JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, C.J. 1. The petitioner by means of this petition has challenged the notice dated 24th May 2005, issued by the Director of School Education to the petitioner terminating his services w.e.f. one month from the date of receiving notice. 2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was engaged as Night Guard on contract basis on 31st May 1990. He joined duties and his service which was on contractual basis was extended from time to time. According to the petitioner, he was falsely involved in a criminal case under Section 395 IPC and session's trial with regard to the case was held and the petitioner was convicted by the learned Sessions Judge and directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. The petitioner aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal and the sentence imposed upon him was set aside in Criminal Appeal No. 01 of 1997 on 02.04.2002. It was, thereafter that the petitioner submitted a representation to the Director of School Education on 17.04.2004 stating that he could not attend the school and discharge his duties from the period from 21.01.1997 to 02.04.2002. Surprisingly, the Director, thereafter, treating the petitioner to be a temporary civil servant, passed the impugned notice terminating his services w.e.f. one month of 24th May, 2005. 3. As far as this notice is concerned, we have no doubt in our mind that the notice is wholly without jurisdiction. The petitioner, admittedly, was a contractual employee and not a temporary civil servant in terms of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 and, therefore, the provisions of the said Rules were not at all applicable to him. 4. Having held so, the question is whether we can direct that the petitioner should be reinstated in service or not. The petitioner has invoked extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Any litigant who invokes the extraordinary writ jurisdiction must also show that not only in law but also in equity he is entitled to the relief which he claims. 5. Admittedly, the trial started sometime in July, 1992. The petitioner for almost 5 years did not inform his superior authorities that he was facing a criminal trial under a serious offence of Section 395 IPC. He did not inform his superiors that the police had lodged a case of dacoity against him. 5. Admittedly, the trial started sometime in July, 1992. The petitioner for almost 5 years did not inform his superior authorities that he was facing a criminal trial under a serious offence of Section 395 IPC. He did not inform his superiors that the police had lodged a case of dacoity against him. He continued to perform his duties as Night Guard despite the fact that there was a case of dacoity pending against him. If he had informed his superiors about this case, his contract may not have been renewed. After the petitioner was convicted on 21.01.1997, he again did not care to inform the Department. He kept silent for more than 5 years and did not attend duty. It was only after he was acquitted by the High Court that he filed the representation. In case the petitioner was aware about his rights that after his acquittal he is entitled to a job he should have also been aware about the legal obligation on him that if he was involved in a serious criminal case he should have informed his employer and after he was convicted he should have brought this fact to the notice of his employer. Such a person is not entitled to any relief from this court. 6. We are clearly of the view that this is a case of abandonment of job and the question of the petitioner's service being terminated on grounds of absence of leave does not arise because the petitioner was only a contractual employee and the contract ended when the petitioner did not join duties for that particular year. There was no fresh contract in his favour and thereafter he could not continue his job. 7. The reliance placed by Sri Arijit Bhowmik on the judgments reported in AIR 1964 SC 1854 (Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India) and AIR 2000 SC 1706 (Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. & Ors.) is totally misplaced. In these cases what has been held is that punitive action even against a contractual employee must be according to the rules of natural justice. There can be no quarrel with this proposition of law. However, in this case we are of the considered view that this is a case of abandonment of job since the petitioner without any order of the employer did not attend duty for more than 5 years. There can be no quarrel with this proposition of law. However, in this case we are of the considered view that this is a case of abandonment of job since the petitioner without any order of the employer did not attend duty for more than 5 years. Hence, there is no merit of the writ petition and, accordingly, it stands dismissed.