JUDGMENT : - Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge The petitioner is a partnership firm and as per partnership deed dated 22.3.2006, it was having following partners: 1. Smt. Sangita Rani Goel W/o Dr. Navdeep Goel = 50% partner 2. Sh.Sandeep Goyal S/o Sh. R.N.Goyal = 25% partner 3. Smt. Neelima Goyal D/o Sh. Narinder Kumar = 25% partner 2. The petitioner is a registered vendor with the Department of Railways for three products designed and manufactured by it namely: (i) BLDC fan (ii) Regulated Battery Charger (iii) Constant voltage constant current pre-cooling unit and battery charger for SGAC Coaches. 3. In wake of what came to be known as “Railway Bribery Scam”, the petitioner alongwith many other firms were temporarily delisted vide communication dated 13.5.2013 since one its partner and General Power of Attorney holder Mr. Sandeep Goyal had been arrested. The petitioner through the remaining two partners i.e. Mrs. Sangita Rani Goel and Mrs. Neelima Goyal had already received e-mails to the effect, to which they responded vide their letter dated 22.5.2013 in the following manner: “Kindly refer, your email dated 13.5.2013, for the subject cited above, we understand that temporary delisting on account of our partner, Mr. Sandeep Goyal is named in the railway board case. After getting the information, I Sangita Rani Goel, alongwith 2nd partner, Mrs. Neelima Goyal has decided to take necessary action, as our firm is serving Indian Railways, for the last 10 years and our firm hold good reputation. We the following partners are having majority stake in the firm. We along with our CA. were present to discuss the matter to take the necessary action immediately. Mrs. Sangita Rani Goel Partner Mrs. Neelima Goyal Partner The matter was discussed in detail and both the partners unanimously agreed to remove Mr. Sandeep Goyal, who is holding only 25% stake in our firm, to remove from the partnership. As we have to follow certain procedure and it will take minimum 15-20 days for the procedures. We both partners agreed for the removal of Mr. Sandeep Goyal from the partnership with immediate effect and not to assign any work. The new partnership deed will be submitted to you soon. In the meantime, it is requested not to delist us, as Mr. Sandeep Goyal is a minority shareholder and having only 25% stake in M/s Pyramid Electronics. We both partners agreed for the removal of Mr. Sandeep Goyal from the partnership with immediate effect and not to assign any work. The new partnership deed will be submitted to you soon. In the meantime, it is requested not to delist us, as Mr. Sandeep Goyal is a minority shareholder and having only 25% stake in M/s Pyramid Electronics. Moreover, it directly impacts on the livelihood of approximately 200 families of the employees of M/s Pyramid Electronics. Therefore, your good self is requested to consider our case sympathetically for relisting of Pyramid. Should you need any clarification, in this regard, we will be pleased to depute our representative for the same. Thanking you and looking for your favourable response” A perusal of the aforesaid letter would show that these partners had requested the respondents not to delist the petitioner as the tainted partner Mr. Sandeep Goyal was being removed from the partnership. 4. Thereafter these partners sent another letter dated 10.6.2013 informing the respondents that they had completed all the procedures for removal of Mr. Sandeep Goyal from the Firm. It was further informed that re-constituted Partnership-cum-Retirement Deed had come into existence and the copy of the same was also sent. Thereafter, it was requested that “as the accused partner, who is having minority stake has been removed from the Partnership. Therefore, your goodself is requested to re-list the M/s Pyramid Electronics at the earliest”. 5. This was followed by yet another letter dated 15.6.2013 wherein the petitioner specifically acknowledged the fact that they had been temporarily delisted in pursuance to the media reports in which Mr. Sandeep Goyal had been shown to be involved in the bribery case involving high officials and Ex.Minister of Railways regarding appointment as member in Railway Board. It was claimed that Mr. Sandeep Goyal was having minority stake in the partnership firm and moreover, the allegations against him were personal in nature and the criminal misconduct was yet to be proved and even in case the same is proved, the same does not in any way reflect or devolve on the conduct of the petitioner. 6. It was claimed that Mr. Sandeep Goyal was having minority stake in the partnership firm and moreover, the allegations against him were personal in nature and the criminal misconduct was yet to be proved and even in case the same is proved, the same does not in any way reflect or devolve on the conduct of the petitioner. 6. On 20.6.2013 the respondent No.3 informed the petitioner that it had been temporarily delisted for its two items i.e. Distribution Transformer 3 KVA and Bulk Inverter 2.5 KVA 110V DC/230V AC and to the similar effect was the letter dated 2.7.2013 issued by respondent No.2 informing the petitioner that it had been de-listed from Part-I and Part-II categories for certain items as detailed in the said letter. 7. Undisputably, the complete mechanism and procedure for supply of items to the respondents including delisting of firms is governed and regulated by the RDSO annexed with the petition as Annexure RE. The purpose of this document has been spelled out in Clause 2 thereof in the following terms: “2.0 Purpose This document contains directives for vendor approval/vendor registration (multi-sourcing) of items allotted to RDSO by Railway Board. This document contains directives specific to changes of vendor approved status i.e. upgradation/down gradation, de-listing and relisting etc. A set of related documents create the full set of directives for vendor registration process at RDSO. These are listed under Para 5.0” and scope of its application is spelled out in para-3 of the following terms: “3.0 Scope of Application This directive is applicable to all units covered by the quality management system of RDSO without any exception.” 8. Insofar as the provision regarding delisting of vendor is concerned, the same has been provided in Clause 4.2.8 in the following terms: “4.2.8 Temporary delisting Temporary delisting of vendors can be resorted to under the following conditions: a) Vendors have not applied in time for renewal of approval. b) Two samples have been picked from the consignee and the first sample fails in tests. c) Cases where epidemic failures are noticed in the items supplied. d) Direction from law enforcing agencies. e) Any other serious reason. The firm to be temporarily delisted shall normally be served with a show cause notice bringing out the reason(s) for the temporary delisting. The notice shall allow atleast 10 days for the time to reply. c) Cases where epidemic failures are noticed in the items supplied. d) Direction from law enforcing agencies. e) Any other serious reason. The firm to be temporarily delisted shall normally be served with a show cause notice bringing out the reason(s) for the temporary delisting. The notice shall allow atleast 10 days for the time to reply. However, under exceptional circumstances, issue of the show cause notice shall be dispensed with. The directorate head shall record the reasons for dispensing with the show cause notice. Process for final delisting shall be initiated at the earliest after temporary delisting.” Then, in case there is any decision against the vendor, then the provision for appeal has been provided in clause 4.4. in the following manner: “4.4.Appellate Authority and time period for appeal The vendor can appeal against the decision of the directorate to ADG/RDSO who shall be appellate authority for all cases pertaining to vendor development. The appeal against the order shall be addressed to ADG and given in writing along with the statement of details and reason for the appeal. The appeal must be submitted within 30 days of communication of the impugned order.” 9. Though, the petitioner was temporarily delisted as far back as on 13.5.2013, but has preferred the present petition after a period of nearly ten months and now seeks the quashing of letters dated 13.5.2013, 20.6.2013 and 2.7.2013 respectively. 10. The respondents have raised preliminary objection regarding the very maintainability of this petition on the ground of existence of an alternative and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under RDSO specification by way of appeal under Clause 4.4. It is further contended that the petitioner in fact had already filed an appeal under the said provision in case of rejection of one of its item i.e. BLDC fan. The respondents claimed to have temporarily delisted the petitioner by invoking the provisions of Clause 4.2.8.(e) of the RDSO order. 11. Mr. It is further contended that the petitioner in fact had already filed an appeal under the said provision in case of rejection of one of its item i.e. BLDC fan. The respondents claimed to have temporarily delisted the petitioner by invoking the provisions of Clause 4.2.8.(e) of the RDSO order. 11. Mr. Pramod Kohli, Senior Advocate on the other hand has argued that the provisions of Clause 4.2.8 (e) were not at all attracted to the present case because sub clause (e) has to be read together with sub clause (a) to (d) of Clause 4.2.8 and when so read, it clearly reveals that the provision of appeal would only be attracted when the dispute relates to the quality of the product or the product itself but in no case will it apply to the conduct of the petitioner. He further contends that this is the precise reason why the petitioner had preferred an appeal when one of the product i.e. BLDC fan had been rejected because of its design as it related to the product itself, but insofar as the action regarding delisting in such circumstances is concerned, there is no provision whatsoever for filing of an appeal because the delisting had not been effect in exercise of Clause 4.2.8 (e) supra. 12. We are afraid that we cannot agree with this submission made by the petitioner. In fact not only in the representations noted above but even during the course of argument, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to various provisions of RDSO and vehemently argued that different clauses of this RDSO had been violated and, therefore, the petition be allowed. He had particularly referred to Clauses 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.8 etc. and in fact banked upon these provisions to contend that the action of the respondents was illegal. 13. We fail to understand as to how the petitioner can claim to be bound by one part of this document i.e. RDSO and not the other part. It is trite that no party can say that he will be bound by only one part of the agreement and not the other part, unless such other part is impossible of performance or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act, and is severable from the remaining part of the agreement. It is trite that no party can say that he will be bound by only one part of the agreement and not the other part, unless such other part is impossible of performance or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act, and is severable from the remaining part of the agreement. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Limited and others vs. Raja Transport Private Limited (2009) 8 SCC 520 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “14. No party can say he will be bound by only one part of the agreement and not the other part, unless such other part is impossible of performance or is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act, and such part is severable from the remaining part of the agreement. The arbitration clause is a package which may provide for what disputes are arbitrable, at what stage the disputes are arbitrable, who should be the arbitrator, what should be the venue, what law would govern the parties, etc. A party to the contract cannot claim the benefit of arbitration under the arbitration clause, but ignore the appointment procedure relating to the named arbitrator contained in the arbitration clause.” 14. Undisputably, the temporary delisting of the petitioner has been effected by resorting to the provisions of Clause 4.2.8(e) of this RDSO and, therefore, it is incumbent upon the party aggrieved by such order to resort to the remedy as provided in the RDSO itself. This view of us is substantiated by the fact that the petitioner has already resorted to filing of an appeal in the case of BLDC fan. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then contend that the existence of adequate alternate remedy is not to operate as a bar and is in fact self imposed restriction by the Court in entertaining the writ petition. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then contend that the existence of adequate alternate remedy is not to operate as a bar and is in fact self imposed restriction by the Court in entertaining the writ petition. It is further contended that even where an alternate efficacious remedy exists, it has been consistently held by the various Courts including the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the same would not operate as a bar in atleast three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justices or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court like Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 , Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil vs. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia and others (2004) 2 SCC 65 , Aslam Mohammad Merchant vs. Competent Authority and others (2008) 14 SCC 186 and V.K.Ashokan vs. Assistant Excise Commissioner and others (2009) 14 SCC 85 . 16. Before we proceed further, it is relevant to note here that in the correspondence made by the remaining partners of the petitioner on 22.5.2013, 10.6.2013 and 15.6.2013 never have they complained regarding the infringement of the fundamental rights, violation of principle of natural justice or the order or proceedings being without any jurisdiction and therefore these prima-facie appear to be an after thought particularly taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner has approached this Court after nearly ten months of its having been temporarily delisted. 17. The question as to what extent, would the availability of alternate efficacious remedy bar the filing of a writ petition, has been recently gone into by this Bench in CWP No. 4779 of 2014 alongwith other connected matters titled M/s Indian Technomac Company Ltd. vs. State of H.P. and others decided on 4.8.2014 wherein the entire case law on the subject has been discussed in the following manner: “11. Now, the question which arises for determination is – when an Act provides mechanism to have remedy(ies), can a writ lie in the given circumstances? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons. Now, the question which arises for determination is – when an Act provides mechanism to have remedy(ies), can a writ lie in the given circumstances? The answer is in the negative for the following reasons. It is well settled principle of law that High Courts have imposed rule of self limitation in entertaining the writ petition in terms of writ jurisdiction when alternative remedy is available. High Court must not interfere if there is adequate efficacious alternative remedy available and the practice of approaching the High Court, without availing the remedy(ies) provided, must be deprecated, unless express case is made out. 12. The Apex Court in Union of India and another vs. Guwahati Carbon Limited, (2012) 11 SCC 651, while dealing with the similar question, has observed in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15 as under: “8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, AIR 1979 SC 1250 . In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p.88, para 23) “23. ……. when a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner and all the –other forums and modes of seeking remedy are excluded.” 9. A Bench of three learned Judges of as Court, in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 , held: (SCC p.440, para 11) "11......The Act provides for a complete-machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for 1 enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute must be availed...." 10. In other words, existence of an adequate alternate remedy is a factor to be considered by the writ court before exercising its writ jurisdiction (See Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCR 566 ). 11. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , this Court held: "15. In other words, existence of an adequate alternate remedy is a factor to be considered by the writ court before exercising its writ jurisdiction (See Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCR 566 ). 11. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , this Court held: "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justices or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged......" xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx 14. Having said so, we have gone through the orders passed by the Tribunal. The only determination made by the Tribunal is with regard to the assessable value of the commodity in question by excluding the freight/ transportation charges and the insurance charges from the assessable value of the commodity in question. Since what was done by the Tribunal is the determination of the assessable value of the commodity in question for the purpose of the levy of duty under the Act, in our opinion, the assessee ought to have carried the matter by way of an appeal before this Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944. 15. In our opinion, the assessee ought not to have filed a writ petition before the High Court questioning the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the Tribunal. The Excise Law is a complete code in order to seek redress in excise matters and hence may not be appropriate for the writ court to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in observing that since the assessee has a remedy in the form of a right of appeal under the statute, that remedy must be exhausted first. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in observing that since the assessee has a remedy in the form of a right of appeal under the statute, that remedy must be exhausted first. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, ought not to have been interfered with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the appeal filed by the respondent/assessee.” 13. The Apex Court in Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India and others, (2011) 14 SCC 337, after discussing its various earlier decisions, held that the High Court had committed error in entertaining the writ petition without noticing and referring to the relevant provisions of law applicable in that case, which contained statutory remedy of appeal and accordingly set aside the order of the High Court in terms of which the writ petition was entertained. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 24 and 25 hereunder: “24. Section 19 provides for remedy of appeal against an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers under sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 17. If Sections 11, 17 and 21 of the 1986 Act which relate to the jurisdiction of the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission, there does not appear any plausible reason to interpret the same in a manner which would frustrate the object of legislation. 25. What has surprised us is that the High Court has not even referred to Sections 17 and 19 of the 1986 Act and the law laid down in various judgments of this Court and yet it has declared that the directions given by the State Commission are without jurisdiction and that too by overlooking the availability of statutory remedy of appeal to the respondents.” 14. The Apex Court in a recent decision in Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 , has discussed the law, on the subject, right from the year 1859 till the date of judgment i.e. 8th August, 2013. We deem it proper to reproduce paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 hereunder: “12. The Apex Court in a recent decision in Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 , has discussed the law, on the subject, right from the year 1859 till the date of judgment i.e. 8th August, 2013. We deem it proper to reproduce paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 hereunder: “12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 ; Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425 ; Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 ; State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 , have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for decision has not been adopted. (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422 ; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653 ; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436 ; S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572 ; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 ; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293 ; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 ; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634 ; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj); Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509 ; Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72 ). 13. In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp.343-45 paras 12-14) “12. 13. In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp.343-45 paras 12-14) “12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7). ‘7. … The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.’ 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) ‘11. … It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, 141 ER 486 in the following passage: (ER p. 495) “… There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. … But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.” The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd., 1935 AC 532 (PC) and Secy. Of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.’ 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) ‘77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32—is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.’” (See: G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 ; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 ; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472 ; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 ; C.A. Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765 ; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 ; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; Tin Plate Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 ; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272 ; Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999) 1 SCC 209 and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569 ) 14. In Union of India vs. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., (2012) 11 SCC 651,this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed: (SCC p.653, para 8) “8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83 . In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23). ‘23. … when a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking [remedy] are excluded.’” xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx 15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case AIR 1964 SC 1419 , Titagarh Paper Mills case 1983 SCC (Tax) 131 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 16. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 16. In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery for the assessment/re-assessment of tax, imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the Revenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 this Court has noticed that if an appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar’s wife” the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. 17. In the instant case, neither has the writ petitioner assessee described the available alternate remedy under the Act as ineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent and satisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts of instant case. In light of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the Writ Court ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition filed by the assessee, wherein he has only questioned the correctness or otherwise of the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act, the reassessment orders passed and the consequential demand notices issued thereon.” This Court thereafter concluded : “16. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that the writ petitioners-Company have remedies of appeal(s), before approaching the High Court by way of the writ petitions, for the redressal of their grievances. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that the writ petitioners-Company have remedies of appeal(s), before approaching the High Court by way of the writ petitions, for the redressal of their grievances. The petitioners ought to have exhausted the remedy of appeal before the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner or Additional Excise and Taxation Commissioner or the Excise Commissioner, as the case may be, and if the petitioners were not successful in those appeal proceedings, another remedy available to them was to challenge the said order(s) by the medium of appeal before the Tribunal, and again, if they were unsuccessful, they could have availed the remedy of revision before the High Court in terms of Section 48 of the HP VAT Act, 2005. Keeping in view the above discussion, read with the fact that the dispute raised in these writ petitions relates to revenue/tax matters, it can safely be concluded that the petitioners have sufficient efficacious remedy(ies) available.” The decisions relied upon by the petitioner have been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove. 18. Having observed so, we are of the considered view that the petitioner has alternative efficacious remedy available to it and, therefore, the petition is not maintainable and the same merit to be dismissed. However, it is made clear that the observations made herein shall not cause any prejudice to the petitioner in case it files an appeal before the prescribed authority and the period spent by the petitioner for prosecuting this writ petition, shall be excluded by the Appellate Authority while computing the period of limitation. 19. The petitioner can take all the grounds as taken in this writ in the appeals and we are intentionally not making any observation qua the same, lest it prejudices the case of either of the parties. 20. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is dismissed alongwith pending CMPs, if any. Interim order dated 13.3.2014 passed by this Court shall stand vacated. The parties are left to bear their own costs.