DIPAK MISRA, ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN, UDAY UMESH LALIT
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The present appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated 18.08.2009 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1188-SB of 2000 wherein the High Court has affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad in Sessions Case No. 74 of 2000/1998, wherein the learned trial Judge has found the appellant guilty under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC' for short) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with a default clause. Be it stated that the appellant was tried along with his parents for offences under Section 304-B/34 IPC but for paucity of evidence, the High Court recorded an acquittal in favour of the parents. 2. The prosecution case, sans unnecessary details, is that Rashmina, wife of the appellant, breathed her last on 09.09.1998. A week prior to the aforesaid date, she was residing in her parental home, but thereafter, with the intervention of the well-wishers and people of the locality, she came back to the house of her husband, where the death took place on the aforesaid date. On an FIR being lodged, criminal law was set in motion and the investigating agency, after collecting the material, laid the charge-sheet before the competent court, which in turn committed the matter to the Court of Session and eventually, it was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad. 3. To substantiate the case before the learned Trial Judge, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses and brought on record certain documents. The appellant took the plea of false implication and also the factum that he could not be implicated under Section 304-B IPC inasmuch as the marriage had taken place on 5.6.1991 and the death had not occurred within a span of seven years. Certain documents were brought on record to substantiate the said stand. The learned trial Judge, appreciating the evidence on record, came to hold that the prosecution had been able to prove the case and accordingly recorded conviction under Section 304-B/34 IPC. 4.
Certain documents were brought on record to substantiate the said stand. The learned trial Judge, appreciating the evidence on record, came to hold that the prosecution had been able to prove the case and accordingly recorded conviction under Section 304-B/34 IPC. 4. On appeal being preferred, the High Court came to hold that the evidence, as far as the parents of the appellant are concerned, was absolutely sketchy and on the basis of the said evidence, the conviction could not be sustained and resultantly acquitted them. However, the High Court found that there was ample evidence against the accused-appellant to sustain the conviction under Section 304-B IPC. 5. We have heard Mr. M.Z. Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Ramesh Kumar, learned counsel for the State of Haryana. 6. As the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court have found that the accused-appellant guilty under Section 304-B IPC, it is imperative to see whether conditions precedent engrafted under Section 304-B IPC are satisfied or not. It is submitted by Mr. Choudhary that when the death had not occurred within a span of seven years and the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the said factum, the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge and the concurrence given thereto by the High Court are absolutely fallacious. It is urged by him that the prosecution had produced a photocopy of the Bahi (register) during the trial and the same was not marked as an exhibit whereas, the defence, after making a lot of endeavour, examined D-1, Babu Lal, who proved the Bahi as Exhibit D/A. 7. We have carefully perused the original documents. On a scrutiny of Exhibit D/A, it is clear as crystal that the marriage was held on 5.6.1991. The version of the prosecution is that the marriage had taken place on 05.06.1992. The same, as we find, had not remotely been established. In this context, Mr. Choudhary has commended us to the decision in Baljeet Singh and Another v. State of Haryana, (2004)3 SCC 122 wherein a two-Judge Bench has opined that law requires the prosecution to establish first by cogent evidence that the death in the case occurred within seven years of the marriage. As is perceptible, nothing has been brought on record by the prosecution that the death has taken place within a period of seven years of date of marriage.
As is perceptible, nothing has been brought on record by the prosecution that the death has taken place within a period of seven years of date of marriage. On the contrary, the defence has brought acceptable and reliable evidence that the marriage was much prior to seven years. Therefore, we do not have a scintilla of doubt that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the offence under Section 304B of IPC. 8. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the accused-appellant can be convicted for any other offence of IPC. As we find, there is really no evidence as regards the demand of dowry. There are few bald statements by the brother which, as we find, have been demolished in the cross-examination. As far as the facet of cruelty associated with the second part of Section 498A IPC is concerned, it has also not established. It is interesting to note that the trial court under Section 313 Cr.P.C. had not put any questions whatsoever with regard to cruelty. On a careful scrutiny of the same, we find that four questions were put to the appellant. The first question related to demand of dowry, second question related to marriage and third and fourth were formal questions. Thus, nothing was put to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 9. One aspect needs to be noted. As has been indicated earlier, the deceased was in her parental home for eleven months, and she had come to matrimonial home seven days prior to her death, being persuaded by the well-wishers so that she could lead a decent matrimonial life. The High Court has recorded a finding on the basis of evidence that there was no demand of dowry within the period i.e. 02.09.1998 to 09.09.1998. Therefore, even if there was any demand of dowry otherwise, it was prior to eleven months of the death. Therefore, the demand of dowry cannot be stated to have been made soon before the death of the deceased. 10. As far as statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, recently, this Court in Sukhjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 (11) SCALE 414, after referring to Tara Singh v. The State, AIR 1951 SC 441 Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhaya Bharat, AIR 1953 SC 468 and Ajay Singh V. State of Maharashtra, (2007)12 SCC 341 , has opined thus : "10.
On a studied scrutiny of the questions put under Section 313 CrPC in entirety, we find that no incriminating material has been brought to the notice of the accused while putting questions. Mr. Talwar, has submitted that the requirement as engrafted under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. To buttress the aforesaid submission, he has drawn inspiration from the authority in Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar. Relying upon the same, he would contend that when the incriminating materials have not been put to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. it tantamounts serious lapse on the part of the trial Court making the conviction vitiated in law." 11. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we find that the conviction under Section 304-B IPC recorded against the accused-Appellant by the trial Court, which has got the stamp of approval by the High Court, is unsustainable and accordingly, the same is set aside. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. As the appellant is on bail, he be discharged of his bail bonds.