JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. 1. Assailing the judgment dated 25.8.2008, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Una, H.P. in Sessions Case No. 7 of 2005 (R.B.T.S.C. No. 8-8-2005 – Sessions Trial No. 12-8-2005), titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Sanjeev Kumar & others, whereby respondents-accused stand acquitted, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of prosecution that in the year 2002 Sanjeev Kumar (accused No. 1) was married to Nirmala Devi @ Meena Devi (deceased) as per Hindu customary rites. Since inception of her marriage, deceased was subjected to cruelty and maltreatment for having brought insufficient dowry by her husband as also her in-laws i.e. Maya Devi (accused No. 2) and Rirka Singh (accused No. 3). Deceased disclosed the incident to her maternal uncle Ram Lal (PW- 3). On 6.6.2004 deceased, on account of alleged atrocities, cruelties and maltreatment was forced to consume poison. She was immediately taken to the Primary Health Centre at Amb, where Dr. S.K. Verma (PW-1) examined her and issued MLC (Ext. PW-1/A). Police was informed and ASI Parkash Chand (PW-9) reached the hospital. Deceased was not found fit to make statement. She was critical and as such was referred for further treatment to the Zonal Hospital, Una, where she was declared as having brought dead. F.I.R. No. 124 of 2004, dated 6.6.2004 (Ext. PW-9/B), was registered at Police Station Amb, District Una, H.P. under the provisions of Sections 498-A and 306 both read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against all the accused persons, who during the course of investigation were arrested. Police prepared inquest reports (Ext. PW-9/C and 9/D) and also got post mortem of the dead body conducted from Dr. N.S. Dogra (PW-2). Post Mortem Report (Ext. PW- 2/B), on the basis of report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga (Ext. PW-2/A), was prepared and issued by PW-2. With the completion of investigation, which revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused were charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498-A, 306 and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. With the completion of investigation, which revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused were charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498-A, 306 and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined nine witnesses and statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. were also recorded, in which they pleaded innocence and false implication. No evidence, in defence was led by the accused. 5. Trial Court found prosecution not to have established its case and, as such, acquitted the accused of the charged offences. Hence the present appeal. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as also perused the record, we are of the considered view that in the instant case no ground for interference is made out. The Court below has correctly and completely appreciated the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as also other material placed on record. 7. From the testimony of Dr. S.K. Verma (PW-1), it is clear that deceased who was first attended by him was unfit to make any statement. Application (Ext. PW-9/A) and medical certificate (Ext. PW-1/A) are on record to this effect. From the testimony of Dr. Dogra (PW-2) who conducted the post mortem, it is evidently clear that Meena Devi died on account of phosphide poisoning. Post Mortem Report (Ext. PW-2/B) is on record to this effect. It also cannot be disputed that deceased died within two years of her marriage. 8. The question which needs to be considered is as to whether deceased consumed poison on account of the cruelty, atrocities, maltreatment or dowry demands meted out by the accused or not? Abetment was there or not. 9. Before we deal with the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, we shall discuss the statement of law on the point. 10. Law with regard to cruelty as defined under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and abetment to commit suicide, so as to fall within the scope of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code is now well settled. 11. It is a settled position of law that there should be reasonable nexus between cruelty and suicide. It has to be substantiated, established and proved on record. 11. It is a settled position of law that there should be reasonable nexus between cruelty and suicide. It has to be substantiated, established and proved on record. Cruelty by itself would not amount to having committed an offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. A reasonable nexus has to be established between cruelty and the suicide in order to make good the offence of cruelty under the penal laws. Cruelty has to be of such a gravity as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. Suicide alone would not establish that it was occasioned on account of cruelty which was of sufficient gravity so as to lead a reasonable person placed in similar circumstances to commit suicide. Mere assumption or demand of dowry by itself in given circumstances may not amount to cruelty. Harassment has to be with a definite object i.e. to meet any unlawful demand. Every act of cruelty is not punishable. There must be evidence to show that soon before the death, the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of natural or accidental death so as to prove that death had occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances. The expression soon before the occurrence is very relevant, where Sections 113-B and 304- B IPC are pressed in to service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case the statutory presumption would arise. The expression “soon before” would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If the incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 12. In Girdhar Shankar Tawade vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 5 SCC 177 , the Apex Court has held that the basic purpose of statutory provision is to prevent cruelty which stands defined by attributing a specific statutory meaning attached thereto. In order to ascribe a meaning to the word cruelty as is expressed by the Legislatures: Whereas explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz. In order to ascribe a meaning to the word cruelty as is expressed by the Legislatures: Whereas explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz. (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the Legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrace the attributes of cruelty in terms of section 498 (A). 13. In Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , the Apex Court has also held that Sections 498-A and 306 IPC are independent and constitute different offences. Though, depending on the facts and circumstances of an individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an offence under section 498- A and may also, if a course of conduct, amounting to cruelty is established leaving no other option for the woman except to commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit suicide. However, merely because an accused has been held liable to be punished under section 498-A IPC it does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by the woman concerned. 14. In Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India & other, (2005) 6 SCC 281 , the Apex Court has held that:- “10. The object for which Section 498-A IPC was introduced is amply reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons while enacting the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 46 of 1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in the number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction involving such cruelty. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short Cr PC) and the Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by the husband, in-laws and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the menace of dowry death and cruelty. 11. One other provision which is relevant to be noted is Section 306 IPC. The basic difference between the two sections i.e. Section 306 and Section 498-A is that of intention. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the woman concerned to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended. 19. The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreak personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the courts have to take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not as an assassin's weapon. If the cry of wolf is made too often as a prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual wolf appears. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not as an assassin's weapon. If the cry of wolf is made too often as a prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual wolf appears. There is no question of the investigating agency and courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that the ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at the truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any preconceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide and generalised a statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of a watchdog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.” 15. In State of West Bengal vs. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 , the Apex Court has held that:- “In a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of S. 498A, I.P.C and S. 113A of Indian Evidence Act. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of S. 498A, I.P.C and S. 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court's conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. The doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject matter. The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. In the very same decision the Apex Court further cautioned that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. In the very same decision the Apex Court further cautioned that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. 17. In Arun Vyas & another vs. Anita Vyas, (1999) 4 SCC 690 , the Apex Court has held that essence of offence in Section 498-A is cruelty. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the wife is subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. 18. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact. The impact of complaints, accusations or taunts on a person amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the individual victim concerned, the social background, the environment, education etc. Further, mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty. In other words, each case has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether the mental cruelty was established or not. Mohd. Hoshan A.P. & another vs. State of A.P. (2002) 7 SCC 414 . 19. In State of A.P. vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582, the Apex Court has held that:- “It is plain that as per clause (b) of the Explanation, which, according to learned counsel for the State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does not amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. In other words, for the purpose of Section 498-A IPC harassment simpliciter is not cruelty and it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property etc. that it amounts to cruelty punishable under Section 498-A IPC.” 20. In Balram Prasad Agrawal vs. State of Bihar & other, (1997) 9 SCC 338 , the Apex Court has held cruelty to mean torture to be so unbearable in the common course of human conduct that a young lady having commitments to life could take a drastic steps to end her life leaving behind her infant children in the lurch and at the mercy of the accused husband who was found to be in contemplation of remarrying. 21. In Arvind Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 6 SCC 407 , the Apex Court has held as under:- “The word 'cruelty' in common English acceptation denotes a state of conduct which is painful and distressing to another. The legislative intent in Section 498-A is clear enough to indicate that in the event of there being a state of conduct by the husband to the wife or by any relative of the husband which can be attributed to be painful or distressing. The same would be within the meaning of the section. Torture is a question of fact. There must be a proper effort to prove it.” 22. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The accused must by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct create such circumstances that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhatisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 . 23. The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from individual to individual, also depending upon the social and economic status to which such person belongs. Cruelty for the purposes of constituting the offence under the aforesaid section need not be physical. Even mental torture or abnormal behaviour may amount to cruelty and harassment in a given case. Gananath Pattnaik vs. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 619 . 24. Prosecution evidence has to be appreciated in the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position. 25. Significantly, prosecution has only examined two witnesses to prove the alleged atrocities, abetment and maltreatment which need to be analyzed in the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion. 26. Ram Lal (PW-3) is the real uncle of the deceased. He simply states that deceased was married to accused No. 1 in the year 2002. After marriage, deceased visited his house three–four times. On each visit, deceased complained that accused had subjected her to maltreatment for having brought insufficient dowry. She was asked to bring money from her parents. She also complained of the accused persons treating her with cruelty. Witness further states that he discussed the matter with his brothers namely Mela Ram and Subhash Chand. Since they could not afford to give money, deceased was consoled that in due course things would settle down amicably. However on 6.6.2004 he learnt that deceased consumed poison. That is all the witness states. 27. Now significantly except for this bald statement there is nothing on record to establish any such dowry demands. Allegations with regard to acts of cruelty and maltreatment are vague and unspecific in relation to time, place and manner. Mela Ram and Subhash Chand have not been examined in court. Why so? Has not been explained. Their examination was necessary as testimony of this witness does not establish and prove the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. Significantly witness admits that two of his sisters are married in the village of the accused. None of them have been examined in Court. It is not the prosecution case that either the deceased or her family were not having good relations with them. Significantly witness admits that two of his sisters are married in the village of the accused. None of them have been examined in Court. It is not the prosecution case that either the deceased or her family were not having good relations with them. In fact, they were the best persons to have deposed about the alleged acts of cruelty/dowry demand/maltreatment. Witness admits that brothers of the deceased were alive and are living in the very same district i.e. Una. Yet even they have not come forward to depose in favour of the prosecution. We further find this witness not to have remembered the dates or for that matter, the month when deceased allegedly visited his house in the year 2003–2004. We find that on the point of demand of money, in cross examination, this witness has made several contradictions. His version that deceased narrated the incident to him privately does not inspire confidence at all, for she did nothing thereafter. 28. Nirmala Devi (PW-4) is relative of the deceased. She only states that three–four days prior to her death, deceased came to her parents house. At that time she had inquired about her welfare, who simply stated that her condition was miserable and none else could be miserable than her. Immediately her husband called and she went away. But significantly PW-3 does not testify the factum of this visit of the deceased, as the witness wants us to believe. Be that as it may, crucially this witness admits that deceased Nirmla Devi @ Meena Devi had not revealed why her condition was miserable. Hence she does not advance the case of prosecution in any manner. 29. Except for vague and unspecific allegations, which remain unsubstantiated, there is nothing on record to prove the prosecution case of dowry demands or maltreatment/abetment/instigation, which prompted the deceased to commit suicide. 30. Having perused the testimony of prosecution witnesses on record, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt, to the effect that accused persons subjected the deceased to cruelty; abetted her to commit suicide within seven years of her marriage; and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable material on record. It cannot be said that the findings returned by the court below are not borne out from record, are perverse, illegal, erroneous or arisen out of incomplete appreciation of prosecution evidence. 31. The accused have had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94 , since it cannot be said that the trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also pending applications, if any. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Records of the Court below be immediately sent back.