Order The petitioner has called into question the preventive detention order, dated 01.03.2014 (Annexure-A) and the order, dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure-H) continuing the detention for a period of one year. 2. Sri Ashok Mulage, learned counsel appearing for Sri Babu Rao Mangane for the petitioner submits that the Deputy Commissioner has passed the impugned order, dated 01.03.2014 (Annexure-A) without applying his mind. He submits that the petitioner is already acquitted in so many criminal cases. He submits that the offences being attributed to the petitioner are all excise offences. The petitioner can be dealt with in the ordinary course pressing into motion the ordinary criminal law. For advancing this submission, he relies on the Apex Court judgment in the case of MUNAGALA YADAMMA v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH reported in (2012) 2 SCC 386 . There is no need to detain him under the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985 (hereinafter called as ‘the Goondas Act’). 3. Sri Ashok Mulage submits that the order, dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure-H) continuing the petitioner’s detention for a period of one year is illegal. There is no provision in the Goondas Act for passing the order of detention against anybody for a period of twelve months in one go. He read out from the Goondas Act Section 3(2) and the proviso thereto, which are extracted hereinbelow: “3(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in subsection (1) exercise the powers conferred by the subsection: Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this subsection shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.” 4. He relies on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of CHERUKURI MANI VS. He relies on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of CHERUKURI MANI VS. CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH reported in 2014 AIAR (Criminal) 640. Paragraph Nos.13 and 14 of the said decision, read out by him, are extracted hereinbelow: “13. Proviso to Subsection (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from time to time. An order of detention would in the first instance be in force for a period of three months. The Government alone is conferred with the power to extend the period, beyond three months. Such extension, however, cannot be for a period, not exceeding three months, at a time. It means that, if the Government intends to detain an individual under the Act for the maximum period of 12 months, there must be an initial order of detention for a period of three months, and at least, three orders of extension for a period not exceeding three months each. The expression “extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time” assumes significance in this regard. 14. The requirement to pass order of detention from time to time in the manner referred to above, has got its own significance. It must be remembered that restriction of initial period of detention to three months, is nothing but implementation of the mandate contained in Clause (4) (a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It reads as under: Clause 4: No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention: Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorize the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (7); or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause (7).” 5. Sri Manvendra Reddy, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submits that the proviso to Section 3(2) of Goondas Act have application for a situation where the matter is not yet referred to the Advisory Board. Once the matter is placed before the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board gives its opinion approving of the preventive detention, the order for continuing the detention for one year can be passed. In support of his submissions, he has relied on the Division Bench’s order, dated 16.09.2014 passed in W.P.(HC) No.200012/2014. He read out paragraph Nos.9 and 13 from the said order, which are extracted hereinbelow: “9. In the case on hand the first respondent on receipt of the report of Advisory board, wherein it is stated that there are sufficient grounds for detention of detenue has confirmed order of detention for a period of one year with effect from 15.05.2014 by exercising power under Section 13 of the Act. Therefore, the petitioner cannot contend that the State Government has exercised the powers under Subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Act, wherein the State Government can pass the order of detention from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. 13. In the case on hand, the State Government has confirmed the order of detention for a period of one year from the date of detention, after receiving the opinion of the Advisory Board. It is not the case where the order of detention was made for a period of one year at a stretch under Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for petitioner cannot be accepted.” 6. Sri Manvendra Reddy submits that the detaining authority has fully applied its mind. He submits that the petitioner is involved in as many as 17 cases of illicitly distilling the liquor. 7. The submissions of the learned counsel have received our thoughtful consideration. The detaining authority refers to the registration of as many as 17 criminal cases against the petitioner. The petitioner is involved in the illegal activities of preparation of spurious toddy and is engaged in the supply of Chemical Chloral Hydrate to make the fast buck. The detaining authority has observed that the petitioner has been playing havoc with the lives of the people. The petitioner is involved in the illegal activities of preparation of spurious toddy and is engaged in the supply of Chemical Chloral Hydrate to make the fast buck. The detaining authority has observed that the petitioner has been playing havoc with the lives of the people. The impugned order is reflective of the detaining authority’s application of mind and the consideration of the relevant materials and circumstances. 8. The only serious question that falls for our consideration is whether the impugned order, dated 07.05.2014 (Annexure-H) is bad, as it continues the petitioner’s detention for one year at a stretch? 9. To answer this question, we need to comprehend the scheme of the Act. An Act may be considered as consisting of a series of declarations of the legislature. Different sections of an Act may have different functions at different stages. The drafters take great care to design a section, so that it deals with a single point. How different sections are organized and arranged indicates the legislative intention. 10. The proviso to Section 3(2) of the Goondas Act states that the period of detention cannot exceed three months at any one time. But such a restriction is at the stage when the State Government or the detaining authority passes the order. Obviously the same is before placing the detention order before the Advisory Board. 11. Once the State Government obtains the affirmative opinion of the Advisory Board, the provisions contained in Sections 12 and 13 of the Goondas Act come into operation. The said provisions are extracted hereinbelow: “12. Action upon report of Advisory Board.– (1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the State Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period, not exceeding the maximum period specified in section 13, as they think fit. (2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the State Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 13. (2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the State Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 13. Maximum period of detention.– The maximum period for which any person may be detained, in pursuance of any detention order made under this Act which has been confirmed under section 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention.” 12. Sections 3(2) and 13 contain the provisions governing the preventive detention at two different stages. Notwithstanding this position, let us examine the application of the proviso to Section 3(2) for continuing the previous detention after obtaining the affirmative opinion of the Advisory Board from two more angles. 13. A proviso is a verbal formula placed at the end of a Section or sub-Section of an Act with the intention of narrowing the effect of preceding words. Proviso operates so as to qualify that which precedes it. The proviso is dependent on the main section; it cannot be treated as an independent enacting clause. Nor can it be imported into the subsequent sections. 14. Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. In saying so, we are fortified by the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of M/s. MACKINNON MACKENZIE AND CO. LTD. v. AUDREY D’COSTA AND ANOTHER reported in (1987) 2 SCC 469 . The relevant portions of the said judgment are extracted hereinbelow: “11. ……The proviso to subsection (3) to Section 4 comes into operation only where subsection (3) is applicable……….The proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso………….” 15. In its decision in the case of RAM NARAIN SONS LTD. v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1955 SC 765 , the Apex Court has this to say: “10 .…….It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other…….” 16. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other…….” 16. As held by the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER v. ASHWANI KUMAR AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2009 SC 186 , as a general rule a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment and ordinarily a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. It is also profitable to refer to what the Hon’ble Supreme Court has said in paragraph No.14 of its judgment in the case of A.N.SEHGAL AND OTHERS v. RAJE RAM SHEORAN AND OTHERS reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 304. “14. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms.” 17. The proviso to Section 3(2) cannot be construed as nullifying Sections 12 and 13. The said proviso qualifies the generality of only Section 3. Proviso is to be considered only in relation to the section or subsection to which it stands as a proviso. The proviso is to be taken as limit in its operation to the section that it qualifies. 18. Yet another dimension on which the issue can be examined is by assuming, for the sake of argument of the last resort, that proviso to Section 3(2) and Section 13 are irreconcilable. The later section has to be preferred to the earlier section. Section 13 prevails over to the proviso to Section 3(2); the last intention of the lawmakers has to prevail over their earlier intention, if it is impossible to give effect to the whole expression of the legislative intention. The later section has to be preferred to the earlier section. Section 13 prevails over to the proviso to Section 3(2); the last intention of the lawmakers has to prevail over their earlier intention, if it is impossible to give effect to the whole expression of the legislative intention. In taking this view, we are fortified by the Privy Council’s decision in the case of KING v. DOMINION ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED reported in AIR 1947 PC 94 PAGE 94. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as follows: “...... If proviso 2 is repugnant in any way to proviso 1 it must prevail for it stands last in the enactment and so to quote Lord Tenterden C.J., “speaks the last intention of the makers”......” 19. Thus, viewed from any angle, the argument that the preventive detention cannot be continued for a period exceeding three months at any one time, even after obtaining the affirmative opinion of the Advisory Board, is unacceptable. 20. The Division Bench, by its order, dated 4.8.2014 passed in WP (HC) No.105/2014 had quashed the order continuing the detention for a period of 12 months on the solitary ground that the period of detention cannot exceed three months at any point of time. The said decision is following the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of Cherukuri Mani (supra). The Division Bench’s order is stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by its order, dated 1.12.2014 passed in SLA (C) 31680/2014 filed by the State of Karnataka against Padmavathi. 21. In the result, we dismiss this petition. No order as to costs.