Issue entrustment of investigation in case FIR No. 56 dated 15.5.2013 registered under Sections 379/411/473/120-B IPC and 21/22/61/85 Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 at Police Station Banur District Patiala (Annexure P-46) (hereinafter referred to as 'NDPS Act') and other such similar cases apparently being investigated by Special Investigation Team under the supervision of Respondent No. 3 Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala to the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as 'CBI') in view of the wide ranging ramifications/repercussions both national and international including the urgent need to unearth the unholy nexus involving officials, ministers, bureaucrats, leaders of political parties and other such persons occupying positions in higher echelons of power and authority with the drug racket in the State of Punjab as the investigations being conducted are merely aimed at sensationalizing the issue without any real intent to reach at the truth as also on account of the fact that no free, fair, impartial and unbiased investigation is expected from the local police which is playing in the hands of vested political interests and also praying that this Hon'ble Court may monitor such investigations as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia, in “Babu Bhai Jamna Das Patel Versus State of Gujrat (2009) 9 SCC 610 ”; ii. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to Respondent No. 1 and 2 to forthwith comply with the mandate laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Parkash Singh and others Versus Union of India and others 2006 (8) SCC 1” pertaining to police reforms especially in the area related to separation of investigation police from the law and order police so as to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people. iii. iii. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to meticulously & scrupulously interpret and comply the provisions of NDPS Act in due consultation, coordination and association between the respective departments i.e. one relating to the Drugs Control Authorities falling under the jurisdiction of Respondents No. 5 to 7 etc. and the other relating to Penal Law enforcement measures falling under the jurisdiction of Respondent No. 1 to 4 etc. so as to ensure that the laudable provisions of the NDPS Act which are intended to curb the drug menace do not become an instrument of oppression as also to ensure that the provisions of the NDPS Act are applied, implemented and executed in a holistic manner in furtherance of the objectives of the Act. iv. Issue an appropriate writ, order or directions to Respondent No. 1 to 4 to bring about transparency in the conduct of investigations, searches, seizures and arrests made under the NDPS Act as also other penal provisions, as also to follow and comply with the mandate of Code of Criminal Procedure in its true and corrective perspective. v. Issue an appropriate writ, order or directions re. ensuring that the Investigating Agencies in the State employ scientific methods aided with latest technology including Video recording etc. wherever necessary so as to instill confidence into the purported searches, seizures, disclosures and recoveries etc. made in the course of such investigations. vi. Issue any other order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may kindly be passed in favour of the Petitioners; vii. Dispense with the service of the advance notices upon the respondents; viii. Exempt the Petitioner from filing the certified/original as well as true type copies of Annexures P-1 to P-60; ix. Costs of the petition be Awarded in favour of the Petitioner; It is further prayed that this Hon'ble court may be pleased to stay all further proceedings arising out of FIR No. 56 dated 15.5.2013 registered under Sections 379/411/473/120-B IPC and 21/22/61/85 Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 at Police Station Banur District Patiala (Annexure P-46) qua the petitioner in the interest of justice.” 7. The said writ petition was listed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 9th January, 2014, and the following order came to be passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court: “Counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner was arrested on 13/14.11.2013 and the recovery of 2 kg. of Pseudoephedrine and 25 grams of Ice/Metha Matamine was effected from Car No. PB-10-CE-0001 on 14.11.2013. Apart from this, his two factories at Baddi were searched on 15/16.11.2013 and thereafter recovery of 300 Kgs. of Mixture Powder and 16 drums containing 25 kg. each of Pseudoephedrine was effected. This recovery was made a ground for extending the police remand. Learned counsel has submitted that these two factories in Himachal Pradesh had been operating with a valid licence which was issued under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act as well as Section 9-A of the NDPS Act. The petitioner has not faced any other criminal complaint under the NDPS Act and recovery from these two factories cannot be made a ground to involve him in FIR No. 56 dated 15.5.2013 registered under Sections 379/411/473/120 IPC, 25/54/59 NDPS Act and 21/22/61/85 Arms Act registered at Police Station Banur. Notice of motion for 10.2.2014. On asking of the Court, Mr. Rupam Aggarwal, DAG, Punjab, accepts notice on behalf of the State. Counsel for the petitioner is directed to supply copy of the petition to the counsel for the State during the course of the day.” 8. It is crystal clear that the petitioners have not questioned the order made by JMIC Mohali on 14th November, 2013, before the Punjab and Haryana High Court by the medium of the writ petition (supra). The petitioners could have sought relief from the Punjab and Haryana High Court, if at all aggrieved. The disputes/reliefs prayed in the writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court are almost the same, which are prayed/sought in the writ petition in hand. 9. In the given circumstances, prima facie, it appears that the writ petition filed before this Court is an afterthought, just to hamper the investigation, which has been conducted by the Punjab Police. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgment made by the Apex Court in a case titled as Wazir Chand and another versus The State of Himachal Pradesh and others, reported in AIR 1954 Supreme Court 415, in support of his case. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgment made by the Apex Court in a case titled as Wazir Chand and another versus The State of Himachal Pradesh and others, reported in AIR 1954 Supreme Court 415, in support of his case. This judgment is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case for the reason that in Wazir Chand's case (supra), J&K Police was conducting the investigation, had requested Chamba Police to conduct the search and effect the seizure. Accordingly, J&K Police also entered the territorial jurisdiction of Chamba district and the Chamba Police alongwith J&K Police made search and effected seizure without any order from the Court of competent jurisdiction either from J&K or from Himachal Pradesh. The person aggrieved filed applications before this Court for issuance of writs of mandamus and certiorari, which came to be dismissed on the ground that the same was not maintainable as the High Court was not having the jurisdiction. Feeling aggrieved, the same was questioned before the Apex Court and the Apex Court held that search made without following due process of law was bad and the search was conducted within the jurisdiction of Himachal Pradesh and the High Court of Himachal Pradesh had the jurisdiction. But, it would be profitable to record herein that in the case (supra), no order was made by the Magistrate having the competence and jurisdiction and in the present case, order has been passed by JMIC, Mohali. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the search has not been conducted as per the provisions contained in the CrPC read with the provisions of NDPS Act. 12. Whether this argument is available to the petitioners is to be seen by the Magistrate, who has passed the order issuing the search warrants or can be raised before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, if permissible under law. At the cost of repetition, if at all the petitioners were aggrieved, they were to question the said order before the Court of competent jurisdiction. 13. At the cost of repetition, if at all the petitioners were aggrieved, they were to question the said order before the Court of competent jurisdiction. 13. It is a moot question as to whether the search and seizure conducted in terms of the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the CrPC, which contains Sections 91 to 105 read with the provisions contained in Sections 165 and 166 of the CrPC, can be made basis for quashing the investigation or quashing the search and seizure made? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons: 14. The Apex Court in a case titled as M.P. Sharma and others versus Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and others, reported in AIR 1954 SC 300 , held that searches made in pursuance of warrants issued under Sections 94 and 96 of the CrPC cannot be challenged as illegal on the ground of violation of fundamental rights and cannot be made ground for quashing the investigation or quashing the search. It is apt to reproduce paras 18 and 19 of the judgment herein: “18. A consideration of the history of Indian Statutory legislation relating to searches does not support the theory propounded. The provisions for searches are to be found in the successive Codes of Criminal Procedure. In the earliest Code, Act 25 of 1861, there appears no provision for issuing summons or notices for production of documents, but there was only a provision for the issue of a search warrant by a Magistrate under S. 114 thereof, which is in the following terms : "When a Magistrate shall consider that the production of any thing is essential to the conduct of an enquiry into an offence known or suspected to have been committed, he may grant his warrant to search for such thing; and it shall be lawful for the Officer charged with the execution of such warrant to search for such thing in any house or place within the jurisdiction of such Magistrate. In such case the Magistrate may specify in his warrant the house or place, or part thereof, to which only the search shall extend." There was also S. 142 of the said Code which vested in an officer in charge of police station with the power to make a search 'suo motu' in certain circumstances. In such case the Magistrate may specify in his warrant the house or place, or part thereof, to which only the search shall extend." There was also S. 142 of the said Code which vested in an officer in charge of police station with the power to make a search 'suo motu' in certain circumstances. In the next Criminal P. C., Act 1 of 1872, the relevant provisions were in Ss. 365, 368 and 379. Section 379 was more or less a repetition of S. 142 of the previous Code (Act 25 of 1861) vesting power in a police officer to make a 'suo motu' search. Section 365 appears to be the earliest statutory provision for the issue of a summons, either by a police officer or by a Court for the production of a document required for investigation. This was followed by S. 368 relating to the issue of search warrants which was in the following terms : "When a Magistrate considers that the production of anything is essential to the conduct of an inquiry into an offence known or suspected to have been committed or to the discovery of the offender, or when he consider that such inquiry or discovery will be furthered by the search or inspection of any house or place, he may grant his search-warrant; and the officer charged with the execution of such warrant may search or inspect any house or place within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the District. The Magistrate issuing such warrant may, if he sees fit, specify in his warrant the house or place, or part thereof, to which only the search or inspection shall extend; and the officer charged with the execution of such warrant shall then search or inspect only the house, place or part so specified.” It will be noticed that even when the procedure of summons for production of documents was introduced, as above in S. 365, the provision for the issue of a search-warrant in S. 368, has absolutely nothing to do with the question of non-compliance by the concerned person with the summons for production. It is only in the next Criminal P.C., Act 10 of 1882, that the provisions, Ss. 94 and 96, appear which correspond to the present Ss. It is only in the next Criminal P.C., Act 10 of 1882, that the provisions, Ss. 94 and 96, appear which correspond to the present Ss. 94 and 96 of Act 5 of 1898, linking up to some extent the issue of search-warrants with non-compliance or likelihood of non-compliance with a summons to produce. It may be mentioned in passing that the provision for the issue of general search warrants appears for the first time in the Procedure Code of 1882 and even there the issue of such general warrants is not based on non-compliance with a previous summons for production. It is, therefore, clear that there is no basis in the Indian law for the assumption that a search or seizure of a thing or document is in itself to be treated as compelled production of the same. Indeed a little consideration will show that the two are essentially different matters for the purpose relevant to the present discussion. A notice to produce is addressed to the party concerned and his production in compliance therewith constitutes a testimonial act by him within the meaning of Art. 20 (3) as above explained. But a search warrant is addressed to an officer of the Government, generally a police officer. Neither the search nor the seizure are acts of the occupier of the searched premises. They are acts of another to which he is obliged to submit and are, therefore, not his testimonial acts in any sense. Even in the American decisions there is a strong current of judicial opinion in support of this distinction. In - 'Hale v. Henkel', (1905) 201 US 43 (G), Justice McKenna in his dissenting judgment makes the following observations : "Search implies a quest by an officer of the law; a seizure contemplates a forcible disposition of the owner .......... The quest of an officer acts upon the things themselves, may be secret, intrusive, accompanied by force. The service of a 'subpoena' is but the delivery of a paper to a party, - is open and aboveboard. There is no element of trespass of force in it." A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of security & that power is necessarily regulated by law. There is no element of trespass of force in it." A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of security & that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some process of strained construction. Nor is it legitimate to assume that the constitutional protection under Art. 20 (3) would be defeated by the statutory provisions for searches. It is to be remembered that searches of the kind we are concerned with are under the authority of a Magistrate (excepting in the limited class of cases falling under S. 165 of the Criminal P.C.). Therefore, issue of a search warrant is normally the judicial function of the Magistrate. When such judicial function is interposed between the individual and the officer's authority for search, no circumvention thereby of the fundamental right is to be assumed. We are not unaware that in the present set up of the Magistracy in this country, it is not infrequently that the exercise of this judicial function is liable to serious error, as is alleged in the present case. But the existence of scope for such occasional errors is no ground to assume circumvention of the constitutional guarantee. 19. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the searches with which we are concerned in the present cases cannot be challenged as illegal on the ground of violation of any fundamental rights and that these applications are liable to be dismissed.” 15. The Apex Court in Radha Kishan versus State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court 822, held that even assuming that the search was illegal, the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. 16. The same view was taken by the Apex Court in V.S. Kuttan Pillai versus Ramakrishnan and another, reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 185. It is apt to reproduce paras 14, 15 and 17 of the judgment herein: “14. 16. The same view was taken by the Apex Court in V.S. Kuttan Pillai versus Ramakrishnan and another, reported in AIR 1980 Supreme Court 185. It is apt to reproduce paras 14, 15 and 17 of the judgment herein: “14. Section 93(1) (c) of the new Code comprehends a situation where the Court may issue a search warrant when it considers that the purpose of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code will be served by a general search or inspection to search, seize and produce the documents mentioned in the list. When such a general search warrant is issued, in execution of it the premises even in possession of the accused can be searched and documents found therein can be seized irrespective of the fact that the documents may contain some statement made by the accused upon his personal knowledge and which when proved may have the tendency to incriminate the accused. However, such a search and seizure pursuant to a search warrant issued under Section 93(1) (c) will not have even the remotest tendency to compel the accused to incriminate himself. He is expected to do nothing. He is not required to participate in the search. He may remain a passive spectator. He may even remain absent. Search can be conducted under the authority of such warrant in the presence of the accused. Merely because he is occupying the premises which is to be searched under the authority of the search warrant it cannot even remotely be said that by such search and consequent seizure of documents including the documents which may contain statements attributable to the personal knowledge of the accused and which may have tendency to incriminate him, would violate the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination because he is not compelled to do anything. A passive submission to search cannot be styled as a compulsion on the accused to submit to search and if anything is recovered during search which may provide incriminating evidence against the accused it cannot be styled as compelled testimony. This is too obvious to need any precedent in support. The immunity against self-crimination extends to any incriminating evidence which the accused may be compelled to give. This is too obvious to need any precedent in support. The immunity against self-crimination extends to any incriminating evidence which the accused may be compelled to give. It does not extend to cover such situation as where evidence which may have tendency to incriminate the accused is being collected without in any manner compelling him or asking him to be a party to the collection of the evidence. Search of the premises occupied by the accused without the accused being compelled to be a party to such search would not be violative of the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 20(3). 15. It was, however, urged that Section 93(1) (c) must be read in the context of Section 93(1) (b) and it would mean that where documents are known to be at a certain place and in possession of a certain person any general search warrant as contemplated by Section 93(1) (c) will have to be ruled out because in such a situation Section 93(1) (a) alone would be attracted. Section 93(1)(b) comprehends a situation where the Court issues a search warrant in respect of a document or a thing to be recovered from a certain place but it is not known to the Court whether that document or thing is in possession of any particular person. Under clause (b) there is a definite allegation to recover certain document or thing from a certain specific place but the Court is unaware of the fact whether that document or thing or the place is in possession of a particular person. Section 93(1)(c) comprehends a situation where a search warrant can be issued as the Court is unaware of not only the person but even the place where the documents may be found and that a general search is necessary. One cannot, therefore, cut down the power of the Court under Section 93(1) (c) by importing into it some of the requirements of Section 93(1)(b). No canon of construction would permit such an erosion of power of the Court to issue a general search warrant. It also comprehends not merely a general search but even an inspection meaning thereby inspection of a place and a general search thereof and seizure of documents or things which the Court considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of an investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code. It also comprehends not merely a general search but even an inspection meaning thereby inspection of a place and a general search thereof and seizure of documents or things which the Court considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of an investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code. The High Court accordingly sustained the general search warrant in this case under Section 93(1)(c). 16. …........................ 17. The appellant and his co-accused are office bearers of a public institution styled as H.M.D.P. Sabha. We were informed at the hearing of this petition that this Sabha is a public institution engaged in the activity of running educational institutions and supporting objects or activities of a general charitable nature. When the first complaint was filed, the allegation therein was that criminal breach of trust in respect of funds of the public institution has been committed by the office-bearers thereof. A search warrant was issued but it was quashed by the Kerala High Court. Thereafter another complaint was filed making some more serious allegations and a search warrant was sought. Now, this search warrant was being issued to conduct search of the premises used as office of an institution. The place will be in possession of the institution. The office-bearers of the Sabha are accused of an offence. Documents and books of accounts of the institution are required for the purpose of the trial against the office-bearers of the institution. The office premises could not be said to be in possession of any individual accused but stricto sensu it would be in possession of the institution. Books of accounts and other documents of the institution could not be said to be in personal custody or possession of the office-bearers of the institution but they are in possession of the institution and are lying in the office of the institution. A search of such a public place under the authority of a general search warrant can easily be sustained under S. 93(1)(c). If the order of the learned Magistrate is construed to mean this, there is no illegality committed in issuing a search warrant. Of course, issuance of a search warrant is a serious matter and it would be advisable not to dispose of an application for search warrant in a mechanical way by a laconic order. If the order of the learned Magistrate is construed to mean this, there is no illegality committed in issuing a search warrant. Of course, issuance of a search warrant is a serious matter and it would be advisable not to dispose of an application for search warrant in a mechanical way by a laconic order. Issue of search warrant being in the discretion of the Magistrate it would be reasonable to expect of the Magistrate to give reasons which swayed his discretion in favour of granting the request. A clear application of mind by the learned Magistrate must be discernible in the order granting the search warrant. Having said this, we see no justification for interfering with the order of the High Court in this case.” 17. The Apex Court in Om Parkash Sharma versus Central Bureau of Investigation, Delhi, reported in AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2335, has laid down the same principle. 18. The Apex Court has also discussed the entire mandate of the said provision of law in a case titled as Superintendent of Police, CBI and others versus Tapan Kumar Singh, reported in (2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases 175. It is apt to reproduce para 23 of the judgment herein: “23. The High Court also held that before conducting the search and seizure the mandatory requirement of Section 165 was not fulfilled inasmuch as the investigating officer did not record in writing the grounds for his belief as required by the said section. It is premature at this stage to consider whether search and seizure was done in accordance with law as that is a question which has to be considered by the court, if the accused is ultimately put up for trial and he challenges the search and seizure made. Similarly, the question as to whether the GD entry, or the FIR formally recorded on 20-10-1990, is the FIR in the case, is a matter which may be similarly agitated before the court. Where two informations are recorded and it is contended before the court that the one projected by the prosecution as the FIR is not really the FIR but some other information recorded earlier is the FIR, that is a matter which the court trying the accused has jurisdiction to decide. Where two informations are recorded and it is contended before the court that the one projected by the prosecution as the FIR is not really the FIR but some other information recorded earlier is the FIR, that is a matter which the court trying the accused has jurisdiction to decide. Similarly, the mentioning of a particular section in the FIR is not by itself conclusive as it is for the court to frame charges having regard to the material on record. Even if a wrong section is mentioned in the FIR, that does not prevent the Court from framing appropriate charges.” 19. The Apex Court in latest judgments titled as State of Haryana versus Rajmal and another, reported in (2011) 14 Supreme Court Cases 326 and M.T. Enrica Lexie and another versus Doramma and others, reported in (2012) 6 Supreme Court Cases 760, discussed the entire mandate of the relevant provisions applicable and also the development of law made by the judgments of the Apex Court. It apt to reproduce paras 17 and 18 of the judgment in Rajmal's case (supra) herein: “17. Now let us examine the first question on which the High Court has interfered, namely, the legality of the search procedure. 18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radha Kishan v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 822 , while construing a similar provision in CrPC of 1898 held that an illegal search does not vitiate the seizure of the article. The only requirement of law in such cases is that the court has to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond this no further consequences ensue. (AIR p. 824, para 5 of the Report.)” 20. It would also be profitable to reproduce para 14 of the judgment in M.T. Enrica Lexie's case (supra) herein: “14. The police officer in course of investigation can seize any property under Section 102 if such property is alleged to be stolen or is suspected to be stolen or is the object of the crime under investigation or has direct link with the commission of offence for which the police officer is investigating into. A property not suspected of commission of the offence which is being investigated into by the police officer cannot be seized. Under Section 102 of the Code, the police officer can seize such property which is covered by Section 102(1) and no other.” 21. A property not suspected of commission of the offence which is being investigated into by the police officer cannot be seized. Under Section 102 of the Code, the police officer can seize such property which is covered by Section 102(1) and no other.” 21. We have restrained ourselves from discussing the merits of the case. However, it is made clear that any observation made hereinabove shall not cause any prejudice to the petitioners in any way, whatsoever. 22. Having said so, the writ petition is not maintainable and is dismissed in limine.