JUDGMENT : SANJAY KAROL, J. 1. State has appealed against the judgment dated 17.1.2008 of the learned Special Judge, Chamba, Division Chamba, Himachal Pradesh, passed in Sessions Trial No. 41 of 2006, titled as State of H.P. v. Safri Ram, challenging the acquittal of respondent Safri Ram (hereinafter referred to as the accused), who stands charged for having committed offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 14.12.2005, SHO Madan Lal (PW-8), alongwith Constable Ram Prakash (not examined), Constable Madan Kumar (Pw-2) and Yogesh Gurang, had set up Naka at Bhukru. At about 3.30 p.m., when a Maruti Van bearing No.HP1323 was being checked, police party saw the accused run towards Chamunda Temple side. On suspicion, he was apprehended. Bag, which he was carrying on his shoulder, was searched, from which Charas in the shape of Battis was recovered. Constable Madan Kumar (PW-2) was asked to arrange for weights and scales. On weighment, contraband substance was found to be 750 grams. Two samples, each weighing 25 grams, were drawn and sealed in empty cigarette packets with seal impression 'K'. Remaining bulk parcel was also sealed with the same seal impression. NCB form, in triplicate, was filled up. Constable Yogesh Gurang carried Ruka (Ex. PW-3/A) to Police Station, Chowari, District Chamba, on the basis of which FIR No.101, dated 14.12.2005 (Ex. PW-6/A), under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, was registered. Kuldip Singh (PW-7), who was posted as ASI in the same Police Station, brought the file and handed it over to Madan Lal (PW-8). Sealed samples were deposited with MHC Kuldip Kumar. Sample was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory through Constable Rishikesh (PW-1) and report (Ex.PW-7/D) taken on record. Investigation revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime. Hence, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses and statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took up plea of innocence and false implication. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses and statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took up plea of innocence and false implication. No evidence in defence was led. 5. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offence. Hence, the present appeal by the State. 6. We have heard Mr. B.S. Parmar, learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. Vivek Singh Thakur, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is well reasoned and is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: " (6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under S. 417, Criminal P.C., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." 9. In the instant case, we find that independent witnesses Dinesh Kumar (PW-4) and Tarbeej Singh (PW-5), who were associated at the time of carrying out search and seizure operations, have not supported the prosecution case at all. Despite extensive cross-examination, nothing fruitful could be elicited from their testimonies. 10. It is a settled proposition of law that merely because a witness has turned hostile, his entire evidence cannot be termed to be unworthy of credence. It is for the Court to consider, whether as a result of contradiction, witness stands fully discredited or part of his testimony can still be believed. If the credit of a witness is not fully shaken, Court can rely upon that part of the testimony which appears to be creditworthy. 11. It is for the Court to consider, whether as a result of contradiction, witness stands fully discredited or part of his testimony can still be believed. If the credit of a witness is not fully shaken, Court can rely upon that part of the testimony which appears to be creditworthy. 11. It is a settled proposition of law that sole testimony of police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can or cannot be a sole eyewitness in a criminal case. It will always depend upon the facts of a given case. If the testimony of such a witness is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and if required duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible evidences, then the statement of such witness cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and may have some interest in success of the case. It is only when his interest in the success of the case is motivated by overzealous ness to an extent of his involving innocent people; in that event, no credibility can be attached to the statement of such witness. 12. It is not the law that Police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption applies as much in favour of a police officer as any other person. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of police administration. 13. Rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the public, it can only bring down the prestige of police administration. 13. Wherever, evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attachis to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. Such reliable and trustworthy statement can form the basis of conviction. [See: Govindaraju alias Govinda v. State by Srirampuram Police Station and another, (2012) 4 SCC 722 ; Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 760 ; Girja Prasad v. State of M.P., (2007) 7 SCC 625 and Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 . 14. Apex Court in Tahir v. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338 , dealing with a similar question, held as under:- "6. ... .In our opinion no infirmity attachis to the testimony of the police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case." 15. In view of the aforesaid statement of law, we shall now examine the testimonies of police officials present on the spot. 16. In view of the aforesaid statement of law, we shall now examine the testimonies of police officials present on the spot. 16. In the instant case, we find testimony of police officials, namely Madan Kumar (PW-2), Yogesh Gurang (PW-6) and Madan Lal (PW-8) not to be inspiring in confidence at all. There are major contradictions, improvements, embellishments, impeaching their credit and rendering the prosecution story to be extremely doubtful. 17. Madan Lal (PW-8) states that at about 3.30 p.m., they were checking a vehicle at a place known as Bhukru. He clarifies that they left the Police Station at 3 p.m. and laid Naka at 3.15 p.m. He further states that accused was apprehended at 3.30 p.m. and by 3.45 p.m., Constable Madan Kumar (PW-2) was sent for bringing weights and scale, and by 4.30 p.m. Ruka was sent to the Police Station. Now, this version of his stands materially contradicted by Madan Kumar (PW-2), according to whom, Ruka was written by PW-8 at 3.35/3.40 p.m. He further states that copy of the Ruka was given to him at 3.40 p.m. He is positive about the timing. According to Yogesh Gurang (PW-6), police party left at 1 p.m. and laid the Naka at 1.30 p.m., and Ruka was handed over at about 4.30 p.m. Further he states that accused stood arrested at 3.30 p.m. Now, there is variation in the timing of police party having left the Police Station, set up the Naka and when Ruka was sent, which renders the prosecution version to be doubtful, more particularly when there is nothing on record to establish departure of the police party for the purpose of carrying out Naka. 18. Further, if the weighing scale was brought at 4.45 p.m., then how could Ruka be written at 4.30 p.m. and handed over to PW-2, for being taken to the Police Station. 19. Further, PW-2 states that accused was nabbed by Constable Ram Prakash, who has not been examined in Court. Why so? has not been explained. Non-examination of this witness acquires significance, in view of variation in the distance after which accused was noticed and apprehended. According to PW-8, distance was 20-25 metres. 20. We further find that there is contradiction with regard to the procurement of empty cigarette packets, in which the sealed samples were put. Why so? has not been explained. Non-examination of this witness acquires significance, in view of variation in the distance after which accused was noticed and apprehended. According to PW-8, distance was 20-25 metres. 20. We further find that there is contradiction with regard to the procurement of empty cigarette packets, in which the sealed samples were put. According to PW-2, they were lying in the kit, whereas according to other police officials they were lying on the road and picked up from there. Presumption that police was carrying the IO Kit cannot be deduced from the record, rendering the credit of the witness to be impeachable. 21. It has come on record through the testimonies of police officials present on the spot that there were shops at the place of setting up of Naka. Independent witnesses PW-4 and PW-5 were not known to the police party. Allegedly, they were travelling in the Maruti Van, which was checked by the police. Why is it that police did not associate any local persons as witnesses? There is no explanation for the same. At least after apprehending the accused, search and seizure operations could have been carried out in the presence of local witnesses. 22. Further, we find there is discrepancy with regard to the weights and the manner in which the samples were drawn and weighed. According to Yogesh Gurang (PW-6), two samples were drawn by dividing 50 grams charas in equal parts, whereas according to Constable Madan Kumar samples were drawn, first with weight of 10 grams and then 5 grams. Also, version of PW-6 that seal was handed over to Dinesh Kumar (PW-4) stands belied by the said witness. 23. It has come on record that Police Station was at a walking distance of 5 minutes from the place where Naka had been set up. Now, Kuldip Singh (PW-7) states that Ruka was received at 3-3.30 p.m., but he reached the spot only at 6 p.m. This delay has not been explained. There is also contradiction with regard to time of filling up of NCB form (Ex. PW-7/D). Madan Lal first states that the same was filled up on the spot, but clarifies that attestation was done the following day i.e. 15.12.2005. 24. On the question of link evidence, we also find the prosecution case to be absolutely doubtful. There is also contradiction with regard to time of filling up of NCB form (Ex. PW-7/D). Madan Lal first states that the same was filled up on the spot, but clarifies that attestation was done the following day i.e. 15.12.2005. 24. On the question of link evidence, we also find the prosecution case to be absolutely doubtful. Madan Kumar (PW-2) does state that two samples alongwith specimen seals and NCB form were entered in the Malkhana register and kept in the Malkhana of the Police Station, but subsequently so admits that no entry of the NCB form was made in the Malkhana register, nor does it find mention in the road certificate. Also, date of dispatch is not mentioned. This link evidence is also not complete. 25. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that the accused was found in conscious and exclusive possession of 750 grams of charas. 26. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the parties. 27. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. 28. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.