JUDGMENT : The present Second Appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 24.04.2013 passed by learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Bharuch, dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2007, in turn confirming judgment and decree dated 12.01.2007 passed by learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Bharuch in Regular Civil Suit No. 66 of 2006. 1.1 The trial court partly allowed the suit which was for damages on the ground of breach of contract, directing the defendant to pay Rs.83,188/- with interest at the rate of 6% against the total suit claim of Rs.1,47,719/- sought to be recovered with 18% interest. The aggrieved appellant-original defendant has invoked the jurisdiction of this court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 2. The plaintiff-a public limited company-engaged in production and marketing of fertilizers, chemicals etc., instituted a Regular Civil Suit against the defendant-a private limited company which manufactures Rubber Nylon Conveyor Belts etc., for recovery of Rs.1,47,719/-. It was the case in the plaint that the plaintiff placed a purchaser order with the defendant company dated 20.11.1996 for supply of Glimmer License Open Length Rubber Nylon Conveyor Belt of particular size and specification. The defendant accepted the order and informed the plaintiff by letter dated 04.12.1996 that the material as per the purchase order and instructions mentioned therein were ready for delivery. It was the case of the plaintiff that the defendant requested to depute its representative for on-the-spot payment on priority basis and the plaintiff deputed its representative who handed over demand draft of Rs.1,25,188/- bearing No. 287278 dated 06.12.1996 in the name of defendant in full payment of its proforma bill dated 20.11.1996. 3. It was further stated that the defendant addressed letter dated 10.12.1996 to the plaintiff giving guarantee against faulty material and bad workmanship. The guarantee period was 12 months from the date of supply as per the purchase order. The defendant also confirmed that the goods in question would conform requirement of purchase order dated 20.11.1996. The defendant undertook further to indemnify the plaintiff against any manufacturing defect and agreed for replacement of conveyor belts if not found suitable on practicable test as per the letter of indemnity given on 30.11.1996. The certificate of guarantee as well as the test certificate were issued by the defendant in compliance of the terms of the purchase order, stated the plaintiff in the plaint. The certificate of guarantee as well as the test certificate were issued by the defendant in compliance of the terms of the purchase order, stated the plaintiff in the plaint. 3.1 It was next pleaded that when the goods were inspected by the plaintiff’s department concerned, the defects were noticed. It was observed by the user department, as paragraph-7 averred, that while taking out small length of 2 ft., the carcase got detached from the ply indicating poor bonding. It was further stated that it was possible to peel off carcase from ply by hand. As per the case of the plaintiff, therefore, the goods supplied were found to be faulty at the time of practical use and they were not as per the specification given in the purchase order. By fax message dated 07.01.1997 and letter dated 08.01.1997, the defendant was informed; fax message was again sent on 13.02.1997, requesting the defendant to visit the office of plaintiff etc. 3.2 It was the further case of the plaintiff that the goods in question were not matching the specification and there was clear violation of terms and conditions of deal-cum-agreement and the contract of sale. It was contended that therefore, the defendant was under obligation and legally liable to refund the full amount paid towards the price of the goods with interest and take back the goods. The plaintiff gave legal notice dated 22.05.1997 as the defendant did not comply with the instructions, nor replied in the matter. 3.3 On the above factual premise and pleadings, the plaintiff sought to recover Rs.1,25,188/- with interest at the rate of 18% from 06.12.1996. In the Suit prayer, Rs.1,47,719/- was claimed recoverable adding interest for the period from 06.12.1996 to 06.12.1997. 3.4 The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement at Exh.14. One of the contentions raised was that the trial court did not have territorial jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit. It was the contention that the terms and conditions of the contract agreed with the plaintiff was at Bombay and delivery of the goods were also taken from Bombay and the payment was also made at Bombay. The defendant admitted that he had undertaken to indemnify the plaintiff against any manufacturing defect and had agreed to store the Conveyor Belt. It was the contention that the terms and conditions of the contract agreed with the plaintiff was at Bombay and delivery of the goods were also taken from Bombay and the payment was also made at Bombay. The defendant admitted that he had undertaken to indemnify the plaintiff against any manufacturing defect and had agreed to store the Conveyor Belt. 3.5 The trial court framed issues including the issue as to whether the defendant proved that the court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The same was answered in negative and it was held that the civil court at Bharuch had jurisdiction. The trial court partially decreed the suit as above. The first appellate court framed issues for determination. The issue was also framed that whether Principal Senior Civil Judge, Bharuch had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The first appellate court upheld the findings of the trial court on the aspect of jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal on merits. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. Pratik Acharya for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Maulik Nanavati for the respondent. 4.1 The main contention raised by learned advocate for the appellant was about the jurisdiction. He submitted that the court at Bharuch did not have jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. In the context, learned advocate invited attention of the court to the questions of law pleaded and proposed in the memorandum of appeal, which were (i) whether two courts below have committed an error and failed to consider law points of jurisdiction under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure read with the provisions of the Contract Act? (ii)whether two courts below erred in interpretation of terms of bill at Ex: 20? (iii) whether two courts below erred in not considering section 16 of the code of civil procedure code, 1908? (iv) whether both the court below erred and committed serious illegality in appreciation of oral evidence at Exhibit:50?(v) whether both the court below erred in interpretation of cause of action and jurisdiction of Court? (vi) whether the courts below have erred in pause wrong issue and come to the wrong conclusion?” 4.2 Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the contract between the parties governed, as far as the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute was concerned, by a condition which provided that Bombay court would have the jurisdiction. (vi) whether the courts below have erred in pause wrong issue and come to the wrong conclusion?” 4.2 Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the contract between the parties governed, as far as the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute was concerned, by a condition which provided that Bombay court would have the jurisdiction. He relied on documents Exh.27 and Exh.29 to support his submission. According to him, these documents conclusively showed that the parties had agreed on the jurisdiction to be the court of Bombay. In that view, it was submitted that the suit instituted by the plaintiff at Bharuch was not competent. Learned advocate for the appellant in the next submitted that no cause of action or part thereof could be said to have arise at Bharuch and that all the sub-transactions leading to the contract was at Bombay; the acceptance of proposal was at Bombay, the goods were sent from Bombay. It was submitted that the courts below committed an error in holding that civil court at Bharuch was competent to try and entertain the suit. Learned advocate relied on the grounds set out in the memo of appeal. 4.3 In support of his submissions, learned advocate for the appellant referred to and relied on decision in Shriram City Union Finance Corporation vs. Rama Mishra [ 2002(9) SCC 458 ], paragraphs-8 and 9 thereof in particular. He further also relied on decision in Sawastik Gases Pvt. Ltd. vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited [2013 (9) SCC 30], paragraph-9 onwards as well as paragraphs-27 and 28 thereof. 4.4 Learned advocate for the respondent-original plaintiff countering the contention about jurisdiction raised on behalf of the appellant submitted that the alleged condition on jurisdiction did not form part of the contract between the parties. He submitted that until the contract was completed, the plaintiff had no knowledge about the so-called clause relied on. It was submitted that it was in printed form on the printed invoice which was raised by the defendant after the plaintiff dispatched the purchase order. He submitted that the contract was completed with sending of purchase order. Any clause on jurisdiction was not brought to the knowledge of the plaintiff and hence, was not part of contract. He submitted that the suit was for damages for breach of contract, for which the defendant had given guarantee and had undertook to indemnify for faulty material. He submitted that the contract was completed with sending of purchase order. Any clause on jurisdiction was not brought to the knowledge of the plaintiff and hence, was not part of contract. He submitted that the suit was for damages for breach of contract, for which the defendant had given guarantee and had undertook to indemnify for faulty material. He submitted that in this context when the goods were found to be defective upon receipt thereof at Bharuch when the department of the plaintiff put them to use, the cause of action arose at Bharuch. 4.5 Learned advocate in support of his submissions relied on decisions in (i) Hakam Sing vs Gammon [ (1971) 1 SCC 286 ], (ii) ONGC vs Modern Construction Company [1997 Law Suit (Gujarat) 123], (iii) decision of Delhi High Court in Wollaque Ventilation and Construction Private Limited vs Sterling Tools Limited being A.O. No.301 of 2010 decided on 18.02.2011 and (iv) Madras High Court decision in Shree Durga Lodge Limited Vs M/s. Federal Lloyd Corporation being A.S. no.989 of 2007 decided on 17.06.2011. 5. The principal point raised by the appellant was about jurisdiction by harping that the documents Exh.27 and Exh.29 forming part of the transaction showed that there was a clause regarding the court at Bombay will have jurisdiction, which was agreed between the parties and it being in the nature of exclusionary clause on jurisdiction, the suit instituted at Bharuch was not competent in law. In the context of said issue, looking at the sequence of correspondence forming part of the transaction between the parties, pursuant to the inquiries by the plaintiff-Narmada Velly Fertilizers Limited, the defendant-company put up its proposal as per plaintiff’s requirement, sending it to the plaintiff (Exh.26). On 23.10.1996, a statement of estimation was sent by the defendant on its letterhead (Exh.27), in which the description and specification of the goods proposed to be supplied, the price thereof and the terms of delivery, etc., were indicated. It inter alia mentioned that the same was subject to the conditions mentioned at the footnote and on the reverse. The plaintiff thereafter sent purchase order to the defendant company (Exh.28), in turn invoice dated 28.11.1996 (Exh.29) was raised and sent to the plaintiff at its place-Narmadanagar, District Bharuch. In the said invoice at the top, it was mentioned that “This sale is subject to our business terms. The plaintiff thereafter sent purchase order to the defendant company (Exh.28), in turn invoice dated 28.11.1996 (Exh.29) was raised and sent to the plaintiff at its place-Narmadanagar, District Bharuch. In the said invoice at the top, it was mentioned that “This sale is subject to our business terms. Bombay jurisdiction and interest at 18%”. 5.1 The purchase order (Exh.28) inter alia mentioned that with reference to your abovementioned offer and subsequent correspondence, we are pleased to inform that the rates offered by you are accepted subject to the terms and conditions of our abovementioned inquiry against this order. Please supply the goods shown hereunder strictly according to such terms and conditions. The said purchase order mentioned overleaf dispatch and packing instructions. In addition to the printed conditions overleaf, additional conditions were stated. It included giving of guarantee certificate by the defendant company in respect of use of faulty material and bad workmanship, for a period of 12 months from the date of supply. It was further required that the supplier shall supply material test certificate and test certificate from his own testing house. It was indicated that the dispatch of the goods should be through M/s. Economic Transport Organisation’s chartered vehicle and the delivery shall be on-door basis. 5.2 As per letter dated 04.12.1996(Exh.30) addressed by the defendant, it was stated that the material in respect of the purchase order dated 20.11.1996 was ready for delivery and inspection. It further appears that on 30.11.1996, a letter of guarantee was issued by the defendant which was received by the plaintiff on 14.12.1996. The said guarantee letter/certificate (Exh.31) titled “To whomsoever it may concern”, read thus-“We hereby guarantee the stores exactly as per Purchase Order No. SAS/651056/1655 dated 28.11.1996, and in compliance with Indian Standard Specifications. We indemnify against any manufacturing defect and agree to replace stores if not suitable on practical test. It is understood such replacement will be done with acceptable stores free of any charge.”. The test certificate required as per additional condition attached to purchase order (Exh.28)was sent on 30.11.1996(Exh.32). On 10.12.1996 the defendant addressed letter to the plaintiff regarding receipt of Demand Draft for bill amount against the order. It is understood such replacement will be done with acceptable stores free of any charge.”. The test certificate required as per additional condition attached to purchase order (Exh.28)was sent on 30.11.1996(Exh.32). On 10.12.1996 the defendant addressed letter to the plaintiff regarding receipt of Demand Draft for bill amount against the order. 5.3 It was the case of the plaintiff as already stated that since upon practical testing, the Conveyor Belts were found to be defective and in faulty working condition which led the plaintiff to raise complaints and the plaintiff was further required to dispose of the Conveyor Belts on as it where is basis by issuing tender. 6. For considering whether the contract between the parties contained any condition as to confer the jurisdiction on the courts at Bombay only, whether such condition was impliedly agreed upon or emanated from the correspondence leading the contract, the material aspect would be the point of time the contract could be said to have been completed between the parties. In this regard, Section 4 of the Contract Act, 1872 would be of relevance, which provides as to when communication of acceptance of offer becomes complete. The Section reads as under, “4. The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The communication of an acceptance is complete- as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor; as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer; the communication of revocation is complete- as against the person who makes it, when it is put into a course of transmission to the person to whom it is made, so as to be out of the power of the person who makes it; as against the person to whom it is made, when it comes to his knowledge.“ 6.1 Applying the statutory principle in Section 4 of the Contract Act above, the acceptance of offer in the instance case became complete as against the proposerthe defendant company when it is put in to transmission to the defendant and when it has gone out of control or power of the acceptor-the plaintiff. In other words, as soon as the Purchase Order (Exh.28) was sent by the plaintiff accepting the proposal (Exh.26, 27). In other words, as soon as the Purchase Order (Exh.28) was sent by the plaintiff accepting the proposal (Exh.26, 27). The Purchase Order was sent from the place of plaintiff in Bharuch, Gujarat to the defendant at Bombay. The acceptance of offer in so far as the plaintiff was concerned, became complete with dispatch of the Purchase Order by the plaintiff. It was the issuance of Purchase Order which was the point of co-terminus when the contract between the parties completed. 6.2 In Modern Construction Company(supra), the facts were that the contractor’s tenders were accepted by ONGC at Bombay, the work orders were issued by the Superintending Engineer, Gujarat, the work was to be performed at Hazira, Surat, the payment was made at Bombay and Surat. This court observed that when the offers came to be accepted by ONGC, communication of acceptance was sent by ONGC to the contractor from Surat to Mansa by telegrams. It further observed that it was therefore clear that the communication of acceptance became complete qua the contractor who was original proposer when intimation was sent into transmission by telegram from Surat to Mansa. The court held, “Thus, communication of acceptance of offers muturing into conclusion of contract is complete as against the contractor when telegrams were sent from Surat and as against the acceptor O.N.G.C. When the telegrams were received by the proposer-contractor. It means that contract came to be concluded the moment telegrams were sent from Surat as there was completion of acceptance of offers insofar as proposer of the offer was concerned and qua proposer-contractor and proposal became promises. But insofar as acceptor O.N.G.C. was concerned. Thus, the acceptor O.N.G.C. had an option to revoke the acceptance of offers till communication is received by the proposer. Therefore, the contention that contract was completed at place, Mansa, in Mehsana District, on the ground that intimation of communication of acceptance, i.e., the telegrams were received is not sustainable. Such a contention was wrongly accepted by the trial Court at Mansa in Mehsana District.”. (para-13) 6.3 Therefore, until the time the contract culminated and was completed, the clause in respect of jurisdiction was not in picture. The mention about “Bombay jurisdiction” was in the invoice dated 28.11.1996 raised pursuant to the Purchase Order dated 20.11.1996 of the plaintiff. Such a contention was wrongly accepted by the trial Court at Mansa in Mehsana District.”. (para-13) 6.3 Therefore, until the time the contract culminated and was completed, the clause in respect of jurisdiction was not in picture. The mention about “Bombay jurisdiction” was in the invoice dated 28.11.1996 raised pursuant to the Purchase Order dated 20.11.1996 of the plaintiff. What was stated on the top of the invoice(Exh.29) was that “This sale is subject to our business terms. Bombay jurisdiction and interest at 18%”. It is debatable in itself whether the above words would constitute in its effect a clause on jurisdiction, much less an exclusionary clause, whereby it could be construed that it was suggestive that the jurisdiction would be of Bombay court only. Even while viewing and construing the said printed sentence on the top of Exh. 29 to be the clause on jurisdiction, could it be said that the same was agreed before the conclusion of the contract and whether it was put to the knowledge of the plaintiff, which again is an essential requirement. 6.4 In Hakam Sing Vs Gammon [ (1971) 1 SCC 286 ], the Apex Court held, “But such an agreement must be spelled out either by express words or by necessary implication. Ouster of jurisdiction of Courts cannot be lightly assumed or presumed. If there is such a concluded agreement, it will certainly operate as estoppal against the parties to the contract. If it is merely a unilateral affirmation or statement made by one of the parties, as long as it is not shown that the statement has been accepted by the other party as a term or condition of the agreement, it cannot be held that there is an agreement to confer exclusive jurisdiction on any Court. Particular caution is necessary in regard to such a clause contained in a printed form, as in this case. Where the printed form is signed by both the parties or where a form printed by one party is signed by the other party and forwarded by the latter to the former and the printed form contains clear words clear words conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a court at any particular place or ousting jurisdiction of the court at any other place, it may not be difficult to hold that the parties have agreed on such a term. Even in such cases, Courts must remember that, people often sign order forms containing a good deal of printed matter without caring to read what is printed. It cannot always be said that everything which is printed may be deemed to form part of the contract. Where a form printed by one party is signed only by third party and delivered to the other party, without anything more it will be difficult for the court to hold that there has been consensus ad idem in regard to the particular clause. Of course, if there is some other material to indicate acceptance or consent of the party who received the printed form, then the court is free to infer that the clause formed part of the agreement.” 6.5 Relying on Hakam Sing (supra), the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Company Limited vs Associated Transport Corporation Private Limited and another [AIR 1998 Kerala 36] (supra), set out the position of law. In the case before the Kerala High Court Exhibit. B1 contained printed words “subject to Bombay jurisdiction alone”, and the Kerala High Court observed thus, “Apart from the existence of these printed words, respondent has no case that there was a meeting of minds between the consignor and the carrier and there was a specific agreement in that behalf. The consignment was delivered to the carrier, the carrier took custody of the goods and thereafter issued the receipt or consignment note which contained the printed words. The note was signed only by an employee of the respondent. No doubt, they were handed over to the consignor. Hut there was nothing to indicate that there was an agreement between the parties to confer exclusive jurisdiction to Bombay Court. These printed words by themselves and without anything more would not be sufficient to constitute an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of all court other the court specified.” 6.6 In order that a condition becomes binding to the parties to the contract, and which applies to the conditions or clause as to the jurisdiction as well, the sine qua non is firstly, it must form part of the contract itself. Secondly, it ought to have been conveyed in the proper manner. Secondly, it ought to have been conveyed in the proper manner. The courts have held as noted above that merely because the standard printed form of invoice mentioned the jurisdiction subject to a particular place, it cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the court at other places where part of cause of action may arise. The next requirement is that the party must have knowledge of the condition and that both the sides must be ad idem. In any view, this essential ingredient was not there. 6.7 The submission of learned advocate for the appellant that Exh.27 read with Exh.29 amounted an agreement between the parties that Bombay court only would have jurisdiction, could not be countenanced. Exh.27 was an estimate send in course of proposal by the defendant company. It was in the course of the stage of proposal. The contract between the parties was never concluded at that stage. The juncture when the contract stood concluded between the parties was when purchase order dated 20.11.1996 sent by the plaintiff which was responded by the defendant company by sending the proforma invoice (Exh.26). Until the conclusion of the contract at the said stage, nothing was indicated in respect of jurisdiction aspect. The condition sought to be described as jurisdictional clause was first mentioned as printed in the invoice dated 28.11.1996. In other words, the plaintiff had no intimation, nor was made aware by any other means or material. In the circumstances, in any case, it could be said in the least that the parties were not ad idem on the condition as to jurisdiction. The said alleged condition on jurisdiction had not entered into the arena of concluded contract. It never became part of the agreement of contract, nor there was anything attendant to suggest that both the parties had agreed to make it a part of contract. 6.8 In light of above, the first appellate court appropriately reasoned as under and was eminently justified in holding that, “…the question is that the defendant has brought to the notice of this fact to the plaintiff. No satisfactory evidence is produced by the defendant that the plaintiff has got noticed this fact by plaintiff. The document Exh. 27 and 29 are not signed by plaintiff. No satisfactory evidence is produced by the defendant that the plaintiff has got noticed this fact by plaintiff. The document Exh. 27 and 29 are not signed by plaintiff. There is no evidence brought on record by defendant that they brought to the notice the fact in respect of ouster of jurisdiction of other except Mumbai. There is no separate agreement in respect of jurisdiction. So, in my view, when the jurisdiction of other court ouster by an agreement, the agreement is clear and unambiguous and declaration is not one side and partly must have knowledge of the agreement. In the case on hand, the declaration printed behind bills and no signature of plaintiff obtained behind bills or front of bill by noticing the clause of jurisdiction brought to the plaintiff’s knowledge. Hence, in absence of evidence in respect of ouster jurisdiction is brought to the knowledge of plaintiff, the document Exh.27 and 29 are not sufficient to establish that the court of Bharuch has no jurisdiction.” 7. Furthermore, in the facts of the case, it could not be gainsaid that the cause of action and at least part of it arose at Bharuch so as to attract jurisdiction of the civil court at Bharuch. The trial court rightly reasoned on the correspondence between the parties to observe that they were addressed to the place of plaintiff at Narmadanagar, Bharuch. The events formed part of bundle of facts constituting cause of action. 7.1 The cause of action in the suit arising out of contract, would arise within the meaning of Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Such cause of action may arise at the place where the contract is made. It may arise at the place where contract is to be performed or came to be performed. The cause of action may also arise at a place where in performance of the contract, any money due thereunder expressly or impliedly has to be carried out. 7.2 In a suit for damages for breach of contract, the origination of cause of action is the bundle of facts by which the breach takes place and is felt. In this regard, the place where the contract is to be performed and in course of performance, the breach is noticed becomes significant fact for arising of cause of action. 7.2 In a suit for damages for breach of contract, the origination of cause of action is the bundle of facts by which the breach takes place and is felt. In this regard, the place where the contract is to be performed and in course of performance, the breach is noticed becomes significant fact for arising of cause of action. Since the cause of action consisting breach of the contract, the suit can be filed where the breach of the contract occurred. The plaintiff’s suit in the present case was for damages for breach of contract-the performance guarantee and the breach occurred when the department concerned found at Bharuch in course of practical use of the goods-the conveyor belts that they were defective and they were defective and faulty. It could not be gainsaid that at least, a part of cause of action accrued that the place where the contract was performed and therefore, the court at Bharuch could be the proper jurisdictional venue for instituting the suit for damages on the ground of breach of contract. 7.3 The issue could be looked at from another standpoint as well. The purchase order dated 20.11.1996(Exh.28) as noted above, was a point of maturation and completion of contract initiated with proposal by the defendant. In the purchase order, the plaintiff put up two further conditions of guarantee certificate to be given by the defendant for faulty material and bad workmanship for 12 months from the date of supply. It was further required that the defendant would have to submit testing certificate. In pursuance of these two additional conditions put up by the plaintiff along with the purchase order, the defendant addressed a letter(Exh.30) keeping the material ready and further on 30.11.1996(Exh.31) sent a performance guarantee. It tantamounts to agreeing to the said additional terms by the defendant by conduct. These conditions and conduct of accepting it by the defendant could be viewed as a separate contract by itself. The suit was based on giving of said performance guarantee(Exh.31) under which the defendant undertook the responsibility to replace the stores if not found suitable on practical test. The said performance guarantee was received by the plaintiff at Bharuch having been dispatched to Bharuch and the goods were thereupon found faulty and with bad workmanship. In this context, there was hardly room to contend that the court at Bharuch had no jurisdiction. 8. The said performance guarantee was received by the plaintiff at Bharuch having been dispatched to Bharuch and the goods were thereupon found faulty and with bad workmanship. In this context, there was hardly room to contend that the court at Bharuch had no jurisdiction. 8. At this stage, the decisions relied on by learned advocate for the appellant may be referred to. Relying on decision in Sriram City Union Finance Corporation Limited Vs Ram Mishra(supra), it was contended that it was open to a party to chose any of the two competent courts to decide the disputes. In that case, it was held that in case parties under their own agreement expressly agreed that their disputes shall be tried by only one of the courts, then the party can file the suit in that court alone in respect of which there was an agreement. In this case, on facts, no such agreement was forthcoming to apply the principle. Reliance placed was misconceived. Another decision of the Apex Court in Swastik Gases Private Limited(supra) was with reference to Sections 9 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the agreement provided a clause that the agreement shall be subject to jurisdiction of courts at Kolkata. The Supreme Court held that merely because the words “alone”, “only”, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” were not used, it would not make any difference as the intention of the parties was clear and unambiguous to agree that the courts at Kolkata would have jurisdiction which meant that the court at Kolkata alone would have jurisdiction. 9. For the forgoing discussion, reasons and the position of law emerging, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court did not book any error so as to warrant any interference in this Second Appeal. No substantial question of law arises requiring to be gone into. No other point except jurisdiction was raised, nor any other issue of law existed or was found to be arising. The impugned judgment and decree contending concurrent finding on facts on various issues, were proper and legal on all counts requiring no interference in the second appellate jurisdiction of this Court. 10. No other point except jurisdiction was raised, nor any other issue of law existed or was found to be arising. The impugned judgment and decree contending concurrent finding on facts on various issues, were proper and legal on all counts requiring no interference in the second appellate jurisdiction of this Court. 10. Accordingly impugned judgment and decree dated 24.04.2013 passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Bharuch, dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No.50 of 2007 and thereby, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is upheld. The present Appeal is hereby dismissed.