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2014 DIGILAW 1124 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Inder Singh

2014-05-13

AMITAVA ROY, VIJAY BISHNOI

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. - The State of Rajasthan is in appeal against the judgment and order dated 21.3.2007 rendered in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.3541/1995 thereby setting at naught the penalty of removal of the respondent-herein from service inflicted on him by way of disciplinary measure. 2. The brief outline of the relevant facts as available from the records is that in the year 1992 while the respondent (writpetitioner in S.B.Civil writ petition no.3541/1995) was serving as Constable under the Superintendent of Police, Udaipur, he remained absent from duties from 13.5.1992 to 2.11.1993 i.e. for a period of 539 days. A memorandum of charges dated 6.9.1993 was served on him initiating a disciplinary proceeding under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") imputing that he had deliberately absented from duties and that inspite of recall notices issued to him, he did not report back for duty thereby displaying serious negligence and lack of devotion to duties in violation of the departmental rules. The respondent-writ-petitioner in reply to the memorandum of charges denied the allegation of deliberate absence from duties and demanded that an enquiry be conducted. The disciplinary authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police, Udaipur thereafter, appointed an enquiry officer. As the charges leveled against the respondent-writ- petitioner were wholly based on records and the same were duly introduced in the disciplinary proceedings on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the respondent-writ-petitioner when called upon, examined himself. He stated in course of his testimony that while he was on duty on 13.5.1992 he suddenly fell ill for which he proceeded to his home at Bambora on the next day and took treatment from the Government Ayurvedic Hospital thereat till 24.5.1992. He testified further that thereafter, from 25.5.1992 to 17.6.1992 he was under treatment at the Government Hospital, whereafter he availed treatment at General Hospital, Udaipur from 7.7.1992 to 30.10.1992. According to him, he continued with his treatment thereafter. He mentioned further that meanwhile his widowed sister-in-law and child fell ill and eventually his child died. He stated that because of such unforeseen events and his physical illness, he got mentally imbalanced and as such, could not return to duty. He admitted to have received recall notices, but reasoned that he could not return for duty for these reasons. He also produced medical certificates of his treatment. He stated that because of such unforeseen events and his physical illness, he got mentally imbalanced and as such, could not return to duty. He admitted to have received recall notices, but reasoned that he could not return for duty for these reasons. He also produced medical certificates of his treatment. The enquiry officer on the basis of the official documents and the evidence oral and documentary adduced by the respondent-writ-petitioner held the charges to be proved. The disciplinary authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police, Udaipur vide order dated 31.12.1993 concurred with the enquiry officer and imposed on the respondent-writ- petitioner the penalty of deduction of Rs. 150/- p.m. from his salary for two years. The period of absence was ordered to be construed as leave without pay. 3. The next higher authority i.e. Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur by his order dated 14.1.1994 being of the view on a consideration of the materials on record that on the proved charges penalty awarded was inadequate, remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority for a fresh scrutiny and decision based thereon. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority by its order dated 18.3.1994 while reiterating the findings on the charges as before, imposed on the respondent-writ-petitioner the penalty of fixation of his pay at the minimum of his pay scale for a period of two years. The period of his absence from 13.5.1992 to 2.11.1993 was ordered to be treated as leave without pay. 4. It was subsequent thereto on 18.4.1994 that the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur in exercise of the powers under Rule 32 of the Rules issued notice to the respondent writ- petitioner to show cause why the proposed penalty of removal from service on the proved charges should not be imposed on him. The notice recorded inter-alia that the penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority was construed to be wholly inadequate. 5. The respondent-writ-petitioner in his reply to the notice while asserting that he had not admitted the charges as such and instead had furnished cogent and sound reasons for remaining absent from duties, reiterated his contentions as made before the enquiry officer as recited hereinabove. He mentioned further that he was contemplating an appeal against the order passed by the disciplinary authority and therefore, requested that pending the consideration thereof, the proceeding initiated under Rule 32 be kept in abeyance. He mentioned further that he was contemplating an appeal against the order passed by the disciplinary authority and therefore, requested that pending the consideration thereof, the proceeding initiated under Rule 32 be kept in abeyance. As the records would reveal, the respondentwrit- petitioner did indeed file such appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules on 30.5.1994 before the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur. However, the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur continued with the proceeding under Rule 32 and eventually vide order dated 15.6.1994 while rejecting the reply filed by the respondent-writ-petitioner, awarded him the penalty of removal from service. The order dated 18.3.1994 of the disciplinary authority was annulled. By implication therefore, the appeal of the respondent-writ-petitioner preferred against the order dated 18.3.1994 of the disciplinary authority stood disposed of as well. Being aggrieved, the respondent-writ-petitioner preferred appeal against the order dated 15.6.1994 of the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur before the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur and the latter dismissed the same by order dated 17.1.1995. He having challenged these decisions in the writ petition, by the judgment and order impugned, the penalty of removal from service has been interfered with and the order dated 18.3.1994 of the disciplinary authority has been restored. 6. Mr.Panwar has persuasively argued that as the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur had initiated the proceeding under Rule 32 of the Rules before the appeal had been filed by the respondent-writ-petitioner against the order dated 18.3.1994 of the disciplinary authority, interference with the order dated 15.6.1994 on the ground that the power of revision or review could not have been exercised under the said statutory provision is erroneous. Further, as the respondent-writ-petitioner had admittedly remained absent from duties for a period of 539 days and the explanation provided by him had been adjudged to be unsatisfactory, the penalty of removal from service is thus commensurate with the gravity of charges proved and therefore, substitution thereof by the penalty of fixation of his pay at the minimum of his pay scale for a period of two years is unjustified in the context of departmental discipline, he urged. 7. 7. Per contra, Mr.Kalla has argued that as the departmental appeal filed by the respondent-writ-petitioner was pending on the date on which the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur had ordered his removal from service, the impugned decision is ex-facie lacking in competence as has been rightly adjudged by the learned Single Judge. According to the learned counsel, as no deliberate abstention from duty had been proved, the penalty of removal from service is shockingly disproportionate thereto and therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment and order is called for. 8. We have examined the pleaded facts and the documents on record and have also analyzed the rival arguments advanced. 9. That at the relevant point of time, the respondent-writ petitioner was posted as Constable under the Superintendent of Police, Udaipur and thus, was a member of the disciplined force is an undeniable fact. He was absent from duties from 13.5.1992 to 2.11.1993 i.e. 539 days. A bare perusal of the orders dated 31.12.1993, 18.3.1994, 15.6.1994 and 17.1.1995 reveals that all the authorities concerned had duly assessed the explanation offered by the respondent-writ-petitioner citing the reasons for his absence and inability to return timely to duty and examined as well the documents submitted by him and on an overall consideration thereof and other incidental aspects had concurrently concluded that the charges leveled against him had been proved. On a scrutiny of these orders, we are of the opinion that the ultimate finding recorded by these authorities cannot be repudiated to be perverse being against the materials on record or illegal or vitiated by any extraneous consideration. 10. Rule 32 of the Rules, the sheet-anchor of the case of the respondent-writ-petitioner is quoted hereinbelow:- 32. On a scrutiny of these orders, we are of the opinion that the ultimate finding recorded by these authorities cannot be repudiated to be perverse being against the materials on record or illegal or vitiated by any extraneous consideration. 10. Rule 32 of the Rules, the sheet-anchor of the case of the respondent-writ-petitioner is quoted hereinbelow:- 32. The authority to which an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 14 lies may, if no appeal has been preferred therefrom, of its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the records of the case in a disciplinary proceeding held by an authority subordinate to it and after making further investigation if necessary, revise (any order) passed in such a case and after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary - (a) Confirm, modify or set aside the order; (b) Impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order; (c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as it considers proper in the circumstances of the case; or (d) pass such order as it deems fit. Provided that - (1) An order imposing or enhancing a penalty shall not be passed unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against enhanced penalty. (2) If the appellate authority propose to impose any of the penalties specified in clause (iv) to (vii) of rule 14 in a case where an inquiry under rule 16 has not been held, it shall, subject to the provisions of rule 19, direct such an inquiry to be held and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry, pass such orders as it deems fit. (3) No action under this rule shall be initiated more than 6 months after the date of order to be reviewed." 11. (3) No action under this rule shall be initiated more than 6 months after the date of order to be reviewed." 11. It would be apparent from the above text that the authority to which an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 14 lies, is vested with the power, if no appeal has been preferred therefrom, to call for on its own motion or otherwise and examine the records of the case in a disciplinary proceeding held by an authority subordinate to it and after making further investigation, revise any order passed in such a case and after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary amongst others enhance the penalty imposed by the order and remit the case to the authority which made the order with necessary direction or pass such order as it deems fit. This provision however predicates that the order imposing or enhancing the penalty would not be passed unless the person concerned had been given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against enhanced penalty. A time limit of six months has also been prescribed for the invocation of this power. As the records would reveal, the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur issued the notice to the respondent-writ petitioner under Rule 32 of the Rules on 18.4.1994 qua the order dated 18.3.1994 passed by the disciplinary authority imposing the penalty of fixation of his pay at the minimum of his pay scale for two years & treating the period of his absence from duties to be one on leave without pay. The statutory appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules was filed by the respondent-writ-petitioner thereafter on 30.5.1994. In that view of the matter, the initiation of the proceeding under Rule 32 of the Rules by the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur cannot be construed to be in contravention thereof as has been held by the learned Single Judge. As the order dated 15.6.1994 of the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur would reveal, the said authority minutely scrutinised the materials on record including the explanation furnished by the respondent-writ-petitioner and his documents and recorded the finding that he (respondent-writ petitioner) was guilty of indiscipline, insubordination and gross negligence amounting to serious misconduct thus rendering him unbecoming of a member of the disciplined force. On a consideration of all relevant aspects, the order dated 18.3.1994 of the disciplinary authority was interfered with and the penalty of removal from service was awarded to the respondent-writ petitioner. By the order dated 15.6.1994, the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur disposed of both the proceedings i.e. (i) under Rule 32 of the Rules; and (ii) appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules. The order dated 17.1.1995 of the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur in unreserved affirmation of the order dated 15.6.1994 of the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur also on a scrutiny thereof does not admit of judicial intervention. 12. The learned Single Judge annulled the penalty of removal from service on the ground that as the appeal of the respondent writ- petitioner against the order dated 18.3.1994 of the disciplinary authority was pending, the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur could not have invoked his power under Rule 32 of the Rules. It was held further that in the face of the explanation furnished by the respondent-writ-petitioner, such a penalty was disproportionate. 13. We find ourselves in respectful disagreement with this finding. Not only to reiterate, the Dy.Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur had initiated the proceedings under Rule 32 at a point of time when the statutory appeal had not been filed by the respondent-writ-petitioner, the explanation offered by him to remain absent from duties for such a long duration had been rejected by the authorities consistently on grounds which cannot be dubbed as frivolous so as to justify interference therewith. As it is, the respondent-writ-petitioner at all relevant points of time was a member of the disciplined force and judged by that measure, his absence from duties for 539 days has been, in our opinion, rightly viewed seriously by the departmental authorities. 14. It is no longer res integra that selection of penalty as a disciplinary step lies in the realm of discretion of the administrative authority and unless the same is vitiated by palpable illegality or is so disproportionate to shock the conscience of the Court, no interference therewith is justified in the exercise of the power of judicial review. 14. It is no longer res integra that selection of penalty as a disciplinary step lies in the realm of discretion of the administrative authority and unless the same is vitiated by palpable illegality or is so disproportionate to shock the conscience of the Court, no interference therewith is justified in the exercise of the power of judicial review. In the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that any interference with the penalty of removal from service would be a retrograde step having the potential of according premium to negligence, indiscipline and lack of devotion to duties and sag the morale of the force. 15. The appeal is thus allowed. The impugned judgment and order is set aside.Appeal allowed. *******