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2014 DIGILAW 110 (AP)

Madanam Seetha Ramulu v. Madanam Vimala

2014-01-28

L.NARASIMHA REDDY, M.S.K.JAISWAL

body2014
Judgment The petitioner in O.P.No.5 of 2000 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Nizamabad, is the appellant. He filed the OP against his wife, the respondent, for divorce, under Section 13(1) (ia) (ib) and (ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’). He pleaded that the marriage between himself and the respondent took place in or around the year 1995, according to Hindu customs and rites. It was stated that four children were born out of their wedlock, and that after the birth of the fourth child, the respondent got herself converted into Christianity. The appellant stated that though he asked the respondent to come back to the fold of Hinduism, she was adamant, and left with no alternative, he filed the OP. He further alleged that the respondent deserted him, and has resorted to various acts of cruelty. He stated that the respondent used to quarrel with him openly, without any provocation, and subjected him to mental agony. The respondent filed a brief counter in the OP. She made a general denial of the allegations made against her. As regards the allegation about the conversion into Christianity, the respondent stated that she had faith in Jesus Christ, and the allegation against her is not true. Through its order, dated 28.02.2003, the trial Court dismissed the OP. Hence, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, under Section 28 of the Act. Sri K. Venu Madhav, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the evidence on record is clinching to the effect that the respondent converted into Christianity, during the subsistence of the marriage, and the trial Court ought to have decreed the OP, on that ground alone. He contends that though the respondent was evasive in her reply to the OP, her father, examined as R.W.2, categorically admitted that himself and all his family members including the respondent, were converted into Christianity, though he was not specific about the date of conversion. Learned counsel submits that R.W.2 admitted in his evidence that his name was Sattaiah and after conversion, he was renamed as Satyanandam, and in S.C.No.405 of 1997, R.W.2 herein deposed as P.W.2 that his name was shown as Sattaiah. Learned counsel submits that R.W.2 admitted in his evidence that his name was Sattaiah and after conversion, he was renamed as Satyanandam, and in S.C.No.405 of 1997, R.W.2 herein deposed as P.W.2 that his name was shown as Sattaiah. He further submits that P.W.3 is said to have converted the respondent into Christianity and R.W.2 admitted that a Register is maintained about the particulars of conversions and his failure to produce the same justifies the inference, that can be drawn, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Sri K.M. Mahender Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the appellant failed to prove the grounds of cruelty and desertion, and even on the grounds referable to conversion, the evidence on record does not support the plea. He submits that the respondent and her parents were professing Christianity, even before her marriage with the appellant, and the mere fact that the marriage was performed, in accordance with the customs of Hinduism, does not make the respondent a Hindu. He further submits that the appellant was aware of the personal status of the respondent, when he married her, and the ground of conversion into Christianity was pleaded, only to get rid of her. He further submits that the trial Court has appreciated the evidence on record on correct lines, and that the appellant is not entitled for any relief whatever. As many as three grounds were pleaded by the appellant for seeking divorce against the respondent. They are referable to Section 13(1) (ia) (ib) and (ii) of the Act. The trial Court framed the points, touching on each of those aspects, as under: 1) Whether the appellant established that the respondent was cruel towards him? 2) Whether the respondent deserted the company of the appellant on her own accord since December, 1997? 3) Whether the respondent converted into Christianity about two years prior to filing of the petition? On his behalf, the appellant examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and filed Exs.A.1 to A.10. On behalf of the respondent, R.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and no documentary evidence was filed. The trial Court dismissed the OP, by holding that none of the grounds pleaded by the appellant are proved. We find that the same points, as framed by the trial Court, arise for consideration before us. On behalf of the respondent, R.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and no documentary evidence was filed. The trial Court dismissed the OP, by holding that none of the grounds pleaded by the appellant are proved. We find that the same points, as framed by the trial Court, arise for consideration before us. Since extensive arguments are advanced in relation to point No.3, we propose to discuss the same first. A valid Hindu marriage can take place only between a man and a woman professing that religion, as on the date of marriage. The first sentence in Section 5 of the Act made this aspect clear. It reads: “A marriage may be solemnized between two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely, …….” In Rajiv Gakhar Vs. Bhavana Wasif @ Sahar Wasif 2011 (6) SCC 139 , the Supreme Court emphasized this aspect. There is no denial of the fact that the marriage between the parties herein took place, according to Hindu customs and rites. Quite large number of photographs, marked as Ex.A.6 together with negatives, substantiates this. A perusal of the photographs discloses that all the customs, that are stipulated for a valid Hindu marriage, were meticulously followed. The appellant pleaded that after the birth of the fourth child, the respondent got converted into Christianity. The averment reads: “After the birth of fourth son of the petitioner i.e., about two years ago, the respondent converted into Christianity and left the house of the petitioner leaving all four children including milk sucking fourth son at the house of the petitioner. The petitioner approached the respondent several times and requested her to reconvert into Hinduism and to come and join the company of the petitioner happily. But, the respondent did not heed to the request of the petitioner and refused to reconvert to Hinduism and join the company of the petitioner.” The counter filed by the respondent is brief. Dealing with the allegations made referred to above, she stated: “She had faith in Christianity since childhood. The petitioner misguiding the Court. The petitioner never admitted her change of religion. Dealing with the allegations made referred to above, she stated: “She had faith in Christianity since childhood. The petitioner misguiding the Court. The petitioner never admitted her change of religion. What she said is, she and her family had faith in Jesus Christ from her childhood.” From her pleadings, it is not clear as to whether the respondent was stating that she was a Christian, prior to marriage or she got herself converted into Christianity later on or that she did not profess that religion at all. The equivocal statement made by her is that she had faith in Jesus Christ. The burden of proof of conversion into Christianity naturally rests upon the respondent. The appellant stated the relevant facts in relation thereto. In his deposition also, he gave details about the conversion of the respondent into Christianity. In case the respondent was of the view that she was a Christian, even by the time of her marriage with the appellant, she was expected to raise an objection, as to the very filing of the OP, under Section 13 of the Act. The reason is that if the marriage was between a Hindu and a Christian. It does not govern the provisions of the Act and a different enactment governs the field. No such objection was raised. In his cross-examination, a suggestion was made to P.W.1 that the respondent did not embrace Christianity. The relevant answer reads: “It is not true to suggest that I forced the respondent to convert into Christianity” From this, it becomes clear that (a) the respondent became Christian, (b) such conversion was after the marriage, and (c) the reason for the conversion is the force exerted by the appellant. This type of defence sought to be projected by the respondent vanishes. To substantiate the plea that the respondent was professing Christianity even from childhood, her father, R.W.2, was examined. According to him, though he was a Hindu by birth and named as Sattaiah, he got himself converted into Christianity somewhere in 1978, and his name was changed as Satyanand. To counter this, the appellant filed the record pertaining to S.C.No.405 of 1997 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nizamabad. R.W.2, the father of the respondent, and others filed a complaint against the appellant, alleging the offences under Sections 498-A and 307 of IPC, and the same lead to S.C.No.405 of 1997. To counter this, the appellant filed the record pertaining to S.C.No.405 of 1997 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nizamabad. R.W.2, the father of the respondent, and others filed a complaint against the appellant, alleging the offences under Sections 498-A and 307 of IPC, and the same lead to S.C.No.405 of 1997. R.W.2 herein deposed as P.W.2 in that case in 1998. His name was shown as Sattaiah. Added to that, he described his name as Sattaiah in the complaint also. If, in fact, he was a Christian from the year 1978, and his name was changed as Satyanandam, that name ought to have been mentioned in the complaint as well as the deposition. Another witness examined by the respondent was R.W.3, a person who acted as Steward in the Church at Armoor. According to him, he was instrumental in converting the respondent and her family members into Christianity, and that it has taken place in the year 1978. He admitted that the Church would maintain a register, wherein the names of the persons, who got converted into Christianity, are mentioned. However, he failed to produce the same. The relevant portion of his deposition reads: “It is true that if any person adopts Baptism, we will enter the name of such person in a particular register. The said register is called as ‘Church roll’. The said register will be maintained in all the Churches. It is true that the names of R.W.2 and his family members entered in the Church roll. I did not produce any register to show that R.W.2 and his family members converted into Christianity in the year 1978.” The failure on the part of R.W.3 to produce the register would naturally lead to an inference to be drawn, as provided for, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. From the above, it becomes clear that the respondent got herself converted into Christianity, after her marriage with the appellant. The Act recognizes conversion of a spouse into another religion as a valid ground for the other to seek divorce. We accordingly answer point No.3 in favour of the appellant. Point Nos.1 and 2 are about the desertion and cruelty. It is not in dispute that the respondent left the company of the appellant, soon after the fourth child was born. We accordingly answer point No.3 in favour of the appellant. Point Nos.1 and 2 are about the desertion and cruelty. It is not in dispute that the respondent left the company of the appellant, soon after the fourth child was born. After that, a complaint was filed against the appellant, alleging the offences under Sections 498-A and 307 of IPC, at the instance of the respondent, though by R.W.2. That signifies the strained relations between the appellant and the respondent. That and other developments constitute a clear case of desertion as well as cruelty. We do not propose to further elaborate this, because our answer to point No.3 would be sufficient to decide the result of the appeal. The points are, accordingly, answered in favour of the appellant. We, therefore, allow the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and the order and decree passed by the trial Court are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand disposed of.