Judgment 1. Since the centripodal issue raised in all the four captioned applications is the same those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. By this writ application under Article-227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner complainant of a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 26/9/2014 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar in Criminal Case No.6871/2013 by which the learned Judge ordered return of the original complaint and the documents to the complainant for presenting the same before the Court having competent jurisdiction to try the offence within a period of 30 days from the date of return of the complaint. It appears that such order was passed by the learned Judge keeping in mind the mandate issued by the Supreme Court in one of its recent pronouncements in the case of Dashrath Rupsing Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC -129. 3. The brief facts giving rise to this application may be summed-up thus : 3.1) The petitioner herein is the original complainant. He filed five complaints against the respondent no.2 –original accused under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonor of five cheques issued by the accused in favour of the complainant. All the five complaints were lodged in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar. It appears that so far as the Criminal Complaint No.6870/2013 is concerned, the same is at the stage of the cross-examination of the complainant. In other words the cross-examination is now on the verge of being completed. So far as the other four complaints are concerned, the complainant has adduced his evidence on affidavit but his cross-examination is yet to commence. 3.2) During the pendency of the above referred five complaints, the Supreme Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsing (Supra.) held that the territorial jurisdiction for filing a complaint for dishonour of a cheque would be restricted to the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence is committed, which is the location where the cheque is dishonoured i.e. returned unpaid by the Bank on which it is drawn. The Supreme Court held that the place of issuance or delivery of the statutory Notice or where the complainant chooses to present the cheque for encashment by his bank are not relevant for the purpose of determining the territorial jurisdiction for filing of the complaint for dishonor of the cheque. 3.3) The Supreme Court also issued directions in that regard and the most relevant direction is found in para-22 of the Report. In para-22 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has observed that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Sec. 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. In all other cases, the complaint shall be returned to the complainant for filing in the proper Court in consonance with the exposition of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further clarified that if such complaints were filed/re-filed within thirty days of their return they would be deemed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or prior filing was itself time barred. 3.4) It appears that the accused herein placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court noted above, filed an application Exh.20 stating that since the cross-examination was yet to commence, the complaint should be ordered to be transferred to the Court of the competent jurisdiction as explained by the Supreme Court. 3.5) Such application was heard by the learned Magistrate and vide order dated 26th September, 2014 allowed the same. The order below Exh.20 reads thus : “Read the application. Heard the parties. Kept in view of Section 145(2) of Negotiable Instrument Act. Moreover, Complainant has filed Criminal Case No. 6861/13, 6871/13, 6872/13, 6873/13, 6870/13. But, in the case No.6870/2013, the Examination-in-chief of complainant has recorded and Cross Examination is in verge of the completion. Perusing the Order of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod V/s. State of Maharashtra & Anr., it is requested that the said complaints may transfer into its concern jurisdiction with application and copy of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court. Except all other Criminal complaints, proceeding has been made in the Criminal Case No.6870/2013 according to Section 145(2) of Negotiable Instrument Act. Except all other Criminal complaints, proceeding has been made in the Criminal Case No.6870/2013 according to Section 145(2) of Negotiable Instrument Act. As per the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the said Criminal Case No.6870/2013 cannot be returned back. Further, in other complaints only Examination-in-chief has been recorded and cross-examination has not been started. Cheques are from Ahmedabad, Sarkhej Branch. Except Criminal Case No. 6870/2013 for all other Criminal Cases No. i.e. 6861/13, 6871/13, 6872/13, 6873/13, it is hereby ordered to be returned back to the complainants for presenting the same before the Court having jurisdiction within 30 days from returning of the complaints. Aplication of transfer the criminal case No.6870/2013 is hereby rejected due to Cross-examination of Criminal Case No.6870/2013 has been started.” 3.6) The complainant feeling dissatisfied with such order passed by the learned Magistrate, has come-up with this application. 4. Submissions on behalf of the petitioner : 4.1) Mr. Padmaraj Jadeja, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the complainant vehemently submitted that the impugned order is erroneous in law and is nothing but complete misreading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh (Supra.). Mr. Jadeja submits that his client filed in all five complaints for the dishonor of five cheques. The accused has appeared before the Trial Court in connection with all the five complaints. He submits that his client as the complainant has also adduced his evidence in original on affidavit. In such circumstances according to Mr. Jadeja the Trial could be said to have reached at the stage of Sec. 145(2) of the Act and, therefore, should not be transferred. 4.2) Mr. Jadeja submits that the case is not at the pre-summoning stage. In all the four complaints the Court has already taken cognizance, plea of the accused has been recorded and the examination-in-chief as contemplated under Sec. 145(1) of the Act, could also be said to have been completed much before the date of the pronouncement of the judgment by the Supreme Court. Therefore, according to Mr. Jadeja when the trial is at the stage of cross-examination of the complainant the Magistrate ought not to have returned the four complaints to the complainant. 4.3) Mr. Therefore, according to Mr. Jadeja when the trial is at the stage of cross-examination of the complainant the Magistrate ought not to have returned the four complaints to the complainant. 4.3) Mr. Jadeja has also placed reliance on the provisions of Sec. 219 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides that when a person is accused of more offence than one of the same kind committed within the period of 12 months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three. Mr. Jadeja submits that a very anomalous situation has arisen in the present case. He submits that the five cheques which were issued by the accused were in connection with one transaction. Out of five complaints if one complaint is to continue in the same Court on the ground that the cross-examination has actually begun and is on the verge of the completion and the other four complaints are to be tried by a different court, then perhaps there could be an apparent conflict so far as the decision is concerned. To put it in other words according to Mr. Jadeja, if the evidence to be led is the same then probably the two courts may reach to two different conclusions resulting into serious miscarriage of justice. 4.4) Mr. Jadeja submits that the Supreme Court in para-22 of its judgment has observed as under – “Where proceedings have gone to the stage of Sec.145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by us from the Court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the court where it is presently pending.” 4.5) By placing reliance on such observations made by the Supreme Court, Mr. Jadeja contends that if the trial has reached the stage of Sec. 145(2) then probably there is no question of transfer. He submits that actual commencement of the cross-examination is not contemplated by the Supreme Court. 4.6) In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Jadeja prays that there being merit in his application, the same deserves to be allowed. Submissions on behalf of the respondent no.2 –original accused : 5.1) Mr. R.J. Goswami, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused has vehemently opposed these applications. Mr. 4.6) In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Jadeja prays that there being merit in his application, the same deserves to be allowed. Submissions on behalf of the respondent no.2 –original accused : 5.1) Mr. R.J. Goswami, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the accused has vehemently opposed these applications. Mr. Goswami submits that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the learned Magistrate in passing the impugned order. He submits that the plain reading of the lucid judgment of the Supreme Court makes it clear that only those cases where the cross-examination of the complainant has actually commenced will remain in the same court, whereas all though the trial might have reached the stage of Sec. 145(2) but that by itself would not be sufficient to save the case from being transferred. In such circumstances he prays that there being no merit in the petition, the same be rejected. 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the learned Magistrate committed any error in passing the impugned order. 7. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either sides, I deem it necessary to look into the provisions of Sec. 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “the Act, 1881”). “Evidence on affidavit-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the evidence of the complainant may be given on affidavit and may, subject to all just exceptions be read in evidence in any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under the said Code. (2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, and shall, on the application of the prosecution or the accused, summon and examine any person giving evidence on affidavit as to the facts contained therein.” Sec. 145 fell for the interpretation of the Supreme Court in the case of Radheshyam Garg Vs. Nareshkumar Gupta – 2010 Criminal Law Journal -2810. The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the object of enactment of the said provision. I may quote with profit the observations made by the Supreme Court as contained in Paras-15, 16 and 17. “15. Nareshkumar Gupta – 2010 Criminal Law Journal -2810. The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the object of enactment of the said provision. I may quote with profit the observations made by the Supreme Court as contained in Paras-15, 16 and 17. “15. If affidavit in terms of the provisions of Section 145 of the Act is to be considered to be an evidence, it is difficult to comprehend as to why the court will ask the deponent of the said affidavit to examine himself with regard to the contents thereof once over again. He may be cross-examined and upon completion of his evidence, he may be re-examined. Thus, the words “examine any person giving evidence on affidavit as to the facts contained therein, in the event, the deponent is summoned by the court in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 145 of the Act’, in our opinion, would mean for the purpose of cross-examination. The provision seeks to attend a salutory purpose. The statements of objects and reasons for enacting the said provision, inter alia read, inter alia, as under : “Keeping in view of the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Finance and other representations, it has been decided to bring out, inter alia, the following amendments in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, namely:— (i) to (iii) … (iv) to prescribe procedure for dispensing with preliminary evidence of the complainant; (v) … (vi) to provide for summary trial of the cases under the Act with a view to speeding up disposal of cases;” 16. The object of enactment of the said provision is for the purpose of expedition of the trial. A criminal trial even otherwise is required to be expeditiously held. 17. We, therefore, do not find any justification for arriving at a finding that a witness can again be summoned for his examination in chief in the court despite affirming affidavit in that behalf.” 8. At a later stage the Supreme Court once again had the occasion to consider such issue in the case of M/s. Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Nimesh B. Thakor – 2011 Criminal Law Journal (Supp.) -719. I may quote with profit the observations made by the Supreme Court as contained in paras-20, 21 22 and 32. “20. At a later stage the Supreme Court once again had the occasion to consider such issue in the case of M/s. Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Nimesh B. Thakor – 2011 Criminal Law Journal (Supp.) -719. I may quote with profit the observations made by the Supreme Court as contained in paras-20, 21 22 and 32. “20. Once it is realized that sections 143 to 147 were designed especially to lay down a much simplified procedure for the trial of dishonoured cheque cases with the sole object that the trial of those cases should follow a course even swifter than a summary trial and once it is seen that even the special procedure failed to effectively and expeditiously handle the vast multitude of cases coming to the court, the claim of the accused that on being summoned under section 145(2), the complainant or any of his witnesses whose evidence is given on affidavit must be made to depose in examination-in-chief all over again plainly appears to be a demand for meaningless duplication, apparently aimed at delaying the trial. 21. Nevertheless, the submissions made on behalf of the parties must be taken note of and properly dealt with. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant in appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 4760/2006 pointed out that sub-section (2) of section 145 uses both the words, “may” (with reference to the court) and “shall” (with reference to the prosecution or the accused). It was, therefore, beyond doubt that in the event an application is made by the accused, the court would be obliged to summon the person giving evidence on affidavit in terms of section 145(1) without having any discretion in the matter. There can be no disagreement with this part of the submission but the question is when the person who has given his evidence on affidavit appears in court, whether it is also open to the accused to insist that before cross-examining him as to the facts stated in the affidavit he must first depose in examination-in-chief and be required to verbally state what is already said in the affidavit. Mr. Ranjit Kumar referred to section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act, that defines “examination-in-chief”, “cross-examination” and “re-examination” and on that basis sought to argue that the word “examine” occurring in section 145(2) must be construed to mean all the three kinds of examination of a witness. Mr. Ranjit Kumar referred to section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act, that defines “examination-in-chief”, “cross-examination” and “re-examination” and on that basis sought to argue that the word “examine” occurring in section 145(2) must be construed to mean all the three kinds of examination of a witness. This, according to him, coupled with the use of the word “shall” with reference to the application made by the accused made it quite clear that a person giving his evidence on affidavit, on being summoned under section 145(2) at the instance of the accused must begin his deposition with examination-in-chief, before he may be cross-examined by the accused. In this regard he submitted that section 145 did not override the Evidence Act or the Negotiable Instruments Act or any other law except the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further submitted that the plain language of section 145(2) was clear and unambiguous and was capable of only one meaning and, therefore, the provision must be understood in its literal sense and the High Court was in error in resorting to purposive interpretation of the provision. In support of the submission he relied upon decisions of this court in Dental Council of India vs. Hari Prakash and Ors., (2001) 8 SCC 61 and Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi, (2005) 2 SCC 271 . Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the appellant in the appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 1106/2007 also joined Mr. Ranjit Kumar in the submission based on literal interpretation. He also submitted that ordinarily the rule of literal construction should not be departed from, particularly when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous. He relied upon the decision in Raghunath Rai Bareja vs. Punjab National Bank, (2007) 2 SCC 230. 22. We are completely unable to appreciate the submission. The plea for a literal interpretation of section 145(2) is based on the unfounded assumption that the language of the section clearly says that the person giving his evidence on affidavit, on being summoned at the instance of the accused must start his deposition in court with examination-in-chief. We find nothing in section 145(2) to suggest that. We may also make it clear that section 137 of the Evidence Act does not define “examine” to mean and include the three kinds of examination of a witness; it simply defines “examination-in-chief”, “cross-examination” and “re-examination”. We find nothing in section 145(2) to suggest that. We may also make it clear that section 137 of the Evidence Act does not define “examine” to mean and include the three kinds of examination of a witness; it simply defines “examination-in-chief”, “cross-examination” and “re-examination”. What section 145(2) of the Act says is simply this. The court may, at its discretion, call a person giving his evidence on affidavit and examine him as to the facts contained therein. But if an application is made either by the prosecution or by the accused the court must call the person giving his evidence on affidavit, again to be examined as to the facts contained therein. What would be the extent and nature of examination in each case is a different matter and that has to be reasonably construed in light of the provision of section 145(1) and having regard to the object and purpose of the entire scheme of sections 143 to 146. The scheme of sections 143 to 146 does not in any way affect the judge’s powers under section 165 of the Evidence Act. As a matter of fact, section 145(2) expressly provides that the court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any person giving evidence on affidavit. But how would the person giving evidence on affidavit be examined, on being summoned to appear before the court on the application made by the prosecution or the accused? The affidavit of the person so summoned that is already on the record is obviously in the nature of examination-in-chief. Hence, on being summoned on the application made by the accused the deponent of the affidavit (the complainant or any of his witnesses) can only be subjected to cross-examination as to the facts stated in the affidavit. In so far as the prosecution is concerned the occasion to summon any of its witnesses who has given his evidence on affidavit may arise in two ways. The prosecution may summon a person who has given his evidence on affidavit and has been cross-examined for “reexamination”. The prosecution may also have to summon a witness whose evidence is given on affidavit in case objection is raised by the defence regarding the validity and/or sufficiency of proof of some document(s) submitted along with the affidavit. The prosecution may summon a person who has given his evidence on affidavit and has been cross-examined for “reexamination”. The prosecution may also have to summon a witness whose evidence is given on affidavit in case objection is raised by the defence regarding the validity and/or sufficiency of proof of some document(s) submitted along with the affidavit. In that event the witness may be summoned to appear before the court to cure the defect and to have the document(s) properly proved by following the correct legal mode. This appears to us as the simple answer to the above question and the correct legal position. Any other meaning given to subsection (2) of section 145, as suggested by Mr. Ranjit Kumar would make the provision of section 145(1) nugatory and would completely defeat the very scheme of trial as designed under sections 143 to 147. 32. On a bare reading of section 143 it is clear that the legislature provided for the complainant to give his evidence on affidavit and did not provide for the accused to similarly do so. But the High Court thought that not mentioning the accused along with the complainant in sub-section (1) of section 145 was merely an omission by the legislature that it could fill up without difficulty. Even though the legislature in their wisdom did not deem it proper to incorporate the word ‘accused’ with the word ‘complainant’ in section 145(1), it did not mean that the Magistrate could not allow the accused to give his evidence on affidavit by applying the same analogy unless there was a just and reasonable ground to refuse such permission. There are two errors apparent in the reasoning of the High Court. First, if the legislature in their wisdom did not think “it proper to incorporate a word ‘accused’ with the word ‘complainant’ in section 145(1)……”, it was not open to the High Court to fill up the self perceived blank. Secondly, the High Court was in error in drawing an analogy between the evidences of the complainant and the accused in a case of dishonoured cheque. The case of the complainant in a complaint under section 138 of the Act would be based largely on documentary evidence. The accused, on the other hand, in a large number of cases, may not lead any evidence at all and let the prosecution stand or fall on its own evidence. The case of the complainant in a complaint under section 138 of the Act would be based largely on documentary evidence. The accused, on the other hand, in a large number of cases, may not lead any evidence at all and let the prosecution stand or fall on its own evidence. In case the defence does lead any evidence, the nature of its evidence may not be necessarily documentary; in all likelihood the defence would lead other kinds of evidences to rebut the presumption that the issuance of the cheque was not in the discharge of any debt or liability. This is the basic difference between the nature of the complainant’s evidence and the evidence of the accused in a case of dishonoured cheque. It is, therefore, wrong to equate the defence evidence with the complainant’s evidence and to extend the same option to the accused as well.” Yet again in a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Banks Association and others Vs. Union of India and others – (2014) 5 SCC -590, the Supreme Court reiterated the position of law explaining that under Sec. 145 of the Act, the complainant can give his evidence by way of an affidavit and such affidavit shall be read in evidence in any inquiry trial and other proceedings in the Court, which makes it clear that a complainant is not required to examine himself twice i.e. one after filing the complaint and one after summoning of the accused. The Court further explained that the affidavit and the documents filed by the complainant along with the complaint for taking cognizance of the offence are good enough to be read in evidence at both the stages i.e. pre-summoning stage and the post-summoning stage. In other words, there is no necessity to recall and re-examine the complainant after summoning of the accused, unless the Magistrate passes a specific order as to why the complainant is to be recalled. Such an order is to be passed on an application made by the accused or under Sec. 145(2) of the Act suo motu by the Court. 10. Thus, considering the three decisions of the Supreme Court aforenoted, the position of law is quite clear. Such an order is to be passed on an application made by the accused or under Sec. 145(2) of the Act suo motu by the Court. 10. Thus, considering the three decisions of the Supreme Court aforenoted, the position of law is quite clear. The words “examine any person giving evidence on affidavit as to the facts contained therein in event the deponent is summoned by the court in terms of sub-sec(2) of Sec. 145 of the Act” would mean for the purpose of cross-examination. Therefore, Sec. 145(2) is a stage at which the accused would cross-examine the complainant. 11. It is not in dispute that in the present case the trial is at the stage of Sec. 145(2) of the Act. At the same time it is not in dispute that the complainant is yet to step in the witness-box to enable the accused to cross-examine him. It is at that stage that the accused wants that all the four complaints be transferred to the court of competent jurisdiction as directed by the Supreme Court. 12. Let me now consider the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh (Supra). 12.1) The Supreme Court has made it very abundantly clear that a complaint under Sec.138 of the Act is maintainable only in the Court within whose jurisdiction the drawee bank is located. 13. The reason why the Supreme Court took such a view is to be found from the observations made by the Supreme Court in para-20. “20. We are quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have to possibly lakhs of cases pending in various Courts spanning across the country. One approach could be to declare that this judgment will have only prospective pertinence, i.e. applicability to Complaints that may be filed after this pronouncement. However, keeping in perspective the hardship that this will continue to bear on alleged accused/respondents who may have to travel long distances in conducting their defence, and also mindful of the legal implications of proceedings being permitted to continue in a Court devoid of jurisdiction, this recourse in entirety does not commend itself to us. However, keeping in perspective the hardship that this will continue to bear on alleged accused/respondents who may have to travel long distances in conducting their defence, and also mindful of the legal implications of proceedings being permitted to continue in a Court devoid of jurisdiction, this recourse in entirety does not commend itself to us. Consequent on considerable consideration we think it expedient to direct that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged Accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. To clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the Complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. To obviate and eradicate any legal complications, the category of Complaint cases where proceedings have gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by us from the Court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the Court where it is presently pending. All other Complaints (obviously including those where the accused/respondent has not been properly served) shall be returned to the Complainant for filing in the proper Court, in consonance with our exposition of the law. If such Complaints are filed/re-filed within thirty days of their return, they shall be deemed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or prior filing was itself time barred. Thus, a plain reading of the observations as contained in para-20 makes it clear that the object was to see that the accused may not have to suffer the travails of journeying to the place where the cheque is dishonoured. 14. The Supreme Court has summed-up the law relating to the offence punishable under Sec. 138 of the Act, in the following manner. “(i) An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank. “(i) An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank. (ii) Cognizance of any such offence is however forbidden under Section 142 of the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or holder of the cheque in due course within a period of one month from the date the cause of action accrues to such payee or holder under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. (iii) The cause of action to file a complaint accrues to a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if (a) the dishonored cheque is presented to the drawee bank within a period of six months from the date of its issue. (b) If the complainant has demanded payment of cheque amount within thirty days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the dishonour of the cheque and (c) If the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days of receipt of such notice. (iv) The facts constituting cause of action do not constitute the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. (v) The proviso to Section 138 simply postpones/defers institution of criminal proceedings and taking of cognizance by the Court till such time cause of action in terms of clause (c) of proviso accrues to the complainant. (vi) Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured. (vii) The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of the Cr.P.C. applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. (vi) Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured. (vii) The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of the Cr.P.C. applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the dishonor takes place except in situations where the offence of dishonor of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Section 184 and 220 thereof.” 15. Let me now consider the most important part of the decision of the Supreme Court with which I am concerned. In Para-22 of the judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under:- “22. In this Appeal the Respondent-accused, having purchased electronic items from the Appellant-company, issued the cheque in question drawn on UCO Bank, Tangi, Orissa which was presented by the Complainant-company at State Bank of India, Ahmednagar Branch, Maharashtra as its branch office was located at Ahmednagar. The cheque was dishonoured by UCO Bank, Tangi, Orissa. A Complaint was filed before JMFC, Ahmednagar. An application was filed by the Respondent-accused under Section 177 CrPC questioning the jurisdiction of the JMFC Ahmednagar, who held that since the demand notice was issued from and the payment was claimed at Ahmednagar, he possessed jurisdiction to try the Complaint. The High Court disagreed with the conclusion of the JMFC, Ahmednagar that the receipt of notice and nonpayment of the demanded amount are factors which will have prominence over the place wherefrom the notice of demand was issued and held that JMFC, Ahmednagar did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint. In view of the foregoing discussion on the issue above, the place where the concerned cheque had been dishonoured, which in the case in hand was Tangi, Orissa, the Appeal is allowed with the direction that the Complaint be returned to the Complainant for further action in accordance with law.” 16. In view of the foregoing discussion on the issue above, the place where the concerned cheque had been dishonoured, which in the case in hand was Tangi, Orissa, the Appeal is allowed with the direction that the Complaint be returned to the Complainant for further action in accordance with law.” 16. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, placing reliance on the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court in Para-22 of its judgment, wants the court to segregate the two stages as under:- “(A) All cases at the pre-summoning stage envisaged under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Act – (i) where the complainant has appeared and made oral statement, or (ii) where the complainant has filed the affidavit, shall be returned to the complainant for filing the same in the proper Court having jurisdiction. (B) All cases of post summoning stage envisaged under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act – (i) where the appearance of the accused has already been made, or (ii) where the application has been filed either by the prosecution or the accused for the purpose of cross-examination of the complainant, or (iii) where the cross-examination of the complainant i.e. recording of the evidence has commenced would continue at the places they are filed and would be deemed to have been transferred from the proper Court to the Court where they are presently pending.” 17. In my opinion the word “only those cases where post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place” should be read harmoniously and in conjunction with the words “the category of complaint cases where proceedings have gone to the stage of section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by us from the court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the court where it is presently pending”. The attempt on the part of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is to persuade me to take the view that the last part of para-22 should be read whereas the first part should be ignored. 18. The attempt on the part of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is to persuade me to take the view that the last part of para-22 should be read whereas the first part should be ignored. 18. I am afraid, I am unable to accept such submission because I also need to keep the object with which the judgment has been delivered by the Apex Court. I have already discussed about the object and in that regard I have also quoted para-20 of the judgment. When the Supreme Court says the “recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2)” only means that the cross-examination has actually begun. If the complainant is yet to step in the box for the purpose of cross-examination by the accused then those cases according to me are covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court. To put it in other words such type of cases should be transferred. I do appreciate that if I have to consider only the interpretation of the words “proceedings have gone to the stage of section 145(2) or beyond” then probably the learned counsel appearing for the complainant may be right, but at the same time I should not ignore the first part of para-22 which makes it very clear that the recording of evidence should have actually commenced as envisaged in section 145(2). There is a fine distinction between the term “has commenced” and “have gone to the stage of section 145(2)”. But for the words “the recording of evidence has commenced” I would have probably disagreed with the learned Magistrate. 19. I am of the view that the learned Magistrate is right in returning the complaints to the complainant for being filed/refilled before the competent court having jurisdiction to try the offence. 20. In the result all the four applications failand are hereby rejected. After the order is pronounced, Mr. Jadeja, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicants prays that the interim order earlier granted by this court be continued for a period of four weeks from today to enable his client to challenge this order before the Apex Court. Having regard to the issue involved, the interim order granted earlier shall continue for a further period of four weeks from today.