Judgment C.L. Soni, J. 1. Following question arises for our consideration:- “Whether the application made under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Old Act’) before the award is passed by the Court acting as Lok Adalat under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (‘the Legal Service Act’) could be considered by the Land Acquisition Officer for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award passed by such Court under Section 18 of the Old Act ? 2. As the above common question arises in all the petitions, we have heard the petitions together for final disposal and decided by this common judgment. 3. Facts in nutshell are that the notification under Section 4 of the Old Act was issued on 12.8.1986 covering the lands of the petitioners with other lands of village Kumetha, Taluka Vaghodia, District Vadodara for the purpose of construction of canal for Narmada Irrigation project. The Land Acquisition Officer declared the award on 23.12.1986 awarding Rs. 15,000/- (Rs.1.50 ps. per Sq. Mtr.) Some of the landholders covered under the same notification preferred references under Section 18 of the Old Act. Such references were placed before the Lok Adalat. Before the Lok Adalat, consent terms at Exh.14 were submitted with a prayer to pass award as per the consent terms. It appears that having come to know about such consent terms, the petitioners submitted applications under Section 28A of the Old Act on 18.10.2012 to the respondent No.1. Thereafter, on the basis of the consent terms, the Court passed award on 31.10.2012 for agreed higher compensation with other statutory benefits. 4. So far as the applications of the petitioners under Section 28A of the Old Act were concerned, they are rejected by the Special Land Acquisition Officer-respondent No.1 herein on the ground that the applications are to be made within three months from the date of the award but they are made before the award was passed. 5. We have heard learned advocates for the parties. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Chirag Patel appearing for the petitioners submitted that what is prohibited under the Old Act is of non-consideration of the application under Section 28A of the Old Act if made three months after the date of the award. Mr. 5. We have heard learned advocates for the parties. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Chirag Patel appearing for the petitioners submitted that what is prohibited under the Old Act is of non-consideration of the application under Section 28A of the Old Act if made three months after the date of the award. Mr. Patel submitted that if the applications are made prior to passing of the award under Section 18 of the Old Act, at the best, they deserve non-consideration till the award is made and such applications could be then considered after the award is passed. Mr. Patel submitted that in any case, the petitioners made applications after the consent terms were presented before the Lok Adalat and since the award is made as per the consent terms, the award which was made on 31.10.2012 would relate back to the date of the consent terms. Mr. Patel thus submitted that the applications made on 18.10.2012 by the petitioners were therefore, required to be considered as having been made after the award was passed. Mr. Patel submitted that since the applications were not dealt with till the award was passed, they could be treated as pending applications on the date of the award and were required to be decided on merits. Mr. Patel submitted that the Act could be said to be benevolent Act for the persons whose lands are acquired inasmuch as whatever the benefits intended by the legislature should be made available without raising technical objection, especially when it is not the case that the petitioners had made applications under Section 28A three months after the award was made by the Lok Adalat. He thus urged to direct the Special Land Acquisition Officer to consider the applications of the petitioners on their own merits and decide the same in accordance with law without raising objection as regards maintainability of such applications. 7. As against the above arguments, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Rutvij Oza appearing for the respondents submitted that the applicants had accepted the award and chosen not to make reference under Section 18 of the Old Act. Mr. Oza submitted that since the petitioners refused to accept the compensation offered to them, it was deposited in the Court. Mr. 7. As against the above arguments, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Rutvij Oza appearing for the respondents submitted that the applicants had accepted the award and chosen not to make reference under Section 18 of the Old Act. Mr. Oza submitted that since the petitioners refused to accept the compensation offered to them, it was deposited in the Court. Mr. Oza submitted that no right had accrued to the petitioners to make applications under Section 28A of the Old Act before the award is made by the Reference Court in connection with the other lands covered by the same notification. Mr. Oza submitted that the law does not permit making of any such application before passing of the award under Section 18 of the Act and therefore, the Land Acquisition Officer has committed no error in rejecting the applications of the petitioners. Mr. Oza submitted that the award could be said to have been passed on the date when it was made and pronounced and not from the back date when the parties had submitted the consent terms. Mr. Oza thus urged to dismiss the petitions. 8. Having heard learned advocates for the parties, it appears that there is no dispute about the fact that the lands of the petitioners are covered by the same notification under Section 4 of the Old Act, in respect of which the other landholders made reference under Section 18 of the Act. It appears that when the references were placed before the Lok Adalat, the consent terms were presented for making of award at the rate of Rs.40/- per Sq. Mtr. and for giving other statutory benefits like solatium, interest, etc. The consent terms at Exh.14 (Annexure-C) bears two different dates one is 21.1.2012 and another is 1.10.2012. However, comparing any of the dates with the date of the applications made by the petitioners under Section 28A of the Act, the applications submitted by the petitioners to the respondent No.1 were after the presentation of the consent terms in the pending reference. 9. What further appears from Annexure-E is that the learned Judge passed the order on 31.10.2012 below the consent terms observing that the parties have presented the consent terms at Exh.14 and accepted the same as true and correct and also confirmed their signatures as well as the thumb impressions, therefore, the consent terms are taken on record. 9. What further appears from Annexure-E is that the learned Judge passed the order on 31.10.2012 below the consent terms observing that the parties have presented the consent terms at Exh.14 and accepted the same as true and correct and also confirmed their signatures as well as the thumb impressions, therefore, the consent terms are taken on record. It is further observed that if there are names of other persons in the award or the names their heirs, they will be entitled to compensation as per the order. Based on such order, the award was made on the same day under Section 18 of the Act declaring that the applicants of the references shall be entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.40/-per Sq. Mtr. as per the consent terms and they shall be further entitled to 30% solatium with statutory interest of 12%, 9% and 15% provided in the Old Act. 10. Section 21 of the Legal Service Act reads as under:- 21. Award of Lok Adalat.- (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870. (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award. 11. As per Section 21 of the Legal Service Act, every award of the Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or, as the case may be, an order of any other Court. Thus, not only such award made by Lok Adalat is a decree of the Civil Court but has become executable award of the Reference Court as Section 21 of the Legal Services Act also refers about the order of any other Court. 12. In the case of K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon Vs. C.D. Shaji reported in AIR 2012 SC 719 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 8, 14,15 and 17 as under:- 8. 12. In the case of K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon Vs. C.D. Shaji reported in AIR 2012 SC 719 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 8, 14,15 and 17 as under:- 8. Section 21 of the Act, which we have extracted above, contemplates a deeming provision, hence, it is a legal fiction that the "award" of the Lok Adalat is a decree of a civil court. In the case on hand, the question posed for consideration before the High Court was that "when a criminal case referred to by the Magistrate to a Lok Adalat is settled by the parties and award is passed recording the settlement, can it be considered as a decree of civil court and thus executable by that court?" After highlighting the relevant provisions, namely, Section 21 of the Act, it was contended before the High Court that every award passed by the Lok Adalat has to be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such executable by that court. Unfortunately, the said argument was not acceptable by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court has concluded that when a criminal case is referred to the Lok Adalat and it is settled at the Lok Adalat, the award passed has to be treated only as an order of that criminal court and it cannot be executed as a decree of the civil court. After saying so, the High Court finally concluded "an award passed by the Lok Adalat on reference of a criminal case by the criminal court as already concluded can only be construed as an order by the criminal court and it is not a decree passed by a civil court" and confirmed the order of the Principal Munsiff who declined the request of the petitioner therein to execute the award passed by the Lok Adalat on reference of a complaint by the criminal court. On going through the Statement of Objects and Reasons, definition of 'Court', 'legal service' as well as Section 21 of the Act, in addition to the reasons given hereunder, we are of the view that the interpretation adopted by the Kerala High Court in the impugned order is erroneous. 14. On going through the Statement of Objects and Reasons, definition of 'Court', 'legal service' as well as Section 21 of the Act, in addition to the reasons given hereunder, we are of the view that the interpretation adopted by the Kerala High Court in the impugned order is erroneous. 14. A statutory support as evidenced in the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in regular courts, but would also take justice to the doorsteps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker and less expensive. In the case on hand, the Courts below erred in holding that only if the matter was one which was referred by a civil court it could be a decree and if the matter was referred by a criminal court it will only be an order of the criminal court and not a decree under Section 21 of the Act. The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court.There is no restriction on the power of Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in a case referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, and by virtue of the deeming provision it has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court.In this regard, the view taken in Subhash Narasappa Mangrule (2009 (3) AIR Bom R 447) (supra) and M/s. Valarmathi Oil Industries ( AIR 2009 Mad 180 ) (supra) supports this contention and we fully accept the same. 15. It is useful to refer the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab and Anr. v. Jalour Singh and Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 660 : ( AIR 2008 SC 1209 : 2008 AIR SCW 1196). The ratio that decision was that the "award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision-making process. The making of the award is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat. This judgment was followed in B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and Anr. The making of the award is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat. This judgment was followed in B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and Anr. v. A.M. Kutty Hassan (2009) 2 SCC 198 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1123). 17. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge: 1) In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such it is executable by that Court. 2) The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. 3) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal), Tribunals, Family Court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature. 4) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court. 13. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the award on the basis of which the petitioners made applications under Section 28A of the Old Act was made by the Lok Adalat under Section 18 of the old Act on the basis of the consent terms. Such award, therefore, could be relied on for the purpose of Section 28A of the Old Act. 14. However, the objection is that before the award was passed on 31.10.2012, the petitioners had made applications under Section 28A of the old Act which were premature and therefore, the benefit under Section 28A of the old Act was not available to the petitioners. 15. We may record that till the award dated 31.10.2012 was made under Section 18 of the old Act, the applications under Section 28A submitted by the petitioners were not dealt with by the respondent No.1. 15. We may record that till the award dated 31.10.2012 was made under Section 18 of the old Act, the applications under Section 28A submitted by the petitioners were not dealt with by the respondent No.1. Undisputably, after the award was made, such applications of the petitioners were decided. Under these circumstances, even if the petitioners had made such applications prior in time than making of the award under Section 18 of the old Act, such applications could have been considered as made on the date of the award or subsequent thereto, especially when the petitioners made such applications after the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award in respect of their lands and especially when the legislative intention in inserting the provision of Section 28A of the old Act was to see that the persons interested in all other lands covered under the same notification for which no reference is made could get the same benefits awarded by the Reference Court to the similarly situated persons who could approach the Reference Court. 16. Section 28A of the old Act requires the persons, like the petitioners, to make written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court for re-determination of the compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court. Such provision of three months for the purpose of making application would not prevent the Collector from considering the applications which are made prior to the date of the award and remained pending. However, such would not mean that the applications filed under Section 28A of the old Act before making of the award under Section 11 of the old Act by the Land Acquisition Officer could be considered as pending applications because unless there is a determination of compensation under Section 11 of the old Act, no such occasion would arise. Similarly, if such application is already disposed of as premature before the award under Section 18 is made, then the person concerned covered under the same notification and wants re-determination of compensation on the basis of the award needs to make an application afresh for such purpose within three months from the date of the award. 17. In the present case, the petitioners made applications after the consent terms were presented before the Court. 17. In the present case, the petitioners made applications after the consent terms were presented before the Court. Therefore, it could be said that there was a cause available with the petitioners to make applications under Section 28A of the old Act in order to ensure that they also get the similar benefits of the award which was to be passed on the basis of the consent terms. We find nothing objectionable against such course adopted by the petitioners. Though in a legal parlance, it could be said that the date on which the award was made is the effective date of the valid decree or order as contemplated under Section 21 of the Legal Service Act and its effect cannot relate back to the date of submitting the consent terms. However, the applications made by the petitioners under Section 28A of the old Act having remained pending till the award was made and consideration of such applications by the respondent No.1 was after the date of the award, we are of the view that such applications could not have been rejected on the ground that they were made prior to the date of the award. 18. For the reasons stated above, the petitions are partly allowed. The impugned orders made by the respondent No.1-the Special Land Acquisition Officer are quashed and set aside. The respondent No.1 is directed to decide the applications made by the petitioners under Section 28A of the old Act on their own merits and in accordance with law. The respondent No.1 shall take decision on such applications within a period of THREE MONTHS from the date of receipt of this order.