Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J. 1. This order shall dispose of C.W.P. Nos. 10040 & 10090 of 2008, involving common questions of law and facts. However, to dictate orders, facts have been taken from C.W.P. No. 10040 of 2008 titled Ranjit & another v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana, Revenue Department & others. Challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 15.11.2000 (Annexure P3) whereby the petitioners were ordered to be evicted from the land in dispute on account of non-payment of rent. The said order has been upheld in appeal on 14.05.2003 (Annexure P4) by the Collector, Sonepat and also by the Commissioner, Rohtak, vide order dated 14.12.2006 (Annexure P5) and was further granted the seal of approval by the Financial Commissioner on 12.02.2008 (Annexure P7), which are also subject matter of challenge in the writ petitions. 2. The sole question that arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioners, who were tenants in the land in dispute, are entitled for an opportunity to make payment of arrears of rent and interest on account of the C.W.P. No. 10040 of 2010 & another connected case failure to calculate the rent by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, as per proviso of Section 14-A(i) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as applicable to the State of Haryana (for short, the 'Act'). 3. To appreciate the controversy, necessarily the facts have to be appreciated and perusal of the paperbook would go on to show that one Daya Chand along with respondents No. 6 to 10, filed applications for ejectment under Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act on 15.07.1986 and 19.02.1986. The ground was that the patti (rent) of the disputed land was too low and should be fixed as 1/3rd of the produce, as per Section 12 of the Act. The Assistant Collector, 1st Grade had accepted the application and vide order dated 15.12.1986, directed the petitioner tenants to pay rent @ 1/3rd of the produce, regarding the disputed land from Kharif, 1985. It was further directed that the consent of the tenants be given within a period of 2 months, failing which, they would be considered to be ejected from the disputed land. Petitioner-tenants filed an appeal before the Collector and vide order dated 02.04.1988, fixed the rent @ ` 400/- per acre. It was further directed that the consent of the tenants be given within a period of 2 months, failing which, they would be considered to be ejected from the disputed land. Petitioner-tenants filed an appeal before the Collector and vide order dated 02.04.1988, fixed the rent @ ` 400/- per acre. The respondent-landlords went in appeal before the Commissioner, Rohtak and the rent was fixed @ 1/4th of the produce. Eventually, vide ex parte order dated 22.01.1997, passed by the Financial Commissioner, the rent was fixed @ ` 400/- per acre from Kharif, 1985 till the said date and thereafter, it was to be @ 1/3rd of the produce of the patti to the landlord and the tenants were directed to execute the kabuliatnama within 4 months. Relevant portion of the order dated 22.01.1997 reads as under: "Having regard to the facts of the case, the revision petitions are allowed to the extended that fixed rent @ ` 400/- per acre would be paid to the landowner from kharif 1985 till the date of announcement of this order. Thereafter rent @ 1/3rd of the produce will be paid to the landowner. Respondent is directed to execute the kabuliatnama within a period of 3 months." 4. The respondent-landlords filed second application for ejectment by placing reliance upon the order of the Financial Commissioner dated 22.01.1997 and submitted that the tenants had not complied with the directions and were liable to be ejected. A plea was taken by the petitioners before the Assistant Collector that an application for extension of time had been filed before the Financial Commissioner and notice had been issued and therefore, ejectment should not be ordered. The said prayer was declined and ejectment was ordered on 15.11.2000 (Annexure P3) by the Assistant Collector. Thereafter, on 01.03.2001 (Annexure P2), the application for extension of time was allowed and time was given to execute the kabuliatnama by 60 days. Since appeal had been preferred by the writ petitioners before the Collector, Sonepat, the same was rejected on the ground that the compliance had not been made and there was no sufficient cause for not paying the rent and not executing the kabuliatnama. The Commissioner, Rohtak also upheld the said ejectment orders on the ground that the petitioners had committed default in timely payment and the kabuliatnama had not been executed within the time frame fixed. The Commissioner, Rohtak also upheld the said ejectment orders on the ground that the petitioners had committed default in timely payment and the kabuliatnama had not been executed within the time frame fixed. The Financial Commissioner also took the same view and upheld the orders by dismissing the revision petition. 5. Counsel for the petitioners has, thus, vehemently submitted that the assessment has to be made by the Assistant Collector under the proviso of Section 14-A(i) of the Act and the kabuliatnama had been submitted within time on 16.04.2001 (Annexure P8), which was within the 60 days period and amount was also deposited. Reference was made to Annexure P13 dated 17.02.2002 where as sum of ` 33,996/- was deposited and it was submitted that the order of ejectment (Annexure P3) was on the strength of the earlier ex parte order, passed by the Financial Commissioner on 22.01.1997 and had been subsequently modified on 01.03.2001. The respondents had filed C.W.P. No. 4532 of 2001, C.W.P. No. 10040 of 2010 & another connected case challenging the extension granted by the Financial Commissioner on 01.03.2001 and the said writ petitions had been dismissed on 02.12.2011 and therefore, placed reliance upon the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in C.W.P. No. 18437 of 2005 titled Uttam Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana & others decided on 23.10.2008. Accordingly, it is submitted that the order calculating rent, interest and costs, in terms of the proviso of Section 14-A(i) of the Act had not been made by the Assistant Collector while ordering ejectment and therefore, the impugned orders were not sustainable. 6. After hearing counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the arguments raised by the counsel for the petitioners. Admittedly, as per the order dated 22.01.1997, the Financial Commissioner had himself fixed the amount @ ` 400/- per acre, which was payable from Kharif, 1985 till 22.01.1997. Thereafter, rent was to be paid @ 1/3rd of the produce and the petitioners were directed to execute the kabuliatnama within a period of 3 months. Instead of complying with the order, when the second petition for eviction was filed on 03.09.1998 on the sole ground of noncompliance of the order of the Financial Commissioner, the petitioners chose to file an application for extension of time which, admittedly, was allowed on 01.03.2001. Instead of complying with the order, when the second petition for eviction was filed on 03.09.1998 on the sole ground of noncompliance of the order of the Financial Commissioner, the petitioners chose to file an application for extension of time which, admittedly, was allowed on 01.03.2001. The petitioners were well aware of the amount which was to be deposited by them and now, cannot turn around and say that the amount due had not been assessed as per the provisions of Section 14-A(i) of the Act. It was open to them, even in the extension application, to deposit the amount since their prayer was only for extension and not on merits. The direction to execute the kabuliatnama was also not complied with as no application was filed that the landowner should come to execute the same. The period had been extended for 60 days for depositing the amount due from the year 1985 till 22.01.1997, i.e., for 12 years. The amount C.W.P. No. 10040 of 2010 & another connected case which has, now, been subsequently paid, was deposited only on 17.01.2002 (Annexure P13) whereas it had to be deposited within 60 days from 01.03.2001. In such circumstances, it would not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to submit that necessary opportunity has not been granted to them and that they were not aware of the exact amount which had to be tendered. Counsel for the respondents was also justified in raising the argument that no such argument was raised before the Financial Commissioner, at any stage and possession had also been taken in pursuance of the orders of eviction before this Court could pass the stay order on 08.07.2008. 7. The Apex court in Raj Kanta v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab 1980 AIR (SC) 1464 has held that where there is no sufficient cause and the rent has not been deposited regularly, the ejectment is to be ordered. The relevant observation reads as under: "8. On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it seems to us that the legislature clearly intended to use the word 'regularly' to mean payment of rent in a uniform and consistent manner without any breach or default. The legislature never contemplated that a single default could be condoned. This inference is fortified by the words "without sufficient cause". On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it seems to us that the legislature clearly intended to use the word 'regularly' to mean payment of rent in a uniform and consistent manner without any breach or default. The legislature never contemplated that a single default could be condoned. This inference is fortified by the words "without sufficient cause". In other words, the legislature clearly provided that if the tenant had committed a default, whether one, two or more, the same could only be condoned if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwise. If, however, we accept the interpretation of the High Court, then the words "sufficient cause" becomes, absolutely redundant. 9. On an overall consideration of the matter, a correct interpretation of the plain language and the words and phrases used in clause (ii) of section 9(1) of the Act seems to us that the word 'regular' connotes a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach and the words 'regular payment of rent' mean that the rent should be paid punctually without any default or laxity. Although the Act is heavily loaded in favour of the rights of the tenants so as to confer on them several important benefits and privileges yet as the Act is confiscatory in nature, so far as the landlord is concerned it C.W.P. No. 10040 of 2010 & another connected case should be strictly construed within the limited sphere inasmuch as the landlord is conferred limited grounds on which ejectment is permissible under section 9 of the Act which appears to be a safety valve for the limited rights that are left with the landlord under the Act. In order therefore to advance the object of the Act so as to assure the limited protection to the landlord, the language employed in the various clauses of section9 has to be construed so as to give real benefit to the landlord within the limited range that the section operates. In the instant case, the words 'failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause' postulate the following conditions:- (1) there must be a failure on the part of the tenant to pay rent; (2) such failure must be to pay rent regularly, that is to say, the rent should be paid punctually consistently without any break or breach.." 8. In the instant case, the words 'failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause' postulate the following conditions:- (1) there must be a failure on the part of the tenant to pay rent; (2) such failure must be to pay rent regularly, that is to say, the rent should be paid punctually consistently without any break or breach.." 8. The tenant is only to be given the benefit in case there is a single default and sufficient cause is shown. In the present case, as noticed above, the default is consistent. The respondents have been litigating on account of nonpayment since 1986, for enhancement of rent and were finally successful on 22.01.1997 wherein the amount was quantified. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioners were not granted the benefit of the proviso to Section 14-A(i) of the Act. Accordingly, the question is answered against the petitioners and it is held that the petitioners were well aware of the amount which they had to deposit in view of the categorical order of the Financial Commissioner and it does not lie in their mouth to say that the amount should have been calculated afresh by the Assistant Collector, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Accordingly, the present writ petitions are hereby dismissed.