JUDGMENT : Aravind Kumar, J. - Heard Sri.Prasad P. learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri.Thejaswi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Smt.Harini Shivanand for 2nd respondent - insurer and cross-objector. 2. The appeal is of the year 2011 and the cross-objection of the insurer is of the year 2012. It is the contention of Sri.Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for claimant - workman that Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation committed a serious error in not considering the income of deceased at Rs.6,000/-p.m. which was also admitted by his employer and a suggestion to the said effect had also been made in the cross-examination of claimant - wife of deceased and as such, Commissioner ought to have considered the income of deceased at Rs.6,000/- p.m. and not Rs.4,000/- p.m. Hence, he prays for modifying the judgment and award passed by Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. On this ground, he seeks for formulating the substantial question of law as formulated in the appeal memorandum and prays for answering the same in favour of claimants. 3. Per contra, Sri.Thejaswi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Smt.Harini Shivanand would contend that Commissioner committed a serious error in not considering the fact that claim petition has been filed after 8 years from the date of death of 1st claimant's husband and delay had not been properly examined and as such, Commissioner could not have awarded any compensation to claimants at all. He would also elaborate his submission by contending that for no fault of cross-objector, it cannot be saddled with interest component for the delay period in the event of this Court coming to a conclusion that insurer is liable to indemnify the claim. He would also contend that Tribunal ought to have taken the age of deceased as reflected in Ex.P.9 - driving licence and not the age of the deceased as reflected in the postmortem report Ex.P8. 4. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that following substantial questions of law would arise for consideration: (1) Whether Commissioner was correct in assessing the loss of earning capacity of deceased by considering his income at Rs.4,000/- p.m. when the claimants as well as the employer of deceased had stated that deceased was earning Rs.6,000/- p.m.?. (2) Whether insurer would be liable to pay interest payable after one month from the date of accident?. (2) Whether insurer would be liable to pay interest payable after one month from the date of accident?. and, from whom the claimants are entitled to seek for payment of interest on the award?. 5. On account of the employmental injuries sustained by deceased Yellappa, a claim petition under Section 10 of the Workmens' Compensation Act came to be filed on 10-11-2008 by his dependants. Since the accident is of the year 2000 and claim having been filed in 2008, there was a delay of 8 years in filing the said claim petition. As such, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also came to be filed along with the claim petition. Said delay has been condoned by the Commissioner on the ground that 1st claimant being the wife of deceased is a rustic village lady, not conversant with the worldly affairs and as such delay deserves to be condoned. Accordingly, delay has been condoned. Re. 1st Substantial Question of Law: 6. Commissioner, while computing the compensation payable to claimants, has arrived at a conclusion that income of deceased should be considered at Rs.4,000/- p.m., on the basis of statutory provision then existing namely, Section 4(1B) of W.C.Act and accordingly Commissioner has computed the monthly wages of workman at Rs.4,000/- p.m. It is not in dispute that said figure reflected in Section 4(1B) has been amended by Act 45 of 2009, which reads as under: "(1B) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, for the purposes of sub-section (1), such monthly wages in relation to an employee as it may consider necessary." 7. The Central Government vide Notification S.0.1258(E), dated 31-5-2010 with effect from 31-5-2010 has specified monthly wages, as Rs.8,000/- for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 4. In the light of amendment having coming to effect with effect from 18-1-2010 and present appeal being a continuation of original proceedings, the benefit that accrue to workman cannot be denied. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'New India Assurance Company Limited v. V.K. Neelakandan and Others, reported in (1999)8 SCC 256 has held such benefit which accrues to an workman when the case is finally adjudicated, will have to be extended. It has been held as under: "3.It is not in disputed.........We are finally determining the rights of the workmen today. It has been held as under: "3.It is not in disputed.........We are finally determining the rights of the workmen today. The Act is a special legislation for the benefit of the labour. Keeping in view the scheme of the Act, we are of the view that the only interpretation which can be given to the amendment is that if any benefit is conferred on the workmen and the said benefit is available on the date when the case is finally adjudicated, the said benefit should be extended to the workmen........" 8. In the light of the above dicta laid down by the Apex Court and in the back drop of amendment brought into W.C.Act by substitution of Section 4(1B), this Court is of the considered view that income of deceased, considered by Commissioner at Rs.4,000/- p.m. cannot be accepted. On the other hand, evidence available on record namely, evidence tendered by the wife of deceased would indicate that deceased was drawing Rs.6,000/- p.m. In fact employer of deceased has entered appearance and has filed his statement of objections before the Commissioner and in paragraph 5 of statement of objections, it is admitted by the employer that deceased was earning Rs.6,000/- p.m. including batta. That apart, in the cross-examination of 1st claimant, it has been suggested to the wife of deceased by the employer himself that deceased was being paid only Rs.6,000/- including batta and not excluding batta. Thus, pleadings and evidence on record would clearly indicate that deceased was earning Rs.6,000/- p.m. and as such compensation awarded by Tribunal by considering his income at Rs.4,000/- p.m. requires to be set aside and compensation has to be re-computed. 9. As noted herein above, age of deceased, as reflected in the P.M. report Ex.P.8 is 42 years. Though Thejaswi, learned Counsel has contended that age of deceased as reflected in the driving licence has to be considered, Commissioner has rightly not accepted the same in as much as in the instant case, driving licence which has been produced and marked as Ex.P.9 does not indicate date of birth of deceased. As such, age reflected in the P.M. report Ex.P.8 deserves to be accepted which is 42 years and the relevant factor applicable would be 178.49. As such, age reflected in the P.M. report Ex.P.8 deserves to be accepted which is 42 years and the relevant factor applicable would be 178.49. Accordingly, compensation required to be computed to which claimants would be entitled to and same would be Rs.6,000 - 50% = Rs.3,000/- x 178.49 = Rs.5,35,470 less Rs.3,56,980 awarded by Commissioner. When deducted balance on additional compensation which would be payable to claimants would be Rs,1,78,490/-. Accordingly, substantial question No. 1 is answered in the negative i.e. against the insurer and in favour of claimants. Re. Substantial Question No. 2: 10. In the instant case, there is no dispute to the fact that a claim petition seeking compensation cannot be thrown out on technicalities. When the technicalities are pitted against substantial justice, such technicalities will have to necessarily yield to substantial justice. In this regard, a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Collector, 'Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , can be looked up where under, contours for considering application for condonation of delay has been explained which are illustrative in nature and it reads as under: "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay?. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an evenhanded manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do evenhanded justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 11. Keeping the above principles laid down by the Apex Court in mind when the facts on hand are examined, it would clearly indicate that 1st claimant is a rustic village lady, who is not conversant with worldly affairs and she being uneducated was not aware of her right to approach the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation to seek payment of compensation, and on account of her illiteracy and not being aware of the benefits of social beneficial legislation size did not approach the Commissioner. As such, Commissioner has rightly condoned the delay and no infirmity can be found with the said finding recorded by the Commissioner. 12. The incidental question that would arise is whether insurer should be made liable to pay the interest for no fault on its part and the answer will have to be in the negative in as much as the owner of offending vehicle who was the employer of deceased being aware of the accident as well as death of 1st claimant's husband, did not take any effective steps to report the fact to the insurer and as such claimants would be entitled to recover interest, namely for a period of 8 years i.e. delay period from the employer of deceased i.e. owner of the offending vehicle namely 1st respondent in this appeal. Accordingly, Question No. 2 is partly answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the cross-objector - insurer. 13. Accordingly, Question No. 2 is partly answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the cross-objector - insurer. 13. In view of the above, I proceed to pass the following ORDER (1) MFA No.4877 of 2011 and MFA.Crob.No. 70 of 2012 are hereby allowed in part. (2) Judgment and award passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation in W.C BNG-3/FC/CR-44/2008, dated 25-11-2010 is hereby modified and an additional compensation of Rs.1,78,490/- is hereby awarded to the claimants which shall carry interest at the rate of 12% p.a. payable after thirty days from the date of accident till the date of payment or deposit said compensation is to be paid by insurer. (3) Insurer is not liable to pay interest for the period of 8 years and claimants would be entitled to recover the said interest for the period of 8 years from respondent No. 1 herein namely the employer of deceased. (4) Insurer is directed to deposit the compensation and 1st respondent is directed to deposit the interest for 8 years before this Court within 8 weeks from today. (5) Order for deposit and payment as directed by Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation shall hold good for additional compensation awarded. (6) No costs. 12-8-2015 ORDER The insured being aggrieved by order dated 17-12-20 passed in this appeal had filed review petition in R.P.Nos.88 and 263 of 2015. This Court after hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the records allowed the same since this Court was of the considered view that fastening of liability on the insured to pay interest for the period of eight years as ordered in paragraph 12 as well as paragraph 13(3) is to be reviewed and accordingly it was reviewed and by order dated 4-8-2015 passed in R.P.Nos.88 and 263 of 2015 recalled the said order. Hence, this appeal has been listed as ordered by this Court. 2. In view of the categorical finding recorded by this Court in R.P.Nos.88 and 263 of 2015 disposed of on 4-8-2015 that insured had already lodged a claim before the insurer in respect of the damage caused to the offending vehicle involved in the accident in question, it came to be held that insurer cannot feign ignorance of claim having been lodged by the insured. Hence, this Court has recorded a finding that insurer would be liable to pay interest for the said delay period also. It has been held by this Court in R.P.Nos.88 and 263 of 2015 disposed of on 4-8-2015 to the following effect: "4. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the judgment passed by this Court on 17-12-2014, it would indicate that insured namely, review petitioner has been directed to pay interest for the period of 8 years on the premise that insured had not intimated the insurer with regard to the accident having occurred and as such, it came to be held that for the period of 8 years (for the period of delay in filing the claim petition) insured/owner would be liable to indemnify the claimants with regard to payment of interest. Perusal of the Motor Claims Form submitted by the review petitioner before fifth respondent-insurer on 10-11-2000 which is also appended to the review petition would clearly indicate that same has been received by the insurer and for having received the Motor Claim Form in Form No. AC-4, acknowledgement has also been furnished by duly affixing its seal by Insurance Company and signature for receiving the Claim Form is also affixed. In fact, Counsel for insurer does not seriously dispute the fact that said Claim Form having been processed and partially having satisfied the claim of the insured. In that view of the matter, insurer cannot be heard to contend that it was not aware of the accident in question and same not having been intimated to it. Though, insured had appeared in the appeal and contested the matter, none had appeared when it was heard and disposed off on 17-12-2014 and reason assigned by the learned Counsel for absence being engaged in Court Hall No.3 deserves to be accepted in as much as, plea put forward in the review petition would indicate that Counsel for review petitioner was engaged in arguing Company Petition No. 37 of 2003 and his absence before this Court on 17-12-2014 being bona fide, deserves to be accepted. On account of said bona fide reason the insured/owner of the vehicle could not bring to the notice of this Court the fact of insurer being aware of the accident in question. On account of said bona fide reason the insured/owner of the vehicle could not bring to the notice of this Court the fact of insurer being aware of the accident in question. Had this fact been made known by any one, this Court would have not directed the insured to pay interest for 8 years on award amount. In that view of the matter, there being an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated 17-12-2014, this Court is of the considered view that to the extent of fastening the liability on the insurer as indicated in paragraphs 12 and 13(3) of the judgment dated 17-12-2014 deserves to be reviewed and appeal requires to be restored by recalling the said judgment to said extent only. 3. In view of above finding recorded in review petition it is hereby ordered that offending vehicle which was undisputedly insured with the second respondent/cross objector and as on the date of the accident the policy was in vogue and in force is liable to pay the interest for the delay period also. This Court had directed the insurer to indemnify the claim with interest "excluding the period of eight years" vide order dated 17-12-2014, which came to be reviewed/recalled by holding that insurer would be liable to indemnify the claimants not only for payment of compensation but also for payment of interest. 4. In that view of the matter substantial question of Law No.2 formulated in this appeal is answered by holding that insurer would be liable to pay interest after one month from the date of the accident and claimants would be entitled to seek indemnification of the award amount as well as interest on the award from the insurer. 5. In view of the afore stated facts paragraph 12 and also paragraph 13(3) is accordingly ordered to be substituted as under: "12. The incidental question that would arise is whether the insurer would be liable to pay the interest for the delay period of eight years?. Undisputedly the insured had lodged a claim before the insurer seeking compensation towards damage caused to the offending vehicle. Said claim form was processed by the insurer and partly settled the claim. Hence, insurer cannot contend that it was not aware of the accident in question. Undisputedly the insured had lodged a claim before the insurer seeking compensation towards damage caused to the offending vehicle. Said claim form was processed by the insurer and partly settled the claim. Hence, insurer cannot contend that it was not aware of the accident in question. That apart the Commissioner for workmen's compensation has condoned the delay in filing the claim petition taking into account that the first claimant i.e., wife of the deceased is a rustic villager, not conversant with the Court procedure etc. In that view of the matter insurer would be liable to pay the interest on the award amount for the delay period also and claimant would be entitled to interest from one month from the date of accident and same is liable to be paid by the insurer i.e., second respondent. Accordingly Question No.2 is answered. "13(3) - Insurer would be liable to pay interest for the period of eight years and claimants would be entitled to recover the said interest from respondent No.2/insurer/cross-objector". Accordingly appeal stands disposed off in terms of this modified order. Registry to make necessary correction in the autograph.