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Jharkhand High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 1098 (JHR)

Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Sanjay Prasad

2014-11-12

APARESH KUMAR SINGH

body2014
Order Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. By a detailed judgment dated 08.08.2013, the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3234 of 2012 was allowed. The respondent/review petitioner herein have sought review of the aforesaid judgment on the ground that the petitioners' claim for seeking employment as a land looser was based upon assertion that two acres of land in total were taken away by the respondent-company of which 1.99 and ½ decimal belonged to the writ petitioners and .05 decimal belong to Ram Nandan Sao son of Nageshwar Sao. It is now pleaded on the basis of a document which incidentally has not been brought in the instant review petition though shown as Annexure-12 to the review petition that .05 decimal of land belonging to said Ram Nandan Sao son of Nageshwar Sao was utilized for providing employment to Dhirendra Prasad. The writ petitioner, therefore, could not have bunched the said piece of land to make it 2 acres of land for providing employment. 3. On being asked, learned counsel for the review petitioner has submitted that the said document is of the date which ranges from 20.02.1993 to 04.04.1997. The said document is not brought on record though it has been shown to be annexed in the Civil Review Petition. The review petitioner on the said ground submitted that the claim of the writ petitioners of having surrendered physical possession of 2 acres of land for claiming employment is not correct and the judgment passed on that basis suffers from error on record. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, in first place it is to be observed that the judgment dated 08.08.2013 passed in W.P. (S) No. 3234 of 2012 of which review is being 3rd sought was the round of litigation between the writ petitioners and the respondent-CCL. The earlier writ petitions being W. P. (S) No. 4687 of 2001 and W. P. (S) No. 4386 of 2008 was on the same issue. The direction passed in the earlier cases were also taken into account while deciding the present writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3234 of 2012. The earlier writ petitions being W. P. (S) No. 4687 of 2001 and W. P. (S) No. 4386 of 2008 was on the same issue. The direction passed in the earlier cases were also taken into account while deciding the present writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3234 of 2012. It is not in dispute that document which is now sought to be relied upon by the review petitioner were not part of the record of the writ petition, though the respondent-Coal Company got sufficient opportunity to traverse the averments made in the pleading of the writ petition where such a claim was made. However, it is also evident that document which is now being sought to be relied upon was well within the possession of the respondent-CCL when the earlier writ petitions were decided including the judgment impugned herein. It, therefore, can be concluded that the document which is now being sought to be relied to impugn the judgment cannot be said to be one which was not within their knowledge or could not be found or produced before the Court earlier even after exercise of due diligence by the respondents/review petitioner. The judgment in question was decided on the basis of the pleading and the materials on records and being tested on ground of review, it definitely cannot be said to be suffering from any errors apparent on the face of record. The ground on which review of judgment can be sought for are well settled and are also contained in the provisions under order XLVII Rule 1 and 2 of the C. P. C. which in principle are also followed in a proceeding under the writ jurisdiction. Order XLVII Rule 1 and 2 which laid down the parameters under which a judgment can be reviewed are being quoted herein:- “1. Application for review of judgment. Order XLVII Rule 1 and 2 which laid down the parameters under which a judgment can be reviewed are being quoted herein:- “1. Application for review of judgment. - (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved – (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for there view.” The principles on which the review jurisdiction can be exercised have also been well settled in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court such as in the case of Kamlesh Verms Vs. Mayawati and Ors. reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 . The opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court contained at para-20 of the report is extracted hereinbelow:- “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When there view will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) Are petition of old and overruled argument is not enough to re-open concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of in consequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be aground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully with in the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in there view petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 6. The issues, which were agitated between the parties, were squarely considered after referring to the documents on record while delivering the judgment under challenge. It is appropriate to reproduce the judgment in toto passed in W.P. (S) No. 3234 of 2012 vide judgment dated 08.08.2013 as it contains, the findings in respect of issues raised and decided by this Court:- “The instant interlocutory application has been preferred by the respondent no. 6 for deleting his name from array of parties in the writ petition on the ground that the present respondent is neither necessary party nor required for proper adjudication of the case. His name has only been included as party respondent in order to support the contention of the petitioner that in similar circumstances, the respondent CCL had given employment to the respondent no. His name has only been included as party respondent in order to support the contention of the petitioner that in similar circumstances, the respondent CCL had given employment to the respondent no. 6 on account of surrender of possession of more than two acres of land to the said respondents, which is being denied to the present petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner and the official respondents do not dispute the aforesaid position that the presence of the respondent no. 6 is not necessary for adjudication of the present controversy. Accordingly, let the name of respondent no. 6 be deleted from the array of parties for which necessary correction be carried out by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 in red ink during course of the day. I.A. No. 5283 of 2013 stands disposed of. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. By the letter dated 22nd / 24th December 2010 (Annexure-15), petitioners' claim for grant of employment under the scheme of land acquisition in the year 1993 by the Central Coalfields Limited has been rejected. The said order was passed in view of the direction given in judgment dated 28th May 2010 passed in WPS No. 4386/08. The grounds for rejection as borne out in the impugned order are; i. that the proposal of the petitioners for appointment as a land looser was falling short of 0.001/2 acres of land, ii. that in the description of land shown by the petitioners for seeking such employment, only 0.96 acres of land has been utilized by the respondent CCL, iii. the concerned mines has since been closed and there is no possibility of utilizing the rest of the land by the respondent, iv. the case of the petitioners is not covered by the revised rehabilitation policy of the respondents. 3. Little background to the controversy is necessary in order to appreciate the case of the parties: Earlier, by an Agreement contained at Annexure-3 dated 10th December 1993 entered into between the Management of the respondent CCL and three persons including the father of the present petitioner no. 1, a total of 2.00 acres of physical possession of the land was surrendered with immediate effect by the second party without any encumbrance, for which compensation had already been paid to the land oustee and the legal possession of the land had already been given to the CCL by the State Government. 1, a total of 2.00 acres of physical possession of the land was surrendered with immediate effect by the second party without any encumbrance, for which compensation had already been paid to the land oustee and the legal possession of the land had already been given to the CCL by the State Government. The claim of the petitioner no. 1 was indicated as 'nominee' son of Kanhai Sao for claiming employment in lieu of the surrender of 2.00 acres of said land. The description of the land contained in the said Agreement also indicated that 0.001/2 acres of land of one Ramnandan Sao, son of Nageshwar Sao were also included in the entire 2.00 acres of land. Apparently, as per the policy of the respondent CCL, it stipulated that the land looser could only be given employment, if the minimum area of land acquired or surrendered in favour of the respondent CCL is not less than 2.00 acres. The said policy also permitted the bunching of the land of a neighbour of the land looser if the area fell short of 2.00 acres. Thereafter, since the petitioner no. 1 was not offered appointment, he had occasion to move this Court in WPS No. 4687/01 for directing the respondent CCL to consider his case for appointment as per scheme and to grant employment to one of the members of the family for which land has been acquired. This Court vide order dated 11thSeptember 2003 disposed of the writ petition directing the competent authority of the respondent CCL to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment within a stipulated period. Relevant extract of the judgment is quoted hereunder:- “This application has been preferred by petitioner for direction on respondents to consider his case of appointment as per scheme, to grant employment to one of the member of the family of which land has been acquired. One of the ground taken by respondents is that the petitioner is not entitled for appointment, as only 1.39 acres of land of his family was acquired. As per scheme, a member of the family whose more than 2 acres of land has been acquired for M/s C.C.L. is entitled for appointment. One of the ground taken by respondents is that the petitioner is not entitled for appointment, as only 1.39 acres of land of his family was acquired. As per scheme, a member of the family whose more than 2 acres of land has been acquired for M/s C.C.L. is entitled for appointment. It is true that this Court cannot determine the disputed question whether more than 2 acres of land of the family of petitioner was acquired or not, but from the enclosure attached by the petitioner i.e. the Certificate of Collector under the Act for acquisition, it appears that certain compensation amount was paid to Shri Sakal Prasad Sao and Shri Kanhai Lal Sao (uncle and father of petitioner) jointly for acquisition of 2.28 ½ acres of land. Another certificate shows that a further compensation amount was paid to Shri Sakal Prasad Sao and Shri Kanhai Lal Sao (uncle and father of petitioner) jointly for acquisition of another 1.04 acres of land. In the circumstances, for determination of the question as to what is the total land of the family of petitioner was acquired, the case is remitted to the General Manager, Barkakana Area, C.C.L. The petitioner may produce documents before the General Manager, Barkakana Area, C.C.L. in support of claim of acquisition of more than 2 acres of land. The General Manager, Barkakana Area C.C.L. if so required may enquire from the concerned office of the State Government and will communicate its decision to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of representation. If it is found that more than 2 acres of land of petitioner's family was acquired for C.C.L., the competent authority will consider the case of petitioner for appointment within a period of three months from the date of decision. In case the authorities dispute the claim of the acquisition of 2 acres of land in such case the petitioner may move before a civil court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief. The writ petition stands disposed of.” 4. Thereafter, the petitioner's application was rejected by order dated 21st November 2006 passed by the General Manager, (BS), Central Coalfields Limited, Barka-Sayal Area (Annexure-6). The said order dated 21st November 2006 gave description of the land which were included for the purposes of showing that the area of land surrendered by the father of the petitioner no. Thereafter, the petitioner's application was rejected by order dated 21st November 2006 passed by the General Manager, (BS), Central Coalfields Limited, Barka-Sayal Area (Annexure-6). The said order dated 21st November 2006 gave description of the land which were included for the purposes of showing that the area of land surrendered by the father of the petitioner no. 1 was 2.00 acres and it includes ½ decimal of land of one Ram Nandan. In respect of L.A. Case No. 2/1980-81 in respect of Khata No. 51 & 1, total 2.28 and ½ acres of land has been acquired. If the share is calculated, share of the petitioner's father came to 1.03 ¼ acres of land. Out of Khata No. 43 in respect of 1.04 acres of land, the petitioner's share comes to 0.52 acres. In plot no. 293 (P) in respect of which L.A. Case No. 1/1978-79 started, petitioner's grand father's share came to 0.09 acres. In respect of other areas of Plot No. 293, total area being 1.39 acres, petitioner's share comes to 0.34 ¾. The said order therefore indicated that the total area in the petitioner's share comes to 1.99 acres (approximately). The petitioner had claimed half decimal of land of one Ram Nandan whose name has occurred in the Agreement (Annexure-3) which has been referred to herein above and it was taken to bunch with the land of the petitioner so that it comprised 2.00 acres of land. The reason for rejection of the petitioner's claim however, was that at the time of consideration of the petitioner's case, there was no system available of making arrangement with other raiyats to overcome the shortfall of land necessary for getting employment. 5. The petitioner therefore being aggrieved against the said order dated 21stNovember 2006, had moved this Court in WPS No. 4386/08. The said case was decided by judgment dated 28thMay 2010 (Annexure-11). 6. The question which was raised before the learned Single Judge of this Court in the said writ petition on behalf of the respondent was that though, the petitioner had 1.99 acres of land (approximately) and the same was delivered to the respondent CCL, but clubbing of the adjacent land to make it total two acres of land was permissible only on the date on which the land was acquired. The respondent had also raised an issue that the matter was being disputed, the petitioner ought to have moved the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. These relevant issues were noticed and discussed by the learned Single Judge and it was observed that admittedly, 1.99 acres of land belonging to the petitioner was delivered along with the half decimal belonging to his neighbour making a total of two acres to the respondent CCL. Therefore, there cannot be any dispute that the total 2.00 acres of land has not been delivered by the petitioner to the respondent CCL. For better appreciation, the relevant extracts of the said judgment are worthy of being quoted hereunder: “7. In the light of the explanations offered by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the contents of the impugned order, it appears that admittedly, 1.99 acres of land belonging to the petitioner together with half decimal of land belonging to the petitioner's neighbour, making a total of two acres, was delivered by the petitioner, was accepted by the Respondents-CCL authorities. Therefore, there cannot be any dispute now that the total two acres of land has not been delivered by the petitioner to the Respondents. Such delivery was also accepted by the Respondents, even as reflected in Annexure-8. The benefit of the scheme of such “Bunching” which was applicable on the date of delivery of the land in 1993 cannot be withdrawn now on the ground that the scheme has been subsequently withdrawn. 8. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, I find that the Respondents-authorities of the C.C.L., having admittedly, acquired two acres of land from the petitioner, as reflected in Annexure-8 to the writ application, they are liable to carry out their obligation as per the terms of the Agreement for the grant of employment to one of the members of the petitioner's family.” 7. Learned Single Judge in the wake of objection made by the respondent, gave a definite finding that the benefit of the scheme of such bunching which was applicable on the date of delivery of the land in 1993 cannot be withdrawn now on the ground that the scheme has been subsequently withdrawn. Learned Single Judge in the wake of objection made by the respondent, gave a definite finding that the benefit of the scheme of such bunching which was applicable on the date of delivery of the land in 1993 cannot be withdrawn now on the ground that the scheme has been subsequently withdrawn. In such circumstance, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the concerned authorities of the respondent CCL to take an appropriate decision in respect of the petitioner's claim for grant of employment under the scheme for acquisition of 2.00 acres of land by the respondent CCL in 1993 within a stipulated period of three months. Now, the petitioner's case has once again been rejected by order dated 22nd/24thDecember 2010 on the grounds which have already been indicated herein above. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners, during the course of argument, had drawn attention of this Court to the Agreement dated 10thDecember 1993 (Annexure-3), the order impugned dated 22nd/24th December 2010 contained at Annexure-6 as also the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in WPS No. 4386/08, referred to herein above. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the documents obtained under the RTI which are contained at Annexure-9, specially the notings dated 28thFebruary 2001 recorded by the Director (Personnel) in respect of the case of employment of petitioner no. 1. As per the said notings, out of 2.00 acres of land acquired for Saunda-'D' Project, 0.96 acres of land has been utilized for O.B. Dump & Road Diversion etc. The noting also made it clear that the remaining land of 1.04 acres of land will be utilized in the second phase of the mining operation, as indicated in the noting dated 17th January 2001 referred to therein itself. Therefore, 1.04 acres of land will be utilized in future for the purpose of OB Dumping and Road Diversion, etc. For better appreciation, the said noting is also quoted hereunder:- “DT(PP) may kindly see the employment case of one Sri Sanjay Prasad, S/o Kanhai Saw against the two acres of land acquired for Saunda-'D' project out of which 0.96 acres of land has been utilized for O.B. Dump & road Diversion etc. and the remaining land of 1.04 acres will be utilized in the second phase of the mining operation. CGM(P&A) was indicated vide his note dt. and the remaining land of 1.04 acres will be utilized in the second phase of the mining operation. CGM(P&A) was indicated vide his note dt. 17.1.2001 at page-26/N and also by GM(B), Barkakana that 1.04 acres of land will be used in future for the purpose of OB Dumping & Diversion etc. In view of above, DT (PP) may kindly see before the matter is put up to CMD for decision.” 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners therefore has assailed the impugned order on the specific grounds that neither the question that the land fell below 2.00 acres was factually and legally tenable, nor the ground that only 0.96 acres of land could be utilized out of 2.00 acres of land, would be taken on their behalf. 10. After such land has been acquired, though the mines may have been closed later on, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer on account of such eventuality which has happened later on, if at all. He has also assailed the impugned order on the last ground that the petitioner's case is covered under the scheme of 1993 as also the Agreement contained at Annexure-3 dated 10th December 1993 whereunder, a total of 2.00 acres of land were surrendered for the purposes of seeking employment as land looser. Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the present writ application, the original petitioner Sanjay Prasad for whose claim, the claim for appointment was preferred earlier, has now also been joined by his son Ashish Kumar and it is open to the respondent CCL to grant employment either to the petitioner Sanjay Prasad or to his son Ashish Kumar. Sanjay Prasad is said to have become over age by now as he was of 27 years of age at the time of the Agreement in the year 1993. 11. Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge on the previous occasion also shows that the land acquired was approximately 1.99 acres and as a matter of fact, it was less than 2.00 acres even after bunching of 0.50 acres of land of neighbour. Secondly, the scheme of bunching have been subsequently changed after coming into force of revised rehabilitation policy. Therefore, the petitioner could not be given the benefit of the earlier scheme. Secondly, the scheme of bunching have been subsequently changed after coming into force of revised rehabilitation policy. Therefore, the petitioner could not be given the benefit of the earlier scheme. He also submits that if the matter is so dependent upon the determination of questions of facts, the proper remedy should have been to invoke the forum of the concerned competent Court of civil jurisdiction. On these grounds, learned counsel for the respondents has justified the impugned order and submitted that the prayer made in the writ petition is not worthy of being allowed. 12. I have heard counsel for the parties at some length and gone through the relevant materials on record. 13. The background history of the instant case, though in some detail, have been indicated in the opening paragraph of the judgment. The present writ petition is third round of litigation between the parties on the very question of employment of the petitioner based upon his claim as a land looser and having surrendered physical possession of 2.00 acres of land in the year 1993 in favour of the respondent CCL. The Agreement dated 10th December 1993 (Annexure-3) entered between the Management of the respondent CCL and the petitioner and other two persons who were neighbours of the petitioner show that the physical possession of the land surrendered to the respondent CCL was having an area of 2.00 acres. The petitioner was nominated as a person entitled to claim employment in lieu of the surrender of 2.00 acres of land. In due course of time, the respondent however failed to honour the said Agreement which led to filing of the first writ petition being WPS No. 4687/01. That writ petition was however disposed of vide order dated 11th September 2003, extracts of which has also been quoted herein above. Respondents were directed to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment and take a decision within a stipulated period. The order which was passed thereafter dated 21st November 2006 (Annexure-6) has also been discussed in some detail in the earlier part of the judgment. The said order dated 21st November 2006 itself indicate that the petitioner's share of land comes to approximately 1.99 acres and the petitioner had sought to adjust ½ decimal of land of his neighbour Ram Nandan to make it 2.00 acres at the time of physical surrender vide Annexure-3. The said order dated 21st November 2006 itself indicate that the petitioner's share of land comes to approximately 1.99 acres and the petitioner had sought to adjust ½ decimal of land of his neighbour Ram Nandan to make it 2.00 acres at the time of physical surrender vide Annexure-3. Petitioner's claim was rejected in November 2006 on the ground that such bunching was not available. 14. At this stage, calculation of the total area of land described at Annexure-6 which is in some controversy now as per the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is required to be verified. Even as per Annexure-6, petitioner's share of land comes to 1.99½ acres of land calculating 1.03 ¼ acres + 0.52 acres+ 0.09½ acres +0.34 ¾ acres. Respondents had also assessed the said area of land as 1.99 acres (approximately), that is why in the judgment rendered on the last occasion by this Court in the earlier writ petition being WPS No.4386/08, this Court also held that admittedly, 1.99 acres of land belongs to the petitioner. By the correct Arthematical calculation, which is also borne out from Annexures-3 and 6, lands surrendered are 1.99½ acres of the petitioner's share along with 0.05 acres of land of his neighbour Ram Nandan i.e. total being 2.00 acres which fulfills the criteria of 2.00 acres under the scheme for offering employment to a land looser. The first ground of rejection in the impugned order is therefore wholly incorrect on facts. From the documents obtained under the RTI and brought on record, extracts of which have been referred to herein above, it is obvious that the respondent themselves have taken a stand as shown in the notings of the Director (Personnel) that 0.96 acres of the petitioner's land could be utilized for O.B. Dump and Road Diversion at the relevant point of time in 2001 and the rest of 1.04 acres of land could be utilized in future. The petitioner therefore cannot be made responsible for non-utilization of the said land which has been made one of the main grounds of rejection of his claim. 15. Thirdly, if the mine has been closed by the respondent, petitioner has got nothing to do with the same. The petitioner therefore cannot be made responsible for non-utilization of the said land which has been made one of the main grounds of rejection of his claim. 15. Thirdly, if the mine has been closed by the respondent, petitioner has got nothing to do with the same. The claim of the petitioner was dependent upon the cause of action which had occurred upon the surrender of 2.00 acres of land at the time of Agreement in the year 1993. 16. So far as the last ground of rejection is concerned, the same is not tenable as per the reason indicated just hereinabove and also for the reason that in the earlier judgment dated 28th May 2010 passed in WPS No. 4386/08, wherein learned Single Judge had also categorically held that the benefit of the scheme of such “bunching” which was applicable on the date of delivery of the land in 1993 cannot be withdrawn now on the ground that the scheme has been subsequently withdrawn. The instant grounds of rejection of the petitioner's claim are nonest and incorrect on facts as well. Some of the issues have already been decided and attained finality in the absence of appeal against the said judgment. Now it is no longer open to the respondents to re-agitate the same issues for rejecting the petitioner's claim. 17. In the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and the reasons recorded herein above, the impugned order dated 22nd/24thDecember 2010 cannot be sustained in law as well as on facts and the same is accordingly quashed. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, that the petitioner has been made to suffer repeated litigation at least on three occasions i.e. in successive writ petitions being WPS No. 4687/01, WPS No. 4386/08 and the present writ application, it will not be proper nor in the interest of justice to remand the matter once again to the respondents to take a decision in accordance with law. Since the facts which have been recorded herein above, do establish that the petitioner had surrendered physical possession of 2.00 acres of land to the respondent CCL in the year 1993, and the said scheme of the respondents did permit employment to the land looser who had surrendered physical possession of 2.00 acres of land, and all these ingredients have been fulfilled in the present facts and circumstances, there is no reason why the respondents should not be directed to give appointment to the present petitioner, though almost twenty years have elapsed from the date when he had physically surrendered the land. This Court however refrains from commenting upon the conduct of the respondents in such a matter. The facts of the case speak of the manner in which they have compelled the petitioner to approach this Court on a number of occasions with the same grievance. Accordingly, the respondent shall issue appointment letter either to the petitioner no. 1 or to his son-petitioner no. 2 as they so choose, since it is informed that petitioner no. 1 has become over age by now, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.” 7. The respondents/review petitioner, however, even after three round of litigations have chosen to seek review of aforesaid judgment on wholly unsustainable ground. This Court, in these circumstances and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, therefore, is satisfied that no grounds for review are made out to reopen the findings rendered by the judgment in question. 8. Accordingly, the review petition is dismissed.