JUDGMENT Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The substantial question of law formulated and to be answered in this appeal states as under:- Whether the two Courts below were justified in holding that the suit is barred by limitation on account of the fact that as the condition of payment was on demand and the demand admittedly was made by the plaintiff on 25-4-1995 and, therefore, the period of notice of demand also should have been taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of limitation part? In order to answer the substantial question of law following facts in nutshell are required to be noticed as under:- For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status before the trial Court. 1.1 Plaintiff - Smt. Tulsi Bai filed a money recovery suit against the defendant-Rambagas Singh, later on he died and his legal representatives were substituted in his place, stating inter alia that her husband was earlier in service in Bhilai Steel Plant and defendant was co-employee with him, and defendant being in need of money, advanced Rs. 50,000/- on 3-5-1992 to him, who executed receipt/acknowledgment promising that it will be payable on demand with interest by himself or his legal representatives. It was further pleaded when the money was demanded by the plaintiff on 25-4-1995 by notice, delivered to defendant on 27-4-1995, the amount was not paid resulting into filing of the suit for recovery of aforesaid sum on 3-5-1995. 1.2 During the course of trial, plaintiff filed an application under Section 3 read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act stating inter alia that loan was advanced on 3-5-1992 and period of limitation of three years expired on 2-5-1995 and the suit was filed on 3-5-1995 and, therefore, the delay of one day in filing the suit be condoned. 1.3 Defendants opposed the application stating inter alia that application is not entertainable and, therefore, it be rejected and suit be dismissed as barred by limitation. 2. The trial Court by its order dated 6-9-1999 in Civil Suit No. 4-B of 95 rejected the application holding inter aha that in a duly constituted suit, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not attracted and the delay cannot be condoned and, consequently, dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. 3. Plaintiff preferred first appeal there-against. 2. The trial Court by its order dated 6-9-1999 in Civil Suit No. 4-B of 95 rejected the application holding inter aha that in a duly constituted suit, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not attracted and the delay cannot be condoned and, consequently, dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. 3. Plaintiff preferred first appeal there-against. First appellate Court by its order dated 14-2-2003 in Civil Appeal No. 28 of 2001 affirmed the order passed by the trial Court, leading to filing of this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Shri H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit both the courts below have committed a legal error in holding that delay of one day in filing the suit cannot be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. He would further submit that notice of demand was sent on 25-4-1995 to the defendant claiming the amount of Rs. 50,000/- as per condition attached and, therefore, the notice period ought to have been excluded while computing the period of limitation of three years and suit ought to have held within period of limitation by trial Court as well as first appellate Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and perused the records of both the courts below. 6. The plaintiff's case is based on receipt/promissory note dated 3-5-1992, which reads as under:- (Vernacular matter omitted-Ed) 7. Further, the plaintiff has placed reliance on Article 22 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under:- 8. Admittedly, in the instant case, the money in question was advanced to defendant on 3-5-1992 and the period of limitation prescribed for institution of such money suit expired on 2-5-1995 and the suit was filed on 3-5-1995; and the plaintiff claimed that as per Article 22 of the Limitation Act, he has made a demand by issuing notice to defendant on 25-4-1995, and delivered to him on 27-4-1995 and, therefore, notice period deserves to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. 9. The pre-eminent question that falls for consideration before this Court, is whether in a money recovery suit the demand notice period has to be excluded while computing the period of limitation for institution of such a suit. 10. 9. The pre-eminent question that falls for consideration before this Court, is whether in a money recovery suit the demand notice period has to be excluded while computing the period of limitation for institution of such a suit. 10. In order to appreciate the point raised, it would be necessary to notice sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short the Act) provides as under:- 15. Exclusion of time in certain other cases:- (1)………………… (2) In computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. Explanation - In excluding the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be counted. 11. A close reading of sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act would show that it has been inserted so as to allow the period of notice to be excluded in case off all suits in respect of which notice is required to be given by any enactment for the time being in force and such notice is required to be served as condition precedent for institution of suit under particular enactment and that enactment requiring such notice also prescribes the period of notice before expiry of which, suit cannot be instituted. In other words, Section 15(2) of the Act authorizes deduction of period of notice where such notice is required to be given like under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure etc., However, matter would have been different, if such notice is not required to be served as a condition precedent for institution of a suit. 12. It is also well settled law that the court cannot introduce a new period of limitation on any ground as the Limitation Act is complete code in itself and any ground for extension of time, suspension of time must be brought within the fore corner of the Act itself. 12. It is also well settled law that the court cannot introduce a new period of limitation on any ground as the Limitation Act is complete code in itself and any ground for extension of time, suspension of time must be brought within the fore corner of the Act itself. 13. The Supreme Court, in case of Union of India and Others vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Another, (2004) 3 SCC 458 : AIR 2004 SC 3079 has excluded the notice period of two months required by Section 80 of the Code under Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act while computing period of limitation for filing suit holding that service of notice under Section 80 of the Code is mandatory for instituting suit and held as under. 12. Firstly, the period of two months required by Section 80 of the Code where-under notice is mandatorily required to be given before filing the civil suit has to be excluded from computing the period of limitation under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 14. The Nagpur High Court in case of Dominion of India vs. W.N. Sareen Co. AIR 1953 Nagpur 10 has held that in order to exclude time Section 15(2) of the Act, notice must be a notice of suit and the enactment requiring such notice to be given must prescribe the period of notice before expiry of which the claimant cannot institute a suit. Paragraphs 5 & 6 report as under:- 5. The learned Counsel for the respondent has brought to our notice the decision in B. & N.W. Railway Co. vs. Ramsarup Lal Coudhary, AIR 1922 Pat 549, where it was held that the consignee was entitled to deduct from the period of limitation the time given by him to the railway company to settle his claim made under section 77 of the Railways Act. In that case the consignee had asked the railway company to settle his claim within 15 days. This time was excluded under Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we are unable to accept this interpretation of section 15(2). Under that section the notice must be a notice of suit and the enactment requiring such notice to be given must prescribe the period of notice before expiry of which the claimant cannot institute a suit. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, we are unable to accept this interpretation of section 15(2). Under that section the notice must be a notice of suit and the enactment requiring such notice to be given must prescribe the period of notice before expiry of which the claimant cannot institute a suit. The claim under Section 77 is not a notice of suit and no period is prescribed by that section. The plaintiff could have made his claim under Section 77 on the 26th July, 1946 and given a notice of suit on the same date and instituted the suit on the expiry of two months from the date of receipt of the latter notice. In - Badridas in Council, AIR 1947 Pat 118 it was contended that section 77 should be so construed as to exclude from the period of limitation the period taken in correspondence between the plaintiff and the Railway Administration. This contention was not decided as the claim itself was not made within six months as required by section 77 though the head note indicated that the contention was negatived. (6) We are therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to deduct from the period of limitation the period taken in the correspondence with the Railway Administration. 15. Recently, the Delhi High Court in case of New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Ashok Kumar Ahuja, (2009) BC 305 has held that under 15(2) of the Limitation Act would be applicable in case where the issuance of notice is a condition precedent for institution of a suit, relying upon the judgment of Patna High Court in case of Union of India vs. Kedar Nath Babulal, AIR 1959 Patna 252. Para 11 of the report succinctly held as under:- 11. The contention of the Counsel for the defendant is well founded that the present case is not one where the provision of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act would come to the rescue of the plaintiff, for the reason that it was not mandatory for the plaintiff to issue a notice, in accordance with any requirement of the law before raising a demand on the defendant. Furthermore, as contemplated under Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, the notice, if any, was required to be given to the defendant as envisaged under Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, in the context of disconnecting the electricity supply. But such a notice was not a condition precedent for the purpose of filing a suit for recovery of outstanding arrears for electricity consumed. In this regard, Counsel for the defendant is justified in relying on the judgment in the case of Kedar Nath Babulal (supra), wherein the provision of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act was considered in the light of Section 77 of the Railways Act and it was held that absence of notice does not mean that a suit cannot be brought but only provides that it cannot be decreed and that the Court always has the jurisdiction to decide the necessity of a notice before granting a decree. Even in the present case, there is nothing placed on the records to establish that no suit could be brought by the plaintiff against the defendant in the Court in the absence of a notice. Rather, no prior notice is contemplated by the statute. In the aforesaid circumstances, the contention on behalf of the defendant that the present suit instituted by the plaintiff is barred by limitation and is, therefore liable to be rejected, is upheld. 16. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions, it would appear that Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirement of any law for time being in force, period of notice shall be excluded, while computing the period of limitation of institution of suit. 17. Having ascertained the legal position and bearing in mind, the principle laid down therein, reverting back to the facts of the case; it is luminously clear that provisions of Section 15(2) of Limitation Act is not attracted at all, for the reason that it was not imperative for plaintiff to issue notice in accordance with any requirement of law, before instituting the money recovery suit, therefore, notice period of such suit cannot be excluded while computing the period of limitation, for institution of such suit and thus, trial Court and first Appellate Court are absolutely and perfectly justified in dismissing the plaintiff's suit as barred by limitation. I do not find any illegality in finding so arrived therein. I hereby affirm the said findings. The decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit, as affirmed by the first appellate Court is hereby maintained 18. Resultantly, the second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal dismissed.