JUDGMENT : - Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (oral) The plaintiff is the appellant and has come up in appeal against concurrent findings recorded against him by the learned Courts below. 2. The facts, in brief, are that the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for possession in the trial Court pleading that the property detailed in Khata Khatauni No. 58/66, Khasra No. 115, measuring 14-15 bighas situated in village Palion, Tehsil Nahan is a “Gair Mumkin Abadi” of inhabitants of village Palion and the plaintiff being member of the village community Palion has been coming in peaceful possession of a ‘Chhaper’ in Khasra No. 115, which is shown by red ink and marked with word ‘A’ in rough site plan (hereinafter referred to as suit ‘Chhaper’), since the times of his forefathers. It is further averred by the plaintiff that he used to keep his cattle in the suit ‘Chhaper’ without any hindrance from anybody including the defendants/respondents as owner thereof. It is alleged that on 16.4.2002 the defendants, who are related to each other, formed an unlawful assembly and came over ‘Chhaper’ in dispute and dispossessed him unlawfully and forcibly by removing his cattle therefrom. Per the plaintiff, he sustained injury while protecting his possession and resisting the criminal assault on him by the defendants, who were armed with deadly weapons. The plaintiff reported the matter to the police, on which a case under various offences was registered against the defendants. The police also filed proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in the Court of SDM, Nahan and further requested to attach the suit property and to appoint receiver during the pendency of the proceedings. It is further averred that the plaintiff is a law abiding person and therefore, he preferred to file the present suit for possession. 3. The respondents/defendants contested the suit by filing written statement and thereby raising preliminary objections on the ground of maintainability, locus-standi, limitation, the suit being bad for want non-joinder of necessary parties, cause of action, court fee and jurisdiction. Apart, it is claimed that the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed with special costs under Section 35-A CPC. The respondents/defendants contested the suit by filing written statement and thereby raising preliminary objections on the ground of maintainability, locus-standi, limitation, the suit being bad for want non-joinder of necessary parties, cause of action, court fee and jurisdiction. Apart, it is claimed that the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed with special costs under Section 35-A CPC. On merits, the defendants though admitted that the property detailed in Khata Khatauni No. 58/66 bearing Khasra No. 115 is a ‘Gair Mumkin Abadi’ of village inhabitants and plaintiff is one of the inhabitant of the village, but it is mentioned that the plaintiff has got his separate Abadi, whereas one Dila Ram had also a plot with ‘Chhaper’ in the said Abadi surrounded by the houses of Kesho Ram and defendant No.1. It is specifically denied that the plaintiff has got any right or concern over the ‘Chhaper’ in dispute, rather it is alleged that it was coming in possession of the defendants for the last 15 years. It is pleaded that the defendants are also the members of the village community. Per the answering defendants, a plot with ‘Chhaper’ in dispute belonged to one Dila Ram and after his death the said property was succeeded by his daughters Smt. Amro Devi, Ishroo Devi and Sunehri Devi. Since the said successors of late Dila Ram were settled outside and were not deriving any benefit out of said property, they as such sold it to defendant No.1 by executing an agreement on 5.1.2000 and another agreement dated 1.6.2002 was executed by them acknowledging therein the receipt of the entire sale consideration from defendant No.1 on 5.1.2000. It is further pleaded that since the possession of the said property was with defendant No.1 as such only formal ownership with possession was delivered through the sale agreements. It is thus pleaded that since the defendants were already in settled possession of the property for years together and now since 5.1.2000 the defendant No.1 is the owner of ‘Chhaper’ and also a plot sold by the successors of Dila Ram, as such, question of dispossessing the plaintiff forcibly or unlawfully does not arise. The defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with heavy costs under Section 35-A CPC. 4. The defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit with heavy costs under Section 35-A CPC. 4. In the replication filed by the plaintiff the averments contained in the plaint were reiterated and the assertions made in the written statement by the defendants were controverted. As per plaintiff, he has no knowledge about the sale transaction as pleaded by the defendants. However, it is pleaded that late Dila Ram had no concern with the suit Chhaper nor his daughters had any right to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendant. 5. On 3.10.2002 the learned trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of decree of possession of the suit Chhaper? OPP 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit as alleged. If so, its effect? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit as alleged, if so its effect? OPD 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation as alleged if so its effect? OPD 6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed with special heavy cost U/s 35-A, CPC, as alleged, if so, its effect? OPD 7. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 8. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged, if so, its effect? OPD. 9. Relief. 6. The learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31.12.2005 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff/appellant filed an appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court, who too vide judgment and decree dated 31.3.2008 has been pleased to dismiss the same. 7. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below, the appellant/plaintiff is before this Court by way of present regular second appeal. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records carefully. 9. It is being strenuously argued by Mr. 7. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below, the appellant/plaintiff is before this Court by way of present regular second appeal. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records carefully. 9. It is being strenuously argued by Mr. R.K.Gautam, Senior counsel for the appellant that the findings recorded by the learned courts below are perverse as oral and documentary evidence has not at all been considered and if considered, the same has not been considered in its true right perspective. It is further argued that the appellant had submitted and proved the Khaka Dasti of the suit ‘Chhaper’ Ex.PW-4/A on record by examining Prithi Singh, retired Revenue Officer, who had visited the spot and prepared this document and had shown the dimensions of the Chhaper. It is further argued that this statement of Prithi Singh went unchallenged as there was no cross-examination conducted on this witness regarding this aspect of the matter. It is further argued that the learned trial Court without any rhyme or reason adverted itself to the case relating to the identity of the property which was not in dispute and, therefore, the findings so recorded by it essentially have to be taken to be perverse, illegal and unsustainable in the eyes of law. 10. The learned Courts below on the basis of the evidence have come to a firm conclusion that insofar as the defendant/respondent’s ‘Chhaper’ is concerned, the dimensions of the same have been specifically given in the written statement but no such dimensions of the ‘Chhaper’ claimed by the plaintiff/appellant have been mentioned in the plaint. Moreover, the learned Courts below have upheld the agreements Ex.DW-3/A and Ex.DW-3/B by relying upon the statement of Ishro Devi, DW-2, wife of Prem Chand, who happened to be one of the signatories to these documents. Besides, the statements of DW-3 Hans Raj and DW-4 Desh Raj substantiate the possession of the respondent qua the ‘Chhaper’ in dispute. DW-3 in fact happened to be the Vice President of the Gram Panchayat, Palion, who had specifically deposed that the defendant/respondent had been coming in possession of the ‘Chhaper’ in question for the last more than 15 years, while the house of the appellant was situated on the other side of the Gali. 11. DW-3 in fact happened to be the Vice President of the Gram Panchayat, Palion, who had specifically deposed that the defendant/respondent had been coming in possession of the ‘Chhaper’ in question for the last more than 15 years, while the house of the appellant was situated on the other side of the Gali. 11. Further, the learned Courts below have categorically held the Khaka Dasti Ex.PW-4/A to be not legally proved on record to be a document pertaining to the ‘Chhaper’ of which the appellant claims to be owner and was alleged to have been forcibly dispossessed by the respondents/ defendants. 12. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below are pure findings of fact which cannot be gone into by this Court in second appeal. The true scope of Section 100 of CPC has been delineated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur and others vs. Kaki and others (2007) 1 SCC 546 , wherein it has been held as under: “31. The question which now arises for our adjudication is whether, according to the true delineated scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. 32. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 100 C.P.C. before amendment. 33. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, C.P.C.) corresponds to Section 584 of the old Civil Procedure Code of 1882. The Section 100 (prior to 1976 amendment) reads as under : "100. Second appeal. - (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to a High Court on any of the following grounds, namely : (a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte." 34. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte." 34. A reference of series of cases decided by the Privy Council and this Court would reveal true import, scope and ambit of Section 100 C.P.C.. Cases decided prior to 1976 amendment both by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court dealing with the scope of Section 100 C.P.C. 35. The Privy Council, in Luchman v. Puna [(1889) 16 Calcutta 753 (P.C.)], observed that a second appeal can lie only on one or the other grounds specified in the present section. 36. The Privy Council, in Pertab Chunder Ghose v. Mohandra Purkait [(1890) ILR 17 Calcutta 291 (P.C.)], observed that the limitation as to the power of the court imposed by sections 100 and 101 in a second appeal ought to be attended to, and an appellant ought not to be allowed to question the finding of the first appellate court upon a matter of fact. 37. In Durga Chowdharani v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri (1891) 18 Cal 23 (PC), the Privy Council held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. The clear declaration of law was made in the said judgment as early as in 1891. This judgment was followed in the case of Ramratan Shukul v. Mussumat Nandu (1892) 19 Cal 249 (PC) and many others. The Court observed : (IA p.3) It has now been conclusively settled that the third court...cannot entertain an appeal upon question as to the soundness of findings of fact by the second court, if there is evidence to be considered, the decision of the second court, however unsatisfactory it might be if examined, must stand final." 38. In the case of Ram Gopal v. Shakshaton [(1893) ILR 20 Calcutta 93 (P.C.)], the Court emphasized that a court of second appeal is not competent to entertain questions as to the soundness of a finding of facts by the courts below. 39. The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad v. Baijnath [(1893) ILR 15 Allahabad 367]. In the case of Ram Gopal v. Shakshaton [(1893) ILR 20 Calcutta 93 (P.C.)], the Court emphasized that a court of second appeal is not competent to entertain questions as to the soundness of a finding of facts by the courts below. 39. The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad v. Baijnath [(1893) ILR 15 Allahabad 367]. The Court observed that a judge to whom a memorandum of second appeal is presented for admission is entitled to consider whether any of the grounds specified in this section exist and apply to the case, and if they do not, to reject the appeal summarily. 40. Similarly, before amendment in 1976, this Court also had an occasion to examine the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya and Others [ AIR 1959 SC 57 ], the High Court of Madras set aside the findings of the District Judge, Guntur, while deciding the second appeal. This Court observed that notwithstanding the clear and authoritative pronouncement of the Privy Council on the limits and the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under section 100, Civil Procedure Code, "some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of Second Appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set aside the judgment of the High Court which had no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence.” 41. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa [ (1964) 2 SCR 673 ], the Andhra Pradesh High Court interfered with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court which, in turn, had itself reversed the Trial Court's finding on the same question of fact. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa [ (1964) 2 SCR 673 ], the Andhra Pradesh High Court interfered with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court which, in turn, had itself reversed the Trial Court's finding on the same question of fact. While setting aside the decree of the second Appellate Court, this Court observed : (SCR p. 685) "It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact, but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid." 42. It may be pertinent to mention that as early as in 1890 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and they added a note of warning that no Court in India has power to add, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 43. Even before the amendment, interference under Section 100 C.P.C. was limited, which has now been further curtailed, which we would be dealing in cases decided by this Court after the amendment. 44. We have given reference of a large number of cases decided by the Privy Council and this Court to clearly understand the ambit and scope of Section 100 before amendment. 45. The Amendment Act of 1976 has introduced drastic changes in the scope and ambit of Section 100 C.P.C. A second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. is now confined to cases where a question of law is involved and such question must be a substantial one. Section 100, as amended, reads as under: "100. 45. The Amendment Act of 1976 has introduced drastic changes in the scope and ambit of Section 100 C.P.C. A second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. is now confined to cases where a question of law is involved and such question must be a substantial one. Section 100, as amended, reads as under: "100. Second appeal.(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." Cases decided after 1976 amendment 46. In Bholaram v. Ameerchand (1981) 2 SCC 414 a three Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 47. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 47. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait [ (1997) 5 SCC 438 ], a three judge Bench of this Court held: (a) that the High Court should be satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law and not mere question of law; (b) reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded; (c) it has the duty to formulate the substantial questions of law and to put the opposite party on notice and give fair and proper opportunity to meet the point. The Court also held that it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage. 48. This Court had occasion to determine the same issue in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (1999) 2 SCC 471 . The Court stated that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of the such duly framed substantial questions of law. 49. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand (1998) 6 SCC 683 that the judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand (1998) 6 SCC 683 that the judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. On this short ground alone, this appeal is required to be allowed. 50. In Kanai Lal Garari v. Murari Ganguly (1999) 6 SCC 35 the Court has observed that it is mandatory to formulate the substantial question of law while entertaining the appeal in absence of which the judgment is to be set aside. In Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 713 and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 the Court reiterated the statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law. These judgments have been referred to in the later judgment of K. Raj and Anr. v. Muthamma (2001) 6 SCC 279 . A statement of law has been reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the Court in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly delineated the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. The Court observed that an obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the Court. In the said judgment, it was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code of Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. 52. In Kamti Devi (Smt.) and Anr. v. Poshi Ram (2001) 5 SCC 311 the Court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. 53. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil [ (2004) 5 SCC 762 ], this Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 54. In the same case, this Court observed that in a case where special leave petition was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with findings of fact of the lower Appellate Court. This Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. This Court again reminded the High Court in Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments v. P. Shanmugama [ (2005) 9 SCC 232 ] that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. 56. Again, this Court in the case of State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi [ (2005) 10 SCC 139 ] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 57. Again, in the case of Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai [(2005) 10SCC 553], this Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 58. Again, in Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh [ (2005) 12 SCC 270 ], this Court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. In this case, the findings of the Trial Court and the lower Appellate Court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C.. This Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. 59. In the case of H. P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa [ (2006) 2 SCC 496 ] delivered on 6.2.2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. 59. In the case of H. P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa [ (2006) 2 SCC 496 ] delivered on 6.2.2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the judgments of the Courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes reappreciation of evidence. This Court found that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and needed to be set aside. Legislative Background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973 60. The comprehensive 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted to the Government of India in 1973 gives historical background regarding ambit and scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. According to the said report, any rational system of administration of civil law should recognize that litigation in civil cases should have two hearings on facts one by the Trial Court and one by the Court of Appeal. 61. In the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India, it is incorporated that it may be permissible to point out that a search for absolute truth in the administration of justice, however, laudable, must in the very nature of things be put under some reasonable restraint. In other words, a search for truth has to be reconciled with the doctrine of finality. In judicial hierarchy finality is absolutely important because that gives certainty to the law. Even in the interest of litigants themselves it may not be unreasonable to draw a line in respect of the two different categories of litigation where procedure will say at a certain stage that questions of fact have been decided by the lower courts and the matter should be allowed to rest where it lies without any further appeal. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. It is in the light of this basic approach that we will now proceed to consider some of the cases which were decided more than a century ago. 62. The question could perhaps be asked, why the litigant who wishes to have justice from the highest Court of the State should be denied the opportunity to do so, at least where there is a flaw in the conclusion on facts reached by the trial Court or by the Court of first appeal. The answer is obvious that even litigants have to be protected against too persistent a pursuit of their goal of perfectly satisfactory justice. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary for the satisfaction of the defeated litigant; but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury. 63. The rational behind allowing a second appeal on a question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal having jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and, where necessary, re-establish, uniformity throughout the State on important legal issues, so that within the area of the State, the law, in so far as it is not enacted law, should be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction. This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts have authority to make binding decisions on questions of law. 64. It may be relevant to recall the statement of Douglas Payne on "Appeals on Questions of Fact" reported in (1958) Current Legal Problem 181. He observed that the real justification for appeals on questions of this sort is not so much that the law laid down by the appeal court is likely to be superior to that laid down by a lower court as that there should be a final rule laid down which binds all future courts and so facilitates the prediction of the law. In such a case the individual litigants are sacrificed, with some justification, on the altar of law-making and must find such consolation as they can in the monument of a leading case. In such a case the individual litigants are sacrificed, with some justification, on the altar of law-making and must find such consolation as they can in the monument of a leading case. Historical perspective 65. The predecessors of the High Courts in their Civil appellate jurisdiction were the Sadar Divani Adalats. The right of appeal to the Sadar Divani Adalat was very wide initially, but came to be severely curtailed in the course of time. The "Conwallis Scheme", for example, made provision for two appeals in every category of cases, irrespective of its value. By 1814, this was reduced to one appeal only. Only in cases of Rs.5,000 or over, there could be two appeals; one to the Provincial Court of Appeal and second to the Sadar Divani Adalat. As Lord Hastings observed: "The facility of appeal is founded on a most laudable principle of securing, by double and treble checks, the proper decision of all suits, but the utopian idea, in its attempt to prevent individual injury from a wrong decision, has been productive of general injustice by withholding redress, and general inconvenience, by perpetuating litigation". Arrears 66. The primary cause of the accumulation of arrears of second appeal in the High Court is the laxity with which second appeals are admitted without serious scrutiny of the provisions of Section 100 C.P.C. It is the bounden duty of the High Court to entertain second appeal within the ambit and scope of Section 100 C.P.C. 67. The question which is often asked that why a litigant should have the right of two appeals even on questions of law. The answer to this query is that in every State there are number of District Courts and courts in the District cannot be final arbiters on questions of law. If the law is to be uniformly interpreted and applied, questions of law must be decided by the highest Court in the State whose decisions are binding on all subordinate courts. Rationale behind permitting second appeal on question of law 68. If the law is to be uniformly interpreted and applied, questions of law must be decided by the highest Court in the State whose decisions are binding on all subordinate courts. Rationale behind permitting second appeal on question of law 68. The rationale behind allowing a second appeal on a question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal having a jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and, where necessary, re-establish, uniformity throughout the State on important legal issues, so that within the area of the State, the law, in so far as it is not enacted law, should be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction. This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts have authority to make binding decisions on question of law. 69. The analysis of cases decided by the Privy Council and this Court prior to 1976 clearly indicated the scope of interference under Section 100 C.P.C. by this Court. Even prior to amendment, the consistent position has been that the Courts should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. 70. Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 C.P.C. only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as "substantial question of law" which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on facts" or "one more dice in the gamble". The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as "substantial question of law" which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on facts" or "one more dice in the gamble". The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was: (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question. 71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 C.P.C. have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law. 72. When Section 100 C.P.C. is critically examined then, according to the legislative mandate, the interference by the High Court is permissible only in cases involving substantial questions of law. 73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and they added a note of warning that no Court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. 74. The High Court seriously erred in interfering with the findings of facts arrived at by the Trial Court and affirmed by the first Appellate Court.” 13. 74. The High Court seriously erred in interfering with the findings of facts arrived at by the Trial Court and affirmed by the first Appellate Court.” 13. Taking into consideration the aforesaid exposition of law and further taking into consideration that no question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration, I find no merit in the appeal as the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are pure findings of fact which cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are not based on any misconception of fact or law or misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on construction of inadmissible evidence or ignorance of material facts so as to call for interference by this Court. 14. In view of above discussion, the appeal is dismissed, so also the pending application, if any. The parties are left to bear their own costs.