JUDGMENT N. Kotiswar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. R.K. Umakanta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Sundari, learned GA for the respondents. The present petition has been filed seeking payment of Rs. 1 lakh with interest as compensation from the respondents claiming that the petitioner had been illegally and wrongfully confined and continued in detention in jail/custody for 8 (eight) days after being set free by the High Court on quashing of his detention order passed under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA). 2. The brief facts of the case, as pleaded by the petitioner, may be stated as follows. The petitioner was arrested on 21.03.2007 by the BSF on the charge of possession of an Air Pistol and handed over to the Police in connection with which the FIR Case No. 48(3) 2007 CCPur P.S under Section 400 IPC and 25(1-C) Arms Act was registered against him. Accordingly, he was remanded to judicial custody by the C.J.M., Churachandpur on 22.03.2007 till 30.03.2007. While the petitioner was in custody in connection the FIR case, the District Magistrate, Churachandpur, issued the order for detaining him under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) vide order dated 28.03.2007. The petitioner filed W.P. (Cril) No. 67 of 2007 challenging the aforesaid detention order passed under the NSA before the Gauhati High Court, Imphal Bench. The writ petition was allowed by the High Court on 30.01.2008 by setting aside the order of detention and directed as follows: The impugned detention order dated 28th March, 2007, approval order dated 9th April, 2007 and confirmation order dated 16th May, 2007 are hereby set aside. The petitioner/detenu, namely Kapkhanlun Zou @ Kaplun, is to be released forthwith if he is not required to be detained in connection with any other case(s). A copy of the said order along with the release order dated 30.01.2008 was forwarded to the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur, on 30.01.2008, which was received on the same day. Thereafter, it was forwarded to the office of the Principal Secretary (Home), which was also received on 31.01.2008. It was then endorsed to the Joint Secretary (Home) for further necessary action. 3. Thereafter, it was forwarded to the office of the Principal Secretary (Home), which was also received on 31.01.2008. It was then endorsed to the Joint Secretary (Home) for further necessary action. 3. According to the petitioner, even though the office of the Chief Secretary, took prompt action for release of the petitioner, the Joint Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur, sent a communication/letter addressed to the DGP, Manipur, after five days i.e. 5.2.2008 for releasing of the petitioner, with a copy to the DGP of Prisons, Manipur for necessary action. The said communication dated 5.2.2008 from the Joint Secretary (Home) was received by the Director General of Prisons on 8.2.2008 after three days, thus causing a delay of 8 (eight) days altogether. The aforesaid delay of 8 (eight) days in communicating the order of this Court for releasing the petitioner, according to the petitioner, amounts deprivation of his right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, after the detention under the NSA was declared to be illegal by the Court. Accordingly, the petitioner has filed this writ petition claiming for payment of compensation on the ground that there has been undue delay in implementing the order of the Court directing release of the petitioner which has resulted in violation of his fundamental right. 4. The State respondents have filed their affidavit in opposition. In the affidavit in opposition it has been stated that the release order dated 30.01.2008 passed by the Hon’ble High Court in WP (Cril) No. 67 of 2007 was routed through the Section Officer (Home) and it was placed on the desk of the dealing assistant on 2.2.2008. The next day i.e. 3.2.2008 being Sunday, the matter could not be taken up. The next day i.e. 3.2.2008 being Sunday, the matter could not be taken up. However, on the next day, i.e. 4.2.2008 as there were many other urgent and time bound daks such as approval of the detention order passed by the District Magistrates, preparation of reports of cases to the Advisory Board under NSA, and also to the Central Government, consideration for disposal of various representations submitted by detenues and calling of parawise comments on representations so submitted from the concerned District Magistrates for remitting the same to the Central Government, preparation of parawise comments on Writ Petitions to the Additional Government Advocates (High Court)/State Government Counsel (High Court), confirmation of detention orders in connection with the detentions of insurgent outfits under N.S.A., the release order dated 30.1.2008 as stated above was taken up on 5.2.2008. Accordingly, a letter was issued on 5.2.2008 requesting the DGP, Manipur and DGP of Prisons, Manipur for necessary compliance of the Hon’ble Court’s order dated 30.1.2008. It was, therefore, submitted that the Home Department had taken due care for compliance of the Court’s order and there was no deliberate and intentional defiance of the Court’s order and delay had occurred due to circumstances as explained above, and denied the allegation of negligence. It has been further stated that the Home Department deals with various other departments including Police Department (MR/IRB/Civil Police etc), N.S.A. detention matters, enquiry commissions, Award/Reward for uniform personnel, requisition of helicopter by the State Government, remittance and VVIP visits in Manipur, Jail Department, Fire Service Department, Home Guards, Relief and Rehabilitation, Gratia Payment of Civilians, Law and Order, Protected Area Permit of Foreigners and Right to information etc and as such, the Home Department, being over burdened with various tasks and duties involving the aforesaid aspects it was bound to take some time. Accordingly, it has been submitted that there was no negligence on the part of the authorities and delay has been caused due to various reasons as explained above. It has been also submitted that necessary verification had to be undertaken before the petitioner was released which involve various agencies before he was actually released and as such no undue delay had occasioned. It has been also submitted that necessary verification had to be undertaken before the petitioner was released which involve various agencies before he was actually released and as such no undue delay had occasioned. In the additional affidavit filed by the authorities it has been submitted that the communication letter No. 17(1)1081/2007-H (Pt) dated 5.2.2008 of the Joint Secretary (Home) Government of Manipur was received by the office of the S.P., Jail on 8.2.2008 afternoon. The same was endorsed to the Additional Superintendent, Central Jail, Sajiwa on the same day for further necessary action. The detenu was released from Central Jail, Sajiwa on 11.2.2008 as 9th and 10th February, 2008 were 2nd Saturday and Sunday respectively. 5. Mr. Umakanta, learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly asserted that the Court’s order was to release the petitioner forthwith after having quashed the detention order passed under the NSA and as such the delay of eight days in releasing the petitioner amounts to infraction of his fundamental right as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and as such the petitioner has to be compensated for the illegal act on the part of the authorities in detaining him after his detention order was quashed and Court had directed for releasing the petitioner forthwith. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bhim Singh, MLA Vs State of J&K & Ors: (1985) 4 SCC 677 , Rudul Sah Vs State of Bhar & Anr: (1983) 4 SCC 141 , Mohd Zahid Vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi: (1998) 5 SCC 419 and Prema Bangar Swamy Vs State of Maharashtra & Ors: 2004 Cri L.J 1296. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that considering the peculiar nature of the case, and as the delay has been properly explained, the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court may not be applicable as there was no deliberate or willful negligence on the part of the authorities to release the petitioner. 7. While quashing the detention order of the petitioner under the NSA, the High Court had directed that he be released forthwith, unless required to be detained in connection with other case. 7. While quashing the detention order of the petitioner under the NSA, the High Court had directed that he be released forthwith, unless required to be detained in connection with other case. Therefore, before releasing the petitioner in terms of the order passed by the High Court, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities to verify whether the petitioner is required to be detained in connection with any other case. That verification would entail proper application of mind by referring to the records concerning the petitioner. In that context, explanation furnished by the respondents has to be examined whether the delay of 8 (eight) days is reasonable or not. It has been noted that the order dated 30.01.2008 was made available to the office of the Joint Secretary (Home), who was dealing with the matter on 2.2.2008. However, the matter was not taken up on the next day stating that it was a holiday, being Sunday. The matter also was not taken up on 4.2.2008 on the ground of heavy pendency of urgent matters as explained in the affidavit in opposition of respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and briefly referred to in the preceding paragraph No. 5. Accordingly, only on 5.2.2008 the order was communicated to the Jail Authority, which was received by the office of the S.P., Jail on 8.2.2008 and he was released on 11.2.2008. 8. It may be noted that the order dated 30.01.2008 of the High Court was communicated to the office of the Chief Secretary on the same day and it was forwarded to the Home Department on the next day i.e. 31.01.2008, which was placed on the desk of the dealing assistant only on 2.2.2008 after two days. This Court is of the view that once the order was communicated to the Home Department on 31.1.2008, it ought to have been placed immediately to the concerned official on the same day or on the next day. However, it was placed before the Dealing Assistant only on 2.2.2008. This delay, however, has not been explained by the authorities in their affidavit. The contention of the respondents that the next day, i.e. 3.2.2008 being Sunday, the matter could not be taken up and it could not be taken up on the next day i.e. 4.2.2008 because of heavy pendency of works cannot be appreciated as the matter relates to a release order of a detenue. The contention of the respondents that the next day, i.e. 3.2.2008 being Sunday, the matter could not be taken up and it could not be taken up on the next day i.e. 4.2.2008 because of heavy pendency of works cannot be appreciated as the matter relates to a release order of a detenue. Further, the three days’ delay in dispatch of the communication for releasing the petitioner by the Home Department on 5.2.2008 which was received by the Jail authorities on 8.2.2008 has not been explained properly in the affidavit in opposition. This Court is of the view that the authorities have not been able to explain satisfactorily the delay during the period of 31.1.2008 to 2.2.2008 at the level of Home Department and delay of three days in communicating the order to the Jail authorities from 2.2.2008 to 5.2.2008 as mentioned above. This Court expects that once a person under preventive detention has been directed to be released by a competent Court there should not be any undue delay on the part of the authorities to release the said person and if any delay had been occasioned, such delay ought to be properly explained. 9. It may be worth noting that as per the Assam Jail Manual, as also followed in the State of Manipur, the release of an under-trial prisoner is governed by Rules 789 and 790 of Part III which deals with "Superintendence and Management of Jails" which are reproduced herein below. Rule 789. Release of under-trial at the jail. On receipt of a warrant or order of revision, directing the release of an under-trial prisoner, he shall be at once released (unless the order be received after the wards are locked up for the night, in which case he shall be released immediately after the wards are opened next morning), and the warrant of detention and order of release shall be returned to the Court which issued them, with an endorsement by the Jail Superintendent certifying that the order of release has been carried out. Any property which has been taken possession of by the jail authorities shall be made over to the prisoner. Rule 790. Release of under-trial at Court. Any property which has been taken possession of by the jail authorities shall be made over to the prisoner. Rule 790. Release of under-trial at Court. If an under-trial prisoner be discharged in open Court, or released on bail while attending the Court, by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, a notification of the fact, under the signature of the officer so discharging or releasing him, shall be sent to the same day to the Jailer. The Gauhati High Court Criminal Rules and Orders, as applicable in the State of Manipur (in absence of any Rules framed by the Manipur High Court), provides under Rule 25, Chapter 1 that no warrants for release of prisoners shall be dispatched by a Court after sunset, or if it is so dispatched shall be endorsed with the instruction for release as early as possible next morning. Reading of the above provisions of rules would indicate that there must be expeditiousness in the release process. Those responsible for ensuring release of the detenue must act promptly and with alacrity. It does not brook any undue delay. Under Rule 790 quoted above, if the under-trial prisoner is present in Court he could be immediately released from the Court. The present proceeding has arisen out of an order passed by the High Court allowing a writ petition for issue of habeas corpus directing release of the petitioner. The words "Habeas Corpus" literally means "bring the body here". In earlier times in England where it originated, when the writ was issued it was necessary for the detaining authority to bring the person under detention before the judge or the Court with the justification thereof and if it was found unreasonable, the person used to be released forthwith. This practice of production of the person before the Court, however, was gradually abandoned due to exigency of Court proceedings and to avoid inconvenience in transportation of the detenue to and fro the Court in the event of refusal by the Court to release the detenue. This practice of production of the person before the Court, however, was gradually abandoned due to exigency of Court proceedings and to avoid inconvenience in transportation of the detenue to and fro the Court in the event of refusal by the Court to release the detenue. This procedure has been approved by the Supreme Court in Kanu Sanyal Vs District Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674 to be applicable in India also, where it was held that in the matter of Habeas Corpus petition, while considering a Habeas Corpus application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court could dispense with the production of the body of the person detained while issuing a rule nisi and rule nisi can be heard and appropriate order can be passed without requiring the body of the person detained to be brought before the Court. This, however, cannot distract from the observation made in that judgment that the most characteristic element of writ of habeas corpus is its peremptoriness and "the essential and leading theory of the whole procedure is the immediate determination of the right of the applicants’ freedom and his release, if the detention is found to be unlawful". Thus, if the Court had directed production of the petitioner in the Court, he would have been released from the Court and in absence of production of the petitioner before the Court, all steps ought to have been taken promptly for the release of the petitioner at the earliest. It is in this legal background that the delay occurred in this case has to be examined. 10. The time taken in the file processing, preceding the release of the petitioner, if it had not involved release of the petitioner, could have been considered a normal and routine which would not have attracted much scrutiny. But in the present case, the matter relates to release of a person who had been directed to be released from detention by setting aside the detention order. In other words, the Court had removed the legal restrictions on his liberty. Therefore, the authorities/officials concerned ought to have considered the matter with promptness which seems to be absent. On the other hand, it was dealt with as if it was a normal "dak". It was not dealt with the prime urgency it deserved. In other words, the Court had removed the legal restrictions on his liberty. Therefore, the authorities/officials concerned ought to have considered the matter with promptness which seems to be absent. On the other hand, it was dealt with as if it was a normal "dak". It was not dealt with the prime urgency it deserved. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the authorities/officials were dealing with the matter at a leisurely pace cannot be ignored. The justification that the Home Department is overburdened cannot be considered to be a valid ground to defer dealing with orders issued by High Courts and competent courts directing release of persons under detention since it would directly affect and deprive the deserved liberty and freedom from continued incarceration. It is for the authorities to devise the method and procedure to expedite the process relating to release orders. Liberty and freedom as enshrined under Article 21 and related articles are sacrosanct and once the fetters of law have been lifted on enjoyment of these, these ought not be constricted by procedures which are avoidable and not specifically provided statutorily. Therefore, this Court would not hesitate to hold that there was definitely some amount of delay in releasing the petitioner which could have been avoided if the authorities/officials had shown promptness and urgency in the mater relating to release from detention. 11. Having accepted the plea of the petitioner that there was a delay in ensuring release of the petitioner from detention, the next question which arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to any compensatory cost under the public law remedy which he is seeking to invoke in this petition. As we do so, it may be necessary for us to revisit the law governing this arena. The Constitutional public law remedy as opposed to private law remedy as available under law of tort etc. for claiming damages or compensation has developed and taken firm roots in Indian jurisprudence, mainly because of shocking violation of human rights as envisaged under Art 21 of the Constitution of India. 12. Traditionally and ordinarily, the claims for compensation or damages for any wrong or malfeasance against the State are dealt with by the Civil Courts and the Writ Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not the appropriate forum for dealing with such claims. 12. Traditionally and ordinarily, the claims for compensation or damages for any wrong or malfeasance against the State are dealt with by the Civil Courts and the Writ Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not the appropriate forum for dealing with such claims. The present claim has been made by the petitioner on the ground of negligent act on the part of the officials in discharge of their official functions. Ordinarily, no such claim would lie against the State for payment of compensation even for the alleged violation of fundamental right of the petitioner if we follow the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Kasturi Lal - vrs.- State of U.P. : AIR 1965 SC 1039 wherein the Supreme Court by elucidating the difference between the sovereign and non sovereign functions of the State observed that 21. Thus, it is clear that this case recognises a material distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to public servants, and acts committed by public servants which are not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers. If a tortious act is committed by a public servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. And the other hand, if the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge if duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any sovereign power, an action for damages would lie. The act of the public servant committed by him during the course of his employment is, in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been employed by a private individual for the same purpose. This distinction which is clear and precise in law, is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the State’s liability arising from tortious acts committed by public servants. This distinction which is clear and precise in law, is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the State’s liability arising from tortious acts committed by public servants. That is why the clarity and precision with which this distinction was emphasised by Chief Justice Peacock as early as 1861 has been recognised as a classic statement on this subject. 13. However, during the last about three decades, there has been a great march and tremendous developments in the field of public law whereby the Supreme Court under Art. 32 and the High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 have entertained applications and granted compensation and damages in appropriate cases even in cases relating to sovereign functions of the State. The distinction between the sovereign and non-sovereign functions of the State has been diluted, thus enlarging the scope of the liabilities of the State. In N. Nagendra Rao -vrs.- State of A.P., AIR 1994 SC 2663 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court succinctly delineated the thin line that divides the sovereign and non sovereign functions and observed that any such compartmentalization of the functions of the State as sovereign and non sovereign is no more sound jurisprudential view considering the myriad functions discharged by the State in a welfare State like India which touch upon the lives of large number of citizen in their day to day affairs and that there is no rational for the proposition that even if the officer is liable, the State cannot be sued. It was also observed that the ratio of Kasturi Lal (supra) would be applicable in those rare and limited cases where statutory authority acts as a delegate of such functions for which it cannot be sued in a Court of law. 14. The Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 after discussing the earlier cases in which the Supreme Court had intervened and awarded compensation for violation of fundamental rights succinctly explained the jurisprudential basis for such judicial interventions. The legal principles forming the basis of intervening and awarding damages/compensation in writ proceedings which were otherwise within the purview of the normal civil Courts was explained in Nilabati Behera’s case by relying on the decision in Rudal Sah Vs. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141 . The legal principles forming the basis of intervening and awarding damages/compensation in writ proceedings which were otherwise within the purview of the normal civil Courts was explained in Nilabati Behera’s case by relying on the decision in Rudal Sah Vs. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141 . It may be apposite to refer to some of the relevant portions of the said judgment in Nilabati Behera referring to Rudal Sah, 11................The petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial, in the sense that a civil court may or may not have upheld his claim. But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible to predicate, in the absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in his favour. In these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip-service to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated. Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders to release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage by its officers to the petitioner’s rights. It may have recourse against those officers. 15. Therefore, the State must repair the damage by its officers to the petitioner’s rights. It may have recourse against those officers. 15. The aforesaid principle was again reiterated in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416 where it observed that, 44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 16. However, having consolidated the law of Constitutional remedy, the Supreme Court also indicated the threshold of this remedy to be applicable in such cases where violation of fundamental right has been shown to be blatant, gross abuse of authority and intentional abuse of power. The Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Ghosal v. University of Calcutta and Ors., (2002) 7 SCC 478 held that, ...............But it would not be correct to assume that every minor infraction of public duty by every public officer would commend the Court to grant compensation in a petition under Articles 226 and 32 by applying the principle of public law proceeding. The Court in exercise of extraordinary power under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution, therefore, would not award damages against public authorities merely because they have made some order which turns out to be ultra vires, or there has been some inaction in the performance of the duties unless there is malice or conscious abuse. Before exemplary damages can be awarded it must be shown that some fundamental right under Article 21 has been infringed by arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the public functionaries and that the sufferer was a helpless victim of that act. The said observation was relied on in "Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi Vs. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy and Ors." (2011) 14 SCC 481 where the Supreme Court held that, 54. It is evident from the decisions of this Court as also the decisions of the English and Canadian Courts that it is not proper to award damages against public authorities merely because there has been some inaction in the performance of their statutory duties or because the action taken by them is ultimately found to be without authority of law. In regard to performance of statutory functions and duties, the courts will not award damages unless there is malice or conscious abuse. .............................................................................. .............................................................................. 99. The law is well settled that a constitutional court can award monetary compensation against the State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining damages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens. .............................................................................. .............................................................................. 104. Constitutional courts’ actions not only strive to compensate the victims and vindicate their constitutional rights, but also to deter future constitutional misconduct without proper excuse or with some collateral or improper motive. The constitutional courts can in appropriate cases of serious violation of life and liberty of the individuals award punitive damages. However, the same generally requires the presence of malicious intent on the side of the wrongdoer i.e. an intentional doing of some wrongful act. 105. The constitutional courts can in appropriate cases of serious violation of life and liberty of the individuals award punitive damages. However, the same generally requires the presence of malicious intent on the side of the wrongdoer i.e. an intentional doing of some wrongful act. 105. Compensatory damages are intended to provide the claimant with a monetary amount necessary to recoup/replace what was lost, since damages in tort are generally awarded to place the claimants in the position he would have been in, had the tort not taken place; which are generally quantified under the heads of general damages and special damages. Punitive damages are intended to reform or to deter the wrongdoer from indulging in conduct similar to that which formed the basis for the claim. Punitive damages are not intended to compensate the claimant which he can claim in an ordinary private law claim in tort. Punitive damages are awarded by the constitutional court when the wrongdoer’s conduct was egregiously deceitful. .............................................................................. .............................................................................. 108. Several factors may gauge on a constitutional court in determining the punitive damages such as contumacious conduct of the wrongdoer, the nature of the statute, gravity of the fault committed, the circumstances, etc. Punitive damages can be awarded when the wrongdoers’ conduct "shocks the conscience" or is "outrageous" or there is a wilful and "wanton disregard" for safety requirements. Normally, there must be a direct connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the victim’s injury. 17. Posited thus, we will examine the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Bhim Singh’s case, the petitioner, Bhim Singh, who was an MLA while proceeding from Jammu to Srinagar, was arrested en-route by the Police at around 3 a.m. in the night and his whereabouts were not made known to his family members and only when a writ of Habeas Corpus was filed before the Supreme Court and notice was issued to the respondents, the petitioner, Bhim Singh, was released on bail by the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge of Jammu, before whom he was produced. Sessions Judge of Jammu, before whom he was produced. The Supreme Court noted that Bhim Singh was kept in police lock up from 10-14 of September 1985 and he was produced before the Magistrate for the first time only on 14.9.1985 and made the observation that as he was not produced before the Magistrate within the mandatory period of 24 hours of his arrest there was gross violation of his constitutional right and in that context directed the State respondents to pay to him a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. What one can note in the case is that there was violation of the right of an elected MLA without any due process of law, from the initial stage of detention which was clumsily sought to be rectified by belatedly producing him before a Magistrate. Similarly, in the case of Rudul Sah, even though Rudul Sah was acquitted by the Court of Session, Muzaffarpur, Bihar on 3.6.1968 he was released from the Jail only on 16.10.1982 after about 14 years after he was acquitted. The Supreme Court, taking serious note of the prolonged detention without authority, held it to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution and directed payment of interim compensation of Rs. 30,000/- in the palliative nature. As evident, the Supreme Court was shocked by the prolonged delay of about 14 years in releasing the accused after acquittal. In Mohd Zahid’s case, the appellant Mohd Zahid was convicted under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 by the Designated Court and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000, and in default of payment to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 months more, on the basis of two prosecution witnesses who claimed to have witnessed the recovery of certain fire arms from the said Mohd Zahid and his arrest. The Supreme Court, however, on close perusal of the evidence set aside the conviction and held that the appellant, Mohd Zahid had been made a victim of prolonged illegal incarceration due to machination of the said two witnesses and other police personnel and accordingly, the Delhi Government was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation for the wrong committed on him. 50,000/- as compensation for the wrong committed on him. In the decision of the Bombay High Court referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner in Prema Bangar Swamy’s case, it relates to the continued detention of the petitioner Prema Bangar for more than two years after she was acquitted by the NDPS Court which was also upheld by the Appellate Court. In the said case, the Bombay High Court had observed that the petitioner, Prema Bangar Swamy, remained in illegal detention from 13.12.2000 onwards till she was released on 13.09.2003 and accordingly after considering other relevant factors awarded compensation of about rupees two lakhs. 18. What is to be noted in the above referred cases is that the Supreme Court and the High Court were perturbed by the grossness of the violation of the fundamental rights of the persons, either by the lack of sanction of law in detention as in the case of Bhim Singh or prolonged detention for years as in the cases of Rudal Shah and Premal Bangar without authority of law and false implication of an innocent resulting in underserved languishing in jail as in the case of Mohd Zahid. Thus, the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court awarded compensation to the victims by invoking the doctrine of constitutional remedy for the violation of fundamental rights which were found to be blatant, gross and shocking, which may not be applicable in the present case. In the present case, even though this Court had found that there was delay in releasing the petitioner from detention, it cannot be said that there was gross and blatant violation of his rights, though there was certain degree of negligence on the part of the officials. The concern of this Court is that the officials did not demonstrate the promptitude and urgency the matter deserved. It was dealt with in a routine fashion without much regard for early and expeditious release of the petitioner which is the mandate of law. Therefore, this Court in the light of the judgments discussed above and peculiar facts obtaining in this case would be reluctant to impose any heavy exemplary cost by way of public law remedy to the extent claimed by the petitioner as gross abuse of authority, arbitrariness, mala fide is not discernable in the present case and restrict the claim to a sum of Rs. 10,000/- only, considering the fact that the responsible officials have not shown promptness and urgency in dealing with the release order passed by the High Court it deserved and which was avoidable. However, it would be open to the petitioner to seek adequate and proper compensation under the ordinary civil remedy for the loss he may have suffered on account of the delay in his release from detention, for which the petitioner may approach the competent civil court within a period of six months from today. Petition stands disposed of accordingly.