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2014 DIGILAW 111 (AP)

Devika v. N. Narasing Rao

2014-01-28

L.NARASIMHA REDDY, M.S.K.JAISWAL

body2014
Judgment L. Narasimha Reddy, J. This appeal demonstrates a totally lopsided approach on the part of the Family Court, Secunderabad, in an O.P. filed by the respondent herein, for divorce, against the appellant. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place, on 25.05.1998, at Hyderabad. Stating that the appellant is not cooperating with him in the family life and that various acts and omissions on her part would constitute cruelty, the respondent filed O.P.No.89 of 2001 for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’). The O.P. was opposed by the appellant. She stated that ever since the marriage, not only the respondent, but also her family members, including his sisters, used to harass her. She has enlisted the instances of harassment said to have been caused to her. She further stated that she was forced to swallow sleeping pills, and on another occasion, she was forced to drink dettol, and that the respondent has driven her out from the matrimonial house. On her part, the appellant filed O.P.No.58 of 2002, under Section 9 of the Act, against the respondent, for the relief of restitution of conjugal rights. Through a common judgment, dated 16.11.2002, the trial Court passed a decree of divorce in O.P.No.89 of 2001 and dismissed O.P.No.58 of 2002. This appeal is filed against the decree of divorce granted by the trial Court. The appellant contends that there was absolutely no evidence whatever, except the self-serving statement of the appellant and that the trial Court has placed the burden on every aspect upon her, i.e. the appellant and passed the decree of divorce. On behalf of the respondent, it is argued that the trial Court has taken into account, the relevant facts, applied the precedents that govern the situation and passed the decree. It is urged that the matter does not warrant any interference. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent. On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed the following points for its consideration: i) “Whether the petitioner in O.P.No.89 of 2001 established cruelty towards him by the respondent? ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled for divorce? iii) Whether the respondent in O.P.No.58 of 2002 is entitled for restitution of conjugal rights?” The respondent deposed as PW.1 and filed Exs.A.1 to A.10. ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled for divorce? iii) Whether the respondent in O.P.No.58 of 2002 is entitled for restitution of conjugal rights?” The respondent deposed as PW.1 and filed Exs.A.1 to A.10. The appellant deposed as RW.1 and filed Exs.B.1 and B.2. A perusal of the O.P. filed by the respondent discloses that his complaint was mostly about the alleged non-cooperation on the part of the appellant in leading the family life. Except making vague and general allegations, he did not mention anything specific. He has also stated that the appellant was not conceiving, in spite of various medical tests and treatments. Even if those contentions or allegations are taken as true, one just cannot arrive at the conclusion that there was any cruelty on the part of the appellant. The family of the respondent comprised of himself, his parents and the respondent. It was alleged that his sisters and brothers-in-law also used to frequently visit his house. In case there was any act of cruelty on the part of the appellant, the respondent could have examined anyone of his family members or the neighbours. Except the deposition of the respondent, there was no other oral evidence. The documentary evidence adduced by him comprised of the prescriptions for the treatment of the appellant. The documents cannot be said to be of any relevance to the ground of cruelty pleaded by the respondent. The appellant deposed as RW.1 and narrated her pain and suffering in the hands of respondent and other family members. Ex.B.1 is a letter issued by the Dalitha Jathiya Sangam of the area in which the parties herein were living. A perusal of the same discloses that the respondent did not evince any interest for resolution of the disputes and he walked out of the meeting by stating that he would approach the Court of law. In Ex.B.2 also similar observation was made by the Members of the Committee. The very purpose of establishing Family Courts was to ensure that the disputes between spouses are resolved through an informal mechanism and relieve the proceedings of the stringent rules of evidence or strict application of the provisions of law. The ultimate objective is to make an attempt to sustain the family, if necessary by diluting the procedure, that is otherwise applicable to the proceedings before the ordinary Courts. The ultimate objective is to make an attempt to sustain the family, if necessary by diluting the procedure, that is otherwise applicable to the proceedings before the ordinary Courts. Section 9 of the Family Courts Act makes this very clear. Unfortunately, for the appellant, the Family Court at Secunderabad was held by an Officer, whose inclination or idea was exactly in the opposite direction. He has just taken the self-serving version of the respondent as the ultimate truth and at the same time, he discarded every plea raised by the appellant herein by observing that she did not substantiate the same through other evidence. For example, the appellant narrated the nature of her suffering undergone in the hands of the respondent. In relation thereto, this is what the learned Presiding Officer observed in paras 12, 13 and 14 of the order: “12. In support of her contention, no cogent evidence is produced by her. Even if the petitioner is in the habit of beating the respondent naturally she will inform her close relations, parents, brothers and also close friends and none of them examined by her even there is no pleading to that effect that she informed the same to the friends and brothers etc. No evidence is produced by the respondent as such that contention cannot be accepted. 13. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner used to comment on the ladies passing by comparing their private parts with her. On 30.12.1999, the petitioner suspecting her character had a quarrel with her and forced her to swallow a handful of sleeping tablets and beat her and she got bedridden for two weeks in the hospital and she is not able to attend her normal functions. As such she could not attend her husband when he was in hospital. But no material is produced by her that she was in the hospital at the relevant time. As such she could not attend him when he was in the hospital as such the contention of the respondent in that aspect cannot be accepted. 14. The evidence of respondent that on 19.02.2001, they have to attend the death ceremony of mother-in-law of his sister-in-law. Her parents also attended the ceremony. In that ceremony the petitioner and his relatives consumed alcohol. 14. The evidence of respondent that on 19.02.2001, they have to attend the death ceremony of mother-in-law of his sister-in-law. Her parents also attended the ceremony. In that ceremony the petitioner and his relatives consumed alcohol. None of them talked to her in the ceremony, after coming home all her in-laws settled in her parents-in-laws room for another ground and started abusing her and her parents. She silently walked away to her room and tried to sleep, about 3.00 clock in the night the petitioner woke her up to neck her out of the house. They beat her mercilessly as it is unbearable she told them to stop and she is ready to die. They forced her to drink dettol and continued to beat her, and she started vomiting they joined in Gandhi Hospital. In support of her contention, except her testimony that she was admitted in Gandhi Hospital. As such her contention cannot be accepted. If there is documentary evidence, it is the duty of the respondent to produce the same, she failed to produce such material as such her contention cannot be accepted.” These are only the few samples from the order passed by the Family Court. Not a word was said about the respondent (petitioner in the O.P.) as to what exactly are the acts of cruelty and how they are proved. This is the second time, that we had to make an observation about the obsession of the learned Presiding Officer about the sex between the partners of marriage. Invariably, in every order passed by him, he reproduces the following paragraph from the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Rita Nijawan v. Balakrishna Nijawan AIR 1973 Delhi, 200: “Marriage without sex is an anathema. Sex is the foundation of marriage and without a vigorous and harmonious sexual activity it would be impossible for any marriage to continue for long, it cannot be denied the sexual activity in marriage has an extremely favourable influence on a woman’s mind and body. The result being that if she does not get proper sexual satisfaction it will lead to depression and frustration. It has been said that the sexual relations when happy and harmonious vivifies woman’s brain, develop her character and troubles her vitality. The result being that if she does not get proper sexual satisfaction it will lead to depression and frustration. It has been said that the sexual relations when happy and harmonious vivifies woman’s brain, develop her character and troubles her vitality. It must be recognized that nothing is more fatal to marriage than disappointment in sexual intercourse.” It is just un-understandable, as to what was the relevance of that paragraph in the O.P. filed by the respondent. If the grievance of the respondent was about the non-cooperation on the part of the appellant, one would expect himself to file a petition under Section 9 of the Act. Incidentally, it is the appellant herein who filed a petition under that Section. The ultimate conclusion arrived at by the trial Court is reflected in para 20 of the order as under: “In the present case on hand they are living separately since several years even within short time, from the date of marriage, the respondent living with her parents, it is established by the evidence of PW.1, without informing PW.1, she left to her parents house. As such it amounts to cruelty and the respondent is not living with the petitioner. The fault lies with the respondent. The petitioner established that the respondent protested for sex it amounts to cruelty on that ground, the petitioner is entitled for divorce. The acts of the respondent towards the petitioner amounts to cruelty. Under the above circumstances the petition is liable to be allowed.” We find that the order passed by the trial Court is totally perverse and contrary to the provisions of the Act, and cannot be sustained either on facts or in law. The tone and tenor of the judgment is contrary to the very letter and spirit not only of the provisions of the Act, but also of the Family Courts Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed by imposing costs of Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand) payable by the respondent to the appellant and the decree of divorce granted by the trial Court is set aside. The miscellaneous petition filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of.