Judgment : Harish Tandon, J. These bunch of applications pertain to the direction to pay the legitimate dues to the secured creditors from the sale proceeds lying with the official liquidator in terms of the adjudication of claims on the basis of proof submitted with the official liquidator. Apart from the letter of direction sought by the official liquidator, the secured creditors have also approached by filing the applications for release of their dues on pro rata basis. In course of the arguments, all the parties who intervened, raised a point whether the contract labourers can be brought within the ambit of Section 529, 529A and 530 of the Companies Act. According to the banks who are arraigned as secured creditors denied the right of the contractual labours as a workman within the meaning of aforesaid provisions of the Companies Act and have further assailed the decision of the official liquidator in bringing those contract labourers within the definition of the workmen under the Companies Act. The contract labourers refute the stand of the bank by saying that their services were perennial in nature and after the abolition of the contract labourers by introduction of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, they become the employee of the company (in liquidation) and, therefore, are to be treated as workmen having a preferential claim under the Companies Act. Section 529 of the Companies Act put the workmen in the category of the secured creditors and to have a pari passu charge with the other secured creditors. Section 529A of the said Act containing a non obstante clause gives primacy to workmen dues and debts of the secured creditors in priority to all other debts to be paid in full unless the assets are insufficient to meet them, otherwise they would be paid in equal proportion. Section 530 of the Act depicts the preferential payments and there is no quarrel that the wages or the salary of an employee who rendered service to the Company along with the accrued holiday remuneration and other statutory benefits. For the purpose of Section 529A and 530, the workmen is defined in Sub section (3) of Section 529 of the Act to mean the employees of the company being the workmen within the definition of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For the purpose of Section 529A and 530, the workmen is defined in Sub section (3) of Section 529 of the Act to mean the employees of the company being the workmen within the definition of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Before proceeding to deal with the argument so advanced and the point raised before this Court, it is axiomatic to quote the aforesaid Sections, which runs thus :- “529. Application of insolvency rules in winding up of insolvent companies.—(1) In the winding up of an insolvent company, the same rules shall prevail and be observed with regard to— (a) debts provable; (b) the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities; and (c) the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors; as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency with respect to the estates of persons adjudged insolvent: [Provided that the security of every secured creditor shall be deemed to be subject to a pari passu charge in favour of the workmen to the extent of the workmen’s portion therein, and where a secured creditor, instead of relinquishing his security and proving his debt, opts to realise his security,— (a) the liquidator shall be entitled to represent the workmen and enforce such charge; (b) any amount realised by the liquidator by way of enforcement of such charge shall be applied rateably for the discharge of workmen’s dues; and (c) so much of the debt due to such secured creditor as could not be realised by him by virtue of the foregoing provisions of this proviso or the amount of the workmen’s portion in his security, whichever is less, shall rank pari passu with the workmen’s dues for the purposes of Section 529A.] (2) All persons who in any such case would be entitled to prove for and receive dividends out of the assets of the company, may come in under the winding up, and make such claims against the company as they respectively are entitled to make by virtue of this section. [Provided that if a secured creditor instead of relinquishing his security and proving for his debt proceeds to realise his security, he shall be liable to pay [his portion of] the expenses incurred by the liquidator (including a provisional liquidator, if any) for the preservation of the security before its realization by the secured creditor.] [(3) For the purposes of this section, Section 529-A and Section 530,— (a) “workmen”, in relation to a company, means the employees of the company, being workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (b) “workmen’s dues”, in relation to a company, means the aggregate of the following sums due from the company to its workmen, namely:— (i) all wages or salary including wages payable for time or piece work and salary earned wholly or in part by way of commission of any workman, in respect of services rendered to the company and any compensation payable to any workman under any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (ii) all accrued holiday remuneration becoming payable to any workman, or in the case of his death to any other person in his right, on the termination of his employment before, or by the effect of, the winding up order or resolution; (iii) unless the company is being wound up voluntarily merely for the purposes of reconstruction or of amalgamation with another company, or unless the company has, at the commencement of the winding up, under such a contract with insurers as is mentioned in Section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, rights capable of being transferred to and vested in the workman, all amounts due in respect of any compensation or liability for compensation under the said Act in respect of the death or disablement of any workman of the company; (iv) all sums due to any workman from a provident fund, a pension fund, a gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of the workmen, maintained by the company; (c) “workmen’s portion”, in relation to the security of any secured creditor of a company, means the amount which bears to the value of the security the same proportion as the amount of the workmen’s dues bears to the aggregate of— (i) the amount of workmen’s dues; and (ii) the amounts of the debts due to the secured creditors. 529-A. Overriding preferential payments.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, in the winding up of a company,— (a) workmen’s dues; and (b) debts due to secured creditors to the extent such debts rank under clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 529 pari passu with such dues, shall be paid in priority to all other debts. (2) The debts payable under clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be paid in full, unless the assets are insufficient to meet them, in which case they shall abate in equal proportions.] 530. (2) The debts payable under clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be paid in full, unless the assets are insufficient to meet them, in which case they shall abate in equal proportions.] 530. Preferential payments.— (1) In a winding up, [subject to the provisions of Section 529-A,] there shall be paid in priority to all other debts— (a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the company to the Central or a State Government or to a local authority at the relevant date as defined in clause (c) of sub-section (8) and having become due and payable within the twelve months next before that date; (b) all wages or salary (including wages payable for time or piece work and salary earned wholly or in part by way of commission) of any employee, in respect of services rendered to the company and due for a period not exceeding four months within the twelve months next before the relevant date [* * *], subject to the limit specified in sub-section (2); (c) all accrued holiday remuneration becoming payable to any employee, or in the case of his death to any other person in his right, on the termination of his employment before or by the effect of, the winding up order or resolution; (d) unless the company is being wound up voluntarily merely for the purposes of reconstruction or of amalgamation with another company, all amounts due, in respect of contributions payable during the twelve months next before the relevant date, by the company as the employer of any persons, under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948, (34 of 1948), or any other law for the time being in force; (e) unless the company is being wound up voluntarily merely for the purposes of reconstruction or of amalgamation with another company, or unless the company has, at the commencement of the winding up, under such a contract with insurers as is mentioned in Section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, rights capable of being transferred to and vested in the workman, all amounts due in respect of any compensation or liability for compensation under the said Act in respect of the death or disablement of any employee of the company; (f) all sums due to any employee from a provident fund, a pension fund, a gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees, maintained by the company; and (g) the expenses of any investigation held in pursuance of Section 235 or 237, in so far as they are payable by the company. (2) The sum to which priority is to be given under clause (b) of subsection (1), shall not, in the case of any one claimant, exceed [such sum as may be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette]: [* * *] (3) Where any compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), is a weekly payment, the amount due in respect thereof shall, for the purposes of clause (e) of subsection (1), be taken to be the amount of the lump sum for which the weekly payment could if redeemable, be redeemed if the employer made an application for that purpose under the said Act. (4) Where any payment has been made to any employee of a company,— (i) on account of wages or salary; or (ii) to him, or in the case of his death, to any other person in his right on account of accrued holiday remuneration, out of money advance by some person for that purpose, the person by whom the money was advanced shall, in a winding up, have a right of priority in respect of the money so advanced and paid, up to the amount by which the sum in respect of which the employee or other person in his right, would have been entitled to priority in the winding up has been diminished by reason of the payment having been made. (5) The foregoing debts shall— (a) rank equally among themselves and be paid in full, unless the assets are insufficient to meet them, in which case they shall abate in equal proportions; and (b) so far as the assets of the company available for payment of general creditors are insufficient to meet them, have priority over the claims of holders of debentures under any floating charge created by the company, and be paid accordingly out of any property comprised in or subject to that charge. (6) Subject to the retention of such sums as may be necessary for the costs and expenses of the winding up, the foregoing debts shall be discharged forthwith so far as the assets are sufficient to meet them, and in the case of the debts to which priority is given by clause (d) of sub-section (1), formal proof thereof shall not be required except in so far as may be otherwise prescribed. (7) In the event of a landlord or other person distraining or having distrained on any goods or effects of the company within three months next before the date of a winding up order, the debts to which priority is given by this section shall be a first charge on the goods or effects so distrained on, or the proceeds of the sale thereof: Provided that, in respect of any money paid under any such charge, the landlord or other person shall have the same rights of priority as the person to whom the payment is made. (8) For the purposes of this section— (a) any remuneration in respect of a period of holiday or of absence from work through sickness or other good cause shall be deemed to be wages in respect of services rendered to the company during that period; (b) the expression “accrued holiday remuneration” includes, in relation to any person, all sums which by virtue either of his contract of employment or of any enactment (including any order made or direction given under any enactment), are payable on account of the remuneration which would, in the ordinary course, have become payable to him in respect of a period of holiday, had his employment with the company continued until he became entitled to be allowed the holiday; [* * *] (c) the expression “the relevant date” means— (i) in the case of a company ordered to be wound up compulsorily, the date of the appointment (or first appointment) of a provisional liquidator, or if no such appointment was made, the date of the winding up order, unless in either case the company had commenced to be wound up voluntarily before that date; and (ii) in any case where sub-clause (i) does not apply, the date of the passing of the resolution for the voluntary winding up of the company. (9) This section shall not apply in the case of a winding up where the date referred to in subsection (5) of Section 230 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913), occurred before the commencement of this Act, and in such a case, the provisions relating to preferential payments which would have applied if this Act had not been passed, shall be deemed to remain in full force. [(bb) the expression “employee” does not include a workman; and] Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines the workmen as under :- “2(s). “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employee in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire ore reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that disput, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding (ten thousand rupees) per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” There is no ambiguity to say that by virtue of the reference the definition of the workmen engrafted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is borrowed and/or brought within the Companies Act. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, which came into effect on February 10, 1971, was enacted with an avowed object to deal with the abuses of the contract labour system and to curb the abuses of the employment of the contract labour. The contract labour is defined in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 to mean “a workman employed as a contract labour in or in connection with an establishment when he is hired from or in connection with such work by or through a contractor with or without the knowledge of the principal employer”. The contract labour is defined in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 to mean “a workman employed as a contract labour in or in connection with an establishment when he is hired from or in connection with such work by or through a contractor with or without the knowledge of the principal employer”. The definition of the contract labour suggest that it is not a species of a workman and can be hired in an establishment by the principal employer or by his agent with or without the knowledge of the principal employer or through a contractor or by a contractor with or without the knowledge of principal employer. Clause I of Section 2 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 defines the workman as : (i) “workman” means any person employed in or in connection with the work of any establishment to do any skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, but does not include any such person— The express definition of the workmen imbibed within itself two eventualities, firstly, any person employed in or in connection with a work of an establishment to do any skilled, semi skilled or unskilled manual, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, secondly, it excludes the managerial or administrative staff, an employee in supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per mensem or an outworker to whom any article or materials are given out or on behalf of the principal employer to be made up cleaned, washed, altered or mended, finished, repairs adopted or otherwise for sale in relation to the trade or business of the principal employer. Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, empowers the appropriate government to issue notification after consultation with the central board or a state board as the case may be, prohibiting by notification in the official gazette employment of the contract labour in any process operation or otherwise in any establishment. Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, empowers the appropriate government to issue notification after consultation with the central board or a state board as the case may be, prohibiting by notification in the official gazette employment of the contract labour in any process operation or otherwise in any establishment. It is not debated by either of the parties before this Court that the Company in liquidation is not an establishment within the meaning of the aforesaid section but on the other hand they have admitted that a notification was issued by the appropriate government published in the official gazette bringing the company in liquidation within the meaning of the establishment. The said notification is also brought to the notice of this Court and it is discernable from the various decisions taken by the Company before it went into liquidation that some of the contract labourers whose services were perennial in nature were absorbed and were treated as the employees of the company in liquidation. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that those employees have availed voluntary separation scheme and the voluntary retirement scheme and have been paid their entitlements discernable from the order passed by the Company Court in a liquidation proceeding. The other left out contract labourers have joined in this litigation taking advantage of the aforesaid notification to treat them as a workman so as to bring at the pedestal of other secured creditors and claimed the pari passu charge. Those contract labourers placed reliance upon a three bench judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Air India Statutory Corporation, etc. –Vs- United Labour Union & Ors reported in AIR 1997 SC 645 in support of their contention that the abolition of the contract labour system ensures right to the workmen for regularization of them as employees in the establishment in which they were hitherto working as a contract labour through a contractor. It is further submitted that upon the removal of the contractor, a direct relationship of an employee and the employer between the principal employer and the contract labour is established as held :- “………..…….On abolition of contract labour, the intermediary, i.e. contractor, is removed from the field and direct linkage between labour and principal employer is established. Thereby, the principal employer’s obligation to absorb them arises. Thereby, the principal employer’s obligation to absorb them arises. The right of the employee for absorption get ripened and fructified …………………………………………………………………… ……………………………The contractor is an intermediary between the workmen and the principal employer. The moment the contract labour system stands prohibited under Section 10 (1), the embargo to continue as a contract labour is put and end to and direct relationship has been provided between the workmen and the principal employer. Thereby, the principal employer directly becomes responsible for taking the services of the workmen hitherto regulated through the contractor……………………………………………………………” It is pertinent to record that the judgment rendered in case of Air India Statutory Corporation (Supra), came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench in case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. -Vs- National Union Water Front Workers & Ors reported in AIR 2001 SC 3527 and is overruled with prospective effect. Before the Constitution Bench apart from the other points, one of the point was whether the contract labourer would be treated to have been automatically absorbed in the establishment of the principal employer on issuance of the notification under Section 10 (1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Taking a dissenting view from what was taken in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation (Supra), the Court held: “114. We find no substance in the next submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that a combined reading of the definition of the terms ‘contract labour,’ ‘establishment’ and ‘workman’ would show that a legal relationship between a person employed in an industry and the owner of the industry is created irrespective of the fact as to who has brought about such relationship.” The ultimate conclusion deducible from the said Constitution Bench decision is that neither Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 nor any provision of the Act either expressly or necessary implication suggest the automatic absorption of contract labour on issuance of the notification by the appropriate government under Section 10(1) of the Act. It would be relevant to quote paragraph 122 of the said report, which runs thus:- “The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus: (1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government; (b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act; if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate Government. (2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Government: (1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the case may be, and (2) having regard to (i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question, and (ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10; (b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented. (3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment concerned. (4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case prospectively and declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court, for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case shall hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final. (5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder. (6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications.” In case of Nitin Kumar Nathalal Joshi & Ors –Vs- Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd & Ors reported in AIR 2002 SC 1444 , the point arose whether the contract labourers who continued at such even after the notification issued by the appropriate government under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 are entitled to take benefits of the decision rendered in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation (Supra), which suffered prospective overruling in Steel Authority of India (Supra). By negativing the aforesaid contention and extending the benefits, it is held: “8. By negativing the aforesaid contention and extending the benefits, it is held: “8. In the present case, the appellants were no absorbed by the principal-employer. Therefore, it cannot be said that the decision in Steel Authority of India Ltd. case (supra) cannot be applied. The directions issued by the learned single Judge were modified by the Division Bench of the High Court and never given effect to. Therefore, the directions issued by this court in the Steel Authority of India Ltd. case (Supra) are applicable on all force.” What is deduced from the aforesaid decision is that mere issuance of notification under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, does not ipso facto make an automatic affirmation and/or absorption of the contract labourers as held in Steel Authority of India (Supra). It would be different where the contract is camouflaged to give a colour that those contract labourers are in fact working under the establishment of principal employer who are shown to be in tacit control of the contractor. Lifting the veil is required to be adopted in such case and a definite finding is to be arrived whether those contract labourers are in fact a workman under the establishment of principal employer who is having a submersive control over them. Even the Constitution Bench in case of Steel Authority of India (Supra) have recognized three classes of the contract labourers in paragraph 105 thereof and it would be pertinent to quote as under: “An analysis of the cases, discussed above, shows that they fall in three classes: (i) where contract labour is engaged in or in connection with the work of an establishment and employment of contract labour is prohibited either because the industrial adjudicator/court ordered abolition of contract labour or because the appropriate Government issued notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, no automatic absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment was ordered; (ii) where the contract was found to be a sham and nominal, rather a camouflage, in which case the contract labour working in the establishment of the principal employer were held, in fact and in reality, the employees of the principal employer himself. Indeed, such cases do not relate to abolition of contract labour but present instances wherein the Court pierced the veil and declared the correct position as a fact at the stage after employment of contract labour stood prohibited; (iii) where in discharge of a statutory obligation of maintaining a canteen in an establishment the principal employer availed the services of a contractor the courts have held that the contract labour would indeed be the employees of the principal employer. The next issue that remains to be dealt with is: B. Whether on a contractor engaging contract labour in connection with the work entrusted to him by a principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him (the principal employer) and the contract labour emerges.” Though automatic absorption is not permissible in view of the said Constitution Bench decision (Steel Authority of India) but in the event it is found after lifting the veil that the principal employer was retaining the control over those contract labourers and the agreement between the principal employer and the contractor is a mere camouflage, such contract labourers are the employees of the principal employer after the issuance of notification under Section 10(1) and abolition of the labourers being employed through contractors. The official liquidator has simply quoted the definition of the workmen assigned in Industrial Disputes Act and under the Companies Act and have suddenly jumped to the conclusion that those contract labourers are the workmen within the definition engrafted under Section 528 of the Companies Act. The official liquidator has no occasion to consider the agreement between the contractors and the principal employer nor have recorded any finding whether such an agreement is sham, unreal and mere camouflage to disassociate the linkage between the contract labourers and the principal employer. I am oblivion of the proposition of law that directing the authority to consider without embarking to consider myself when all the materials are available before the High Court is not welcome as held in case of A. P. SRTC & Ors; – Vs- G. Srinivas Reddy & Ors; reported in (2006) 3 SCC 674 . I am oblivion of the proposition of law that directing the authority to consider without embarking to consider myself when all the materials are available before the High Court is not welcome as held in case of A. P. SRTC & Ors; – Vs- G. Srinivas Reddy & Ors; reported in (2006) 3 SCC 674 . Since all the materials are not available before this Court and by an earlier order the official liquidator was directed to adjudicate the claim of the contract labourers whether they can be brought within the purview of workmen as defined under Section 528 of the Companies Act, this Court feels that the official liquidator should adjudicate afresh after inviting all the interest parties to produce the relevant contracts and thereafter shall arrive at the finding whether the contract is of such nature which after piercing the veil would suggest that there was a direct relationship of employer and an employee between the contract labourers and the principal employer. This Court, therefore, does not intend to pass letter of direction as sought by the official liquidator in terms of the report filed before this Court and also do not intend to pass any further direction for release of the payment as sought by the banks in their respective applications as well as the release of the amount to the contract labourers. This Court, therefore, directs the official liquidator to make an adjudication within six weeks in the light of the observations made hereinabove. This Court does not feel that the aforesaid application should be kept pending and, therefore, disposed of the same. However, this order shall not prevent them to seek the similar relief after the adjudication is made by the official liquidator in terms of the directions made hereinabove. These applications are disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance of all requisite formalities.